Houthis Declare Open Season on Saudi Arabia

Photo of Houthi rebels in Yemen

The Houthis are threatening Saudi oil infrastructure, but are they all bark or is there real bite behind the threats?

The Houthis largely depend upon Iranian weapons, but if Iran were able to replenish drone and missile stockpiles, they still have to get them into Yemen, evading Saudi border controls and U.S. naval monitoring. If the weapons did make their way into Houthis’ hands, the question then becomes about scale.

Potshots and isolated strikes won’t move the needle, but sustained strikes could overwhelm Saudi defenses. The largest concern is the Petroline, which has helped stave off the energy crisis throughout the Iran war. We’ll find out soon enough what the Houthis have up their sleeves.

Transcript

Hey y’all. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today is the 21st of July. We’re talking about something that went down yesterday on the 20th, on Monday. The Houthis, which are an ethnic group in western Yemen, basically declared open season on all things Saudi, including oil flows. Now, Yemen is in the southwest corner of the Arabian Peninsula, and most of the Saudi population lives on the west side of the peninsula. 

And so using weapons systems, mostly drones and missiles supplied by the Iranians. Everything that matters is within range of the Yemeni. Now, a few things to keep in mind at the point of this recording. There have been no attacks, just the threat. Number two, in the first phase of the Iran war that happened a couple of months back, the Yemeni did fire quite a few things, and then it appeared that they ran out, which means that the question is whether that they have been replenished by the Iranians in the time since. 

Yemen has arguably the worst industrial base on the planet and cannot make things like styrofoam or even plywood, which by volume make up the majority of, say, a had drone. They certainly can’t make semiconductors and electronics, so any equipment that they have isn’t simply guided by the IRGC. IRGC is the militant faction that now runs Iran. Since the Trump administration killed everyone who might qualify as moderate. 

But the GC also does the supply. So guidance and supply and targeting. So don’t think of this as a separate actor. This is just an arm of Iran for this purpose. Which brings us to the third problem. Iran had more than enough time in the way the Trump administration handled the cease fire to earn money, in fact, earn US dollars and for supplies to be rerouted from China. 

Most of the equipment that is used to make the Shahid drones and the missiles comes from China. It used to come by water, but there was a blockade. So now it comes often by rail and that is something the US can’t interdict. So in the two three months that we’ve had since the blockade started, that should have been more than enough time for Iran to completely replenish all of their stocks. 

And with the way the United States ended the blockade by allowing Iran access to the US dollar market, they probably have more than the currency to pay for all of it. But getting the equipment from Iran to Yemen is a different thing. The rail option or road option is not a good one, because you have to go through Iraq and Saudi Arabia and the Saudis have a de facto blockade at the Yemeni border. 

You might theoretically be able to go through Oman, but the Houthis are on the other side of the country, so it’s probably not gonna work either. So it has to go by water. And while the US Navy has had a hard time asserting control over the Strait of Hormuz just because of the mechanics of the new weapon systems, being able to monitor what goes in and out of Yemen is child’s play in comparison. 

So unless there’s been a gross collapse of strategic planning in the Trump administration, which I cannot rule out, the odds of unrestricted access for the IRGC to Yemen to replenish their military supplies is pretty low. So at the moment, the fact that 24 hours has gone by and there hasn’t been an attack, I am not exactly calling bullshit, but I am dubious of the Yemeni are going to be able to do anything. 

But let’s assume let’s assume that this is wrong and that supplies have made it to Yemen, and the IRGC is preparing attacks on Saudi infrastructure. A couple things to watch for. Number one is volume. If they cook off a drone or a missile a day, going after a ship or a highway or a refinery or whatever it happens to be, that’s not a big deal. 

Mostly because there’s just not a huge I mean, it’s a target rich environment, but the Saudis have been dealing with some form of attacks from Yemen for almost a decade now, and that sort of volume isn’t going to really move the needle very much. Second, if we do get more attacks a dozen a day or more, then we’re in a different field. 

And then we need to consider a couple of things, because first of all, while the Iranians have mid-range drones that are perfectly capable of hitting the western side of Saudi Arabia, flying over the Persian Gulf over the entirety of the Arabian Peninsula, hitting the far side of the country. They’ve done that. They’ve demonstrated they can do that with accuracy. 

Doing so requires the weapon system flying a bit of a gantlet, because you have to get over American naval forces in the Gulf. You have to get over the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and Gutter and Kuwait, all of which have air defense. And you have to get there over the entirety of this Arabian Peninsula. There’s plenty of chances for fighter jets, for example, to shoot down drones. 

And then, of course, there’s missile defense on the western side of the peninsula. Two or if you fire it from Yemen, you spend most of the time over the water. And under the earlier Trump administration, we had a 30 day war between the United States and the Yemeni. And the United States learned very, very quickly that it really couldn’t root out the launchers in a place that as is as mountainous and as rural as Yemenis. 

So if your weapons systems spend most of their flight time over the water, most of them are going to get through and they’re going to hit the Saudi coast, coming from the west instead of the south. And in doing so, the air defenses will be out of position. So you could do some very real damage very quickly. And then third most important thing. 

One of the reasons why the loss of crude out of the Persian Gulf has not led to a catastrophic energy induced depression to this point is that the Saudis have something called a Petro line that ships about 7 million barrels per day from their fields in the east, across the length of the peninsula. Going west, it hits Yanbu primarily, which is one of their primary ports on the western coast. 

And that one pipe has made up for about a third of the disruption that we would have felt, and has done wonders for keeping prices from going stratospheric. Well, it’s an easy range of anything from Yemen, so I’m not calling that the Yemeni can’t do this, although I have my doubts. But we will find out in the next few days, maybe a couple of weeks. 

Whether or not a the Iranians have actually moved hardware successfully to Yemen, and b whether the hardware that is moved has significantly accurate targeting in order to damage the facilities that are necessary to prevent that energy induced depression. A lot of moving pieces, a few if things in that statement, but we’re going to pretty soon whether the hardware and the equipment is there because we know the advisors are already 

and the Houthis really have no problem sticking it to the Saudis at every opportunity. So time will tell. And it won’t take that much time.

Ukraine Closes the Sea of Azov

NASA satellite image of the Sea of Azov | Photo by NASA and creative commons licsense

Ukrainian drone attacks have effectively shut down Russia’s use of the Sea of Azov, which is a critical export route for southern Russia.

The sea connects the Volga River canal system to the Black Sea, allowing agricultural goods, coal, iron, and more to reach global markets. And with Russia’s rail network already overburdened, losing this waterway is devastating.

If Ukraine expands these drone attacks into the eastern Black Sea, the shadow fleet will face even further disruptions. With no quick solutions on the table, the Russian economy and war effort will be on its back foot for quite some time.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from just below Cupid Peak, above Loveland Pass. And over here we have Grays and Tories and Grizzly Mountain. Not going to be able to do those today because we got lightning moving in. Boo. But I’m still going to do a video for you guys. I just got back from Yosemite and still catching up on everything that happened. 

But one of the big things that happened in the Ukraine war is that the Sea of Azov is now offline. The Sea of Azov is a body of water to the east of the Crimean peninsula, that’s Russian occupied Crimean peninsula, and to the south of Russian occupied lands in southeastern Ukraine. It’s a waterway that freezes sometimes in the winter. 

But the real important thing is that is the outlet for a huge amount of cargo. The Russian system is not well set up for shipping cargo. A lot of stuff has to go by rail, but the Russians are literally running out of ball bearings, so they’re hitting the max of what they can do, and they can’t replace the cars and the speed that they need to. 

So they’re seeing reductions in throughput. That makes it much more important to ship things by water. The problem is, is that the Russian coast of the Black Sea doesn’t have any navigable river outlets. It’s somewhat rough and mountainous. And so what happens is you’ve got an inland waterway, the Volga, that goes near Moscow and snakes through Russia and empties into the Caspian Sea. 

The problem is the Caspian Sea is a landlocked body of water. So what the Soviets did is they engineered a series of canals and locks that go from the lower Volga near the Caspian over some low ridges, and get into the Don River system. And the Don empties into the Sea of Azov. So, in essence, if you’re shipping coal or iron or especially agricultural products, you get it onto the Volga. 

You go through a series of locks until you get to that connection. You take the canal over to the Don, to Rostov on Don, and then you get into the Sea of Azov, and from there you get into the Black Sea in the wider world. Well, while I was gone, the Ukrainians hit over 200 ships in like a week in their first big push and basically shut off the sea of his off completely. 

So any of the cargo that used to use this waterborne export, which was one of Russia’s main ones, the primary one for southern Russia, suddenly has nowhere to go. They go onto the rails, but the rail system already overloaded and honestly starting to fall back. So a couple of things from this. Number one, we’ve got a lot of Russian cargo that is now just trapped. 

It has nowhere to go and there’s really no quick fix here. The Russians have withdrawn a lot of their air defenses from places even like Crimea, to put it around Moscow, because Ukrainians have shown that any target that’s within roughly a thousand miles of the front is something they can in force. And that’s forcing the Russians to the air defenses that they have in places where they will serve political purposes. 

Because of Moscow, came under heavy drone attack every single night for a month that might shatter the political coalition that holds the Russian system together. Right now. That’s one. Number two, Rostov on Don. This is one of the city’s one of the two cities in Belgorod that serves as nodes for transporting military gear to the front, and it has now lost all of its economic wherewithal. 

It’s now just a military outpost, in effect. This is something that’s going to have a huge impact on the Russian economy and ultimately crimp Russia’s ability to get stuff to the front, because if that river is no longer available, if the canal system is no longer available, if the receipt of is of is no longer available, then one of the more wealthy cities in Russia just lost everything that made it work except for being a military depot. 

And you should expect more tax there over and over and over again in the not too distant future. Third, now that the Sea of Azov is offline, next up is the Black Sea. It’s not that much further. The Ukrainians have loads of drones that are capable of taking the war now just across the Crimean Peninsula and into the ocean, and we’ve already seen dozens of attacks on things like tankers and Borchers, everything that’s in the shadow fleet. 

So look for the Ukrainians over the next couple of months to repeat what they did in the Sea of Azov in the eastern side of the Black Sea, because no ships go there, really, unless they’re part of the Shadow Fleet. No one else wants to dock directly. And it’s not like they haven’t been warned if they decide they want to try. 

The only real solution here that the Russians have, because air defense isn’t going to cut it, is to up their attacks on the Ukrainians to the point that it attracts the Ukrainians ability to do this. But since it’s from mobile launch sites with ever evolving drones and drones at the moment, the Russians haven’t figured out sorry about the wind drones. 

At the moment, the Russians haven’t figured out how to replicate. That’s something that undoubtedly can’t happen this summer. This is going to be a problem for a year from now, or a potential solution for a year from now. And now we’re getting to India and I’ve got to stop so by.

Chinese Marriage Data Confirms Demographic Crisis

A chinese woman in a bridal dress walking down the aisle with her father and onlookers taking photos

Most of the data coming out of China isn’t worth the paper it’s printed on, but there are a handful of metrics that aren’t based on estimates. Today, we’ll be looking at marriage registrations and what the 6% decline from last year means.

This echoes a decades-long decline in marriage registrations and reflects the broader demographic decline facing China. Since an overwhelming number of Chinese births occur within marriage, the population decline may be even worse than previously forecasted.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here coming to you from…where am I? Termoli In Italy? And today we’re going to talk about some Chinese statistics that just popped out in the last couple of weeks that look really bad even by Chinese standards. So backdrop that you need to know this way is that Chinese data is awful. Part of that is just the nature of the beast. 

China really only started its industrialization process in 1978, and so the techniques that a lot of Western countries have been using for the better part of a century are new. And computerization really is only the last 20 years. And it’s a huge place. So getting the locals and the center to agree on what is normal statistics is a little hit and miss at times, and part of it is unfortunately by a degree of design, the central government sense quotas for everything and so lo and behold, the locals meet the quotas or maybe expand upon them. 

And then on top of that, you’ve got punishment issues. And where if a data point comes out, the Chairman Jinping doesn’t like the person who presents it to them, may have their job and or life forfeit. And so the people who do the data collection just stop collecting that data point, whatever it happens to be. So we have really poor data on Chinese demographics and financial issues and bonds and all these other things these days, especially health anyway. 

But there are some that are seen as not politicized. And so data for those is good. And the one we’re going to talk about today is marriage registrations. According to the new data that’s come out in the first half of the year. Those are down by roughly 6% in just the last 12 months. And that is on top of year and year declines that go back the better part of 30 years. 

This is data that has been collected since 1978. And it’s not an estimate like a lot of data. It’s actual registrations. People have actually gone to the equivalent of city hall and registered the marriages. So it’s something we relate to or it’s something that we can relatively rely upon. Now, the reason why this matters is if family formation is down, the birth rate is down, and if the birth rate is down, China’s hollowing out. 

Now, this is something we’ve been looking at at any number of angles for quite some time. What is interesting here, from my point of view, is that the marriage rate drop has been dropping much, much, much faster, two and three times faster than the. Suppose it had declined in the number of 20 and 30 somethings, where usually the people get married. 

So it gives us a little bit more accurate view of just how bad the demographic crisis is. And it was already really, really bad. Basically, we no longer have enough people under age 50 in China to even theoretically repopulate a country of 400 million people, much less supposedly the 1.2 billion that China says it has. And in internal conversations, the Shanghai Academy of Sciences is now debating how many hundred million people under age 40 they’ve over counted. 

They know it’s at least 100 million. And this year, the number 500 million popped up for the first time as a possibility. They just don’t know. And they don’t believe they have the capacity to go out and do get the information, because too many people are concerned with getting the wrong ancer anyway. It’s a tiny little window into the crisis that the Chinese are facing these days, and to be perfectly blunt, there’s no coming back from this without marriages. 

There are no children or very few. But more importantly, there are now no longer enough people to even theoretically get married in order to attempt repopulation. So it’s just a question of timing, whether it’s in single or double digits of years, of course, matters to all of us because we’re all living in the now. 

But it looks pretty rough and this isn’t going to last much longer. All right. That’s it for me for today. Till next time.

The Demographics of Central Europe

A satellite map of central Europe and terrain

Central and Eastern Europe are undergoing major demographic decline. We’re talking low birth rates, aging populations, and decades of youth emigration to Western Europe. So, what does this all mean?

We’re seeing a broad emptying zone with shrinking labor forces and weakening state capacity. In the past, this brought about systemic change or uneven regional power shifts. And we’ll likely see some version of the latter, as control over the region begins to fragment.

Since most European powers won’t be able to project power eastward, Turkey is really the only viable option to become a dominant regional actor.

Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here coming  to you from Colorado. Today we’re going to do another demographic talk this time about kind of what’s next. From a state survival point of view, regional stability point of view. the data is pretty clear has been for, I would argue, a half century. People are living longer. That’s a subset of technology. 

People are having fewer kids, which is a subset of urbanization. When you’re in the country, kids are free labor. You have a bunch when you’re in town. Kids are an expense. You have fewer. But there’s more going on than that in every part of the world. And the story changes based on where you are. 

So today we’re going to talk about the area where Europe bleeds into Eurasia. So the Inter Mariam block of Estonia, through the Baltics, down into Central Europe, down into the Balkans. This is arguably the part of the planet outside of China that has been hit hardest by the demographic. Halloween out. We have three reinforcing trends. Number one, these were all former Soviet states or satellites. 

And so they benefited from the Soviet industrial experience, which was harsh, which crowded people into small living conditions, drastically reduced the desire for kids, and in general gave you infrastructure that wasn’t up to what we considered normal standards, generating the lower standard of living that could not be alleviated by having kids could only be alleviated by having fewer kids. 

Second, in the post Cold War environment, with NATO and especially the European Union, all of these countries eventually ended up joining both institutions. That meant that from a security point of view, they started getting assistance against the Russians. And from an economic point of view, we had a tug of war between two forces. Number one is the economic modernization and expansion that could occur when they were part of what was the world’s second largest economic block. 

And number two is the free movement of people. And these two forces oftentimes found themselves at odds, because if you’re in your 20s and you’re skilled and you’re not nailed down to a family or property, then it makes a lot of sense for you to pack a suitcase and go to Germany or France or wherever, and work in a job that might be below your skill set, but would earn you a wage that is far better than your skill set would have earned you back home. 

As a result, people under age 40 really flowed out of all of these places. On the flip side, as the Europeans integrated their supply chains further east into the former Soviet bloc, they discovered skilled workforce, decent, if not great infrastructure and lower costs. So in many ways, this whole area became a kind of like Mexico was to the United States. 

The Central Europeans would do the stuff that was more labor intensive, more industrial, whereas the Western countries would do things that were more technological and higher value added. So you’ve got this ebb and flow and this integration. The problem is building that infrastructure, training the workforce is integrating the supply chains took time, and the only country in the West that truly took advantage of it was Germany because it bordered Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and so within that core Germany, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, the personnel drain wasn’t as extreme, whereas the countries that didn’t directly border a major industrial economy. 

Estonia. Latvia. Lithuania. Slovenia Bulgaria. Romania. Tended to lag because for them, the pull of the people leaving was more powerful than the retention capability by industrialization. Both trends happen in all the states, but the imbalance between those in core central Europe was very different from those that are on the periphery. As a result, we have already seen the populations of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria dropped by over a fifth, about a quarter, actually, since the post-Cold War era began. 

And they’re probably going to drop by that much again over the next 10 to 15 years, because the problem is when the young people left and only the old people remained. The birth rate functionally went almost a zero, and repopulation became technically impossible. Also within this band of countries are Ukraine, Belarus and Russia. Now Belarus we can’t talk about because they’ve never done a census. 

We really don’t know what it looks like. Ukraine has done a census and it’s God, it’s bad. Their population outflows reflected basically what was going on in the Baltics and the Balkans before the war. And then with the war, anyone who was a single woman or who had kids generally tried to get out. And so we’ve seen a 15% drop in Ukraine’s population just since the war began four years ago. 

There’s very little reason to expect this war to be over soon. War, if it ends in Russian victory. You know, none of these people are going to come back. In fact, the outflow will be even bigger. Russia, Russia’s statistics. The last time they honestly updated them, which was in the early 2000, they showed having a demographic picture that was the worst in the world in terms of death rates and birth rates. 

Since then, they’ve gone out of their way to manufacture some data. Looks pretty good and we just don’t know how bad it is. But the idea that it has gotten significantly better is a bit of a stretch. They may may have managed to get some other causes of mortality down. Things like alcoholism, accidents, drug abuse. Those may well have moderated and that will make the numbers nudge up a little bit. 

But it’s difficult to imagine that the birth rate has recovered at all. Anyway, you pull all this together and we’ve got this wider region that is basically depopulating. So the question is what happens next? There aren’t a lot of historical examples. Let me put out two just to kind of frame this. Not that they’re predictions, but number one is that we all go down together. 

During the dark Ages we had the Black Death Black Plague, which killed third to half of most populations across Europe. But because it killed everyone across international borders, everyone was kind of in the same boat, and the demographic picture had more economic and cultural outcomes than it did military or strategic. Because if you all of a sudden have a labor shortage, then labor starts to get paid more and you start developing the technologies that are necessary to operate with less labor. 

And that led directly to the Renaissance. You know, I don’t want to say that can’t happen this time around. Just keep in mind that last time, it took a century and a half before that really manifested. So if you’re looking for the silver lining in the dark cloud, I guess there it is. But you won’t live to see it. 

Second option we don’t all fall together. Some places fall faster. That’s definitely the story of this region. And the last time we had something like this at this scale, it actually was in this region. We had the Mongols who came through and disrupted systems and killed lots of people and basically depopulated large portions of the territory that we now identify as northern Ukraine and southwestern Russia. 

That’s the part of Russia that’s closest to, say, Belarus. And then, of course, Belarus itself. These areas experienced depopulation and well in excess of three quarters in a very short period of time. And if you go just a little further to the west, you get out of the steps and planes of the Russian space and you hit the forests of Europe. 

Well, at that point, what we discovered is that cavalry charges like the Mongols were famous for really didn’t do anything against a castle wall or in a forest. If they entered the forest, they had to dismount and all of a sudden it’s just a one soldier against lots of peasants with pitchforks. And so the Mongol invasion just kind of broke at that point. 

And then the Mongols had internal political problems, and everybody went home. And so the Lithuanians were the first ones to kind of peek out from the forest like, hey, where everybody go? And they went out a mile and then two miles and then ten miles, like, there’s nobody here. And so Lithuania steadily expanded over the next century to become one of the most powerful countries in Europe. 

They merged with Poland eventually, which was another country that benefited from the the shift into force and fortresses and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth became the most powerful country in the world at the time, didn’t last because eventually the few people that were left across these vast sweeps had kids. The population rose and eventually pushed the Poles and Lithuanians out. But not before the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth conquered Moscow, among other things. Some version of that seems to be the more likely outcome here. The problem is, is that all of the countries that are bordering these zones are also in demographic decline. France looks pretty good, but it’s on the wrong side of Europe. You have to go through Germany. Germany’s demographics are not as bad as, say, Estonia’s or Bulgaria’s, but they are awful. 

And regardless of what the German government, under whatever iteration it happens to be in five, ten, 15, 20 years happens to be just won’t have the manpower to go out and hold the land. There’s one exception and obviously Russia to similar situation. It’s just it’s crumbling from within demographically. The one exception is Turkey. Here’s a country that is still relatively early on, the aging process, the raging rapidly, kind of like the Mexicans or the Brazilians, but they have a minimum of another 40 years before that hits any sort of break point. 

And that assumes that there’s no slowing of recovery. So the last time the Turks went on an expansionist period, they went north through the eastern Balkans into what is today Bulgaria and Romania. They punched through into the Pannonian plain, which was now Hungary, and they went up into what is today Crimea and Ukraine until they’ve hit resistance from the Russians. 

But if we’re fast forwarding 20 years, there’s probably not going to be much of a Russia, and there’s probably not going to be much of a NATO or a Germany. And in that scenario, really, the Turks can go until they hit a country that has some density to it, and they won’t hit that until they hit Poland. That doesn’t mean that a war with Poland is guaranteed. 

We’re talking about an inference on an inference and inference here, but the idea that there is a northern limit to what the Turks can do in this sort of demographic scenario, which is kind of hard locked in at this point. It’s pretty far north. So we’re looking at a broad rewriting of what is possible and this part of the world. 

And considering the time frame, a lot of us, whether we’re watching from the outside or the inside, are going to live to see it, because that’s not that far from now.

Russian Sleeper Cells Don’t Scare Me

A man in sunglasses with Russian glyphs behind him on a red cyber background

The idea of sleeper agents being embedded in the U.S. is largely unrealistic. In contrast, the far more realistic threats that should concern you are short-term operatives carrying out intelligence-gathering or financial activities.

The Hollywood special “sleeper cells” are only worth the investment for major assassinations or mass-casualty events, not routine sabotage or espionage. Whereas, planting foreign intelligence operatives through legal means and for shorter periods makes much more sense. However, the U.S. can typically detect this kind of thing through its vast and interconnected signal detection network.

Transcript

Hey all. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re taking a question from the Patreon page. Specifically, what with everything that’s going on in the world today, with all the changes the United States involved in the Middle East, the Russians literally on the warpath, the Iranians now having ample reason to hate the United States for fresh reasons. And the Chinese, of course, always pushing, pushing, pushing. 

Do I worry at all about things like sleeper agents? Let’s clarify what most people mean by sleeper agents before I answer that. So the idea is you have some highly trained operatives that go into an enemy state, establish themselves as locals, get jobs, raise families, buy homes, and live among the target population for years while they do research towards a specific end tax to justify the investment. 

The reason I don’t worry about sleeper cells is that specific thing towards an end task to justify the investment. Having somebody with a deep skill set in Intel is one of the most expensive things that you can do. It’s like astronauts, F-35 pilots and then the high end spies. So if you’re going to put them somewhere where for years you’re not going to get a payback, you’re talking about having to have a payback on the backside. 

That is on the scale of assassinating somebody like the president or causing mass casualties, simply getting in and stealing a piece of technology or blowing up a pipeline or something is not going to cut it. So no, this is not something I worry about. Does that mean I’m not worried about us, the United States being penetrated by foreign intelligence? 

Totally different topic. The United States is a free society. The United States allows people to fly in with limited background checks. And if you’re going to have an Intel system that wants to flood your country with foreign operatives, you know, student visas, for example, is a very easy to get way to get in. That’s how some of the nine over 11 attackers got in, for example. 

But that’s a very different sort of operation. Those are operators that would be in the United States, people who are operational who have specific tasks. So, for example, in the past, the Russians, both during the Cold War and more recently in the post-Cold War era, have sent dozens of people into the United States to gather information from wherever they can. 

It’s not a sleeper unit. That’s somebody who’s actively reporting. And it’s that sort of act of reporting that U.S. Intel signals intelligence in particular, is very, very good at rooting out. And ultimately, we did Hezbollah. You know, the group in Lebanon has sent people here primarily to love this, buy cigarettes. They bought them in one state. They sold them in another state, set up a little smuggling system within the United States to take advantage of the difference excise taxes. then sent the money home. They also accrued equipment that they were going to send home. But that sort of activity do it in bulk enough to generate money. That is the sort of thing that also tends to pop up on the radar of law enforcement, right down to the local level. The bottom line is, while we may have a free society, we’re still an information society. 

And because we have local law enforcement, state law enforcement, federal law enforcement, and then regulators at every level for everything means it’s really hard to establish some sort of like deep root into the American system to carry out some hypothetical attack. So while we have a lot of operational folks and there are spies in the United States and have been spies, we’ve never had anything that kind of fits the generic term of sleeper cell. 

So for sleeper cells is really tends to be restricted to to low end and really not particularly realistic fiction. This is not something I lose any sleep about. Which isn’t to say that I don’t lose sleep.

Why Space and Data Centers Don’t Go Together

Nebulas and stars in space

We’ve all seen the headlines lately talking about the proposed data centers across the U.S. While nobody wants these things in their backyard, putting them in space isn’t going to solve our problems.

With just a quick look into some basic physics and logistics of putting a data center in space, the idea becomes comical. First, you have to put massive amounts of hardware, cooling systems, and power into space. Then you have to completely reengineer the data center for space. Then you have to think about maintenance. Oh, and cooling these things down in a vacuum is no easy task.

To put it simply: no, we won’t be putting any large AI data centers in orbit.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today we are taking a question from the Patreon crowd. So it’s a question that I have resisted answering because I don’t like it, but so many people have asked, I figure, what the hell? So it’s on space based data centers. Is that the future? Will this solve some problems? 

How much is it? It’s just a little bitty snake. Is this something we should take seriously? Let’s explain what a data center is. You have dozens, hundreds, thousands of racks that contain modules that are packed with things like graphics processing units, Dram and Rand memory, and then threading through it all, some sort of coolant. 

You see, most data centers are based on crunching data, the GPU part, and that generates a lot of heat. So you incorporate the cooling system into the modules and if you can, into the gypsum cells, although that’s really cutting edge and no one’s really doing that at scale just yet. Soon, hopefully. Anyway, those racks have weight, the GPUs have weight, the Nand has weight, the Dram has weight. You need a lot of electricity. You need a lot of coolant. 

You need a liquid system. You need a pumping system. And if you’re going to take a one gigawatt system and move it into space, the theory is that because space is cold, cooling is cheap, and because solar power in space generates at least five times what it does on the surface, power is cheap. No, no. Let’s start with getting this stuff up there. 

So just the computational stuff, the racks and the things in them, not counting the cooling system. That’s for something of this size, roughly 20 million pounds of weight. Then you need another 10 million pounds of weight for the liquid coolant. Then you need another 5 to 8 million pounds of weight for all of the assorted things that keep it alive the pumps, the power cables and such. 

Okay, that by itself is about 250. Starship launches. Starship is the vessel that Elon Musk and SpaceX hope is going to revolutionary space travel. It’s currently in the prototype stage. It has not been going particularly great, but let’s just hand wave that away and say that it works 250 of those to get the equipment up. You’re not done. 

Now you need a construction facility in orbit, which means you need a habitat in orbit. You also need a habitat at the data center, because a typical data center has 100 people working at any given time. Now, the ES International Space Station has never had more than 13 people in at a time. And really it’s only rated for seven. 

So you’re talking about the equivalent of 20 to 40 ES equivalents attached to this data center in order to carry out the work. And that assumes that the work is possible, which are probably isn’t GPU’s really. All the high end chips are not rated for vibration, for cold, for heat, for humidity, and certainly not for radiation. And you’re in space so you don’t have the planet’s magnetic field and atmosphere protecting you. 

So now you need to clad the whole thing in radiation proofing, which is at least another 20 million pounds. There’s another 200 Starship trips. Also, a data center is a living thing. Chips burn out, you have to remove them and replace them. So now you need a space based launch system just to maintain your one data center. Oh, and the biggest thing heat. 

Yes, space is cold. But what people forget is that space is a vacuum, and a vacuum is the most effective insulator we have ever discovered. So yes, you can use radiator fins, but their area of effect has to be an order of magnitude bigger than what they would be on Earth, and a very different configuration because they need to extend significant distance. 

You’re talking about literally tens if not hundreds of kilometers square kilometers of radiator surface in order to radiate the heat. Yeah, it’s cold out there, but it’s also insulating. So you’re now talking about a system that needs a pumping system to get the liquid out to the radiator fins, and you are in zero g. So you don’t only need more pumps to cover more territory. 

Pumps don’t work as well in space because you don’t have gravity doing some of the work. So now we’re basically conservatively up to 500 space a star. 500 star. What’s it called? Starship. Yeah, 500 Starship launches and a note on the radiators. This sort of design, we don’t build on Earth because, you know, we’ve got gravity. So not only are you talking about having to invent a fundamentally new system here for the cooling system, but just the cost of the radiators alone is probably about the same as the GDP of New Zealand, about $250 billion, and that is by itself 20 times the cost of a one gigawatt facility all in on Earth. 

There’s so many levels of dumb to this that I forgot. One that’s really kind of critical. The radiators. Not only are there big and expensive, but remember spaces and insulator. So if you’re radiator fins are flat on to sunlight, they’ll actually absorb heat rather than get rid of heat. So you have to make sure they’re always point in to the sun, which means that your space based data center has to do something that no Earth based data center has to do. 

It has to be able to move. So you got to put engines in maneuvering thrusters on this thing, complete with the fuel. So yeah, so much dumb. So anyone who tells you that data centers in space are coming because we don’t have room is lying to you. Anyone who is telling you it’s the only way that AI is going to work is lying to you. And anyone who’s trying to raise funds off of a story like this is just thinks you’re stupid and is going to get your money. 

Don’t fall for it. Does this mean there can’t be computing in space? Of course not. You can have small, small emphasis on small like a rack systems attached to some sort of orbital platform. But all of these rules apply. Massive radiator fins, atypical cooling system, huge cost to install. And unless you’re going to permanently station people up there when something fails, it’s broken for good. 

So no, this is not revolutionary. But if the rules of physics change, I reserve the right to change my mind.

Defending Against Rising Sea Levels

A glacier in the ocean floating

As sea levels rise, the infrastructure that protects shorelines and prevents coastal flooding will become essential, especially for low-lying countries with more coastal exposure.

Global temps are on the rise, so the ice is melting quicker, and stronger storms are ravaging coastlines. Any country with large population centers near water should be concerned. So, places like China must adapt through coastal infrastructure, similar to what you can see behind me here in Italy.

Transcript

Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the port of Vasto on the Adriatic. And today we’re going to talk about sea level, specifically. These guys down here see these geodesic shapes? These are the types of things you use if you want to protect a coast from storm surges. And especially if you’re looking to reclaim land, the Koreans use them to great effect. 

Almost invented the technology, actually, back in the 1950s and 1960s, when they reclaimed huge swaths of their bays where there are big currents that go back and forth. The idea of these things is because they can interlocked on like a normal blocks. Let me show you the other side here. If you’re not worried about current so much, you just use big squares. 

That’s all you need. But if you’re worried about currents and movement of water, you need something that’s going to lock together. And then you can either dredge if you want a deeper channel or fill it in if you’re trying to reclaim land. Anyway, the reason this matters is over the course of the last century, we know that temperature record has indicated an increase of about 1.2 1.25°C over that period, with the rate of increase jumping significantly since 1990. 

Now, for those of you who know your economic history, from roughly 1820 1850 until roughly 1970 was the industrial age, but not everyone industrialized at the same time or the same pace. It was really just the Americans and the Western Europeans, and then the Japanese and Korean and Taiwanese. But once you fast forward to 1990, the entire developing world joined in with, of course, India and China being the two biggest contributors to economic growth in that time. 

With the Chinese now having industrialized so much that they are kicking out significantly more carbon every year than even the United States and the Europeans together at this point. Anyway, what that means is a lot of ice around the world is leaving. I’m obviously in Italy right now, and I’m hearing stories from folks in Umbria. That’s the central region to the northeast of Rome that they haven’t seen meaningful snow now in over a decade. 

And they used to actually have quite a few issues with snow and avalanches. Anyway, the reason I’m bringing up this is because we’re in a situation where the seas are getting higher and the storms are getting a little bit more intense, probably related as well. And this is really a problem if you happen to live near the coast, roughly 6% of the human population lives within five meters of sea level. 

That’s about 16ft for you Americans out there. And the single largest concentrations of those people are the People’s Republic of China, with the areas around Bohai Bay and especially Shanghai being the most exposed. So you’re going to be seeing a lot more things like this as people try to break the energy of the sea before it can punch through and actually drown them. 

This is something that is going to just become part of everyday life. As humanity attempts to adapt to climate change. A couple things to keep in mind about climate change in general. People talk about solar and wind. You know, that’s all well and good, but the material supply chains that are required to make that work at scale just don’t exist and can’t exist. 

We do not have enough copper and zinc and nickel and the rest to really even try. And even if we did, everything is so spread out around the world that you need significantly more players to make it work than what you need for fossil fuel systems. And if we break down globalization, that’s absolutely not going to happen. And if we break down globalization, we will stop using some of the lower carbon fuels that we are currently using, such as well, and gas. 

And we will switch to things that are more proximate because the alternative is to not have electricity. And that means a lot more coal and would be in burn, which is only going to speed this whole thing up. And then instead of talking about the five meter line, we’ll be talking about the ten meter line. Luckily, that for now is a problem for a different decade.

How to Solve the Cocaine Problem

Photo of man in gloves opening cocaine package

It would appear that my suggestion for everyone to stop doing cocaine hasn’t solved the problem, so let’s look at some of the solutions others have proposed.

What about domestic cocaine production? The U.S. doesn’t have the extremely specific tropical growing conditions necessary for coca plants. What about legalizing cocaine? Healthcare costs and reduced worker productivity would likely outweigh any savings from reduced law enforcement or tax revenue.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today, we are taking a question from the Patreon page. And he says, you keep telling people to not use cocaine. True. But people are going to keep using it. Probably true. So wouldn’t it be better for us to just domesticate it and take advantage of the addiction? Like, oh wow, that’s dark. Let’s start about the the practical restrictions on having a cocaine trade in the United States. 

And we’ll talk about it. It’s a bad idea in general okay. Cocaine is an incredibly finicky plant. It demands subtropical to tropical temperatures year round, is one of the least frost tolerant plants on the planet. Even a light frost will kill the entire plant completely. Won’t come back. It also needs water. Lots of water, at least a meter, preferably two meters of water a year. 

And it can’t have a dry season. So tropical rain year round. But it also hates being wet, so you have to have acidic soils that are very, very well drained. You put those combinations together and you basically have two options. Number one, the Andes, where the mountains prevent the water from sticking around, but at a relatively low elevation, typically about 3000ft maybe. 

So you get the water to drain itself, but you’re low enough that you never have to worry about frost. Now, if you industrialize this production, you could put it in other tropical zones that are lower altitude, that are flatter. But then you have to basically engineer your fields so that they drain, but again, can’t be tropical dry season like say, a lot of Brazil. It has to be fully tropical all year long. No dry season. And that means you’re basically looking at the Andean crest. Or if you want to industrialize, maybe places like Southeast Asia specifically, maybe Indonesia. 

The United States has nothing like that. Even in Florida we get frost from time to time. And so the entire crop would die anywhere further north just would not work. There is just not enough water and not enough reliability. Okay, so from a technical point of view, wouldn’t work. From another point of view, every study I’ve ever seen has always shown that whatever gains we might get by legalizing cocaine in terms of lower costs of law enforcement and maybe higher income from taxes, is going to be wiped from higher care costs and higher worker absentee rates. 

So economically, there’s no case. Environmentally there’s no case. The simplest answer is just not do cocaine. If you’re looking for a horribly destructive drug that we can domesticate production of your answer is fentanyl. It is made from precursor materials that come out of almost any possible chemical company in the United States, is the world’s largest chemical producer, and you can make it in a garage. So if your goal is to have something that destroys your body and mind and you want to grow it domestically, fentanyl is your answer. But just in case it was not clear, don’t do fentanyl either.

The Future of Drone Tech: Naval Strategies

Cargo ship with containers

Ukraine can strike anywhere across the Black Sea thanks to its Sea Baby naval drones, and since jamming is less effective in open water, Ukraine can remotely guide them toward targets.

Take a shadow fleet vessel, for example. Ukraine can use satellite and transponder data to determine targets and then strike the engines and propulsion systems of these ships. With few effective counters, Russia’s ability to protect shipping in the Black Sea is steadily eroding.

If this current trend continues, Russian exports of all kinds, including oil, grain, fertilizer, timber, and more, could be lost.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Pike National Forest, from the southern slopes of Mount Silverheels. Behind me is the Colorado Intermountain, which is home to fair play, among other things. Anyway, today we’re going to talk about something that’s very mountain, you know, naval drones. So in the Ukraine, where we’ve seen several models and the ones we were to talk about today are the sea Babies. 

These are things that the Ukrainians have basically taken motor boats, put a bomb on the front, automated them, and off they go. They are typically always first person drones because when you’re dealing with water, there’s really no option for doing a meaningful fiber optic line. There’s usually not going to have a lot of guidance because there are no landmarks. 

So while there are certain things you can do with maybe a little bit of memory to provide a targeting suite, really these are things that have to be piloted by a person, and the terrain, such as it is, works to that pretty well. You see, jamming is something that the Russians are very good at electronic warfare in general, but you can’t really do it over the water. 

I mean, if you’ve got a warship, maybe, but if you’ve got a warship, then all of a sudden the Ukrainians are going to be sending aerial drones against you to that have the memory to target specific things on the boat. But when you’re talking about, say, shadow fleet vessels, well, you’re not going to put a jammer on a Shadow Fleet vessel because it’s technically not a Russian ship. 

And the Russians just don’t have that many of them to go around. So what happens is the Ukrainians now have these sea babies that have a range of 1500km in east to west. The Black Sea is only 1100 kilometers long. So it’s not just that the Ukrainians can hit any ship on the Black Sea, It’s they can go out there and loiter for a while. 

So what the Ukrainians do is they pull down commercial imagery. SA is the type of synthetic aperture radar, and it basically lights up everything in a strip. And that strip can cover as much as 50,000km, which is a good portion of the Black Sea. And then they just go to a commercial website and see what ships are around. 

You see, every ship in the world has a transponder except shadow fleet because they turn them off in order to avoid sanctions. So basically, you get this sheet satellite data that is accurate to like a quarter of a meter, and they then play forward and map out all the legal ships that have transponders. And anything else is a Russian shadow vessel. 

And if they’ve got a sea baby near it, off they go. It’s also pretty predictable because there’s only 3 or 4 ports for the Russians on the Black Sea. Places like an overseas. And unless they’re going to a specific Turkish port, they’re all going to the Turkish straight to get out of the Black Sea and get to the wider world. 

And that’s a straight line sail. So what we’ve been seeing in the last couple of weeks is these sea babies, which have like half a ton of explosives on them, basically getting in close to a commercial vessel, approaching them from behind and blowing the shit out of the engine room and the propeller. We’re not to the point where it’s had a huge impact yet, but again, these tactics are just like a month old. 

Now, normally what you would do when you’re dealing with something like this on the defensive point of view is you’d fight these things off with helicopters. Small arms fire from the top of a ship really doesn’t do much, and battleship really doesn’t have the ability to lower their guns to the point that they can fire at something in the water and small arms fire. 

Just so you use a helicopter. Now, number one, you don’t base a helicopter off of a commercial vessel. And in a few times when the Russians have had a military vessel nearby, or the Sea Babies have been sufficiently close to the coast that a helicopter from land can interdict. The Ukrainians really learned fast. Okay, we’ll just put an anti-air missile or two on this. 

And they scored many hits. And so Now the Russians aren’t even doing that. 

There’s really no good counter here. Helicopters were really only it, and the Ukrainians are now fielding more and more of these things. And as the Russians basically lose control over Crimea because they can’t have fuel. Even using Crimea as a base for helicopter is disappearing. What this means is probably by the end of the year, we need to start thinking about not simply the Russians losing access to the Black Sea for purposes of shipping out all and oil products, which is 1.5 to 2 million barrels a day. 

Big deal right there. But also shipping anything wheat, fertilizer, timber, whatever it happens to be. Basically, the whole Black Sea is starting to become a no go zone. And again, the Ukrainians have only been doing this for about 4 to 6 weeks at this scale. They keep ramping it up just for a couple more months. There’s not going to be much left of the Shadow Fleet in the Black Sea at all.

South Korea Goes All-In on Drones

Drone Aircraft Dropping Bombs over Misty Landscape | Photo licensed by Envato Elements: https://app.envato.com/search/photos/c058515b-6f36-40c6-837a-4f0644a0809e?itemType=photos&term=military+drone

The South Koreans are going all in on drone warfare, announcing that every soldier will be trained to operate drones. This is a relatively inexpensive way to offset the challenges facing South Korea.

South Korea has shown time and again that it can pivot on a dime. So, incorporating drones into its military strategy to remedy demographic decline is a natural progression. And since they already possess a large industrial base, producing these drones at scale in the coming years isn’t a stretch. South Korea is also facing increased threats from North Korea and weakening U.S. security guarantees, so the case for drones is even stronger.

While the drone warfare of today will likely look far different in ten years, South Korea is well positioned to lead the next generation of military drone technology.

Transcript

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about South Korean defense policy. Specifically in June, the Koreans decided that they’re going to make every soldier competent. Drone operator. Five big things come from this. Number one, why they needed to do it primarily is a demographic situation. Korea has been one of the great success stories for turning a backwards agrarian economy into a forward looking technocracy. 

Doing it really in just a generation, generation and a half fastest infrastructure build out in human history, and a fast urbanization rate that was surpassed only by the Chinese couple of decades later. Anyway, you combine that with the heavy drinking male culture and women deciding that, you know what, maybe there’s an option for me other than the home and you’ve got a high divorce rate, a low marriage rate, and arguably the lowest birth rates in the country. 

And so this has been going on for over half century. And so the Koreans now have more people in their 60s and their 50s and the 40s and the 30s and their 20s and 30s and kids complete inversion of the demographic pyramid. So a normal military structure is to take a lot of young men in their 20s and put them on the front line. 

That’s that’s just structurally not an option for the Koreans anymore. And so they’ve been exploring new possibilities. Drones appear at the moment to fit the bill. Second problem, of course, is North Korea, the North Koreans, while there’s their economy, is a shriveled raisin compared to the robustness that is the South. Something like a third of GDP goes to defense spending, not to mention a not insignificant nuclear arsenal, but more importantly, somewhere between 10 and 15,000 artillery emplacements within range of Seoul. 

So in the case of a war, by the time the first shell hits Seoul, there will be tens of thousands in the air already, and there simply is no conventional or even nuclear solution to that. But maybe with drones there might be. We’ll see. Third problem is the United States. The United States is in the process of ripping up all of its alliances. 

And for countries like South Korea that have faced artificial restrictions put on them by the Americans on what sort of military technologies they can develop, that really puts the Koreans in a bind. So, for example, one of the ways you might be able to counter the North Korean nuclear program and all that artillery to develop your own ballistic missile program, the Americans flat out have barred that since 1955. 

And so the Koreans are now coming into this period where the Americans have become unreliable to absent, and they just don’t have the tools of statecraft or military craft that are necessary for the strategic environment which they find themselves in. Drones offers a cheap and fast way to move into something new. Maybe we’ll see. These technologies are still being developed. 

And that brings us to the fourth thing the industrial plant. Most countries who are moving into drone warfare are discovering that almost all of the parts come from China. And since China is the primary sponsor with Russia of North Korea, the South Koreans definitely don’t want to become dependent upon that. But unlike other countries that have been starting to move into the drone space, the Koreans are already a premier technological manufacturing power. 

And you don’t have to do a lot of creative thinking in order to convert what the Koreans already have and things like aerospace and weapons and automotive and turn it into a drone industry, everything right down to the microchips and the the batteries. So when the Koreans say they’re going to be producing millions of drones a year within a few years, I tend to believe them because they have a lot of the base industrial plant already in place. 

It just requires modification. Now, as the plan stands and it is very early in development. The idea is you make everybody a drone controller and with the technologies of literally yesterday, that makes a lot of sense. But that’s not the technologies that are likely to be used on the battlefield in two, three, four, five, ten years. You see, at this point, most of the drones that have been used by the United States, the Russians and the Ukrainians have been what are called first person view drones. 

Basically, you have a live telemetry fee to your drone. You can see through its optics and you can direct it manually. And that works in any number of circumstances. But it faces two problems when you’re dealing with, say, North Korea. Number one, that link can be jammed. And while there are fiber optic drones with ranges upwards of 50km now, which is nuts, that’s not enough to get all of the potential artillery that could target Seoul. 

So some decision making has to be put into that drone. So it’s not simply unmanned, but it’s to at least a degree autonomous. The way you’ve been doing that to this point is with something called Nand, which is flash memory, cold memory. Think of thumb drive. Nand memory can hold a short decision tree. So you can tell your drone to look for 4 or 5 things and select a target among that list. 

And once the target has been selected, there’s nothing can be jammed because the decision was made on board. You then have to kinetically intercept the drone, which is a lot harder. But there’s another generation of memory beyond Nant. It’s called Dram dynamic random access. Hot memory much faster can hold a much larger decision tree instead of 4 or 5 steps, maybe several thousand steps. 

You’re trained on pilot data, which the Ukrainians have been generating in mass. And the Koreans. South Koreans tend to like the Ukrainians because the Ukrainians are fighting North Koreans. Now, North Koreans have sent troops to assist the Russians in the war. So the South Koreans have become one step removed anyway. The the Dram approach is a different sort of drone with a lot more autonomy. 

And it’s better at, say, following a roadway until it finds a train and then targeting specific parts of the train, for example. Now this is new technology. It is not being used in Ukraine yet. It’s in the process of being invented, quite honestly. But the prototype, the first generation drone, Zeta Zidane is a South Korean product. It’s not militarized yet. 

It’s still in the kind of advanced testing stages of the prototypes, but it already exists. And once you modify those drone brains, for lack of a better term, to a more of a combat chassis, then you really are opening up a new phase of warfare. It’s not swarm intelligence, it’s not a eye where you can throw anything at them and they’ll be able to interpret. 

We don’t have that hardware, but it is a significantly large enough decision tree to in many ways mimic full decision making capabilities. And guess what? Remember I said that South Koreans are already a technological economy? About 90% of the world’s high end dram comes specifically from South Korea. So what’s likely to be the next phase of the drone revolution is something that the Koreans are already the world leader at. 

You put it all together, and by 2030, the Korean military is going to look very, very different. The only question is to the degree to which they decide to go all in on drones. Because if you take one of the world’s top ten manufacturing economies and apply these technologies and the strategic need, which is very, very real and very present, and the Koreans have proven time and time again that they can change direction on a dime and build huge amounts of functional product in a matter of months. So we’re going to see a significant shift, not just in the way that drone warfare happens, but in a number of strategic environments around the world that appear to have been locked in stasis for decades. 

The DMZ and the Korean Peninsula probably being at the top of that list.