Climate Change Will Be Different for Everyone

Let’s talk climate change. With conservative estimates, we’re looking at a few degrees of warming by the end of the century, but if we look at this in the light of global trends, it could be even worse.

This will manifest in more heat and humidity, especially in already hot and humid regions – think Singapore, Houston and parts of the Middle East. This will drive up mortality rates and decrease functionality, which will have an outsized impact on the poorer areas.

Food production is a big concern of mine. As temps warm, wind and moisture patterns will be altered. While this will benefit some areas (increasing water availability and potential for multiple harvests), many regions will lose their agriculture industry or face increased challenges in maintaining production. The main crop to watch is wheat, since it’s currently grown in marginal areas that will be most impacted by climate shifts.

Between climate change, depopulation, and deglobalization, we’re going to have plenty to talk about in the coming decades…

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from a colorful Colorado. Today we’re taking an entry from the Ask Peter forum, specifically what I think the world will look like with a few degrees of warming. Since the industrial period began, we’re up 1.2°C, and assuming nothing changes, we are on track to be probably 3 to 4°C warmer by the end of the century.

And I think that’s overly optimistic because if we really are getting ready for a globalization period in human history, then the lower carbon fuels, oil, and gas are the ones that are internationally traded, and those are the ones that will vanish. And the high complexity fuel systems that require a dozen or more countries in order to make them function, say, solar, are not going to be available in large quantities.

So that will leave most countries with significant economic degradation. And if they still want electricity and heat, they’re going to have to use coal and/or wood. That’s a problem. So I would estimate we’re going to skid right past six degrees by the end of the century, and that’s six degrees centigrade, not Fahrenheit. So it’s a pretty significant change.

The downside with making specific forecasts is that, n equals one, as they like to say, we don’t have records in data to be able to provide us with very specific recommendations. What I’m about to say is probably should be considered much more broadly than I’m even going to say it, but there are a couple of patterns we can look at.

But because we do have over a century of hard data indicating that we are moving in this direction and what some of the early impacts can be. So number one, heat and humidity. As a rule, when the air gets warmer, it can hold more water. That’s a problem for hurricanes. But it also means that places that are already humid are likely to get more humid.

And think of it this way: if you live in a place that is already warm and humid for most of the year—I’m thinking here, Singapore, or Manila, or Houston—you know it’s going to get warmer, you know it’s going to get more humid. And when you pass a certain point, roughly, you know, 90°F, the body has a hard time cooling down.

And when you pass 100°F, it just doesn’t happen. And a lot of these places are going to be edging into a zone where they’re looking at hitting that 90-degree temperature in the night for large portions of the year. And so the implications for human health are pretty damning there. And functionality will be a real problem. Mortality rates will certainly spike.

And so you have to look at the economic capability of these cities and whether or not they can make this adjustment. I mean, some of them, Houston, Singapore, pretty much all of the Arab cities of the Persian Gulf, did this years ago. And you basically go from your air-conditioned house to your air-conditioned garage to an air-conditioned parking garage to an air-conditioned office block.

And if you happen to be one of those poor saps investor works outside, that’s too bad. But, like the Arabs in the Gulf has certainly shown that you can force people to work in 110-degree temperatures for short periods of time. You can still get stuff built. It’s not the best way to live. And you do have mortality rates that are a lot higher.

The Arabs get around this by using guest labor, which is a step off of slave, and then when they get too old to handle it, like, you know, 32, they send them home. But there are models that work—just the bulk of your population basically lives in an aquarium. Then you’ve got the cities that, due to economic vibrancy or strength or soon-to-be vibrancy, are likely to be able to make this transition.

They either on the edge of having enough money to make everybody live indoors, or they’re going to have it soon. I’m thinking there about Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam. Or, Istanbul in Turkey, or Bangkok in Thailand, or maybe, just maybe, Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. And then you’ve got those cities that, it doesn’t look great.

They’re hot, they’re humid. And having the organizational capability and especially economic resources in order to make the switch, less problematic. And this is going to be most of the cities, especially in northern India. This is going to be Pakistan. I’m worried about the cities of northern Brazil in this regard. There are some cities in Iran that don’t look particularly promising.

A lot of North Africa falls into a similar category. These are just places where the economic wherewithal or the strength of the state is simply not sufficient in order to rewire all the infrastructure for a different sort of life. The second big category is going to be food production. There’s a lot about climate change and the specific effects that we’re still in the very early phases of learning.

So I don’t want to blow this out of proportion. But one of the things we do know for certain is that the poles are warming faster than the equator. And when you have big temperature differentials, you get winds, in this case, winds going from roughly the equator in the direction of the poles. Now that changes, most importantly, moisture patterns.

So if there is a large body of tropical or similar tropical water between you and the equator, when the wind goes over that zone, it’s going to pick up more moisture. Remember the water? The year is warmer, too, and you’re going to get storms going from the equator towards the pole, transferring moisture. Now this is good or bad based on where you are.

So, for example, if you are in the United States, especially in the Midwest, you’re looking at more moisture coming in from the Gulf, and warmer moisture at that. So you now have two streams of moisture. You have the jet stream that goes west to east across the continent, that brings moisture. And now you’ve got this Gulf current that’s always been there but is going to be much more powerful.

You live on the coast. That means hurricanes, which is not great. But if you’re in, say, Illinois, it means you’re actually getting more and more water. And water management is the issue. Well, as we’ve seen with plants, plants are a lot like people. As long as you can get a lot of water, then you don’t have to worry so much about the heat.

So we’re starting to see in parts of the Midwest—not even the southern Midwest, most notably Illinois—where we’re starting to see the very early stages of double cropping. So this is one of those where climate change could actually have a very positive impact on global agriculture. Other places that do have this tropical feature aren’t necessarily as well positioned to take advantage of it.

So like Mexico has this, China has this, but these are very rugged areas. And if you just dump more water in a rugged area, you get landslides, mudslides, and flooding. So not exactly great for agriculture. Other places are looking to probably get dried out by this factor because if you don’t have a tropical body of water below you, maybe you’ve got a desert.

And that describes the entirety of the Russian wheat belt, including Kazakhstan. So you’re looking at that area becoming desiccated. Northern Europe, while not exactly going to be falling out of its breadbasket status, has been seen. The weather patterns move steadily offshore for the last half-century as a result of this phenomenon. They do have the Mediterranean below them, but it’s not warm enough.

It’s not large enough, and so these winds are simply pushing normal moisture patterns out to sea or into Scandinavia. Australia could be a bit of a problem because the part of Australia that actually grows the food is on the southwest and the south, and while they do have this moisture effect that is kind of hitting the north part of the country, that’s not where the agriculture is.

So similar effect to what’s happening to Europe, just on the opposite side of the planet. So it’s pushing what weather used to hit the Murray-Darling basin or the Perth area in Western Australia and pushing it south towards and could occur the crop that is going to be most impacted by this is by far is wheat.

Wheat is wheat. And so, it used to be the only thing that most places grew. But in the globalized era, everyone started growing what they could grow best in their zone. And wheat gave way to corn and soy and marijuana and avocados and alfalfa and all the rest. And so wheat gets pushed to the margins, the places where it’s the warmest, where it’s the driest, or it’s the coldest, whatever it happens to be, because it’ll grow anywhere.

Well, if you change the environment of the planet, the places that are going to be pushed into non-production are going to be the ones at the margin. And wheat is the crop in most places where they’re going to see the most pressure. In North America, that’ll be in the Great Plains. In Argentina, that’ll be the southern pampas. In the Eurasian space,

It’s definitely the entirety of the Russian wheat belt. And in Australia, it’s probably going to be Western Australia. So you take all of this together, and we’re looking at parts of the world that are more equatorial, more tropical, becoming less habitable, less dynamic. And you’re going to have to spend most of their money on adapting their population-supporting infrastructure simply to be able to be inhabitable.

And if you’re looking for agriculture, we’re looking at the number one calorie source for the world, being in much smaller supply that will obviously play through in the geopolitics. But until we actually see governments start to crack, it’s really hard to say how. Remember, at the same time this is all going on. We’ve got the globalization shattering merchandise trade and energy trade, and we also have depopulation shattering the ability of countries to have a tax base and a workforce.

So there’s going to be a lot of variables going on at once.

Russians, Russians Everywhere

The Russian Embassy in Warsaw, Poland

Russian “diplomats” are being expelled from Poland due to sabotage attempts. Sabotage has long been a trick up the Russians’ sleeve, as we’ve seen in similar incidents across Europe targeting infrastructure and humanitarian shipments related to Ukraine.

The Five Eyes got rid of their Russian “diplomats” when the Ukraine war started, and that list of intelligence agents was shared with lots of other countries. Sooo, there’s been some widespread diplomatic purges of these Russians.

The Russians have been redeploying these agents worldwide, but predominantly focusing on Africa and Mexico; that’s where they see their sabotage and espionage efforts working the best.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

If you sign up for our Patreon page in the month of October, the proceeds from your subscription for the remainder of 2024 will be donated directly to MedShare. So, you can get our all of the perks of joining the Patreon AND support a good cause while you’re doing it.

We encourage you to sign up for the Patreon page at the link below.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from a chilly Colorado morning. Today we’re going to talk about something that’s just happened. It’s October 23rd, and the Polish government has basically kicked everybody out of the Russian consulate in Poznan, declaring them all persona non grata due to attempted sabotage throughout the country, most notably in Lwow, I believe.

This is not new. We’ve seen dozens of sabotage efforts across Europe, angering a lot of people. They’ve targeted rail systems in Sweden and the Czech Republic, been accused of arson in the United Kingdom and Germany, and have interfered with humanitarian and military shipments to Ukraine, particularly going after food and medical supplies. It’s a frustrating situation but not entirely unexpected.

When the Ukraine war started, there was a wave of diplomatic expulsions. The “Five Eyes” — the American-led intelligence network that includes Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom — and countries with robust intelligence systems, like France, Sweden, and the Dutch, began tracking Russian intelligence assets. With the onset of open conflict, countries with decent intel systems purged all KGB and GRU officers from embassies and shared lists of known agents with other nations.

At the time, about one-third of diplomats in Germany were reportedly KGB officers. Germany, however, was not very adept at intelligence, and given the political climate, many Germans believed the Russians were not a problem until the Ukraine war began. So, these Russian agents were expelled not only from NATO countries but also from Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Consequently, Russia redeployed these agents elsewhere, and countries that received the lists were now aware of their status as intelligence assets.

Russia then shifted its sabotage activities globally, focusing heavily on Africa. This wave of Russian activity is partially why we’ve seen so many coups in Africa recently. There are three benefits Russia gains from these operations: changing the country’s strategic alignment and expelling Western assistance, destabilizing countries to create refugee flows that put pressure on Europe, and, crucially, seizing control of valuable assets like gold, given that Russia has been excluded from most global financial institutions. Russian groups like Wagner now operate gold mines across the Sahel, bringing gold back to Russia, refining it, and transporting it to pay for imports, often to countries like China.

Another specific hotspot is Mexico. The Mexican government sometimes resists U.S. security recommendations, making Mexico City one of the few embassies with a significant number of Russian agents. For those familiar with Cold War spycraft, this isn’t surprising; Mexico City was one of the top KGB outposts during the Cold War. The logic was that causing instability there could indirectly affect the United States. Although we haven’t seen overt sabotage in Mexico like in other regions, Russia is continuing its espionage activities.

SMRs Are Giving Nuclear Power a Facelift

Before we dive into today’s video, if you think back to August of last year…I sent out a video covering a few of these technologies and the limits of innovation. Here’s a link if you want a refresher:

Nuclear power has a bad reputation, and I get it…Chernobyl, nuclear waste, and outdated infrastructure. Buttt, it’s a reliable, carbon-free energy source that might be getting a much needed facelift soon-ish.

Companies like Google and Amazon are realizing their energy needs are growing, so they are investing in small modular reactors (SMRs) to help meet demands. There’s plenty of work to be done before these SMRs are operational, but funding from these tech powerhouses is critical for R&D.

While the small modular reactors won’t solve all of the nuclear issues, they are step in the right direction to changing the public’s opinion about nuclear power. And if this all works out, SMRs could even help solve the energy crisis the US is heading towards.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

If you sign up for our Patreon page in the month of October, the proceeds from your subscription for the remainder of 2024 will be donated directly to MedShare. So, you can get our all of the perks of joining the Patreon AND support a good cause while you’re doing it.

We encourage you to sign up for the Patreon page at the link below.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the Burbank airport just outside of Hollywood.

Today, we’re going to take up the second of our tech modification series, if that’s the right word, specifically talking about nuclear power.

Now, nuclear power is something I’m generally in favor of because it is carbon-free, reliable, and the supply chain is typically within the United States. These are all good things. But there’s also a mechanical issue: public support for it is low. The Russians have been agitating; they can’t stand the idea of nuclear power on a global basis, as it competes with their hydrocarbon exports, even though they use nuclear power themselves quite a bit. Then there’s always the waste disposition issue, which the United States hasn’t really solved. When you’re done using nuclear fuel, you’re left with nuclear waste that you either have to process—requiring a plutonium supply chain in the civilian sector, which is risky from a proliferation perspective—or store somewhere, which results in accumulating waste. The United States has yet to build a large-scale repository to handle all this material, so it tends to be stored on-site. This means that the dozens of nuclear facilities around the country have cooling ponds containing tons of fissile waste material. Other countries have solved these problems, but the U.S. requires a regulatory overhaul, likely several acts of Congress, and would need years to build out the manufacturing system to produce more than one plant, considering we may need dozens.

What has changed, making me more optimistic about the sector, is that big tech is now entering the nuclear business. Big tech companies are building more data centers, and demand for electricity is skyrocketing, especially in locations like Virginia, where about half of the country’s data centers are located. Companies like Microsoft are choosing data centers near nuclear power facilities. Google and Amazon are sponsoring startups to build something called small modular reactors (SMRs), which are portable, can be placed on trucks, and potentially connected to existing grid infrastructure, like old coal plants, or directly power data centers.

There are still regulatory hurdles, and I don’t mean to suggest this will happen overnight, but the fact that Amazon and Google are willing to commit financially to these future reactors is a major boost for companies working on SMR research and prototyping. While we don’t yet have a prototype of a small modular reactor, this kind of investment could push the research forward. I don’t want to over-promise, but this might be the beginning of a more resilient, localized nuclear power infrastructure.

We also have aging nuclear plants to consider. With one exception, all operating nuclear power plants in the country are over 50 years old and have had their lives extended due to their significance to the grid. However, we’re nearing the technical limits of how long these plants can operate, and they will need to be replaced as the United States’ industrial capacity expands, increasing demand for electricity.

Incorporating small modular reactors into the power solution makes sense since they can provide consistent baseload power, unlike solar, which doesn’t work at night. So, this shift in the investment landscape is very encouraging.

The other side of the equation is utility companies, which are regulated monopolies with a different risk tolerance and investment timeline. They may be interested in how new nuclear technology could integrate into their existing systems, especially given the retirement of old facilities. Existing connections to the grid could simplify the process, allowing new reactors to be easily integrated.

Okay, that’s it for me. Take care.

Cuba’s Power Grid Fails, But an Opportunity Arises

Image of an electrical power grid

Cuba’s power grid is collapsing. No, it’s not because of US sanctions or socialism. This ongoing crisis can be blamed on Cuba’s lack of investment into modernizing and its reliance on Soviet and Venezuelan fuel.

Cuba’s power system is powered by diesel generators – much of it deteriorated Soviet-era equipment, which has caused its grid to fail. This culminated in a blackout last week, which was exacerbated by hurricane Oscar making landfall. It’s unlikely that Cuba can get its grid back online all on its own.

So, Cuba finds itself at a crossroads. Without its typical allies able to help, the Cubans might be forced to turn to the US. Both Cuba and the US could benefit from a deal, but there’s a whole lot of pride to be swallowed and history to be forgotten before that happens…

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

If you sign up for our Patreon page in the month of October, the proceeds from your subscription for the remainder of 2024 will be donated directly to MedShare. So, you can get our all of the perks of joining the Patreon AND support a good cause while you’re doing it.

We encourage you to sign up for the Patreon page at the link below.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Huntington Beach in California. I apologize for the sound quality, but I’m on the beach. We’re going to talk about beach country, so it’s unavoidable. We’re gonna talk about Cuba. This past Sunday, a hurricane Oscar roared ashore in eastern Cuba. And I would say, like most hurricanes that do this, they knocked out power.

But that is not the case because in Cuba, the power was already out. Now, the two leading theories as to why that power is out are that it’s a socialist disaster—they can’t maintain their grid—or that they’re under U.S. sanctions and can’t get the parts. Both of those are kind of crap. First of all, let’s deal with the U.S. sanctions issue.

Cuba has been under sanctions since 1960. And there are lots and lots and lots and lots of countries that don’t like the United States and that the U.S. doesn’t like that still have electricity. So that doesn’t answer your question. Second, the idea that the system is mismanaged is, at best, an incomplete answer.

And to explain that, we need to look back. Cuba was functionally a U.S. colony from the time of the Spanish-American War, 1898, until Castro threw off U.S. control at the end of the ’50s and sided with the Soviets. Especially since the Cuban Missile Crisis during the Kennedy years in the early ’60s, Cuba basically existed because the Soviet government paid for them to exist, covering pretty much all of their food imports and their energy imports, as well as all their machine tools and equipment, and providing them with a lot of advisors in exchange for military assets, especially listening centers in Cuba.

Well, that ended when the wall fell. And the 1990s for the Cubans was a really rough time because, you know, this is an agricultural economy that produces sugar. And it’s not that their sugar isn’t good—it’s great—but it’s not enough to have a modern society. And so in the ’90s, when the support from the Soviet Union ended, the place really started to fall apart by any way that you could possibly measure it.

But then a savior arrived in the late 1990s in the form of a guy by the name of Hugo Chavez, who took over Venezuela and started sending the Cubans sufficient fuel to cover all of their needs. Since then, Chavez has basically destroyed his country’s own energy production, and especially under his successor, Nicolas Maduro, who’s the current president.

Venezuela has been falling apart, and they have basically lost the ability to send meaningful amounts of fuel to Cuba. So we’ve seen support go from something like 300,000 barrels a day to something closer to 25 over the course of the last few years. And Cuba is having a hard time keeping anything running. The income that they get from the sugar exports simply isn’t sufficient, and they can’t send to what would be their logical market, the United States.

And rather than buying from their logical market in the United States, they have to buy from at least a continent away to get whatever they need. So everything costs more and they get paid less. And that assumes that their system was doing well, which it is not. On top of that, when you have a grid that was designed back, you know, before the 1950s, it’s not all that hot in the first place.

This isn’t a country where they have a lot of solar or wind or natural gas. They certainly don’t have a nuclear power plant. What they do is they burn oil. And that is, you know, ugly and inefficient and toxic, but it’s also really hard on your power plants. And it’s been 50 years since any of these power plants have had meaningful upgrades.

On top of that, they have built kind of a backup society that is no longer their backup system—big diesel generators all over the place, plugged into the grid. The problem with that is that they’re not nearly as steady in terms of current production. And so it’s really hard on the transformers and the transmission system, which is also not seeing meaningful maintenance in 50 years.

So, bottom line is that the entire grid is falling apart. And back last week on Wednesday, the lights went out and they never came back on. And now the hurricane has hit. And it’s entirely possible that they’re not going to come out in a sustained manner again. Energizing an electrical system that’s had this degree of damage without a steady supply of fuel inputs is nearly impossible.

And when they tried to do it on a regional scale in the days before the hurricane hit, they actually shorted out more of the system. So Cuba very well may be down for the count. And the question is now what happens next? The normal candidates to support them, Russia and Venezuela, are either occupied with other things, don’t have the cash, or both.

And that’s before you consider things like sanctions. And the Chinese, while they love to have some irons in the fire in order to cause problems for the United States where they can, they’re not like pathological about it, like the Russians are. And they’re certainly not going to risk America’s displeasure when there’s no financial gain to be had here.

So, for the first time since the ’90s, and the first time seriously since before the Spanish settled the territory, Cuba is actually on its own. There is one possibility. Natural disasters tend to bring out the best and the worst in people, and the same goes for states. So, we now have the most fluid political environment between the United States and Cuba that we’ve had since the 1990s.

And there is a distinct possibility that Havana or DC, or both, will reach across the Strait of Florida to see if they can cut some sort of a deal. This is a chance for politicians on both sides to either show their better sides and turn the other cheek, or to drive a really hard bargain. Both of these are very viable options, and there’s certainly a need on both sides.

I mean, on the Cuban side, it’s obvious—the country is on its back and it might not be able to get back up, which would lead to horrendous mortality and deindustrialization. But on the American side, we have a massive worker shortage. And as the Chinese fail, we’re going to need various partners at different stages of production. Mexico, to be perfectly blunt, has become too sophisticated for a lot of the manufacturing that needs to move back to the continent.

But Cuba, I mean, their skill set might only be a quarter to a third as good as somebody in the United States—probably less. But they work for 5 to 10% as much. So there’s a way for them to plug in to the North American manufacturing system in a way that would really benefit the three existing NAFTA partners.

The question is whether we can get the politics right. And for better or for worse, the power outages plus Hurricane Oscar have provided an opportunity to find out.

SpaceX Takes “One Giant Leap” for Space Tech

SpaceX rocket launching

Before we dive into today’s video, watch this video I sent out a year ago for a refresher on a few of these technologies and the limits to innovation. Click the button below to watch…

SpaceX’s successful booster recovery, is not just very impressive, but could also dramatically reduce the cost of launching items into orbit. Don’t pull the trigger on that summer vacay to Mars quite yet, but there are some exciting possibilities for space-based manufacturing now on the table.

There are four key areas that this could impact: precision lenses, drugs, fiber optics, and quantum computing. Each of these areas would benefit from being manufactured in a gravity-free environment. Lenses would get finer precision. The drug industry would be able to grow longer, more complex proteins. Creating fiber optic cables would be much more efficient. Quantum computing would get error-free crystal growth.

Each of these industries would see massive leaps and advancements, but the price needs to be right. So, we’re moving in the right direction, but still have some space – hah – for improvement. And further down the road, there is a potential for setting a 3D printing facility to manufacture space infrastructure while in orbit, which could change space travel forever. Let’s not get over our skis though.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

If you sign up for our Patreon page in the month of October, the proceeds from your subscription for the remainder of 2024 will be donated directly to MedShare. So, you can get our all of the perks of joining the Patreon AND support a good cause while you’re doing it.

We encourage you to sign up for the Patreon page at the link below.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from, I don’t even know where I am at the moment, anyway. If you’ve been following for a while, you know, about a year ago, I recorded a video that listed the six kind of breakthroughs technologically, that I thought might deflect the world into a more productive, happy direction. And, in the last couple of weeks, we’ve had a number of issues that have caused me to revisit these technologies.

We’re going to do this very short series about what has changed and the sort of impact it can have. And so this first video is coming to you from New Orleans, where we talk about space technology. Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from the Superdome in New Orleans. And while I’ve been in the Big Easy, a couple of interesting things have happened around the world.

The one I want to talk about today is SpaceX’s successful booster catch. They launched a rocket up—all rockets, in order to reach orbit, require boosters. You need extra fuel so you can achieve escape velocity. And we already know for several years that SpaceX has been recovering their rockets for reuse. And they can even land them vertically now.

But the boosters, until now, have been just discarded. Well, this time, they were able to let the booster land back at a different facility and land itself, and they grabbed it and basically had it on the platform then. Number one, that’s amazing. But what I actually found more interesting was that they then immediately refueled it, meaning that now, with lots of testing, they have to do this over and over again to prove that it’s a viable model.

But they caught it on the first try, which means that the main launch vehicle is now reusable and the boosters are reusable. And this drastically, potentially reduces the cost of launching things into orbit. If you go back to the ’70s and especially the ’80s with the onset of the space shuttle, getting stuff into orbit was more than $50,000 per kilogram.

With SpaceX having the main module be reusable, they’ve gotten that down to $1,500 per kilogram. And now that the booster looks like it’s going to be reusable as well, that number is probably going to drop by half to a third of what we’ve become used to. And when you’re talking about $500 per kilogram or less, all of a sudden the economics of space start to change and people can come and go on a lot more frequency.

I mean, we’re basically starting to talk about some Gattaca-level shit here. Now, I’m not too interested in space tourism because, you know, that’s just a few people going up, joyriding, and coming back, and I’m not too interested in things like Mars or even the moon, because even with this technology, you’re still talking several days to get there and back.

The economics of that hasn’t changed all that much, but we can now start thinking about manufacturing. Basically, what you’re looking at are things that are high-value products, that you can fly the raw materials up and then bring the finished product back down. There’s kind of four categories that I see that kind of play in that pond. The first one, and probably the one that will get going the most, are lenses, which I know doesn’t sound very exciting.

But when you think about what we’re doing in semiconductors right now, the lenses that go into the lithography machines are among the most finely milled things that we have on the planet. Let’s keep in mind that we are now at the stage for maybe semiconductors, where the individual resistors are not all that much bigger than the individual molecules.

So you’re talking about manipulating objects at the atomic level. When you’re doing that, precision is absolutely critical. Okay, so that’s number one. Number two is drugs. Most of the more advanced drugs that we’re developing today are proteins. And proteins can only form so long in gravity because they collapse on themselves or just get mushy and then they’re useless.

So if you can grow them in orbit, you are no longer limited in the length of the protein that you can grow, especially when you’re talking about tailored drugs for individuals. You can easily fly up the medium and then fly down the finished product. I swear I’ve been on aircraft carriers that are quieter than this town. Anyway, what was the third one?

Fiber optic cable? Now, the stuff that is in your house, in your neighborhood, probably costs in the vicinity of a dime to a quarter per meter. That’s not what we’re talking about here. We’re talking about the new stuff, something called Zebulon, which is a more specialized system that can communicate terabits of information per second. It runs at least $100 per meter and upwards of a thousand, based on how good of the stuff you want.

The problem is in the manufacturing process: it crystallizes. And in order to control that, you need very, very precise conditions. So space basically—you can grow it like a crystal and do whatever you need to do with it. Now, you have to, like all these other things, bring it back home. And that’s going to put a limit on what you can do. When you’re talking about something that is 10,000 times as valuable, there’s a little bit of margin in there for transport cost, even if you happen to be going way up.

The fourth thing involved in experimental technologies—one of the reasons that quantum computing has not happened yet is because each machine is different. It’s handcrafted. It’s not just that it hasn’t been serialized or regularized; it’s that we’re inventing ways to perceive and manipulate quantum space. So every single thing about each of those machines is unique and precise. And if you can grow the crystals that do the focusing in space, then you don’t have the errors that you’re going to get and the flaws you’re going to get on a more terrestrial system, while also considering that a quantum computer isn’t all that big.

You’re talking launch costs versus the benefit you get—that’s pretty high. So those are the big four. There is a fifth one to consider, although it would require a significantly larger manufacturing system, and that’s using things like 3D printing technologies to print stuff in space for space. I’m not talking here about a trip to Mars, although I’m sure that’s what Elon Musk wants to go on and on about.

I’m talking about something a lot more basic: satellites. Because if you can drop launch costs to the point that you can build a satellite manufacturing facility in orbit, then all of a sudden you can have a satellite bay and repair facilities and manufacturing facilities also in orbit. And that would dramatically lower the cost of things like information transmission and raise the possibility of even more manufacturing.

And yes, eventually, in time, maybe a moon base or even a trip to Mars. Okay, that’s it for me. I am going to go to a quieter city.

Europe Takes One Step Closer to Nukes…

Soviet OTR-21 Tochka missile photo by Wikimedia Commons

There’s some growing concern in Europe that a Trump victory in the US election could lead to a decrease in support for Ukraine. Without the US backing them, many European countries might reach for nukes to deter any potential conflicts.

There are a handful of countries with nuclear weapons already, but others might be jumping on the nuke train; these countries include places like Ukraine, Sweden, Romania, Germany (yikes), and Poland might even dip their toe in as well.

Conventional forces take time to build. Exhibit A: the Russians turning to North Korea for shells and ammunition due to production struggles. Nuclear weapons can be thrown together fairly quickly and for relatively cheap. Although, this could get dicey if the Russians want to call anyone’s bluff on this.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

If you sign up for our Patreon page in the month of October, the proceeds from your subscription for the remainder of 2024 will be donated directly to MedShare. So, you can get our all of the perks of joining the Patreon AND support a good cause while you’re doing it.

We encourage you to sign up for the Patreon page at the link below.

Cover photo of Soviet OTR-21 Tochka missile by Wikimedia Commons

Will Saudi Arabia Start an Oil Price War?

Image of the Nabawi Mosque, Madina, Saudi Arabia

My crystal ball is working overtime trying to figure out what the future of oil prices will look like. You’ve already heard one of the scenarios, but here’s another POTENTIAL way this could play out.

The Saudis could get frustrated with other oil producers not cutting production, and flood the market with oil. We’re talking 3 million barrels per day, which would drive prices down below $50 per barrel. This would have an outsized impact on higher cost producers like Angola, Venezuela, and Nigeria.

These countries could face economic instability because of this, but they’re not getting the worst of it. The Russian oil fields are hard and expensive to operate, should production drop during a price war, it may never recover. Oh, and the US will be fine thanks to low-cost shale production.

Okay, I’ll go get the popcorn and you grab the sodas.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

If you sign up for our Patreon page in the month of October, the proceeds from your subscription for the remainder of 2024 will be donated directly to MedShare. So, you can get our all of the perks of joining the Patreon AND support a good cause while you’re doing it.

We encourage you to sign up for the Patreon page at the link below.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Fort Worth, Texas. And, I spoke with you recently about what I consider to be the highest risk we’ve had in a long time to the Middle East for crude oil supplies. But remember that I pointed out the possibility of Iran striking at Saudi Arabia’s energy complex and Israel taking out Iran’s, for that matter.

I said 1 in 4 to 1 in 3 chance. It’s not that I think it’s a majority chance. In fact, you know, there’s obviously other scenarios. I’m going to share another one with you today, which takes us the absolute opposite direction and probably has about the same chance of happening just to confuse anyone who wants to play some money in the market.

So you know, you have fun with this. So the idea is that Saudi Arabia is getting a little cheesed off that it has been restricting its own production in an attempt to boost oil prices. Specific. While my hair is out of control here, in order to get prices up, above $100 a barrel. And with the exception of the United Arab Emirates, no one else in OPEC, much less this broader OPEC+ group, has been cutting production at all.

In fact, everyone else has been putting as many barrels in the market as they possibly can. And of course, the U.S. shale producers continue to produce. That’s something that by any other standards would be record levels. But by their standards, like, oh no, only went up a million barrels a day this year, which, you know, is bonkers that it is now and done that for eight of the last 15.

Anyway, the Saudis have very clearly gotten annoyed, and they’re indicating that they’re willing to put a lot more oil on the market, maybe as many as 3 million barrels a day, and that they’re going to try to drive prices down quite a bit in order to grab market share. And that the number of $50 a barrel or lower has been floated. Doing something like that is well within the Saudis’ capability, assuming that global politics are favorable, which is always a little touch and go anyway. Whenever the Saudis have done this, it causes a lot of ruckus around the world among all of the other oil producers, specifically those that

have higher breakeven costs. So places like Angola or Venezuela or Ecuador or Nigeria and especially in places that are really, really dependent on oil flows, like places like, say, Libya and Nigeria in that category, because if they’re getting a lot less income, you know, obviously they face social malcontent. And if their crude isn’t profitable at that point, then they have to shut those production levels in.

And sometimes it can take years, if not decades, for that to be rebuilt. One country I’m not worried about is the United States. We’re now in a situation where the vast, vast, vast—over 80%—majority of the oil that the U.S. produces comes out of a shale well, and pretty much everybody is profitable below 50.

In fact, you’d have to go down to below, probably 35, before you’d see a meaningful impact on existing production. Keep in mind that once you’ve drilled your shale well, its production costs for operating purposes drop below about $10-15 a barrel in most places. So you might not drill new wells, but you’re going to maintain what you’ve got.

In fact, it costs money to shut it in anyhow. The last three times that the Saudis have done something like this, we’ve seen a little blip, oftentimes, in American shale output. But then you see it surge back very quickly, because from the time that a shale operator starts working on a well to the time that it actually starts producing is usually only about two months or less. With some of the new technologies, that might be a little longer, but it’s still less than three months anyway.

So whenever you’ve got market share up for grabs, the Saudis, of course, try to take it, but the U.S. shale guys do as well. So the Saudis have to do all the work, and they don’t have to split the benefits with the U.S. shale players. Now, this time, there is one other thing in the mix that is going to make this particular potential price war a little bit more exciting.

And that is Russia. Russia’s fields are deep. They are thousands of miles from international markets. They require over a thousand miles of pipes. Even the ones that are close to international markets, most of them are in the permafrost. And the Russian educational system for generating petroleum engineers collapsed back in the 1980s. So the only people in Russia who are capable of doing the work are a small cadre of Russian citizens who, in the 2000s, were basically trained abroad.

There’s just a few dozen people, because of the Ukraine war, because of the sanctions regime. The people who would normally do this work, typically Americans, Brits, Dutch, and Germans, are all out, and the Chinese don’t have the capability to work in this sort of technically demanding environment. They just haven’t learned those skills yet. So if you have high-price producers like Russia who lose production, this time around, they’re actually out of the market for good.

A lot of the fields aren’t simply old and complicated and far away and deep; they’re also very, very mature. So it would take a huge amount of investment and technology the Russians simply don’t have in order to get it back up and running on the backside of any sort of trade war. And they can’t do that themselves.

So, how is that for two bookends for what can possibly happen? A conflict in the Persian Gulf that sends oil prices skyrocketing, or a price war that removes a major player from the market permanently? Both of these could happen. In fact, it’s entirely possible that we’re getting some mix of the two, where the Saudis start with the price war, and then the Iranians have an economic reason to take out Saudi energy prices.

And if this is just too wishy-washy for you, well, welcome to my world. This is what geopolitics often is.

The UAE and India Look to Localize Semiconductor Manufacturing

A couple more countries have joined the campaign trail to buildout their semiconductor industries: the United Arab Emirates and India. Let’s break down the different approaches to this buildout and how they might turn out.

The UAE is attempting to sweet-talk Samsung and Taiwan’s TSMC to build a semiconductor fab facility in places like Dubai and Abu Dhabi. In case you didn’t know, these places aren’t exactly known for their engineering expertise or labor forces capable of carrying out these complex operations; meaning these facilities would likely be filled with labor imported from South Asia. Basically they’re paying for the facility to be closer to home, but not actually doing any of the work.

India, on the other hand, is working on a more sustainable model. Bringing together Powerchip and Tata, the Indians are focusing on producing less advanced chips. Don’t be fooled though, these chips and the fab facility where they are made would be vital for the growing tech sector in India. By using local labor and addressing the infrastructure issues associated, India’s approach leans towards functionality over prestige.

While both are attempting to localize semiconductor manufacturing, the UAE and India have different approaches that will likely have very different results.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

If you sign up for our Patreon page in the month of October, the proceeds from your subscription for the remainder of 2024 will be donated directly to MedShare. So, you can get our all of the perks of joining the Patreon AND support a good cause while you’re doing it.

We encourage you to sign up for the Patreon page at the link below.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from a hotel room where I’ve been laid low by a 24-hour flu problem. It’s like, hope it’s only 24 hours. Today we’re going to talk about semiconductors and something interesting that’s happening in the world of fabs. Dubai and Abu Dhabi, which are the two main cities in the United Arab Emirates and the Persian Gulf, are holding talks with Korea’s Samsung and Taiwan’s TSMC about building a fab facility in the Persian Gulf in the United Arab Emirates.

Normally, I would just wave this away because semiconductor fabs are one of the more, if not one of the most, complex manufacturing systems in the world. And there aren’t a lot of people in the Persian Gulf that can do basic math, much less, you know, high-end engineering. But I thought it might be worth exploring why it still might happen and what it would look like.

TSMC and Samsung are not the same. TSMC is what’s called a fab fabricator, and Samsung is more of a conglomerate, right? And so TSMC is part of an ecosystem that involves several thousand companies that come together to provide the materials and the designs, and TSMC simply puts it together. In fact, they don’t even design the managerial process.

What usually happens is a foreigner, typically someone who’s from Japan or the United States, designs a chip in league with the end user. And then that design is given to TSMC. And then that designer typically goes out and sources all of the materials that are necessary to make the chip, ensures that they’re high quality, and then brings them to TSMC themselves.

It’s a little bit oversimplification, but think of TSMC as the world’s best direction followers. They don’t have a lot of intellectual capital in terms of interpreting the designs. That’s all managed by the American or the Japanese guy. Instead, they have an ecosystem of hundreds of companies within Taiwan who then take individual pieces of the design and figure out how to make it most effectively.

And then all of that information is combined under the American or Japanese person’s tutelage in order to provide a very, very specific series of instructions for TSMC, which they then follow. I’m not saying this to suggest that TSMC isn’t good at what they do. Oh my God, they’re the world’s best. But the really high value-added isn’t done in the fab; it’s done outside the fab by others. Samsung in Korea is a little bit different. They’re more of a conglomerate. They have a design house, and they handle more of the instruction-building themselves. But still, these two companies, Samsung and TSMC, are two of only three companies on the planet that can make the high-end chips that are smaller than five nanometers.

The third one is Intel in the United States, which is a little bit more similar to Samsung than TSMC. Anyway, the point of all of this is it’s really, really complicated, requires a lot of really, really smart people who are really, really good at math and engineering. And the Persian Gulf is not known for having any of that.

UAE is basically a financial center because things, concepts like interest, are illegal under Islamic law. So UAE has found a way to kind of do an end run around Sharia laws and the such. And basically, if you’re in the Middle East and you want your money to actually earn something, you bring it to Dubai. And then Dubai does the investing, usually via third-party nationals.

So the idea that you could have a high-end fab in UAE using local labor is hilarious. So it wouldn’t use local labor. The UAE is basically a slave state, and they bring in people from other countries to do all of their work, most notably South Asians. And so if, if, if you get a fab facility operating in the UAE, it’s going to be manned almost exclusively by Indians.

And which brings me to the next point that India’s getting the fab. But they’re not doing what the Emiratis are doing and trying to get the world’s best, so it’s kind of a feather in the cap. No, they’re just going for functionality. So the company Powerchip is partnering with Tata, which is an Indian industrial conglomerate, to build a fab facility that will not make the high-end chips.

The best chips they will make will be 28 nanometers, which is what you are going to see in your typical car, going down to 110 nanometers, which is Internet of Things sort of quality. Nothing particularly sexy. But India, to this point, has not had a single fab operating in the country. It’s a problem of not labor or labor quality.

It’s a problem of infrastructure. So if we have something in Dubai or Abu Dhabi, it’ll be the Emirates with their rock-solid power system, paying for everything and importing all of the labor and all the technology. And the only thing about it that will be Emirati will be the address. And then in India, we’ll have a system where the state will try to set up a better power grid locally to where this facility is going to be.

And then the local labor will be right there. So two very different models to get to two very different places, bringing different assets into play.

China Faces Deflation as Economy Stutters

Photo of woman holding Chinese Yuan

China is facing an economic downturn reminiscent of Japan’s struggles in the 90s. Actually, I take that back…China’s outlook is much worse.

The core of China’s problem is declining demographics. This crushes demand and leaves industrial production as the only path forward. Issuing debt and spending more on real estate, bailing out local governments and boosting industrial capacity isn’t going to do much, in fact, it will lead to deflation…a particularly nasty economic phenomenon which occurs when oversupply drives prices down into a reinforcing spiral of dysfunction involving recession, industrial busts, mass unemployment and general mehness.

If the Chinese want to avoid deflation, they’ll need to cut industrial capacity, but that’s not risk-free either. And to round out China’s list of issues, Chairman Xi’s chokehold on Chinese power adds another layer of complexity to successfully navigating this economic headwind.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

If you sign up for our Patreon page in the month of October, the proceeds from your subscription for the remainder of 2024 will be donated directly to MedShare. So, you can get our all of the perks of joining the Patreon AND support a good cause while you’re doing it.

We encourage you to sign up for the Patreon page at the link below.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from New Orleans. It’s like 6 a.m., but this is the only time I have today to record, so here we are. The news in the last few days is that the Chinese are doing another, another, another stimulus program. It’s starting to feel a lot like what happened in Japan in the 1990s, where they throw more money into the situation, hoping to generate economic growth.

But it never did, because their problem at its core is demographic. Unless you can get people to spend more, to consume more, all that’s left is industrial development. In the case of Japan, they used that for real estate, and so the bottom fell out of the market, and it took 25 years to recover. You could argue it’s only in the last five years that Japan has gotten back to some version of normal.

In the case of China, the demographic decline is way more advanced than it ever was in Japan 20 years ago. In fact, you could argue that in terms of the collapse of numbers of people under age 50, it’s actually much worse today in China than it is in Japan, even now, even though Japan’s the world’s oldest society.

It’s that lopsided. Anyway, back to the topic. The Chinese indicate that they’re going to issue a lot of debt, which is something they’ve never really done before, with the numbers being floated somewhere in the low hundreds of billions to the mid hundreds of billions. So by any measure, even for an economy China’s size, this is potentially a huge amount of capital.

So the question, though, is what are you going to put it towards? Three things have been floated. Number one, buying up property that hasn’t been finished so it can be finished. Well, that will exacerbate the oversupply of condos, which is already more than enough to house over a million and a half people, so that does nothing except for maybe generate a little bit more public goodwill because that’s where 70% of private savings is.

So that’d be a political decision, not an economic one. The second one is to bail out the debt of local governments. Local governments can sell land and issue bonds, but they can’t raise taxes, so they have no way of really generating an income. And once they issue debt, they have really no way of paying it back.

So that’s like a $4 trillion asset class that’s completely bunked. And while, you know, we throw half a billion at it, that’s not nothing, but it really doesn’t move the needle in any appreciable way. And the third idea that the Chinese have floated is, shocker, building more industrial capacity. So we’re in this weird situation where the Chinese are kind of damned if they do and damned if they don’t.

I mean, if they do nothing and consumption continues to wither and tariffs against them for their overproduction continue, then their industrial case fails and the population basically falls into impoverishment. This new idea of throwing a lot more money against industrial output actually generates potentially a worse outcome called deflation. Now deflation sounds nice, but it is not. We’re all familiar with inflation, when prices rise, either because there’s an insufficient supply or too much demand.

Eventually, you get spiraling prices that hurt everybody and eventually eat away at the value of economic assets. Based on who you are, that’s different levels of disastrous. But deflation in many ways is significantly worse. Deflation comes from a similar imbalance between supply and demand, but it’s when there’s too much supply compared to demand. In those circumstances, prices start dropping because there’s too much stuff.

People can’t possibly consume it all. And eventually, people become used to the prices going down, so they put off their purchases, which increases the disparity between supply and demand even more. Eventually, it gets so bad, and the oversupply becomes so much relative to demand that the industrial base starts to collapse and people start to lose their jobs because nothing is profitable anymore.

And then all of a sudden you’re hitting it on the demand side as well. The demand is collapsing because people have lost their jobs. Some version of this, in a persistent but mild form, happened in Japan starting in the late 1990s and continued all through the 2000s and through most of the 2010s. We also had a version of this in the Great Depression.

The problem we have in dealing with deflation is, ultimately, you have to get supply and demand back into whack so that they’re actually aligned with one another again. The two ways to do that are to increase demand or decrease supply. In China, it’s difficult to imagine being able to increase demand because there are now more people over age 50 in China than there are under age 50 in China.

And generally, it’s people under age 40 that are doing most of the consumption, and that is the class that has been completely gutted by the one-child policy, in addition to the world’s fastest industrialization process. It’s only been a generation since Chinese folks were having, on average, five and six kids, to now having one. In fact, in the metros where the majority of Chinese now live, we’re now looking at the birth rate being one quarter or less of replacement levels.

We’re talking about 0.5 children per woman. There aren’t enough people to even think about a meaningful consumption rebound. Well, that leaves destroying supply. And in this, the Chinese face two problems. Number one, oversupply has been the state mantra for the last 40 years, and that is the Chinese development model. You look around the world, you figure out something that’s in demand.

You produce it. You use subsidies, you use cheap labor. You produce, produce, produce, produce, produce—not for your domestic market, for the foreign market. You export it. And over the last 40 years, this has moved from product to product to product, from steel to cement and now increasingly electronics products. Now they’re trying to get into electric vehicles.

And it’s just on and on and on and on. Well, in a world where those who are experiencing breakneck economic and demographic growth, there’s some strength to that model. And especially in the 1990s, in the 2000s, we had the developing world kind of getting in the act of industrialization and urbanization. But a couple things to keep in mind. Number one, you only urbanize once, and once you do that, your demand for those sorts of products drops.

Second, when you urbanize, your birth rate collapses. And if you’re, say, Brazil, that means you had a demographic moment in the 90s and the 2000s, but now you’re actually aging faster than the European countries, and your demand has kind of hit a plateau. And you’re also looking at the Chinese, who are basically doing product dumping at scale. You’re like, you know what? I don’t want to play this game. And so it’s not just the United States and the European Union and Japan and Canada that have put all these tariffs on things like electric vehicles from China. It’s also Indonesia. It’s also Brazil. It’s also Turkey. Most recently, Russia. The Chinese have produced all this stuff with the intent of swamping markets to save their social model.

And in doing so, they basically encouraged everyone to block the markets of Chinese products. So if the Chinese were to add more industrial capacity now as part of a stimulus program, all that’s going to do is exacerbate the oversupply. And now there’s nowhere for it to go. So I would argue that a year ago, before this really got serious, the Chinese probably had about twice the industrial plant that they needed because so much of it was geared to service the foreign market.

Well, now a lot of that is being shut out of foreign markets, and the Chinese are having to deal with it at home. Any stimulus will be on top of that. So the only way that the Chinese can avoid deflation at this point is to basically gut half or more of their industrial plant, and then you’ve destroyed the employment program for the entire country.

And if there’s one thing the Chinese government is obsessed about, it’s making sure that people have jobs so they don’t get together in large groups and go on long walks together. So there are any number of reasons how the Chinese economy can ultimately collapse. Demographics are at the heart of most of it, but it could be a trade war.

It could be a deflationary spiral, or it could be any sort of resource restriction. That’s not a short list, but we’re now in a situation where they could theoretically make it all about internal miscalculations and trying to rationalize their economic model for a world that can no longer support it. So this has become very real, very fast, and the Chinese are struggling mightily.

The question is whether or not they can come up with enough policy creativity to try something new. And since Chairman Xi has basically gutted the entire system of all decision makers but himself, I don’t think the chances of that are very high. All right, you guys take care.

The (Next) Gulf War Is Coming

Photo of a destroyed building in the middle east

If you’ve read my book The Absent Superpower, then today’s video shouldn’t come as a surprise to you (yes, I wrote it nearly ten years ago!). If you’ve been stuck under a rock and haven’t gotten the chance to read it -OR- you want a refresher, you can purchase a copy below.

Given the recent conflict in the Middle East, I’m worried that an oil crisis could be brewing. The main players that might kick off the (next) Gulf War are Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Israel was recently attacked by Iran and their retaliation could be devastating for Iran. Should they choose to target critical Iranian oil infrastructure – most of which is conveniently located near Kharg Island – Iran’s exports would plummet. Should that happen, an Iranian attack on Saudi oil fields wouldn’t be out of the question, and then we could be talking about 20 million barrels per day being under threat.

That means a global oil price of $300 per barrel is in the cards…but not for everyone. The US has the domestic supply to maintain a price closer to $60 per barrel (outside of California, because they still rely heavily on Persian Gulf imports). China would get the snot knocked out of ’em if it does play out like this. The UAE and Saudi Arabia would keep some exports alive thanks to pipelines that bypass the Strait.

Before you go buy a few drums of oil to throw in the basement, let’s wait for Israel to decide what their retaliation plan looks like.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

If you sign up for our Patreon page in the month of October, the proceeds from your subscription for the remainder of 2024 will be donated directly to MedShare. So, you can get our all of the perks of joining the Patreon AND support a good cause while you’re doing it.

We encourage you to sign up for the Patreon page at the link below.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the gloomy California coast. Got a nice little inversion layer going on out there. Anyway, today we’re going to talk about something that I haven’t really talked about in my professional career because I never thought it was going to happen until we had a change in circumstance. Well, we’ve had a change in circumstance, and now it’s time to talk about it.

And that is the possibility of a severe oil crisis because of a conflict in the Middle East. Now, back at my old job at Stratfor, they were always beating this drum. The idea that Iran was about to close the Strait of Hormuz and oil prices go to $500 and blah, blah, blah. And I was always the dissident voice because unless and until Iran feels it has no other choice, that doesn’t work because all of Iran’s crude goes out through the Strait of Hormuz.

Now, when I left, I went on my own. My second book, written about ten years—ten years ago, how did that happen?—mentions the three wars of the globalization period, conflicts that will boil up because the U.S. has stepped back, and whether the countries feel they have an opportunity or because they’re desperate, they take matters into their own hands.

Now, one of these I called the Twilight War, which is now in the opening act with the Ukraine conflict as the Russians try to reshape their neighborhood. But the second one, I called the Next Gulf War. And it’s about a conflict in which Iran and Saudi Arabia fight each other at each other’s throats because they can’t reliably get energy out.

So they try to take out each other. In that scenario, you basically have potentially 10 to 12 million barrels of crude that is at risk. Now, I haven’t brought this conflict up very much since I wrote the book because the circumstances haven’t warranted it. Especially in the last three years, it’s all been about Ukraine and Russia in their Twilight War.

But in recent days, I am reassessing. And specifically, the concern is after Iran launched a couple hundred missiles at Israel a couple weeks back, the Israelis have made it very clear that they intend to retaliate in the time and place of their own choosing. And they’ve specifically shortlisted Iran’s oil sector as potential targets. There is a very obvious target point.

It’s called Kharg Island. There is subsea infrastructure that links via pipe the mainland to the island. And then all, all, all of Iran’s offshore loading platforms are just off the island. This is the only meaningful export point for Iranian crude. And as the Israelis have proven, back in April when we had the previous Iranian assault on Israel, they can take out any air defense system in the country.

If you remember back then in Isfahan, which is where the Iranians have the nuclear program headquartered, the Israelis took out the air defense around the nuclear program specifically to prove that they could if they wanted to. So any sort of air defense and Kharg is almost a rounding error in the Israeli calculus. And there’s no bridge here. It was not built by the Iranians.

It was built by Westerners in the days before the Shah fell. So if Israel decides to move, it’ll just take a couple of sorties. They’ll be done in an hour. And Iran’s entire oil export capacity would be devastated. And in that scenario, suddenly Iran doesn’t have much to lose and, out of desperation, would probably make a push to take out Saudi Arabia.

The scenario specifically outlined in the book involves a military invasion that crosses into Iraq and Kuwait, heads south, making a beeline for the oil fields. Keep in mind that the southern half of Iraq is Shia-populated and has generally had a very pro-Iranian slant ever since the war against Saddam Hussein back in the 2000s. Whether or not it would be an easy invasion is open for debate based on how or whether other countries, such as the United States, get involved.

But even if that is not an option, all of those missiles that the Iranians launched recently against Israel, they have more than enough to take out oil export and processing facilities on the western side of the Persian Gulf, notably Saudi Arabia. Most of Saudi Arabia’s crude comes from the Ghawar region, which is hard up against the coast, and all of the loading platforms are also on the Gulf Coast.

Well, most of them. So you’re talking between the two of them, a significant reduction in what is globally available. If it was just Iran, not a big deal. You’re talking about a million barrels a day. They’ve been under sanction for a while. They’ve mismanaged their own system. But if you bring in Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia, all of a sudden that 1 million turns to 10 million or more, and that doesn’t count what comes out of, say, Iraq or the UAE or Kuwait, all of which would be in the way of a potential conflict.

So now you’re talking potentially 20 million barrels a day. You want oil prices above $300? That’s how you get there. Now, not everything is equal for all players. Yes, currently we have a single global oil price. But in that scenario, that system would shatter because in the United States we have a populist president, and the people running for president are populist.

And back in 2015, U.S. Congress granted the American presidency the authority to summarily end all American crude oil exports, which have been several million barrels a day for a while now. The shale revolution really is rocking and rolling. And so if we have oil prices shoot up, you would have the president, whoever it happened to be, end exports. That would create a super-saturated market within the United States while denying the rest of the world another few million barrels per day, sending prices up even higher.

So you’d have a functional ceiling in the United States of $60 to $70 a barrel, and you’d have a functional floor in the rest of the world, probably around $200 to $300 a barrel. So you get a global depression. At the same time, the United States just kind of skates right on. Second, the country that would suffer the most by far would be China.

It is the largest consumer of crude from Saudi Arabia, from the UAE, from Kuwait, from Iran. And all of those sources would be in danger in some way, if not going completely. Third, on the producer side, not everyone in the Persian Gulf would suffer equally because the Saudis and the Emiratis have seen some version of this problem coming.

And so both of them have built bypass pipelines that avoid the Strait of Hormuz completely. So roughly 5 million barrels a day, maybe as much as six and a half, could still get out. That’s enough to take a lot of the sting out from a budgetary point of view. And if you’re Saudi Arabia and oil prices triple but your exports halve, you’re actually in a net financial superior position.

Assuming the Iranians don’t conquer you. And then finally, in the United States, there is one state that would be in a different situation, and that would be here in California. California doesn’t have any pipes that connect it to the oil fields of Ohio or North Dakota or Texas. And it is the one oil producer in the country that has not benefited from the shale revolution because of regulation out of Sacramento, which means that in this scenario, they’d be kind of hosed because they actually import most of their crude from the same place the Chinese do—the Persian Gulf.

So in the rest of the country, you’ve got a ceiling on energy prices. But out here on the West Coast, you’re looking at $10 a gallon for gasoline, triggering a significant schism in the economic outcomes, even within one country. So this has gone from something that was just kind of out there in the future, if and when de-globalization really gets going, to all of a sudden it’s a meteor.

And now the chances it’s going to happen? Well, I mean, really that’s up to Israel. And then, of course, the Iranian reaction. But I would say it’s somewhere between 1 in 4 and 1 in 3 to happen over the course of the next few months. And considering the depth of this disruption, I hope everyone sleeps well.