Russia: Threats, Deterrence, and the War of Numbers

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Okay, now that all the housekeeping is out of the way, let’s move on to today’s video.

So far in the Ukraine War, the Russians have threatened Finland and Sweden with nuclear annihilation for joining NATO, Germany with nuclear annihilation for providing tanks, Britain with nuclear annihilation for providing missiles, France with nuclear annihilation for merely discussing the possibility of troops, and America with nuclear annihilation because it was a Tuesday. Needless to say, the credibility of Russia’s threats leaves something to be desired…

Russia has struggled to maintain a credible “red line” (referring to the point at which Putin will push the shiny red button) for quite a while now. With the US ready to launch a counter attack should nukes fly, the Russians are already hesitant to pull the trigger, but their recent failed missile test and refusal to enter negotiations means they don’t have a ton of options.

In all likelihood, Russia’s only path to victory in Ukraine relies on sheer manpower. Which means they’ll keep sending wave after wave after wave of their population into the meat grinder until something shifts in their favor…because that’s all they know how to do.

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are free and we will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Kolar, Wisconsin. I love this place, except in the winter when—oh my God. Anyway, back on the 26th. The 26th. The 25th. I can’t remember the exact date. Anyway, sometime in September, the Putin government, Putin himself, announced a new nuclear doctrine for the threshold of when they would actually hit the big candy-like red button.

The Russians are having a problem because they have established all kinds of red lines—dozens of them—over the last two and a half years. Whenever someone has crossed them, whether it’s Ukraine in the war, or weapon supplies from the United States, Germany, Britain, or Turkey, the Russians have ignored their own red line.

So they’re having a credibility problem with their deterrence policy. Putin’s announcement a couple of days ago was about trying to reestablish that. He said that now any non-nuclear country who has an ally who is a nuclear country, should the non-nuclear country use a non-nuclear weapon against Russia, it justifies a nuclear strike on the nuclear country.

This is a stupid, pointless press release—kind of reminds me of the Obama era—because it’s already been violated a few hundred times. The Russians have had a real problem establishing or reestablishing deterrence because they keep saying stupid things like this, which are nonsensical. Immediately, the world goes on, and it’s shown to be a bluff.

Now, the issue is that the Russian conventional military is not all that. By the numbers, Ukraine should have been gone a long time ago, but it’s still punching well above its weight. And that’s before you consider that most of the Western alliance is providing the Ukrainians with ammo and weapons. So, how do you reestablish deterrence?

Well, the first, easiest, most direct, and most reliable way is to have a conversation—to basically call up the United States, establish a summit, and talk about strategic issues, of which nuclear weapons are one.

The Russians have firmly refused that option because if they do that, they have to talk about Ukraine. They have to talk about war crimes. They have to talk about mass kidnappings. They have to talk about the weaponization of sexual violence. They have to talk about encouraging migrants to go to Europe by breaking countries in Africa and the Middle East. They have to talk about all the things they’ve been doing over the last 2 or 3 years that they see as giving them a little bit of leverage.

Of course, the Europeans and the United States have acted, and so the Ukraine war is continuing. Ukraine still exists. For the Russians to establish deterrence by negotiation, they have to put everything else on the table, and they are not willing to do that. As a result, we’ve had no meaningful summits in the last three years with anyone.

What’s the second thing you can do? You can do a demonstration nuclear test. The problem is that the Russian nuclear force has degraded just as much as the Russian conventional force. Less than a week ago, the Russians tried to test out one of the new intercontinental ballistic missiles, and it blew up in the silo.

Now, this is really bad—not just from an embarrassing point of view or a deterrence point of view—but most of the avionics for Russia’s ICBM arsenal were built in Ukraine. This new missile that the Russians were testing was their effort to build a domestic supply chain. It is now apparent that, at least at the moment, that is not possible.

It begs the question of just how reliable the rest of the Russian nuclear arsenal is. If they hit the big candy-red button, will anything happen? If countries aren’t confident that things will launch, deterrence can’t happen.

The third thing you can do is nuke someone. The problem here is, while the Russians have bled away and pissed away their deterrence, the United States has not.

The United States continues to test, fine-tune, and deploy its weapons. It made very clear to the Russians in the early weeks of the Ukraine war that if Russia were to throw a nuke into Ukraine or anywhere else, the first thing the United States would do is use its conventional forces to destroy every Russian military and civilian asset—shipping around the world, every single port within range of conventional force, every single port the Russians have.

If that nuclear weapon were to hit a NATO ally and not just Ukraine, the first few weapons the United States would send back would target Putin personally. So that’s not an option either.

So, what’s left?

What’s left is nothing good. You get Obama-style pointless press releases and Trump-style bluster. That is what passes for strategic policy in the Kremlin these days. Now, whether or not any of that is sustainable over the long run is really not the point. The question, ultimately, is how will the Ukraine war play out?

Remember, Russia is still a large country, and even on its back, it still has a huge amount of resources and manpower to throw at the situation. They’re not bottomless anymore—this is not 1920 or 1980—but the Russians still outnumber the Ukrainians at least 3 to 1. They have an industrial plant that, while atrophied, is still an order of magnitude bigger than anything the Ukrainians have.

They have the Chinese providing huge amounts of components. Probably half of all the weapons systems the Russians have built in the last two years are majority made with Chinese components. Upwards of one-quarter of the artillery shells being used by the Russians on the front are coming from North Korea.

And, of course, all the Shahed drones are coming from Iran. So, there are very real flows here. It’s ultimately a question of whether the Russians can put the numbers to play. To that end, the Putin government, just before that disastrous failed nuclear missile test, announced that they were expanding the military to make it the second-largest standing army in the world.

If Russia is going to win, that’s how—through numbers, by ignoring the casualties, and just steamrolling them. If that sounds inhumane, it’s because this is how Russia has won every single war in its nearly thousand-year history. So far, in this war, they haven’t really put their weight into it. We might be seeing that change now.

If the Russians are going to win, this is how it’s going to go. It’s not going to be because of nukes.

The Civil War of the Sinaloa Cartel

The Sinaloa Cartel, once the dominant organized crime group in Mexico, is turning on itself. This is just another notch along the downward spiral of the Sinaloa Cartel since the arrest of El Chapo years back.

The most recent fighting started after “El Mayo”, a top cartel figure, was betrayed by one of El Chapo’s son and arrested in the US. This newly vacated position caused a power struggle and each of the cartel’s factions is hoping to grab control. The fighting is currently the worst in the Sinaloa state, but is expected to spread throughout Mexico and even spill into the US.

As the fighting ramps up and chaos ensues, we can expect to see disruptions to the distribution network and perhaps the worst news for those who love the white powder…higher prices.

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are not only free, they will always be free. We also will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Transcript

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here. It is the 22nd of September here in Colorado. Well, I guess not just in Colorado. Anyway, the news today is coming out of Sinaloa state in northern Mexico, where there have been at least 100 murders and a whole bunch of abductions as the Sinaloa Cartel is basically devolving into civil war.

Now, the Sinaloa Cartel is rather unique among organized crime groups in that it’s not simply about power or money. It’s run as a business. There was a guy by the name of El Chapo who used to run the place, and he essentially brought together all his chapter leads to compare best practices and figure out how they could run drugs to the United States with less friction and disruption to local law enforcement and local populations.

The concept was pretty straightforward: “Don’t shit where you sleep.” The goal was to maintain good relations with the people where they operated, so they wouldn’t turn on the cartel or go to the government for help. This strategy allowed Sinaloa to become the largest organized crime group in Mexico by far.

However, they were so successful that the United States made El Chapo public enemy number one. Eventually, the U.S. was able to capture and extradite him. He’s now serving multiple life sentences in the American prison system, where he’ll never see the light of day again.

That left his organization in the hands of others who aren’t as competent as he was. El Chapo was, without a doubt, a murderous thug, but he was a murderous thug with a business degree and some managerial skills. Since his capture, the factions he used to control have started to go their own way.

Things really started to unravel back in July, when Ismael Zambada, also known as El Mayo, who used to be the accountant and has taken over most of the operations, was lured to Texas by one of El Chapo’s sons. The second he landed, American law enforcement arrested him. It appears that El Chapo’s son betrayed El Mayo and turned him over to the authorities.

Now, El Chapo has more than one son, and each of them controls a faction of the organization. With El Mayo out of the picture, they’re now fighting among themselves for his share of the cartel.

Cartels aren’t monolithic, especially in a place like Mexico where internal transportation is difficult. The cartel is made up of several dozen groups, mostly locally defined, where local chapters might even use different names, have different organizational structures, and only give lip service to the central leadership. It’s like Canadian politics, but with a lot less politeness.

As long as there’s a strong leader who’s skilled with words and has a firm hand, this system can work and hold together. But when the leader is in prison, his deputy is in prison, and his kids are fighting over what’s left, things fall apart quickly.

Now we’re seeing the largest organized crime group in Mexico break down, and Sinaloa, the heart of the organization, is where the splits are occurring. Over the next few weeks, we can expect to see this violence expand, not just beyond Sinaloa into the rest of Mexico, but also north of the border.

El Chapo’s business-minded approach didn’t just make Sinaloa the largest drug-running group in Mexico—it made them the largest organized crime group on the planet, including in the United States. As the leadership fights among themselves, we’ll see similar breakdowns in their local distribution and retail operations, especially in the U.S., where many of their operations are carried out by local gangs.

This will likely lead to higher drug prices due to distribution disruptions and more violence as the organization fractures at the regional and local levels. Whether that’s good or bad, I’m not sure.

New Ukrainian Weapons Hit Russia Where It Hurts

Ukraine has successfully attacked several major Russian ammunition depots, with explosions detectable hundreds of miles away. These strikes suggest Ukraine’s war strategy is evolving…

There are a handful of factors contributing to the success of Ukraine’s tactics: vulnerability of Russian ammunition, Ukraine’s new missile-drone hybrid weapon and Russian rail system targeting. Combine all of these and you get a recipe for Ukrainian success.

The strategic shift we’re seeing now could pose some serious challenges for the Russians moving forward.

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are not only free, they will always be free. We also will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Transcript

Hello, everybody. It’s Peter Zeihan coming to you from a foggy Colorado. It is the 22nd of September. In the news over the last 4 or 5 days, the Ukrainians have managed to blow up a handful of major arm depots within Russian territory, some of them a couple hundred miles from the border. The three places in question are cross-border, Tow Rope Pets, and two corvettes.

Yeah, pretty sure that’s right. Anyway, one of these explosions was big enough that it was detected by seismic monitoring stations a thousand miles away, which is cool—kind of creepy. Kiloton-range explosion. We’ve got four things going on here, all of which are pretty significant, and when you put them together, it suggests a change in the tempo of the war.

The first thing to understand is that the Russians don’t move and store ammo like normal people. They don’t use forklifts, crates, or pallets; they just have things in boxes moved by hand. So, when something goes wrong—and things often do—it’s very volatile. That’s definitely what happened at all three of these facilities.

The second development is that the Ukrainians have brought a new weapon system into play. The technical term is “drone missile,” which is a bit shy of a cruise missile. The name of this system is a letter, and I’m not going to apologize for mispronouncing it because the Ukrainians chose that name specifically because it’s difficult for the Russians to pronounce—so I’m in the clear. The NSA, anyway. Its range isn’t nearly as good as some of the drones the Ukrainians have been fielding over the course of the summer.

Some of these drones have hit targets a thousand miles from the front, but these probably have a range of no more than 300 miles. However, because it’s a missile instead of a drone, it flies much faster, is much harder to intercept, and can carry a much heavier payload. The bigger Ukrainian drones can carry warheads about 75 pounds, with most of them carrying a third of that. But these new missiles likely have warheads 2 to 5 times as large. I say “likely” because they’re new, and last week was the first time we saw them in action. That said, they’re being used in large numbers—specifically in the attack on Tow Rope Pets, which involved at least 100 of these missiles. This is not just a case of 1 or 2 missiles being launched; entire fleets are now in play. For their debut, that’s pretty impressive from a manufacturing point of view, leaving aside logistics and military planning.

The third issue is that Russia, when it moves cargo more than the final mile, usually relies on rail. Russian territory is vast, and the value of agricultural land in Russia is low. Precipitation is fickle, and the summer season is short, so the amount of income Russian land can generate for the state per square mile is very low. Of the major agricultural zones in the world, Russia’s is by far the lowest in terms of income generated.

This means the Russians can’t afford a normal transport method like having a road network that individual farmers can always access. They simply don’t have the income necessary to build or maintain such a network, so they need something more cost-effective—hence, rail. About 90% of what moves in Russia, whether it’s barrels of oil, bushels of grain, or stacks of ammo canisters, moves by rail. It’s only in the final mile that cargo is moved by hand or maybe by civilian car if it’s a military asset. This system has lots of vulnerabilities, but it’s hard to target trains because rail networks are difficult to disrupt long-term. If a rail line gets blown up, you just lay new track.

In the recent attack, it appears that a train was present, unloading ammo at the time, and it was hit, causing the entire depot to explode. I must emphasize that I’m using local Russian reporting, so take it with a grain of salt. But usually, the Russians don’t celebrate their own trains and ammo dumps getting blown up. “Celebrate” is the wrong word, but you get the point. Unless this was an amazing coincidence, it suggests the Ukrainians have found a way to track Russian rail movements in real-time.

There’s reason to think this is true because a few weeks ago, the Ukrainians attacked Russia to the north and took over large portions of the Kursk province, including a rail depot at a place called Susa. If this allowed the Ukrainians to tap into or hack the Russian rail network, they could now know the schedules and locations of Russian locomotives and what they’re carrying. If they’re carrying ammo and heading to a warehouse full of more ammo, well, that’s a target-rich environment for the Ukrainians. So, we should expect more of these kinds of attacks.

Which brings us to the fourth and final issue: a potential change in targeting. If the Ukrainians do have better intel on the rail system and now have these faster, more lethal, mass-produced missile drones, the logical next step is to target Russia’s power generation and distribution systems. Unlike in the U.S., where half of our cargo by ton-mile is moved by truck, rail is critical in Russia, and two-thirds of Russia’s locomotives are electric. If Ukraine can disrupt the electricity system, the entire Russian transport system could fall apart.

We may already be seeing early stages of this. We know the Ukrainians have used drones to attack power centers in Crimea, though it felt like a test run—there weren’t many drones involved. But if they now have better intel on rail systems and weapons to hit ammo and transport networks, we’ll likely see much more activity within 150 miles of Ukraine’s borders to the north, northeast, and east.

We’ve seen Russian counteroffensives in places like Kursk peter out in the last 72 hours, as well as in the Donbas, where Russian forces were on the verge of capturing a Ukrainian rail network at Borowski. The Russians had been making steady progress toward this goal for months, ever since they captured the fortress city of Avdiivka. They got within 5 or 6 miles of Borowski, and if they had taken it, Ukraine’s ability to move forces along the front would’ve been crippled. But the assault stopped, likely due to the kind of attacks I’ve just described.

This is bad for Russia in the short, mid, and long term. It affects their ability to reach the front, let alone supply it. Remember, the Russian military doesn’t operate on quality—it’s all about throwing huge numbers of troops and shells at the enemy and incrementally advancing. You can’t do that without a robust rail network, and the Ukrainians may have just found a way to strike at its heart.

Immigration: Social Costs vs. Economic Benefits

Its easy to sit up in an ivory tower and say immigration is always good because of the economic benefits; however, turning a blind eye to the social implications of immigration would be irresponsible in a well-rounded discussion. Here’s what Canada and Germany have going on:

Canada jumped on the immigration train fairly early in order to counteract their demographic decline. This influx of young immigrants helped stabilize the population, boosted labor productivity, and brought in more taxes than it cost in benefits. Butttt Canada’s social fabric is rapidly changing due to this new (and growing) population of immigrants.

On the other end of the spectrum, we have Germany and they’re not exactly known for their history of immigration. Over the past few years, the Germans have brought in large numbers of refugees from places like Bosnia, Syria and Ukraine. That has created some hefty social challenges, which will only continue to grow as Germany must bring in millions of young immigrants annually to balance its demographics.

While there is a strong economic case for immigration, we must also consider the social and political costs that it comes with. No amount of money can make a round peg fit in a square hole…

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are not only free, they will always be free. We also will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the top of the Grand Canyon of the 12. I’m in Yosemite, just below Glen Allen. This is where I’m going to be hiking for the next couple of days. Not bad!

Today, we are taking an entry from the Ask Peter Forum, and the question is: Could you go through the numbers on the pros and cons of mass immigration into countries, specifically like Canada and Germany?

People always talk about the economic upside and the tax benefits, but they rarely mention the downsides, like crime and social identity. It’s a reasonable question, especially as we see more and more countries aging. Since we have more nations basically aging out, immigration is often brought up as one of the few, if not the only, possible patches or even solutions.

Let’s start by saying Canada is a special case. Canada knew 30 years ago that they were headed for a German-style demographic implosion. Under the Harper government and later under the Trudeau government, they made the decision to open the floodgates and become an immigrant country. You’ve probably had, I mean, they didn’t count the statistics the same way we do in the United States, but roughly 3 to 4 million immigrants have come in and become Canadians during that period.

Most of these immigrants were in their 20s and 30s, as Canada specifically targeted younger people, unlike the migrants they had received in earlier years. This managed to stabilize the numbers, but only so long as they keep those inflows coming, because native Canadians, to use a church term, still have a very, very low birth rate. There’s no replacement coming from within the population, so a new social fabric is developing.

The numbers, which I don’t have top of mind, I apologize, are unequivocal: the new migrants, especially those under age 40, generate far more in tax payments than they take out over their lifetime. It’s a definite net fiscal benefit. In terms of jobs, as a rule, the people who migrate tend to be the more aggressive, skilled, and educated of their countrymen. This gives you a boost in labor productivity. Not everyone is an Elon Musk, but you get the idea.

Third is crime. Unequivocal data shows that in every country that tracks these statistics, crime committed by immigrants is significantly lower—typically at least a third lower—than crime committed by the native-born population.

Fourth, there’s something people usually don’t think about: education. In the United States, it costs over $150,000 to graduate a kid from high school. That’s just the government cost for education, not the societal cost of raising the child from birth to age 18, including healthcare. One of the benefits of migrants is that, you know, another country has already paid those costs, and now you’re benefiting from their labor. Economically, it’s a very easy case to make.

Two things to keep in mind. Number one: not all migrants are the same. Take the United Kingdom, for example. Indian migrants and family reunification—basically, the UK would bring in one person from India who meets all of these criteria we’ve discussed. But then they bring in their extended family, and all of a sudden you’ve got 60 Indian Brits, half of whom are over 60. It’s a different story if you’re bringing in new retirees; the cost to society can be very, very high.

Also, in the German case, the migrants from Syria—about a million of them—were 80–90% male. So, you’re not getting much of a demographic boost there because there weren’t enough women to have more children.

The second complicating factor is social cohesion. If immigration has been a part of your social fabric for decades or even centuries, absorbing people from different places is relatively easy. Countries like the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have done this in phases for a long time, so if someone says their parents are from a different country, most Americans won’t even blink. People in the U.S. assimilate very quickly.

But if your country doesn’t have that culture, like Germany, and you suddenly open the floodgates, things start to look very different. The first real wave of migration into Germany happened during the Bosnian wars in the 1990s. Germany did the right thing for the right reason by taking in refugees, but it changed the social character of the country. They did it again in the 2000s with Syrians, and now they’re doing it with Ukrainians. If you wait too long, until there are more people in their 40s than in their 30s, 20s, 10s, or even newborns, you’ll end up with a very different place.

This is the situation that Canada will face—not right now, but in 20 or 30 years. They waited until late in the day to start bringing in millions of people. If it happens over a long enough period, society can adapt. But in Germany’s case, this has all happened relatively quickly. To maintain their demographic standing, Germany may have to bring in 2 to 2.5 million people under age 30 every year for the next 20 years, just to stay where they are. By then, those people will form the majority of the country, which will make it a very different place.

If you look at immigration purely as a numbers game, a fiscal issue, or an economic growth issue, it’s a slam-dunk case. But we don’t live in that world. And you know what we call the gap between the ideal and reality? Politics.

Why You Should Ditch Your Pager (Hezbollah Operative Edition)

If your pocket starts to feel warm in the coming days, here’s a few questions you should ask yourself. #1 – Are you trapped in the 80s? #2 – Are you affiliated with any terrorist organizations? If you answered yes to either of these questions, you should probably throw your pager away…but hopefully all of my readers ditched their pagers before Bush Senior left office.

If you haven’t heard by now, a sophisticated Israeli operation targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon was carried out on September 17. While Israel has not officially claimed this attack, it appears to be the next chapter in the rising tensions between Israel and Hezbollah.

Israel’s operation involved intercepting pagers somewhere along Hezbollah’s supply chain, implanting explosives, and then returning those devices to the supply chain to eventually end up in the hands of Hezbollah operatives. Those devices were then detonated earlier this week. Hezbollah has evolved into a political and militant power within Lebanon, so they’ve somewhat limited conflict with Israel to help maintain their political footholds.

This attack resulted in a number of casualties among Hezbollah and also provided the Israeli’s with a strategic understanding of who is involved with the organization. As of now, I don’t expect this to escalate into a broader conflict.

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are not only free, they will always be free. We also will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today, I’m recording this on the 18th. Yesterday, the 17th of September, we had several thousand pagers explode in Lebanon, injuring at least 2,800 people and killing at least 12. This was undoubtedly an Israeli operation. The Israelis aren’t saying anything about it, but no one else would, and no one else has a vested interest in doing this.

The target was Hezbollah, which is a militant/political organization in Lebanon that the Israelis have been dealing with over the last several months, and vice versa.

Okay, so what’s going on?

Number one, Hezbollah is not new. It’s been around for decades. Israel is not new. It’s been around for decades. Basically, since Hezbollah’s formation—it’s been around for 40, 50, 60 years—they’ve always been involved in conflict with Israel. However, things have evolved over the last 15 years in a more peaceful direction. The two haven’t come to direct blows since a brief air war in the early 2000s. The reason is very simple: Hezbollah is not a typical terrorist organization. They also have a political wing that is part of the government in Lebanon.

There’s a whole class of people in Hezbollah who don’t see a vested interest in firing rockets into northern Israel because they are now part of the power structure. If you challenge Israel in a way that makes them feel the tanks need to move, there’s nobody in the neighborhood who can stand up to them. So, you get this hybridized organization where there’s a militant wing and a political wing.

I’m not suggesting any of them are nice people, but not everyone wants to have a war. In fact, even on the militant side, in the aftermath of the Hamas attacks last year, Hezbollah knows they are fortunate that Israel has its hands full with a suppression operation in Gaza. The danger, of course, is that everyone in the Middle East always wants the last word.

Both sides—Israel and Hezbollah—have been doing attacks on each other, just like the Iranians, in order to get the last word. But since no one will let anyone else have the last word, we keep having these layered attacks that escalate, settle down, escalate again, and so on.

I have no reason to believe that this is any different. I don’t think it’s going to lead to a general war, but Hezbollah will feel like it has to respond, and then Israel will feel like it has to respond, which will make Hezbollah feel like it has to respond. Welcome to the Middle East. This is just what the place looks like on a good day.

This does not change my assessment that the Middle East is still the most volatile part of the world and has been for a little over two years now.

Now, what about this attack specifically?

Well, a few things. First of all, this is clearly against international law—using a civilian network, the telephone network, to trigger civilian devices (pagers) in civilian areas of Lebanon is clearly not legal. But because Hezbollah has a militant wing and has been launching missiles and rockets into Israel, I really don’t see anyone who matters bringing a court case against the Israelis for this one. So that’s kind of a minor sideshow issue.

Far more important: this was a pretty sophisticated attack. The Israelis have had a lot of intelligence failures over the last few years. They completely missed the Gaza operation, and they’re botching their counterattacks into Gaza now. This should have been done months ago, and they’re making no appreciable progress. They’ve had to go back over areas they’ve already cleared, over and over again. This has the makings of a quagmire operation for them.

Now, let me explain how this attack likely happened. The pagers were manufactured in Taiwan. They were shipped to Hungary, where a Hungarian company’s distribution system took over. Somewhere between Taiwan and Hungary—and these things being delivered to Hezbollah—the Israelis got a hold of the shipments and implanted explosives in them. Probably what they did was swap out the batteries and replace them with a hybrid battery-explosive system.

There’s no way to remotely hack a pager and turn it into a bomb. Sorry. The most a pager would do is get really hot if tampered with. So, the sophistication to do that without anyone noticing, and getting it into thousands of people’s hands, is kind of impressive.

There’s also the operational aspect. Hezbollah uses pagers because cell phones can be easily tracked if you know what you’re doing. Pagers only send a signal when they’re on, so they’re a much simpler technology but safer if you’re trying to avoid having the Israelis drop a bomb on your head. Well, the Israelis have now hit a couple thousand people who were part of the Hezbollah supply chain and distribution system.

It’s not like everyone who has a pager in Lebanon got hit—just the people who had gotten pagers from Hezbollah. The vast majority, if not all, of them were affiliated with the organization in an operative way. So, the next step here is that the Israelis undoubtedly had observers in hospitals across Lebanon. They’ve either confirmed or identified hundreds, if not thousands, of Hezbollah agents and operatives. That’s a rich intelligence trove. It doesn’t get much better than that. Not to mention, a lot of these guys are going to have holes in their thighs and will be easy to identify after they heal because they’ll be limping for the rest of their lives.

You’ve got to give credit where it’s due—that was a brilliant operation.

Finally, it raises the question of what else the Israeli intelligence services have been up to. After those recent intelligence failures, there was an open question as to whether or not Israel had lost its mojo. Clearly, at least some people in their intelligence services have not. If they can interrupt a supply chain of pagers, what else can they do?

Manufactured goods in Lebanon—everything is imported. So, that’s an opportunity for the Israelis to reach out and tackle anything that Hezbollah might have an independent supply system for.

Today, on the 18th, we found a second wave—walkie-talkies, something else that is hard to hack—that exploded and probably injured another 300 people. Now you’ve got a bunch of Hezbollah folks walking around missing fingers. The Israelis are not done here, and Hezbollah will react, but we have seen a level of sophistication in Israel today and yesterday that we just haven’t seen in the last few years.

Whether they’re doing this because they have some broader plans or whether this is just the most recent tit-for-tat, I don’t have an answer for you. But what I can tell you is that operationally, Hezbollah has now been marked, and a more traditional assassination campaign would be so much easier than it was just three days ago.

The Future of Saudi Arabia

A photo of Saudi Arabian traffic against a desert skyline

The US has become largely self-sufficient when it comes to oil, and it was never really reliant upon Saudi oil in the first place. Back in the day, the US formed a relationship with Saudi Arabia not for itself, but instead to provide US allies with oil during globalization. Times are changing and so is this relationship, so what does the future of Saudi Arabia look like?

The US is largely pulling out of the Middle East and turning its focus back towards home and East Asia. That means American strategic interests in the Middle East have nowhere to go but down.

Without a real need to maintain an active relationship, US-Saudi relations will likely fade, exposing Saudi Arabia to a…colorful neighborhood. It doesn’t take much to imagine a strategic mishap in which the Saudis lose control of their oil fields.

The current external security guarantees aren’t working for the Saudis and they don’t have many great prospects. China’s navy lacks the range to help out Riyadh, Japan remains (mostly) pacifist, and European powers just don’t make a ton of sense. Turkey is the only real option, and not even a great one at that due to Turkey’s strength and “history” of ruling the region.

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

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Our newsletters and videologues are not only free, they will always be free. We also will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Transcript

Morning, everyone. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Waterfall Camp just above the Merced Canyon. That’s the one that stretches pretty much the entire length of the North Country and ends up down in Yellowstone Valley. Today, we’re going to take an entry from the Ask Peter forum about the Middle East—specifically, the Persian Gulf. What’s the future of relations between the United States and the countries in the region, specifically the Arab states, most notably Saudi Arabia?

Well, if you’re an Arab in the Persian Gulf, the news isn’t great. During globalization, the United States needed oil from the Persian Gulf—not for itself, but for its allies. Everyone from Japan to China, to Korea, to Taiwan, to France, Germany, Italy, and Britain. These were countries that did not have sufficient oil capacity for themselves. To induce them to join the global order and the Cold War against the Soviet Union, part of the deal was that the U.S. would keep them fueled. They wouldn’t need a navy to get the oil themselves—the U.S. would take care of that. So, the oil was for the U.S., but not directly. The United States has always gotten most of its oil from within North America, and to a lesser degree, from countries like Venezuela, with a little bit from Africa. We never got more than maybe 20% of our crude from the Middle East at all.

Well, as the shale revolution kicked in, the volumes of crude that the United States got from the Middle East basically dropped to zero. The Saudis got into the habit of parking supertankers off the coast of Louisiana, waiting for them to be needed. And after a while, when it turned out that they weren’t needed anymore, those stopped altogether. In addition, the stuff from Africa went away, Venezuela committed national suicide, and now the United States, plus Canada, is pretty much self-sufficient. There are some rounding errors and caveats in that statement, but that’s kind of the core position.

In the shift through Barack Obama and Donald Trump, the United States became far more disengaged from the world. We went from having a carrier, maybe two carriers at a time, in the Persian Gulf, to now really never having one there unless something is flaring up. This reflects the shift of strategic priorities. The U.S. is far more concerned with things at home, and then, to a lesser degree, what’s going on in East Asia.

For example, when the Kuwaitis discovered a big oil field offshore last month, the Americans were like, “Whatever.” Kuwait can’t develop that itself—Kuwait has no offshore capability. Maybe some of our firms will be involved, but with the security guarantees gone, it’s a different game.

Then there’s Saudi Arabia, which is, of course, the big one. The Saudis are a little cocky because they control the holy sites and claim to control the religion of Islam, or at least speak for it. That is, of course, a hotly contested topic in the region. But the United States has bent over backwards for the last 75 years to keep the Saudis happy because that was the single biggest play in the region for crude. If you could get the Saudis on board, you could pretty much guarantee that the Kuwaitis, Emiratis, and Qataris would join as well. And then you’d have everything you needed.

That doesn’t necessarily play in a post-globalized world. In a world where the U.S. is self-sufficient in energy and has sufficient exports to supply a handful of choice allies, the U.S. actually enters into the role of a disruptor. Reliable energy supplies on a global scale are no longer perceived as a strategic necessity. Once that happens, the U.S. goes from being the greatest guarantor of security the world has ever known to something closer to the opposite. When that happens, the relationship with Saudi Arabia will absolutely tank.

The Saudis can barely operate some of their easier fields. They need a huge army of expats to keep everything going. Simply denying them the staff would be enough to cripple production. More likely, however, all of the oil is exported through just a few terminals, and the Saudis don’t have a navy worth mentioning. So, if you take the world’s greatest naval power against a desert power without much military…you do the math.

I’m not saying the U.S. is going to conquer Saudi Arabia—there’s no point in that. But embargo, destroy some offshore loading facilities, or grab tankers as they leave—these are all options for the future. At that point, if we don’t want the oil and we don’t want someone else to have the oil, Saudi Arabia becomes just a country living in the desert.

Have you seen Syriana? It kind of sums it up. How did Matt Damon put it? The view of the business community is that people in your country were living in tents in the desert a century ago, beheading one another, and you’re going to be doing that again this century? That’s pretty much where we are when it comes to American views of this region. Take away the oil, and all that’s left is a penchant for domestic violence that we don’t particularly like either. So, that relationship is going to break in time. But “in time” is the key word. We’re not there yet.

As the Biden administration has shown over the last two or three years, there’s still a need for an alliance structure to achieve certain things, most notably in the Ukraine war. Also, in terms of boxing China in and semiconductors. As long as the U.S. perceives value in its alliance structure, there’s value in keeping crude flowing unimpeded from the Persian Gulf. But we should be preparing for a middle ground between completely cutting them loose and tolerating them.

In the middle, we would force this region, by hook or crook, to be a little more selective in where they sell their crude. Should things with China ever escalate to the point of shooting, which I don’t anticipate but can’t rule out, one of the first things the U.S. would do is put a few ships in the Strait of Hormuz and make sure crude can’t get to China at all. That would shut down the entire place within three months. That’s a very different relationship from what we have now, but it’s something to think about.

One more thing. Oh, yeah—Lewis Canyon. We have to look at this from the Saudi point of view. The Saudi position has always been that, since they sit on the world’s largest exploitable deposit of oil, they should just be able to pay people to defend them and their beliefs. Right up until the Iraq War in 2003, the United States was basically a bunch of mercenaries. The Saudis thought, “We’ll buy a bunch of their equipment, shrink-wrap it, put it in air-conditioned warehouses, and when we want them to fight our wars, we’ll call up the American press and they’ll do it.”

They didn’t think the Iraq War was a good idea, but it happened anyway. They were violently disabused of their position in the world. As the U.S. steps back, the Saudis are going to need a different security guarantor, and there aren’t many candidates. It’s got to be someone with a blue-water navy who can deploy over long distances—or march to Saudi Arabia.

The problem is, there are really only four options. China doesn’t have the range. Japan does, but they haven’t moved far enough past their pacifist position to invest in an army. It looks like the U.S. and Japan are settling for cooperation over the Pacific, which includes energy security for Japan. So, that probably doesn’t work. Next up are the Brits and the French. The UAE has already gotten into bed with the French, and there’s already military cooperation from their base in the UAE. But the Saudis would really rather not go with Europeans.

The only other option is Turkey. Turkey wouldn’t need a naval force to sail around the Arabian Peninsula to get to the Persian Gulf—they’d just have to march through Iraq directly to Riyadh. But that would generate the one thing Saudi Arabia doesn’t want: a superior military power with easy access to everything Saudi. Because if you’re Turkey in that scenario, why in the world would you defend Saudi Arabia and not just take it over?

 

Hurricanes in the Gulf, Offshore Oil and the Energy Sector

The most recent hurricane that tore through the Gulf of Mexico has sent ripples through the insurance industry thanks to all the property damage, but what will its impact on the energy sector look like?

The US has become a net exporter of refined products, moving over 4 million barrels per day. The shale revolution made this achievement possible, and in the process, helped to move most energy production onshore. So, when Hurricane Francine ripped through the Gulf, its impact on the energy sector was minimal.

Offshore production in the Gulf of Mexico only accounts for about 5% of US production. To minimize the impact even further, shale producers can easily compensate for any temporary loss in offshore ouput. Shale is king, and offshore production just isn’t really needed…but at least future generations can tap into the Gulf reserves should they need it.

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are not only free, they will always be free. We also will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Cove Bay in Barbados. It occurred to me that, the Gulf of Mexico just got hit by a hurricane. And I wanted to tell you why it doesn’t really matter. Well, I mean, it does matter. You do property damage, especially in an era of rising sea levels and bigger hurricanes. Obviously, that has an insurance application that hits us all because insurance companies then have to make up for it either by higher premiums or by charging everybody else more for insurance.

So it does ripple through the system. But from an energy point of view, it doesn’t really matter. The United States is no longer simply energy independent. We are now a net exporter of over 4 million barrels per day, not of crude, of refined product. And that puts the United States into a category that no other country has ever been in terms of being an energy power.

Now, the Gulf of Mexico used to be one of our major energy things. And back when I was working at Stratfor in the Arts, part of my job was to basically chronicle how much stuff went off, like how long I would stay offline, and that gave us price increases that would last not for days or weeks, but months or even a couple of years.

Sometimes because it took a long time to repair the damage, to go out and untangle, what happened on the seabed with the pipelines? It was it was expensive, was laborious, and we would feel it for a long time. Not anymore. One of the many weird things about the shale revolution is that all of the production sites are onshore, and unless you get so much rain that everything floods in your field, you’re talking about a time to bring them back on that if it goes off it at all is measured in days and you can bring on a completely fresh well in the weeks.

So we have seen the price argument and the national security argument for energy production in the offshore Gulf of Mexico dwindle and dwindle and dwindle. And so even though the most recent hurricane just plowed through some of the best production real estate the Gulf of Mexico has, it only took off somewhere between 650 and 750,000 barrels per day, which not that is an insignificant amount, but United States, if you include things like, associate production from natural gas liquids and condensate, we now produce close to 20 million barrels a day.

So you’re talking about less than a 5% reduction. And the shale guys are already spinning up their drills to bring more production on line to displace it. And it’ll be weeks to months before the offshore producers can even pretend to catch up. The price structure just has changed so dramatically. For natural gas, it’s actually even a little bit better.

We’re talking about 750,000,000 cubic feet per day. That is right around one 1.5% of U.S natural gas production. So we’ll barely feel that outside of the local markets at all. And same thing. The shale guys are going up to gas wells to supplant it. So think of it this way. If you’re in the Gulf, you are now the piggy bank.

Should anything go drastically wrong with U.S shale production, the reserves in the Gulf will be there for another generation, but it’s probably going to be another generation or two before that’s all relevant. All right, that’s it for me. Take care.

Photo credit: NASA Goddard Space Flight Center from Greenbelt, MD, USA, CC BY 2.0 via Wikimedia Commons