Economic Troubles for New Zealand

Photo of the skyline of Auckland, New Zealand

New Zealand has been having some issues, with a 1% economic contraction and roughly 80,000 people leaving the country. What does this mean for one of my favorite countries?

New Zealand is a service-driven economy, but its two key industries – tourism and agriculture – are facing some challenges. The weak Kiwi dollar is great for tourists, but its straining local affordability. The dairy sector may be the most efficient in the world, but a collapsing China will cause major issues for exports.

While there are some hills to climb, it’s not all bad news bears. The Kiwis have stronger demographics than other developed countries and New Zealand could be a haven for skilled workers looking to escape collapsing or struggling countries.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey everyone. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from the Queen Charlotte Walkway. That’s the king of Peru sound behind me. And today we’re going to do something that all my Kiwi followers have been screaming for for the last few weeks, which is, you know, do one on New Zealand already. So here we go. New Zealand’s in a bit of a recession right now. 

Contracted about 1% in the last quarter that we’ve got data for, which doesn’t sound like much, but that’s like half as bad as what happened during, say, the subprime crisis in the first year. So, you know, it’s if this was in America, we would all be freaking out. And, so let’s look at the economics, let’s look at the demographics, and then let’s talk about the context. 

So first, the economics, the, the, Kiwi economy, much like everybody else in the first world, is largely services driven. But the two more dynamic sectors in here are agriculture and tourism. Tourism participant has been driving up prices because we’re in a situation right now where the Kiwi dollar is the lowest it’s been in quite some time, which is it for me, but it means lots of people come in and consume lots of things that the locals otherwise would, housing an especially short term in rental housing. 

Sorry. Not sorry. Driving up the prices for everybody else. When you have a situation like that, people get a little antsy. And, because the currency is weak, they’re getting more business, but earning less for it. It’s a little stressful, and people tend to leave. And so 80,000 Kiwis left last year, which, again, doesn’t sound like a lot, but this is a country of only 5 million people. 

So you’re talking about losing basically a quarter of the percent of your population in one year? The only California’s worse than that, of course. 

Anyway, that’s a lot to lose in one year for a country, primarily young and skilled people. Their destinations tend to be Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom, in that order. You go to places where there are jobs. 

It’s just that simple. Okay. Anyway, tourism, obviously something that it works very well here at the wine is good, the food is good, the land is good. It’s just a beautiful place with wonderful people. But if you’re doing more and earning less for it, you can see how that can be a problem. Second big sector agriculture. 

Huge, new Zealand is a primarily volcanic soil, and many of the volcanoes are still active. I hiked on two of them earlier in this trip. And it’s, positioned where the local wind currents bring it. Lots and lots and lots of moisture. In addition, it is surrounded by relatively cool water oceans. You put that together and you never have a hot summer, and you never have a cold winter. 

And fertile soil, plus lots of water. Anything can grow, and I mean, anything can grow. So the New Zealanders have some of the lowest cost of production per unit for agricultural products in the world, and only have 5 million people. So they can focus on quality, they can focus on value add. And the sector that has seen explosive growth over the last 4550 years is dairy. 

Once the Kiwis left being part of the Imperial network that the Brits had built and went into business for themselves, they switched almost wholesale from things like sheep to dairy because they just have a huge competitive advantage. They never need enclosures. They never need shelters in the winter or the summer, and they can just rotate the cattle around, always giving them fresh food. 

Only in the last few years have they started growing corn themselves to use a silage to increase their productivity even more. But even before they had done that, New Zealand dairy was generally considered the highest in the world in terms of quality and could be produced, at the lowest cost of any dairy in the world. 

In fact, they have about a 30 to a 40% price advantage over the country. That’s in second place in terms of efficiency, and that’s the United States. And we only do that with massive enclosures and sheer numbers and lots and lots of, inputs, such as silage, in order to make the cows grow quickly and produce a lot, the Kiwis don’t have to do that. 

They’re starting to. Which means there are additional efficiency gains to be gained. And you should expect both tourism and agriculture, especially dairy, to continue to grow in percentage terms that are just not possible anywhere else in the world. And yet, 80,000 people left, were experiencing here the tail end, the final days of the China boom. As the Chinese demographic situation completely implodes. 

And there’s a combination of political incompetence at the top of the Chinese system and globalization and trade pressures from the wider world basically break the Chinese system and dissolve the country as a functional entity. Everyone who sells to China is enjoying these last few years were basically at the top of the bubble, and then that market just goes away. 

And that’s going to hurt the new Zealanders as much as it’s going to hurt anyone who sells into that market. And we will have to have an adjustment in production capacity around the world. Now, countries like New Zealand, where the efficiency is through the roof, are the ones who will come out of that in the best place. 

They’ll push the higher cost producers like, say, the Brazilians and the Russians out of the market in places where they compete. And we’re going to see that in industry after industry after industry moving forward. Okay. Let’s talk about the people. 

New Zealand has the highest birth rate in the rich world and the highest birth rate in the advanced developing world. Better than India, better than Mexico, better than Turkey, better than Indonesia. Is one of the very few countries in the world where the cost of living for young parents is sufficiently low, and the availability of suburban and rural land isn’t just there, it’s there, and it’s attractive to live in. That helps keep family formation robust, that helps people marry and have kids when they’re still in their 20s. 

The old model that we think of the United States as having dissolved back in the 60s, in the 70s and in, say, Europe much before that, still holds here no matter where you go in New Zealand, there’s lots of families with young children, and yet 80,000 young people still left. Last year. So whenever you have a period of economic distress, people will go to places that allow them to deal with that economic distress. 

New Zealand’s primary problem is that it’s small and so any of the trends that are hitting in the wider world when they do hit New Zealand, there’s not a lot of else in the system to absorb the disruption. And so people flow, Australia, because they’ve got a a deal called the Common economic policy, something like that. 

Yep. I think that’s right. Anyway. And then, of course, they’re still part of the Commonwealth so they can get into Britain. And everybody, who is white is generally allowed into the United States for limited periods of time. Looking forward, you know, what we’re do to looking forward from a different viewpoint. 

Okay. We’re going to finish this video from, Queen Charlotte Sound. So 80,000 Kiwis last year relocated to other countries, which is a record. And that sort of population movement in the face of economic dislocation is about what you would expect. People go to where they think their prospects will be better. Now, I may be very bullish on New Zealand long term, but it’s a small economy. 

So if there is a disruption in the global system, in tourism, agriculture, they’re dependent on the global system. People will look elsewhere, at least temporarily. But we need to think about this on a much larger scale, because New Zealand country with 5 million people is, if anything, the canary in the coal mine of the disruption to come. 

At the end of the day, I think the Kiwis will be fine. More than enough food for themselves, no security issues to speak of. And, because they’re so far from the East Asian landmass, they can access energy either from the Persian Gulf or from Southeast Asia, or from North America or from South America. So, you know, the lights aren’t going to go out here no matter really what happens. 

Other countries are not nearly so lucky. The demographic situation in places like Germany and China is just atrocious. We’re talking about national oblivion here with, their economies ceasing to function in the way we define the term, within a decade, probably with the worst of it in China happening within five years. Germany might have a little bit more time, but only a little. 

And that’s before you consider globalization. Germany and China are both export driven systems, and as the world ages, its ability to buy stuff is going to shrink. And that’s before you consider politics or trade disruptions due to changes in trade policy. So you’re going to have a lot of Chinese, a lot of Germans, a lot of people from other countries looking for greener pastures, in many cases literally. 

And the people who have degrees that are useful in an industrializing environment, and, are mobile are the ones that are likely be able to take the most advantage of, especially if they’re under 50. Because just because the Germans are dying out doesn’t mean that there are no Germans under 50. And the German educational system still cranks out top talent. 

It’s just that there’s not going to be much opportunity for them at home. And if you look back through history, there’s nothing about this that is unexpected. The Germans throughout history have had booms and busts triggered by changes in the geopolitical environment, the one that is most relevant to this conversation, the one that is most relevant to the United States, is what happened in the 1840s with the German civil wars at the onset of the industrial period. 

There you had, over a million Germans leave Germany for American shores, increasing the country’s population, our country’s population by 7 or 8% in less than a decade, from just that one influx. And in doing so, we developed these two little things that today we call Illinois and Texas. So bringing in millions of people who know how things work and how to build things, can drastically change a culture and economy in a short period of time. 

Now, the United States today has 330 million people. The sort of influx it would be necessary to jar the system. It would be pretty big. But there is going to be a very, very large supply of Germans, of Italians, of Koreans and Chinese, and the rest, to take if you can take advantage of that, you solve many of the Americans problems in terms of workforce, industry and demographics and a fairly short period of time and if we don’t, we have to figure out how to do everything without the skill sets, and that’s going to make everything more expensive. 

So watch the Kiwis. In many ways, they are leading the way into something that might work in the future, and the problems that they have identified are ones that are going to be much bigger elsewhere. 

And in a world of globalization and the population, the Kiwis are the ones to watch.

Educating the Workers of Tomorrow

A construction workers cuts lumber in a mask

If I was tasked with raising and educating the next generation of workers (aka what middle school teachers do daily), what would I teach my minions (okay fine, “students”) to best prepare them for the future?

In the School of Zeihan, there will be 2 major areas of focus: Spanish and skilled trades. That’s right, instead of pencil cases and books, I’ll be handing out tool belts and Rosetta Stones on the first day of class.

Spanish will be essential, as Mexico will be one of our most dominant trade partners for the next 50+ years. Extra credit for the kids that can pick up some technical Spanish to bridge the gap in bilingual technical expertise – you know, to manage the semiconductor, automotive and aerospace industries.

After their Spanish lessons, the kids will head over to shop class. We’ll be churning out electricians, construction workers, and just about every other blue-collar position to ensure we can cover the demand associated with doubling the industrial capacity in the US.

So, who wants to enroll their kids in the Colegio Zeihan?

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here coming to you from an incredibly chilly Colorado. And today we’re to take a question from the Patreon page. Is like I’m a middle school teacher. What should I be teaching my kids to prepare for the future? Oh, I like this question. It’s a happy question. Okay. Number one Spanish. It’s the number two language in the United States. 

It’s the number one language. And our top trading partner and the demographics of Mexico, which are significantly younger than the United States, suggests that Mexico is going to be our top trading partner and pretty much every economic sector for at least the next 50 years. Any good beyond that and technology might change, but at least for the next 50 years, integration with Mexico is the story, especially as the Chinese fail. 

Second, if you want to take the next logical step in that not just Spanish, but technical Spanish, the issue is that there are lots and lots of Americans who speak Spanish, and there are lots and lots of Mexicans who speak English, but there are not a lot of people on both sides who speak the technical aspects of specific parts of the language. 

So, for example, 80% of the world’s low quality semiconductors, that’s 90 nanometers and dumber. Think of the Internet of Things, your smart refrigerator, that sort of thing. 90, 80% of those come out of mainland China. And when the Chinese system breaks, we’re going to have to do one of two things. We’re going to have to basically get by without the quality of chips. 

And they’re in everything. So we basically digitize large sections of the economy, or we take this legacy technology, which in many cases is 20, even 30 years old, and we rebuild it somewhere else. And in the case of the United States, it’s probably not very cost effective. We’re probably going to be focusing on the middle and the higher end components that go into things like automotive and aerospace and power management, not to mention AI and satellites and cell phones and computers. 

But Mexico is rapidly, especially in northern Mexico, is rapidly moving up the value added scale in every type of manufacturing they do. And they could probably, with a little bit of help, move into low end semiconductors with just a couple of years of effort. The problem is going to be the transition period between now and then. And for that, you’re going to need a lot of people in a technical capacity in these Mexican semiconductor fabrication facilities who can basically handle the language of the technical side of the manufacturing process, and that requires some very specific language skills that just don’t exist in the bilateral relationship right now. 

And you can do the same thing as Mexico. It’s more sophisticated IT and aerospace and automotive and, wiring harnesses and basically everything that puts together a modern industry. Remember that as the Chinese system goes, that’s the workshop of the World Breaks. There’s going to be a lot of stuff that has to be relocated very, very quickly. And the sooner we can start on that, the better. 

And this is probably, I would argue, more of a restriction on our ability to bring Mexico up to snuff quickly than anything having to do with capital or labor, which is saying something because those are huge problems. And then the third item is much more straightforward here in the United States, in Canada and Mexico, we basically need to double the size of the industrial plant, to replace what currently comes in from China. 

Well, that’s a lot of construction workers. That’s a lot of bricklayers. That’s a lot of electricians. We need skilled blue collar labor with probably electricity manipulation, being the single largest gap in the workforce. So the two biggest things that you can do, if your goal is to earn a six figure salary right out of school, technical Spanish to become an electrician, language skills and shop class are looking really good right now. 

And on top of that, the politics of this are pretty good too. We’re going to double the size of the industrial plant. Pretty much all of those jobs are going to be blue collar. So we do stand at the dawn of the golden age of organized labor. And if you can be the skilled labor within the organized labor who you can punch your own ticket however you want. 

All right, that’s it.

Can Tariffs Replace Income Taxes?

An AI generated image of connex boxes with American and Chinese flags on them

Imagine never paying income tax again. Sounds damn nice to me too. That’s until reality kicks in and you start looking at the math on how large the tariffs would need to be to replace those taxes…

Tariffs on imported goods would need to be roughly 50-65% and you could imagine the fallout that would have. Trade with key partners would collapse, prices would surge, supply chains would be disrupted, and energy supplies would take a hit. Tariffs once worked as a revenue source for the US, but with all the current programs and expenses, they barely scratch the surface.

In theory, there could be a way to make this work; like implementing entitlement programs, so a lower tariff would suffice. However, that would require some massive political changes that the US just isn’t ready for.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey, all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from a windy Colorado. We’re taking a couple of questions from the Patreon page today, specifically. A lot of talk in Washington these days is about replacing all income taxes with import tariffs. Is this possible? What do you think about what it would look like? Great question. The proposal dates back to something that predates the income tax, which was really adopted only about a century ago. 

But you have to keep in mind the volumes in question. Today, the United States imports about 1.14. trillion dollars of goods and services, about, three quarters of that as goods. And the tax generates about 2.6 to $2.7 trillion of income. So if your goal is to zero out the income tax, you need a tariff on everything, not just from China, everything that is in the range of 50 to 65%. 

I guarantee you, if you increase the price of things by half, it’s going to change how we live. For example, we bring in a lot of Canadian crude, heavy stuff that is then refined into, distillates such as gasoline and diesel, which are the primary fuel source for most of, say, the Midwestern part of the United States. That would go to zero almost overnight with a 50% increase. So we’d have lots of reshuffling. We’d have to basically shut down trade relations with all of our major countries that participate. Link supply chains with us. And, anything that is electronic come to Asia would get very expensive. 

So you’d have some big impacts. The reason why you’d have this, such as mismatches. We don’t have the same economy that we had back during the times in the 1800s, when tariffs were our primary source of income. So we have built out the social welfare state with Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security and defense now being our four biggest line items in the government. 

So if you were to zero out Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, then you could perhaps talk about doing an equalization with a tariff that’s only around 20 or 30%. But I would argue that that would require a lot of political evolutions in the United States that we are not quite ready to cope with at the moment. So it’s an interesting idea, but as a, as an income tax eliminator, we’re nowhere near to tariffs, being the solution to that particular problem.

Coal Remains Essential for US Electricity

Photo of coal

Georgia Power (owned by Southern Company) updated its IRP and is sending environmental activists into a tizzy.

The update revealed a significant increase in projected power demands, and to keep up, Georgia Power plans to expand power generation across various sources. That includes delaying the decommissioning of certain coal plants. Hence the environmental tizzy.

But this shouldn’t come as a surprise. The US is reindustrializing, and electricity demands are poised to skyrocket. With manufacturing, AI and data centers all requiring constant, reliable power, there’s not a whole lot of viable options that can provide a base load like coal.

Eventually coal is going to get the boot, but it’s a necessary evil for the time being. As energy transitions begin, we’ll take one step closer to saying goodbye, but that could be a decade or two from now.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming from Colorado. And today we’re gonna talk about electricity in the United States. Specifically, Georgia Power, which is one of the largest components of Southern Company, which is I believe is now the second largest electricity producer in the United States, covers the southeastern part of the country. They filed something on Friday, December 31st, called an IRP, an integrated resource plan. 

And basically it’s their more than back of envelope sketches for how they plan to meet power demand over the next three years. They filed an intermediate one last year, and the big difference between last year and this year is they’re anticipating, demand growth in their region by the end of the decade, growing by over two gigawatts, more than what they had planned for just 12 months ago. 

And so in order to meet that demand, they’re adding more power by pretty much every type of generation you can imagine. But the biggest change is that they’re not going to decommission a couple of coal plants, which of course has some environmental interest up in arms. Expect to see a lot more of this. 

 One of the things to keep in mind when you’re talking about this economic transition the United States is going through, is in order to prepare for a post China world, we need to double the size of the industrial plant in this country. 

And that’s before you consider trade wars. That’s before you consider resource conflicts. That’s before you consider the green transition, which will move a lot of things from, fossil fuel to a more, alternative system. We just are gonna need more power. 

Digitization is great. AI’s wonderful and all those good things. But ultimately, if your economy is going to not just be based on services, if it’s going to be based on manufacturing, if it’s going to be about moving things and stamping things and heating things and smelting things, you’re going to use a lot more electricity. 

And the IRP that Georgia Power just updated reflects that. And you can only add new forms of electrical generation so quickly. And that even assumes that the regulatory picture is very favorable. Now in southern companies zone of operation, Southern Company gets along great with all of the state legislators and the state regulators. So they face fewer obstacles than most electrical companies, in adding new capacity. 

But there are still upper limits on how fast you can add stuff. One of the biggest restrictions of things like Transformers, which can have a lead time of 36 to 60 months and until recently, Transformers have had like a 2 to 4 year waiting list based on what model you were looking at. And without the Transformers doesn’t really matter if you had the generation or not. 

So there’s a lot of delays that are just kind of hardwired into this sort of problem. But ultimately it’s about generation. If you can’t generate the electrons to run through the system, the rest of it is kind of a moot argument. And Georgia Power is now admitting in their IRP that coal, at least in the mid-term, has to be part of the solution. 

Now, in the long run, coal is definitely going to go away in the United States anyway because natural gas is so much cheaper. And as we continue to make incremental gains in solar and wind and battery, they are becoming more competitive. But the advantage you have with coal is it provides something called baseload. It’s on 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 52 weeks a year. 

And that matches up very nicely with most manufacturing processes that run 24 seven, because a lot of it’s automated now and it lines up very well with things like artificial intelligence and data centers, because those server farms will be running 24 hours a day as well. That doesn’t work with solar. When the sun goes down, the electricity stops. 

 And you really can’t pair most of these new industries that are coming in, whether it’s because of relocation re industrialization or digitization, they just don’t pair well with green tech very well, unless you also put in a huge amount of battery. And by huge I mean massive. The best batteries we have right now can really only discharge four hours of storage. 

And there is no place in the continental United States, even in the depths of summer, where you only have four hours of dark. So you have to have something else. And regardless of whether you love it or not, coal is one of those something else’s. So a lot of the coal plants that have been slated for decommissioning or replacement, over the course of the last decade, expect most of those plants to a never be decommissioned, and b if they have been decommissioned but not yet dismantled, expect them to come back, because we’re going to need every electron we can possibly get. 

And decarbonization, for better or for worse, is something that’s going to have to wait for at least next decade and maybe the decade after.

Global Economic Growth Patterns (Or Should I Say Decline)

stockmarket candlesticks in the background

We’re looking at some global economic growth patterns today. Unfortunately, we’re entering an era with a lot of unknowns. Between collapsing demographics and industrial challenges, there seems to be more countries in the red than the green.

China is probably the worst off. After rapid growth brought on by urbanization, a large working-age population, and heavy subsidies, their growth has stagnated, and its population is getting more and more top heavy. Without a reversal of these trends, China’s economy is buying a one-way ticket on the struggle bus.

Even advanced economies like those in Europe are feeling the heat. As countries like Germany and Italy face their own demographic issues, new economic models will need to be created to keep their heads above water. Developing nations are a bit behind the curve in terms of aging demographics and industrial buildout, but they’ll need to shift towards higher value industries to ward off economic stagnation. Places like Brazil will also have to deal with China’s predatory industrial policies which have hindered economic progress.

So, it’s not looking great overall. Aging populations and an inability to evolve economically will stall growth in many regions. If these countries cannot navigate industrial transitions, global economic stability is going to look pretty bleak.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from a chilly, foggy Colorado morning. Today we’re going to talk about growth patterns and what it holds for economic growth, for the world, for the future. Take a look at this chart here. Now this is annual change in GDP from a decade earlier. So you’re getting all the long term trends in one graphic. 

The first country, of course, have to deal with is China because it’s such an outlier. China has two stories going on. Three stories, number one, they lie about a lot of their data. So, it’s probably not as good as it sounds. It’s probably at least a third. Less. Maybe half. Anyway, it’s still the fastest growth over the last 50 years in the world. 

And that requires some explanation. 

Two things going on besides the the line. Number one, the one child policy and rapid urbanization, landed, China with a much, much lower birth rate. In fact, it’s been higher in the United States since the early 90s. Now, in the long term, I have no secret that I think this is going to be the end of not just the Chinese state, but the Chinese nation. 

The actual hunt of necessity is going to vanish from the world by the end of this century. But in the meantime, when you have a lot of people in their 20s and 30s and early 40s, but no kids and not a lot of retirees, every bit of energy can be focused on a combination of industrial production and consumption, which are the two primary methods for growing GDP. 

And if you have that at the same time that you are also subsidizing the hell out of your industry, so you have a lot of investment led production. Yes, you do get growth and yes, it is robust. And yes, it’s such records, but it also sets the stage for the second problem, which is why that chart has just collapsed on the right side and that is that one. 

Those people in their 20s, in their 30s and the early 40s become in their 40s, their 50s and their early 60s. Then that growth story is over, and you no longer have the workforce that is necessary to keep the activity going. And then all that’s left is exports and investment and that’s where the Chinese were about ten, 15 years ago. 

Well, now in the late 2020s and moving into the 2030s, the people who are in their 40s, 50s and early 60s move on to their late 50s, 60s and early 70s. And then it’s just over. We’re already in a situation where the Chinese have about the same amount of population, and people over age 50 is under age 50. 

This is already a terminal demographic. You just can’t get people in their 60s to kick out kids. But it does also mean that unless, unless, unless, unless the Chinese can wildly automate and retain access to every remaining consumer market in the world, that they are almost done. And we’re seeing that in the data. Now, the second story is what’s going on in the advanced world, most notably, Europe. 

And that’s a demographic story, kind of like China. Now the Europeans have a much longer trajectory of history and economic policy than China. Really, China didn’t get started until the opening in 1980. Whereas the Europeans have been part of the industrial process for a century and a half. And so you had more well rounded growth. But the demographic story after World War Two was the same people urbanize, and they industrialize and they had fewer kids. 

And you play that for 2 or 3 generations and there just isn’t a replacement generation. So just as with China, the Germans and the Italians have a lot more people over age 50 than they do under 50. In fact, they’ve been there for a decade already. And this is the decade where they start having more people over 60 than under 60. 

And that is a very different economic model that we have yet to invent. And it’s difficult to see how it will have any growth at all. So as modern economies, a lot of the advanced world is simply fading away and, fading with ever increasing rapidity. That leaves the developing world minus China, which is a different story. When you apply industrial technologies like asphalt and concrete and steel and rebar and electricity, you get a huge amount of growth because you’re basically introducing a fundamentally new economic model on top of whatever your pre-industrial system was. 

And in the building of that structure and the growth that you get from those structures, obviously your GDP rises quite a bit. But then the question is whether or not you can adapt to a new era. So what happened here in the United States is we did this much more slowly, but as we applied these technologies, we didn’t simply increase our production of raw and processed materials. 

We also got into higher value added manufacturing and ultimately services. In most of the developing world, they have not been able, or at least not yet, to successfully make that transition. They’re still, for the most part, raw commodity economies. And so even when you industrialize but don’t change your underlying economic fabric, you get a really good burst of growth for 20, 30 years. 

And then it just stops. And with the exception of, say, the Northeast Asian tigers like, Taiwan and Korea that have made that transition, whether you are in Brazil or Nigeria or even increasingly, South Africa, the jump was never made. 

The 80s, the 90s and especially the 2000 were great growth decade. 

But by the time you get to the 20 tens, it kind of started to fall apart. And now in the 2020s, it’s gone and they just haven’t made the jump. Now they did kind of have the deck stacked against them. They paid for a lot of this industrialization with borrowed money from the advanced economies. And they all have had some sort of debt crisis, which definitely held them back. 

But the bigger issue was China. China used predatory industrial policies to basically gobble up the industrial, capacity of all of these developing countries and moved all that industrial plant to China. The country that has suffered by far the most from that policy is, Brazil, where in the 2000s the Chinese went into Brazil, establish joint ventures with all of these companies were actually solid, maybe even world leading in their sectors. 

The Chinese stole the technologies, took them back to China, build up an industrial plant that was subsidized to compete with the Brazilians on the global stage, and not only destroy the ability of the Brazilians to export to the global market. Ultimately flooded Brazil with Chinese product and destroyed those companies at home as well. Anyway, once that is done, you know, the Brazilians today would have to start over. 

But they have to start over with the demographic that has changed as well, just as the Chinese and everyone else has aged. That has happened in the developing world as well, just starting from a later point. Now we’re nowhere near the point that the Chinese or the Germans, that this is not the last decade for countries like Turkey or Indonesia, Brazil, but they are aging at nearly the same rate as the Europeans almost as fast as the Chinese. 

And if they can’t find a way to change that underlying economic model in the next 20 years, then they’re going to be facing exactly the same sort of demographic pressures that the Europeans and the Chinese are facing today. So it’s not all the same for everybody, but all the trends are they’re just wrapped up in a slightly different picture. 

And it does mean that for the remainder of the first half of this century, we’re looking at most of the growth patterns that were established that were very, very fast at the beginning of the century, simply falling apart because there’s no demographic wherewithal to carry them forward, or the countries haven’t been able to modernize and diversify their economic structures enough to get out of the commodity rut. 

And that is a pretty dark picture for a lot of countries. There just aren’t enough that have made the transition in order to carry us all along.

The Next Recession Isn’t Here Quite Yet

Photo of man holding empty wallet

A potential US recession or depression is always in the back of our minds, but how close are we really?

A major downturn is unlikely to happen in the next 5-10 years for a number of reasons. Consumer spending is still strong, since the millennials are in their prime spending years, so demand is staying high. But when they age out of these years by 2032-2033, it will be a different picture. With the need for a major industrial buildout, construction will support economic activity and reduce the risk of a recession further. And of course, higher capital costs and less speculative behavior has kept the risk of a bubble low and ensured financial stability.

Like all good things, this too shall end…but when? After 2032, things will get a bit hectic. Consumption will crash as a smaller Gen Z will try to replace the millennials in the “big spender” category. And around that same time, we’ll get to see if all those investments into the industrial buildout paid off. And the cherry on top is if the US fails to expand industrial capacity before China collapses, inflation will skyrocket, and supply shortages will be the norm.

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Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. I am green rooming it before presentation and I am going through some of the questions from the Ask Peter Forum, and I’m picking out a couple, specifically this one is do I think there’s going to be a recession or depression in the next 5 to 10 years? Economic forecasting like that is easy. 

Of course, there’s going to be, but I don’t think it’s going to be soon, and I don’t think it’s going to be bad. So let me kind of run through my logic here. Roughly 70% of the US economy is based on consumption. So if nothing happens to the consumer, it really doesn’t matter what happens everywhere else. 

And the United States doesn’t have to worry about a food crisis or an energy crisis, or at least not in the traditional sense. So it really comes down to whether or not you’ve got enough people in the young age groups that are doing the consumption 20 to 45, roughly, to generate an ongoing pulse of consumption that will drive away the doldrums. 

And the group that is in that block are the millennials. Now, the oldest of them are 45. So over this time period, 5 to 10 years, we are looking at them start to kind of ease back as the kids start to leave home. They’ve reached that point in their lives. Keep in mind, though, that a lot of the millennials did everything that every generation has ever done before have kids, buy cars, built homes. 

But they did it with a bit of a delay. So it’s probably not going to be until the older millennials are turning 55 years from now, where we start to see that slow down a little bit, which means that probably for the next eight years, going into 2032, 2033, that this consumption should be fine. In fact, if you look back in the last decade, we’ve had three periods in that period where we would have had an industrial recession. 

But consumption, primarily from the millennials, was more than enough to keep the US system chugging along. And today we have record low unemployment because we’re trying to do an industrial build out without the baby boomers labor. That would suggest the millennial labor is going to be very well compensated and the consumption picture should be fine. The second question is industry. 

We need to prepare for the fall of the Chinese system, which means we need to roughly double the industrial plan to the United States in just the process of building that is going to be highly stimulatory. So on the industrial scale, we will obviously have rises and falls. That’s just the nature of the business. 

It’s a little bit cyclical, but against a backdrop of massive amounts of construction. And we have seen industrial construction spending, increase by a factor of ten over the last five years in the United States. There’s nothing about that that suggests a recession to me in the next 5 to 10 years, because this is a pace we have to keep up for quite some time, even in the most aggressive period where we frontload all of it. 

You’re talking about a six year process, probably going to be more. And third is finance. When finance is too cheap for too long, people start making bets on things that maybe in their retrospect, weren’t the best idea or they overplay their hand in certain sectors. So think of the dot.com bust or the subprime bust. That’s not the environment we have today. 

We don’t have 0% interest rates. We have the most expensive capital we’ve seen in about 15 years. We’ve seen capital cost because of the retiring boomers, roughly triple over the course of the last five years. And it’s just a demographic issue. When you move into retirement, you liquidate a lot of your high velocity investments and things like stocks and bonds, and you move into low velocity stuff like T-bills and cash, because if you don’t and there’s a currency correction or a market crash, you no longer have the income to recover. 

Which means capital costs are more expensive. And so we’re not seeing bubble activity really anywhere. And even though capital costs have increased, they were so low for so long that most folks are in a pretty good credit condition. One of the things we’ve noticed is that, while delinquency rates on loans are up, they’re up from multi-decade lows. 

We have yet to get anywhere near the average delinquency rate. For the post-Cold War environment, and now the capital costs are higher. You see a lot of slowdown in things like housing, because people who are locked in a mortgage at 2%. Hello? Have no reason to move, but it also means that the debts are very, very serviceable, especially against the, very positive employment environment. 

So we’re not looking at a consumption led recession. We’re not looking at an industry recession, and we’re not looking at a bubble, financial led recession. These are all really good things. 

So if there is a risk, it’s certainly not in the short term. And it would probably fall into one of two general buckets. And I’m talking here like 20, 32, 2033. And on number one, we get on the back side of all of this. And the millennials start to edge out of that consumption year. 

And so we see a drop off of consumption because the next generation down Gen Z is the smallest ever. And they’re just not going to be able to buy as much as the millennials have. They’re also a little bit more anti-social. But that’s a different topic. So if you get that far, then you can start talking about some sort of consumption led recession, possibly. 

The second one is an industrial bust. There’s no way that you double the size of the industrial plant in a country and get it all right. And so when you fast forward to the other side of this, we will have a shakeout where things that we may be built the wrong thing in the wrong places don’t look all so hot, especially with higher financing costs. And correcting that is the I mean, basically that’s what a recession can be in the industrial space. So again, when we get to the other side of this, we will have to rationalize some of the things that we have done over the last several years. And that won’t be a lot of fun for anyone who’s in the space. 

But I think the biggest concern, and I really don’t think it’s all that big of a one, is that we, we fail to rise to the occasion. The primary reason we need to double the industrial plant is because the Chinese are literally dying out. Now, let’s assume for the moment that we fail to do that, we don’t build out our capacity in electronics and material processing and electricity and everything else. 

If we fail to do that and the Chinese go away during this time frame, which is highly likely. Then we have a goods shortage and then we will be trying to double the size of the industrial plants. So we will have a massive inflation story as well. One of the advantages of moving early on this is you can use the Chinese industrial plant to build the stuff that we need to build our own industrial plant. 

That’s the cheapest, fastest, easiest way to do it. If we fail to take advantage of this moment in time, we will then have to do it without the Chinese. And everything will cost more and labor will be under more pressure and finance will be under pressure, and we will have shortages of manufactured goods. It will be a wildly inflationary story. 

It’s still technically a growth story, but it would be an environment where inflation would probably be faster than growth. And that might not technically be a recession. But oh boy howdy, it would feel like one. So I would say that that is the biggest risk, but that would be a risk if we just decide that we don’t want to do anything that we’ve said, we’ve wanted to do for the last 20 years, and I have a hard time thinking that that’s the path the Americans are going to take.

Can China Save Itself From the Mounting Debt Crisis?

Photo of woman holding Chinese Yuan

Beijing has announced a hefty plan to help local Chinese governments refinance their debt. But is this enough to ward off the mounting debt crisis?

Local Chinese governments don’t have many revenue sources, so they’re SOL when there’s no more land to sell. Many have issued local government financing vehicles (LGFVs), but they’re essentially hiding the debt…which is over $8 trillion now….about half of China’s GDP. So, the issuance by the national government will help (maybe for 2 years), but it’s not going to solve the problem long-term.

Once the rest of the world understands what China’s debt load actually looks like, I would expect foreign investors to run for the hills. And with all the other issues China is facing, this will be another notch along the journey towards economic decline.

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Undocumented Immigrants’ Impact on US Labor and Economy

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As of late, the topic of illegal immigration is getting as much airtime as Brittney Spears did in the early 2000s. And I hate to burst your bubble, but all those undocumented immigrants are probably doing more good than harm.

Without the influx of ~2 million undocumented immigrants in 2023, labor shortages would have likely caused higher inflation. As the baby boomers retire and the US needs to re-industrialize, labor needs are skyrocketing; this will be putting a heavy strain on industries like healthcare, construction and agriculture, areas where these undocumented workers are heavily employed. Simply put, without these workers, the US economy would be hurting.

Policymakers have obstructed and neglected meaningful immigration reform since the 80s. However, if we could modernize this system (which would take some political creativity currently lacking in DC), we could realize the full benefits of these immigrants minus the constant political bickering.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

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Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Austin, Texas. And today we’re going to talk about everyone’s favorite topic this election season: illegal migration. I’ve no doubt on record saying that if the United States hadn’t had the wave of illegal migration that it had in calendar year 2023—about 2 million people—we’d probably be dealing with inflation north of 8% by now.

So I figured that’s worth a bit of an explanation. In most labor markets, you’ve got a degree of liquidity where workers can move from one subsector to another based on the economic moves and remuneration of the day. But for that to work, you can’t be headed states. You see, here in the United States, the baby boomers are in the process of retiring.

Two-thirds of them have already gone. So we have a labor shortage. In addition, the United States is in the midst of a massive re-industrialization wave as we prepare for the end of the Chinese system. Basically, if we want manufactured products, we have to build it ourselves. So demand has never been higher, and supply has been curtailed. We no longer have that pool of labor that can shift from one thing to the other or be tapped and tracked in terms of building booms.

And so anyone who is removed from the system immediately generates a pulse that goes through the entire network, driving prices higher. So yes, there are 2 million people who crossed illegally last year. Most of them are in the workforce, most here in Texas. As for the folks that are residing here illegally, which, based on whose numbers you’re using, are somewhere between 7 and 14 million.

That’s another huge chunk of the labor force that actually outnumbers the number of folks the United States has who might theoretically be looking for jobs. Unemployment in the United States is below 4%; we’re at historic lows right now. So if you were to remove some of the people who are working, we’d feel it immediately. Now, not all jobs are equal.

These illegal migrants do tend to cluster in three general categories. The first one is health care, particularly when you’re talking about something that’s on the edge of a janitorial job, you know, moving people, clearing bedpans, that sort of thing. The second is in construction, especially industrial construction, because, remember, the United States needs to double the industrial plant.

That doesn’t happen without building a lot of stuff. And third, and finally, agriculture, particularly in fresh foods, whether it’s vegetables or tree fruit. These last two are jobs that Americans just don’t want to do, won’t do, or can’t do. They’re hot. They’re heavy, outdoorsy work—certainly not the sort of stuff that today’s youth, especially Gen Z, is really interested in.

And so that just leaves us with the illegal labor pool. If you were to remove that labor pool, we wouldn’t be able to harvest any of our fruits and vegetables. So say goodbye to most of the produce in grocery stores. We certainly wouldn’t be able to build new homes or new industrial plants, so say hello to dependence on China until China is gone—and then you just don’t have stuff.

And if you don’t want to clean your own bedpan when you go into the hospital or retire, well, then, by all means, be against migration. The question, of course, is whether we can amend our legal structure so that we actually have an updated immigration system to process these people in a way that we find a.

At the moment, we haven’t had meaningful immigration reform in this country since the 1980s, and folks on both sides of the political aisle have taken steps at multiple points to prevent that from happening. So if

you were to wave a magic wand to make this all work better, you’d find a way to induce the would-be illegal migrants to actually collaborate with the system.

And that’s a very different sort of legal structure and enforcement and would require a degree of policy creativity we just have not seen in the White House or in Congress for quite some time

China Faces Deflation as Economy Stutters

Photo of woman holding Chinese Yuan

China is facing an economic downturn reminiscent of Japan’s struggles in the 90s. Actually, I take that back…China’s outlook is much worse.

The core of China’s problem is declining demographics. This crushes demand and leaves industrial production as the only path forward. Issuing debt and spending more on real estate, bailing out local governments and boosting industrial capacity isn’t going to do much, in fact, it will lead to deflation…a particularly nasty economic phenomenon which occurs when oversupply drives prices down into a reinforcing spiral of dysfunction involving recession, industrial busts, mass unemployment and general mehness.

If the Chinese want to avoid deflation, they’ll need to cut industrial capacity, but that’s not risk-free either. And to round out China’s list of issues, Chairman Xi’s chokehold on Chinese power adds another layer of complexity to successfully navigating this economic headwind.

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Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from New Orleans. It’s like 6 a.m., but this is the only time I have today to record, so here we are. The news in the last few days is that the Chinese are doing another, another, another stimulus program. It’s starting to feel a lot like what happened in Japan in the 1990s, where they throw more money into the situation, hoping to generate economic growth.

But it never did, because their problem at its core is demographic. Unless you can get people to spend more, to consume more, all that’s left is industrial development. In the case of Japan, they used that for real estate, and so the bottom fell out of the market, and it took 25 years to recover. You could argue it’s only in the last five years that Japan has gotten back to some version of normal.

In the case of China, the demographic decline is way more advanced than it ever was in Japan 20 years ago. In fact, you could argue that in terms of the collapse of numbers of people under age 50, it’s actually much worse today in China than it is in Japan, even now, even though Japan’s the world’s oldest society.

It’s that lopsided. Anyway, back to the topic. The Chinese indicate that they’re going to issue a lot of debt, which is something they’ve never really done before, with the numbers being floated somewhere in the low hundreds of billions to the mid hundreds of billions. So by any measure, even for an economy China’s size, this is potentially a huge amount of capital.

So the question, though, is what are you going to put it towards? Three things have been floated. Number one, buying up property that hasn’t been finished so it can be finished. Well, that will exacerbate the oversupply of condos, which is already more than enough to house over a million and a half people, so that does nothing except for maybe generate a little bit more public goodwill because that’s where 70% of private savings is.

So that’d be a political decision, not an economic one. The second one is to bail out the debt of local governments. Local governments can sell land and issue bonds, but they can’t raise taxes, so they have no way of really generating an income. And once they issue debt, they have really no way of paying it back.

So that’s like a $4 trillion asset class that’s completely bunked. And while, you know, we throw half a billion at it, that’s not nothing, but it really doesn’t move the needle in any appreciable way. And the third idea that the Chinese have floated is, shocker, building more industrial capacity. So we’re in this weird situation where the Chinese are kind of damned if they do and damned if they don’t.

I mean, if they do nothing and consumption continues to wither and tariffs against them for their overproduction continue, then their industrial case fails and the population basically falls into impoverishment. This new idea of throwing a lot more money against industrial output actually generates potentially a worse outcome called deflation. Now deflation sounds nice, but it is not. We’re all familiar with inflation, when prices rise, either because there’s an insufficient supply or too much demand.

Eventually, you get spiraling prices that hurt everybody and eventually eat away at the value of economic assets. Based on who you are, that’s different levels of disastrous. But deflation in many ways is significantly worse. Deflation comes from a similar imbalance between supply and demand, but it’s when there’s too much supply compared to demand. In those circumstances, prices start dropping because there’s too much stuff.

People can’t possibly consume it all. And eventually, people become used to the prices going down, so they put off their purchases, which increases the disparity between supply and demand even more. Eventually, it gets so bad, and the oversupply becomes so much relative to demand that the industrial base starts to collapse and people start to lose their jobs because nothing is profitable anymore.

And then all of a sudden you’re hitting it on the demand side as well. The demand is collapsing because people have lost their jobs. Some version of this, in a persistent but mild form, happened in Japan starting in the late 1990s and continued all through the 2000s and through most of the 2010s. We also had a version of this in the Great Depression.

The problem we have in dealing with deflation is, ultimately, you have to get supply and demand back into whack so that they’re actually aligned with one another again. The two ways to do that are to increase demand or decrease supply. In China, it’s difficult to imagine being able to increase demand because there are now more people over age 50 in China than there are under age 50 in China.

And generally, it’s people under age 40 that are doing most of the consumption, and that is the class that has been completely gutted by the one-child policy, in addition to the world’s fastest industrialization process. It’s only been a generation since Chinese folks were having, on average, five and six kids, to now having one. In fact, in the metros where the majority of Chinese now live, we’re now looking at the birth rate being one quarter or less of replacement levels.

We’re talking about 0.5 children per woman. There aren’t enough people to even think about a meaningful consumption rebound. Well, that leaves destroying supply. And in this, the Chinese face two problems. Number one, oversupply has been the state mantra for the last 40 years, and that is the Chinese development model. You look around the world, you figure out something that’s in demand.

You produce it. You use subsidies, you use cheap labor. You produce, produce, produce, produce, produce—not for your domestic market, for the foreign market. You export it. And over the last 40 years, this has moved from product to product to product, from steel to cement and now increasingly electronics products. Now they’re trying to get into electric vehicles.

And it’s just on and on and on and on. Well, in a world where those who are experiencing breakneck economic and demographic growth, there’s some strength to that model. And especially in the 1990s, in the 2000s, we had the developing world kind of getting in the act of industrialization and urbanization. But a couple things to keep in mind. Number one, you only urbanize once, and once you do that, your demand for those sorts of products drops.

Second, when you urbanize, your birth rate collapses. And if you’re, say, Brazil, that means you had a demographic moment in the 90s and the 2000s, but now you’re actually aging faster than the European countries, and your demand has kind of hit a plateau. And you’re also looking at the Chinese, who are basically doing product dumping at scale. You’re like, you know what? I don’t want to play this game. And so it’s not just the United States and the European Union and Japan and Canada that have put all these tariffs on things like electric vehicles from China. It’s also Indonesia. It’s also Brazil. It’s also Turkey. Most recently, Russia. The Chinese have produced all this stuff with the intent of swamping markets to save their social model.

And in doing so, they basically encouraged everyone to block the markets of Chinese products. So if the Chinese were to add more industrial capacity now as part of a stimulus program, all that’s going to do is exacerbate the oversupply. And now there’s nowhere for it to go. So I would argue that a year ago, before this really got serious, the Chinese probably had about twice the industrial plant that they needed because so much of it was geared to service the foreign market.

Well, now a lot of that is being shut out of foreign markets, and the Chinese are having to deal with it at home. Any stimulus will be on top of that. So the only way that the Chinese can avoid deflation at this point is to basically gut half or more of their industrial plant, and then you’ve destroyed the employment program for the entire country.

And if there’s one thing the Chinese government is obsessed about, it’s making sure that people have jobs so they don’t get together in large groups and go on long walks together. So there are any number of reasons how the Chinese economy can ultimately collapse. Demographics are at the heart of most of it, but it could be a trade war.

It could be a deflationary spiral, or it could be any sort of resource restriction. That’s not a short list, but we’re now in a situation where they could theoretically make it all about internal miscalculations and trying to rationalize their economic model for a world that can no longer support it. So this has become very real, very fast, and the Chinese are struggling mightily.

The question is whether or not they can come up with enough policy creativity to try something new. And since Chairman Xi has basically gutted the entire system of all decision makers but himself, I don’t think the chances of that are very high. All right, you guys take care.

Longshoreman on Strike: US Ports Get Shut Down

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Back to the picket lines we go…this time with the longshoreman. Ports across the East and Gulf Coasts of the US will impacted by the strike, disrupting nearly two-thirds of the imports and exports by water.

European manufacturers are going to take a hit on this one, along with the US agricultural industry. We’re not just talking a couple days sitting in limbo either, even if the strike ends today, we’re still looking at weeks to clear the backlogs.

The unions’ demands on this one are pretty hefty; we’re talking about a 70% pay increase and a ban on automation at ports. In an industry that’s already plagued by slow advancement and limited automation, this ban would set the US way back. On top of that, the Jones Act has exacerbated the inferences of shipping in the US. So, we’re not talking about a duct tape solution here, its going to be a complex one.

There’s always a way forward, so what does that look like? Manufacturers can brush up on their Spanish and become friends with our neighbors to the South and/or they can build some more warehouses and stop relying on just-in-time supply chains. But that’s costly and inefficient, so expect some economic hurdles along the way.

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Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Dallas. Oh, humid even in October. Anyway, today we’re going to talk about the longshoremen strike on the East and Gulf Coast of the United States. They’ve been in place for a couple of days already by the time you’ve seen this, and we’re looking at roughly half of America’s ability to import and export.

Close to two thirds by water has been shut down. Basically, every port from Maine to the Texas border with Mexico is in effect, and all the ports are closed. This is going to have an impact far more than the actual time of the strike, which is so far to be determined, because for every day that the strike has shut down the ports, it takes about four days for once they reopen to clear the backlog.

So, if you hear that the port has been cleared while you’re watching this video, it’s still going to be upwards of two weeks before they actually get back to normal. And so, if this lasts through the entire month of October, that will obviously impact the holidays and going into the new year. Now, who gets hurt most by this?

Europe is the short version of all this — Europe and agriculture. So, first Europe. The Asians obviously import and export via the West Coast of the United States, which has a different union structure. Talk about them later. But the European model is different from the Asian model when it comes to interfacing with the United States.

In Asia, they either import finished products. Well, no, that’s the bottom line. They import finished products for the most part. The Europeans bring in all kinds of parts and have them assembled within the United States as much as possible so that they then can get around tariff walls. That means that the parts have to have access.

So most of the automotive industry that is in the East or the West Coast regions that has a European component is doing things that way. And it’s not just automotive. It’s pretty much any sort of manufacturing that the Europeans are looking to source closer to the demographic strike that is the United States. And so without that constant flow of parts, the whole thing gets disrupted.

And that’s going to have a very big impact on employment and economic growth throughout the entire eastern seaboard for the foreseeable future. The second group that gets hit is the United States agricultural system because moving things by water is really the only way you can ship things to the wider world, with the exception of Mexico. And so, everything that comes off of rail, everything that goes down the Mississippi to New Orleans, has to get repackaged onto another vessel — oceangoing vessel — at the port and then sent out, and that has basically stopped.

Now, we are kind of in a lull of seasons, agriculturally speaking, so if this only lasts a couple of weeks, no big deal. But if it lasts a month and we’re talking about all of the grains that are coming out of the Midwest suddenly having very few places to go. All right. How is this able to happen?

Well, the United States has an incredibly stupid law called the Jones Act. And you’ve probably heard me talk about it before because it prevents any cargo being transported by any ship between any two American ports by being transported by anything but a system that is 100% American-owned, captain-crewed, and built. We don’t do this for any other modes of transport.

And if we did, we’d be in a significantly worse economic position than the United States is. But since this law was passed in 1920, we’ve seen the amount of cargo in terms of value per mile that has shipped on our waterways drop by over 99%. There’s also a couple of clauses in the Jones Act regarding port management, which basically makes them all local monopolies.

And unions have taken advantage of this by forming a network of unions. It takes in all of the ports so that when one of them strikes, they can all strike. If this was done in the corporate world, this would obviously be easily illegal. And what the unions are demanding is a 70% pay increase. But the real kicker is they want a guarantee in their contracts that no automation will ever be added.

They want to go with like 1970s, 1980s levels of automation. And already, America’s East Coast ports are among the world’s least functional. There are a number of ports on the African continent that actually are more advanced than ours now. Now, under normal circumstances, what we would do — we, the United States, whatever — is give them everything that they say they want.

And then behind the scenes, work, work, work, work, work to add automation so that this can never happen again. That’s more or less what happened with the Teamsters union on the West Coast. And now, the port of LA has gone from one of the worst in the world in just the last few years to one of, you know, let’s call it above average. Repeating that on the East Coast would be wonderful.

That’s probably not going to happen for political reasons. Not only is this an election year, we are going through our once-every-generation-or-two political realignment in the United States, and the factions that make up our parties are moving around. And one of those factions is organized labor. One of Donald Trump’s political successes was teasing them out of the Democratic coalition, but he has not yet succeeded in folding them into the Republican coalition.

So they’re kind of out there in the wind right now, free agents. And as the Chinese system fails and as the euro system falters, if Americans still want manufactured goods, we have to build them ourselves. Well, that means we need to double the size of the industrial plant. How many of those jobs do you think are going to be?

Blue-collar? Probably 80% or more of them. So we are at the dawn of the golden age of organized labor in the United States, and the Longshoremen’s Union is part of that process. So it’s difficult to see the Biden administration using its executive power — which it does have — to forcibly end the strike before the election. You can’t say it won’t happen, but it’s politically more complicated now than it would have been the last time this went down.

In the 1980s. And so we’ve got a very different situation here, and it’s going to be complicated because neither side really wants to piss off organized labor right now. Now, if you’re a manufacturer, you’ve got two possible solutions here. The first one is the easiest one, and the one that will probably be followed most aggressively: Mexico.

Mexico. Mexico. Mexico. Mexico. Mexico. Mexico. Over 90% of our trade with Mexico is done by truck and rail. It doesn’t touch the ports at all. One of the advantages of having a land border. And so, the Mexican integration with especially Texas, but the United States in general, isn’t being affected by this really much at all. And that’s certainly going to increase the argument that Mexico not only is our number one trade partner but is going to maintain that position for the rest of our lives.

And by “our,” I mean anyone who’s alive today. The second piece is a little uglier, and it’s not ideal. And that’s inventory. We’ve spent the last 40 years in manufacturing going to something called Just in Time. The idea that as you get better with logistics, you can partner with all of your suppliers so every piece arrives at the moment you need it in order to assemble a product.

And by doing it that way, you don’t have to buy rafts of warehouses to keep parts for emergencies. You can just focus on the supply chain. Well, if the supply chain is not reliable because of strikes at ports, you have to go back to something called just in case. And that means stockpiling parts — maybe not at your primary facilities, but along the supply chain route for everything.

And that means probably having four, maybe five times as many parts in circulation at a time. That is expensive. You need to buy the land, you need to maintain the inventory, you need to staff that. You need to have basically twice as much industrial plant dedicated simply to holding things in a box. It is wildly inefficient.

And in the world the United States is finding itself in, it’s very, very expensive because we need to expand our productive capacity, expand our storage capacity. And if just-in-case techniques need to be done, then we have less capital and less labor and less land and less industrial plant available for the things we actually need to build.

But until this is resolved, if you’re a European manufacturer, that’s really your only option.