Peter Zeihan, Author at Zeihan on Geopolitics

Can Tariffs Replace Income Taxes?

An AI generated image of connex boxes with American and Chinese flags on them

Imagine never paying income tax again. Sounds damn nice to me too. That’s until reality kicks in and you start looking at the math on how large the tariffs would need to be to replace those taxes…

Tariffs on imported goods would need to be roughly 50-65% and you could imagine the fallout that would have. Trade with key partners would collapse, prices would surge, supply chains would be disrupted, and energy supplies would take a hit. Tariffs once worked as a revenue source for the US, but with all the current programs and expenses, they barely scratch the surface.

In theory, there could be a way to make this work; like implementing entitlement programs, so a lower tariff would suffice. However, that would require some massive political changes that the US just isn’t ready for.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey, all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from a windy Colorado. We’re taking a couple of questions from the Patreon page today, specifically. A lot of talk in Washington these days is about replacing all income taxes with import tariffs. Is this possible? What do you think about what it would look like? Great question. The proposal dates back to something that predates the income tax, which was really adopted only about a century ago.

But you have to keep in mind the volumes in question. Today, the United States imports about 1.14. trillion dollars of goods and services, about, three quarters of that as goods. And the tax generates about 2.6 to $2.7 trillion of income. So if your goal is to zero out the income tax, you need a tariff on everything, not just from China, everything that is in the range of 50 to 65%.

I guarantee you, if you increase the price of things by half, it’s going to change how we live. For example, we bring in a lot of Canadian crude, heavy stuff that is then refined into, distillates such as gasoline and diesel, which are the primary fuel source for most of, say, the Midwestern part of the United States. That would go to zero almost overnight with a 50% increase. So we’d have lots of reshuffling. We’d have to basically shut down trade relations with all of our major countries that participate. Link supply chains with us. And, anything that is electronic come to Asia would get very expensive.

So you’d have some big impacts. The reason why you’d have this, such as mismatches. We don’t have the same economy that we had back during the times in the 1800s, when tariffs were our primary source of income. So we have built out the social welfare state with Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security and defense now being our four biggest line items in the government.

So if you were to zero out Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, then you could perhaps talk about doing an equalization with a tariff that’s only around 20 or 30%. But I would argue that that would require a lot of political evolutions in the United States that we are not quite ready to cope with at the moment. So it’s an interesting idea, but as a, as an income tax eliminator, we’re nowhere near to tariffs, being the solution to that particular problem.

Russia After Russia

Building on yesterday’s video, we’ll be talking about the future of Russia following its collapse. So, what can we expect the Russia after Russia to look like?

Russia’s stockpile of weapons and tech is being drained in Ukraine and the leftovers won’t be of interest to other countries, so military tech in Russia is on its last leg. Most of the skilled labor would leave and it wouldn’t be surprising if security/intelligence personnel turned to crime. Disruptions to resource extraction and agriculture would likely cause an economic meltdown. Minority groups would make a push for independence. And of course, you should expect to see plenty of countries attempt to reclaim old land or try to command influence.

Regardless of how the Ukraine War plays out, Russia is on borrowed time. As the clock counts down, we will certainly see a reshaping of European geopolitics.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Bell Block. Today we’re taking an entry from the Ask Peter forum on the Patreon page. And specifically, what would I anticipate? The former Soviet space must be the Russian space to look like in the aftermath of a Russian collapse. Before I get into the details of that, let me emphasize that I don’t see this happening this year or next year or anytime this decade.

The Russian demographics are horrid, and the war in Ukraine is not going well. And I do certainly expect to see a Russian collapse in my lifetime. But that doesn’t mean it’s just around the corner. We have to see a political break in Russia where the Putin regime fails. And since Putin has basically gutted the system of anyone who is theoretically capable of replacing him, we will then have a leadership struggle and probably a civil conflict that ends in national collapse.

That’s not imminent. Barring a massive, military defeat in Ukraine in the near term. Anyway, with that said, here’s how it goes.

We are taking an entry from the Ask Peter forum on the Patreon page today. And it says With Russia and demographic collapse, what does the post Russian space look like? Are the countries moving in or are there things we need to worry about? And the short answer is yes, those things.

Let’s start with the easy stuff. When an empire dies, when a country dies, there are certain parts of it that live on in another form. That was certainly true of the Soviet Union. And that will be true of post-Soviet Russia as well. So, first of all, the technology, Russia has been a military power for quite some time.

During the Cold War, they were clearly the second most powerful military in the world. But as you’ve noticed in the Ukraine war, the shine has come off. And Russia’s ability to produce at scale, its own technology has been proven to be woefully lacking. They’re more advanced tanks that can only make one at a time. They’re more advanced jets.

They’ve only made a dozen in total in the last 15 years. So the capacity of that to be transferred to another power is very limited. We’ve discovered over the course of the past few years that the Chinese aren’t sophisticated enough to copy the more advanced stuff and all the countries that have the technical skills to do it.

Places like Poland or Ukraine or the Czech Republic or Hungary, would rather work with Western technology, which is more effective, advanced, has higher range and lethality rates and all that good stuff. So If it isn’t been built already, it’s not something that I really worry about because all of the industrial plant that the Russians have simply is wildly inefficient.

They can’t staff at themselves. And everyone who could staff it would rather work with something that’s better. So for most of the military hardware, this is just going to fade away pretty quickly. Also keep in mind that the Russians are burning through everything that they can make in the Ukraine war. So it’s not like there’s going to be a big stock of modern war, material that anyone else could pick up and run with.

Which brings us to the second point. The skilled labor. Even with a million men fleeing the country in, the aftermath at the beginning of the war and even with the Russians having lost somewhere between 300,000 and 800,000 men since then, you know, data varies wildly based on your propaganda story. There are still a lot of Russians that have technical skills.

Now, this is something we know exactly what to look for, because it’s already happened after the Soviet collapse. Somewhere around 10 million, Russians, most of them with more advanced degrees, left the country and never returned. And we’re probably going to see something like that again. But it won’t be nearly as dramatic as last time, because there are no longer 10 million people with advanced degrees left in the country.

The Russian educational system collapsed. Technical educational system collapsed, actually, before the Soviet Union collapsed. And there was never rebuilt. Post-Soviet. So we’re only talking about a low single digit million number of people who could even theoretically leave in the first place that have a skill sets are relevant. And since those skill sets, for the most part atrophied under the post Russian system, under Putin, they won’t have nearly the impulse for growth or activity, that the original one did 35 years ago.

So noticeable, but not huge. And that includes people from the intelligence services who might go into business for themselves. Now, if you guys remember back to the early 1990s, there were a lot of movies where the bad guys were former Russian intelligence agents, former Central European intelligence agents and former South African intelligence agents.

And that really did reflect reality, because you had these giant institutions that were built on domestic control with the personnel to go with them, that all absconded and went into crime for themselves. Around the world. Now that will definitely happen again. But just like with the more technically minded folks, the pool is a lot smaller. It’s going to be more akin to what’s happening with the Syrian dissolution.

It’s the people who maintain security in Russia today are not the FBI technocrats that existed 40 years ago. They’re more like the thugs of Syria. People who, in order to pursue their own power, have decided to take their skill set and go elsewhere. But they’re not good at signals intelligence. They don’t have the connections around the world. But the old Soviet operators or South African operators had.

So basically, you’re just going to get a bunch of sociopaths who are going to head out and try business for themselves. And to be perfectly blunt, if you were good at that, you would have done it in the 90s. And Putin’s system is not like the Soviet system, which was based more or less on meritocracy. It’s more based on a Trumpian sense of loyalty to a person, and that is not a particularly marketable skill once the ship goes down.

So that takes care of the stuff that can leave. What about the stuff that stays? Russia is arguably the most resource rich country in human history. It is an absolutely massive place. And even in the best of times, huge swaths of the territory are empty. And that is so much more true now than it was during the Soviet times.

During the Soviet times, you had your primary cities of Moscow and Petersburg, and then you had a wave of secondary cities, and then you had the countryside. What we have seen in the post-Soviet collapse is the countryside. People have left to go to the secondary cities. The secondary cities have become hollowed out to go to Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

And so instead of maybe having 15% of the country that has a reasonable population density, it’s really closer to 5%. Now, with two cities being larger than they’ve ever been in history. Well, everything else has shrunk into obscurity. You take that population pattern and you remove the structures that allow civilization to function. And we’re probably going to have large parts of the Russian space that currently grow crops.

Stop. What we have seen in Russian agriculture in the last 40 years is you can split the farms basically 4 to 1. Four is the old Soviet style. So roughly 80% very input intensive, wildly inefficient, using mostly local inputs. And the remaining 20% are more what they call enterprise farms, where they bring in Western equipment and technology and inputs.

And those Western oriented farms, are much more productive and generate a lot more income. And probably in terms of calories, generate actually more than the other 80% put together. The problem is, and they’re in the best land, the problem is that 20% is completely dependent upon those international allies supply chain systems, and very few of them are on the borders of the country.

So if Russia breaks down to the point that the 20% the enterprise farms cannot access the inputs they need, they’ll stop functioning or will go back to functioning like the other 80%. So we’re going to see a pretty significant drop in the ability of the Russian area to generate food product as the Russian system loses coherence. I don’t think that will lead to widespread famine or anything, but they’ll certainly be distribution issues, which has always been a Russian problem.

And it suggests that the ability of Russia to maintain a population that’s even less than it has now, might be somewhat constrained when that happens, the mineral output of Russia falls into very dire straits, because most of this stuff is nowhere near where the people live. The nickel, the Palladium, the platinum, the other platinum metals. They’re all up in the high Arctic, say the Cola peninsula or around Norilsk in north central Siberia.

All the gold is out. In eastern Siberia, the oil is in the permafrost, and the infrastructure that is necessary to access and extract out these materials really does require a lot of industrial age maintenance. And it’s maintenance that the Russians have had a hard time doing themselves. On the production side, the Russians have seen their educational system collapse to the point that you only really have a small number, just a few dozen of Russian nationals who were trained abroad over the last 20 years who are keeping this thing going.

And again, they need a lot of Western technology to keep it flowing. So what usually what happens is the Chinese buys, say, the drilling rigs, and then they sell it on to the Russians, a second hand materials. Anything happens to that, the stuff falls apart. So if there is going to be a play for Russian production, you’re talking about a foreign power having to come combine with capital, with technology, with security, and run basically a neo style colony in order to produce the stuff.

And some of the harshest operating environments in the world. And if that infrastructure is dependent on a link back to Russia proper, then the Russian government that remains whatever that looks like, will have a say in it. And so that probably won’t happen at all. So it’s only the stuff on the extremities that might be able to still function.

So you’re talking about the Russian high Arctic, say Sakhalin Island out in the, Far East theater and maybe some select things in East Siberia. Beyond that, it is really hard to see anyone making a mineral play here, because everything is just so far damn away. And if you were to do that, like, say, let’s say you wanted to go take over something in a gold mine in eastern Siberia, you’re talking and have to building a supply chain through an area that is really only supplied by air.

And the chances for everything to go wrong are robust. There is one other consideration.

That’s an ethnic angle to a breakup.

Russia’s population by Russia’s statistics, which are higher than reality would suggest and indicate that it’s a more cohesive nation state than the reality would suggest. Even then, they claim that 20% of their population is not ethnic Russian, with the single largest minority being Turkic minorities. These minorities are kind of concentrated in three general areas. Siberia. In the West, where you’ve got a lot of,

pockets of Germans and especially Ukrainians, and then down in the south where you’ve got, Tartars and bash queers and Chechens and English and the rest, if we’re going to see a meaningful break in the Russian system, a lot of these groups are likely to try to go their own way.

And the ones to watch the most are the ones that are either close to a border, or they may have a foreign sponsor or the ones that are on key pieces of infrastructure or transport corridors, which means that they could actually make a go of it themselves and actually extract, concessions from the ethnic Russians around them. And the second group, it’s the Tatars in the Basque year that are by far the ones you should watch the most.

They live in an area just to the northwest. Kazakhstan. And they sit on all the connecting infrastructure between Russia and Siberia. So if they were to break away, there goes all of Siberia. And they also have significant energy reserves, some cells that they broadly know how to produce and process themselves. Now, there’s still over a thousand miles away from any potential export market.

So that’s not a a clean fix. But if anyone from a technical point of view can make it a go of it, it’s these places. Because these places never saw their technical folks, flee after the Soviet system. They stayed home, the other groups are the ones that are really close to the external borders. And of course, the caucuses are at the top of that list.

And that’s where the Chechens are. And here the country to watch is Turkey, because all of these, almost all of these minorities are Turkic in nature. And the Turks were very active in sponsoring the first and the second Chechen wars in the caucuses, and the idea that central power in Moscow would crack, and they wouldn’t have an interest in expanding their sphere of influence into the caucuses, is kind of silly.

Also, keep in mind that if the Russian republics on the north side of the Caucasus mountains were to go their own way, then that would basically break Russia’s ability to control not just the Caucasus, but would really hurt Ukraine as well, because it’s all part of the same population. Band. So good for everyone except for Russia proper.

The final little piece to keep in mind is in the extreme northwest, where you have a number of, Turkic minorities. If you remember your recent history back in World War Two, the Finns were one of the first countries. Finland was one of the first countries that Russia attacked. And while it was never formally an ally, if anything, it cooperated more with the Nazis because it was in the same theater.

And at the end of the war, we saw the Soviets basically gobble up territory that at one point housed one quarter of the Finnish population. We like to think of the Finns as neutral. We like to think of the Swedes as, you know, attractive, but kind of in their own world. We forget that the Scandinavians got started as fucking Vikings.

And now that they’re no longer, strategically neutral, now that they’re active in the Western alliance, they’ve rapidly emerged as some of the most aggressive allies that the United States has ever had. And unlike countries in Central America whose militaries were defunct when they joined, these are countries that have a very robust military tradition that is very, very current.

So when and if the Russian state breaks, I can guarantee you that we’re going to see a new iteration of Scandinavian Vikings going back into the Russian space, in many cases just to get their land back. But I would be shocked if that’s all they did keep in mind that the original Vikings that went up the rivers are the ones who probably found in Kiev and certainly Moscow, and in the last great war that we saw in the region that involved Sweden.

The decisive conflict that broke the Swedish empire happened actually in Ukraine. So when the Russians started to invade Ukraine again, it started history moving in Stockholm and Helsinki and the rest in a way that I don’t think the rest of the West really appreciates.

And regardless of how the Ukraine war goes, we’re going to be seeing the next chapter of this little bit of history in the decades to come.

The Russian Depopulation

Photo of Russian dolls moving down in smaller size

Today we’ll be discussing Russian birth and death rates since we’ve got some new Russian demographic data to look at. So, go ahead and grab that truckload of salt.

Russian birth and death rates have fluctuated quite a bit due to major events. The most notable was the demographic “death cross” in the 1990s where deaths outnumbered births; this sent the Russians down a dark path of population decline. Despite some brief recoveries throughout the past few decades, new data out of Russia has confirmed things have worsened.

That recent Russian data is likely overly optimistic, so things are bad. Combine that bleak demographic outlook with no improvements to infrastructure, education, or public health, and you can do the math. Of course, the Ukraine War has accelerated this crisis, as the Russians have sent wave after wave into the meat grinder. That current strategy is unsustainable, but a victory in Ukraine could at least put a little bit of air into the Russians’ lungs. A loss or stagnation would suck even more air out.

Either way, Russia is quickly hacking away at its final opportunity at demographic recovery, which brings long-term viability as a functional state into question.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Bell Block, New Zealand. Today we are going to discuss the newest data that’s out from the Russians on their demographics. Russia stopped collecting, demographic data about 17, 18 years ago and have really just been making it up ever since. Now, if you look back through Russian history, there have been a lot of, dark chapters.

And as a rule, when people are depressed, they don’t feel it’s a good idea to have a lot of kids. So these giant rises and dips in the Russian birth rate and death rate, based on what’s going on culturally and economically with the country. Now, the biggest ones, of course, are World War one, World War two. There was a time when Khrushchev tried to shove everyone into small apartments because he thought that was modern, less room for kids. And then, of course, the biggest one is the post-Soviet collapse, when the bottom two, a lot of the Soviet system and we had extended period about 20 years, where basically nothing got better.

You combine this with rampant heroin use and, alcoholism. That is just atrocious by most modern country. Measures, and you get something called a Death cross that happened in the 1990s. And that’s a point when the birth rate and the death rate crossed so that the death rate is higher. And even before you consider incremental mortality issues, you have population shrinkage. Now, a couple of things to keep in mind.

Number one, the Russians back in the mid 80s had this moment of opening and perestroika where we thought maybe, just maybe, we can save the Soviet system. And there absolutely was a little baby boom. And if you fast forward 25, 30 years to just a few years ago, the children of that baby boom, also had kids at a time when Russia was riding high on high energy prices under Vladimir Putin, in the late 2000.

I’m sorry, 20 tens. And so we got another little mini beanie boom. And so that death cross re crossed into a life cross very, very briefly for a very, very low cross. But it was successful and at least for a couple of years bringing the birthrate back up about the death rate. Well with the new data it is clear that that has now reversed.

And remember, this is new data provided by the Russian government is undoubtedly overly optimistic. But even by their own data, they’re now back in the negative territory. All right. So this takes us two places. Number one, none of the underlying issues that have plagued Russia for the last century have gone away. All of them are more intense.

The infrastructure of the Soviet period is still degrading. The Russians have still been unable to rebuild their educational system. Alcoholism is still arise. Drug use is still rife. I’ve run out of speech. Going to go the other way now. And so you shouldn’t expect any improvement because it’s going to be another 25, 30 years before now, the grandchildren of perestroika could be born.

And so you’re dealing more now with the aftereffects of World War one and World War two and oppression and the post-Soviet collapse. And it’s more likely that this period of death is going to be far more intense than what we’ve seen before, because all of the younger people are now older. You know, the boom that they had, say, in the 70s, and they’re just unable to have children now.

The next generation that will be able to have children will be doing it for another 20 years. And second, and far more intensely, is the Ukraine war. As you will notice from this most recent death across it began before the Ukraine war, before Ukraine, or before it began, before the Ukraine war, before Russia became a pariah again, before Russia was under the most extreme sanctions that any major country has ever been on before.

The Russians started seeing massive battlefield casualties. So we are again, in one of those moments in Russian history where people are unsure of their future and they’re not having kids. In addition to the fact that the demographic moment has already passed from the perestroika boom echo, we are already seeing on a daily basis for the last year and a half that more Russian men are dying on the fields of battle in Ukraine than, Russian boys are being born.

And we’ve even had a few days where more men have been dying in the fields of Ukraine than the total number of births – boys and girls.

So We are seeing the Russians waste their last chance to have positive demographic growth ever. And there’s no reason to expect that there’s anything in the Russian system that’s going to improve the, the birthrate or decrease the death rate anytime soon. One of the reasons why Russia has been a major power for so long is numbers.

They have a lot of hope, you know. We’ve had a large country with a lot of ethnic groups and disposing of surplus ethnic groups in the middle of war has long been a Russian strategy for managing their population. They’re doing that now. But you can only do that so long. And that always assumes that you have a robust birthrate, which the Russians don’t anymore.

So the Russians have never been really able to upgrade and update their military strategies in the post-Cold War era to reflect the changes in the demographic picture that just no longer exist and really haven’t existed for decades. So it’s all about lots and lots of artillery. It’s all about what they call meat assaults. It’s human wave tactics, and that works as long as you massively outnumber your foe.

And there are roughly four Russians for every Ukrainian. So it’s not a strategy that is stupid, but is a strategy that if you keep using it when you don’t have a bottomless supply of fighters, that you really eat into what allows your country to exist in the first place. Now, even with this going on, the Russians have more time on their demographic clock than a country like, say, China that has had a rock bottom birth rate now for 40 years.

But when you start burning more people in their 20s than you’re generating babies. You are definitely on a starvation diet. And the question in my mind has always been, when this century, does the Russian ethnicity lose sufficient coherence that it can’t even maintain a state? If they win the Ukraine war, they establish a better external buffer system.

I would say that that would probably be the 2070s or 2080s. But if they become stalled in Ukraine, if they get forced into a piece or a battlefield defeat, that means that they have expended all of the costs of fighting a major war without getting many of the benefits. Then you’re looking at this happening 20, 30, maybe even 40 years earlier.

So, believe it or not, we’re in this weird situation where as long as the Russians are doing this terrific meat assault, it’s really good for the rest of the world. Unless, of course, you happen to be the country that’s on the receiving end. That would be Ukraine. Because it brings forward the day where the Russians just can’t fight any longer at all.

The Real Secret to Saving Birthrates

Today’s conversation might piss off a few prophylactic companies (no, I’m not suggesting we buy thumb tacks and go crazy). The question of the day is…how can we get people to procreate?

No, the lingerie and aphrodisiacs aren’t going to save us this time, we’re talking about bigger changes. A good starting point is making having kids easier: lower costs for essentials like housing, electricity, and food. But then you still need those parents to remain part of the workforce. So, the sticking point is childcare.

Affordable childcare might just be the most effective policy to sustain birthrates and keep your workforce intact in the process. Certain industries in the US (like healthcare) and countries (like Scandinavia) have somewhat figured this out, although it can be pricey.

Once you get the childcare piece taken care of, then you need space for these children to play and grow. Take New Zealand for example, they’ve found a way to keep children (and tipsy adults if we’re being honest) busy for hours and hours…

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Tongariro National Park in New Zealand while I’m doing the Tongariro Northern Circuit, that is mountain Guro in the background, which is and we basically we’ve been going around it the whole time. So why it’s called Tongariro Circuit, not in the whole circuit, I don’t know. Anyway, you might recognize that mountain from Lord of the rings that is Mountain Doom.

So I prefer to call this track the Doom Loop. Anyway, today, taking a question from the Patreon crowd. And that’s specifically if demographics are so core to the success and failure of countries, what are some policies that could be adopted to encourage demographic expansion? Just great question. Quick review. People between 20 and 45 are the ones who are raising kids and spending money and building homes.

That’s where most consumption comes from. People between roughly 45 and 65, the kids have moved out. The house has been paid for, but they’re earning a lot. So the consumption is down, but their income is high. And so they are investing. And that’s where the capital in the tax base comes from, having a balance between those two. Without too many retirees, but enough children to generate the next generation.

That’s ultimately what you want anyway. In most of the world, that’s not what we have. Birth rates have been declining for so long that most of the advanced world, including China, in that are not just running out of children. That happened 20, 30, 40 years ago. They’re now running out of working age adults. So for many of these countries, it’s too late, but not for everybody.

For New Zealand, France and the United States and the Scandinavian countries, the demographic structures are much younger, and so there’s plenty of chance to rehabilitate. Really, it comes down to one thing. Whether you make it easy to have kids, financially speaking, so low cost of electricity, low cost of land, low cost of food, those are all real impetuses.

And finding ways to manipulate those things is absolutely important. But the biggest thing is making sure that would be parents are able to still make choices. And for that, you need to keep both parents in the work force should they so choose. And so it isn’t so much subsidization or paying people to have kids that rarely works.

Instead, it is making sure that there are abilities, the parents can still work and have kids. And that really comes down to childcare. If you can provide affordable, easily accessible childcare, that’s the single biggest thing you can do to keep the birth rates high, because parents, whether men or women are going to not feel like that, they have to make sacrifices in order to have a family, in the United States.

I would argue that the only place that we get this right is with health care personnel. Because if you’re on call and you have to run into the hospital or the clinic, then your kid has to go somewhere. And so there’s a really robust system in the United States for that, for that specific subsector. But for everyone else, you’re kind of on your own.

If you don’t have a grandparent or an aunt or uncle nearby. The Scandinavians have done this a different way where they just have state subsidized health care for everybody. But that gets really expensive really quickly. Hopefully we can figure out something in between in the United States, before the birthrate drops to low.

Okay. We’re going to finish this one up for menopause. Now, as any parent will tell you, there’s one other thing that you have to have if you’re going to be raising kids in that space and the transition from agrarian to industrialized lifestyles, we all started moving into towns and the ability to banish kids to the outside went down.

So even more than needing childcare, you need the ability to put your kids somewhere. Well, in New Zealand, they’ve got that in spades. Not only is there a lot of green space in the country, but they have gone out and built in every major population center, including all the minor ones. Something really special.

Syria Opens Doors for Turkey

Flag of Turkey being flown in front of a building

Syria’s interim leader Ahmed Al Shara has been meeting with the region’s big dogs – Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Respectively, they represent the financial backbone and the military power of the region, so buddying up isn’t the worst idea.

Syria is a complex place, with six distinct regions of varying autonomy. So, there’s a lot of moving parts. Al Shara is teasing the idea of inviting Turkey to establish air bases in southeastern Syria, solidifying Turkish influence in the region.

This sounds like a pretty sweet deal for Turkey. It limits Saudi and Iraqi influence. They could box in Syrian Kurdish forces and prevent Kurdish separatism in Turkey. The US would likely vacate Syria and rely on Turkey to handle things. Not a bad deal for the Turks.

If Turkey could limit Syrian conflict, they could shift their focus to other regional priorities. Should that happen, it is very likely that Turkish power would make a return to pre-WWI levels and reshape the region’s balance of power.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey Everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from a hotel room in San Antonio. I think so. Anyway, today is February 5th. You’re going to see this on the sixth and the last couple of days. The new interim leader of Syria, a guy by the name of Ahmed Al Shara, has been making the rounds in the Middle East with the two most important stops being, Saudi Arabia, where the money comes from, and Turkey, where the power comes from.

While there, he had talks about economics and aid and security with all the players, and he specifically mentioned that he was looking forward to an extending an invitation to the Turks to set up military facilities in the country, specifically air bases in the desert in the southeast of the country. This makes a lot of sense for a lot of reasons, for a lot of players.

But let me just kind of break down what Syria is, what it’s not, and how the Turks fit in. Well, this series is not a single place. It’s the race that was left over from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and at very few points throughout, history, going back centuries. Has it ever been an autonomous chunk of territory?

It’s only because it was all that was left over after the rest of the region got carved up into today’s nation states, it was what was left, and eventually a dictatorship took over, ran the place into the ground and led to the civil war that has recently concluded, or at least entered a new stage. Anyway, there’s not one Syria.

There’s there’s six, in the far north west, there’s a thin coastal strip, it’s where Latakia is. And that is home to a number of minorities, most notably the Alawites, who until recently ran the country. But in the end of the civil war, they basically fled everywhere else. It all went home. And so they have seen the greatest decline in their prospects of any of the groups, as this war has come to at least a temporary conclusion.

And they I don’t want to say they’re a non-factor, but they’re in a box and they really can’t project power to the rest of the country. Now you go to the east, you cross some coastal mountains, and you get to the corridor of Aleppo, Ham and Hama. And the this is the demographic and economic core of the country.

It’s also been devastated. This is where most of the fighting happened. And this is certainly where the Russians carried out what they call urban pacification programs, which is basically putting artillery and air power out of a city and bombing anything that is taller than two rocks on top of one another. This is where most of the war crimes happen.

This is where most of the genocides were even before the war, when the Alawites were in charge by themselves. You move south, you cross a desert gap, and you get to Damascus, which is an oasis city with a couple million people. It’s basically a fortress city in the middle of nowhere. And you go further south from that, and you hit the Druze mountain, which is home to probably the most bad ass of the minorities in the Middle East and is a world all its own.

In the northeast, along the Euphrates River, you have where the Kurds live, and then the southeast half, two thirds of the country, is hard desert. And aside from a few Badoo that go through there, this is kind of ISIS country. There’s really not much. So if the, the bases happened, they’re going to be in that desert section.

And that achieves a number of things for the Turks. Number one, it puts a bracket around what is possible in Syria, and it separates Syria from both Saudi Arabia and Iraq. And considering smuggling in this part of the world is a big deal and has really helped fuel the war. That is something that the Turks would really like to do, but also be able to project power both into Mesopotamia and into Arabia, which would be a nice touch.

But most importantly, it puts the sharp end of Turkish power on both sides of the Syrian Kurds. And the Turks are worried primarily about the Kurds causing the secessionist uprisings back home. So anything that puts the Syrian Kurds into a box is something the Turks are going to want to do.

In addition, that also basically ends any possibility of the United States having any military presence in the country, because we’ve been partnering with the Kurds to resist Assad. And now that Assad, the Alawite government of old, is gone, the strategic need for the US is weakened. And if Turkey, which is how we supply our forces in Syria, turns hostile and puts military bases on both sides of American forces, it’s just not a tenable situation.

Okay. So, that’s kind of the small Syrian picture. The bigger Turkish picture is more important. Turkey has the most viable land. The most sophisticated economy, the most powerful economy, the most powerful military, the most advanced industrial base in the broader region. And that’s not just in the Middle East either, includes the caucuses and the Balkans as well, and arguably even the Black Sea region.

But while Turkey is powerful and is the most powerful player, it can’t do everything at once. It has to choose. And so it’s got issues with Greece and with the Western Balkans and with Ukraine and the Russians and with the caucuses and with Iran and of course, with the Middle East. But now with the Civil War having wound down in Syria, Turkey has this tantalizing possibility to have this area and be done with it.

It’s not that there’s a lot that’s economically viable in Syria at all. It’s not. But if there’s no longer a war and you have a military footprint in the area, and the tentative government in the area is pro Turkish because you put them there, then the Turks have achieved potentially something that I don’t think a lot of people appreciate.

Stability in Syria. I mean, that’s, that’s hard. And if this sticks, if the Turks will still have to invest quite a bit of military, assets here to make it stick, but if it sticks, then the Turks can move on to an area that is far more core to their interests. Which means for the first time in 30 years, the Turks are not simply a free agent, but a free agent with a free hand.

And I can guarantee you that the major players at the Turks might stick their noses into, the European Union, the Russians, the Iranians are not ready for an unrestrained turkey to reenter their neighborhood. So this is about to get delightfully real very quickly. We haven’t really seen the Turks act as a true power since before World War One.

It’s been over a century. But in the aftermath of the Cold War and now in the aftermath of the Syrian Civil War, the Turks are back. They’ve got the capacity, and they’re trying to decide where to go next.

Coal Remains Essential for US Electricity

Georgia Power (owned by Southern Company) updated its IRP and is sending environmental activists into a tizzy.

The update revealed a significant increase in projected power demands, and to keep up, Georgia Power plans to expand power generation across various sources. That includes delaying the decommissioning of certain coal plants. Hence the environmental tizzy.

But this shouldn’t come as a surprise. The US is reindustrializing, and electricity demands are poised to skyrocket. With manufacturing, AI and data centers all requiring constant, reliable power, there’s not a whole lot of viable options that can provide a base load like coal.

Eventually coal is going to get the boot, but it’s a necessary evil for the time being. As energy transitions begin, we’ll take one step closer to saying goodbye, but that could be a decade or two from now.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming from Colorado. And today we’re gonna talk about electricity in the United States. Specifically, Georgia Power, which is one of the largest components of Southern Company, which is I believe is now the second largest electricity producer in the United States, covers the southeastern part of the country. They filed something on Friday, December 31st, called an IRP, an integrated resource plan.

And basically it’s their more than back of envelope sketches for how they plan to meet power demand over the next three years. They filed an intermediate one last year, and the big difference between last year and this year is they’re anticipating, demand growth in their region by the end of the decade, growing by over two gigawatts, more than what they had planned for just 12 months ago.

And so in order to meet that demand, they’re adding more power by pretty much every type of generation you can imagine. But the biggest change is that they’re not going to decommission a couple of coal plants, which of course has some environmental interest up in arms. Expect to see a lot more of this.

One of the things to keep in mind when you’re talking about this economic transition the United States is going through, is in order to prepare for a post China world, we need to double the size of the industrial plant in this country.

And that’s before you consider trade wars. That’s before you consider resource conflicts. That’s before you consider the green transition, which will move a lot of things from, fossil fuel to a more, alternative system. We just are gonna need more power.

Digitization is great. AI’s wonderful and all those good things. But ultimately, if your economy is going to not just be based on services, if it’s going to be based on manufacturing, if it’s going to be about moving things and stamping things and heating things and smelting things, you’re going to use a lot more electricity.

And the IRP that Georgia Power just updated reflects that. And you can only add new forms of electrical generation so quickly. And that even assumes that the regulatory picture is very favorable. Now in southern companies zone of operation, Southern Company gets along great with all of the state legislators and the state regulators. So they face fewer obstacles than most electrical companies, in adding new capacity.

But there are still upper limits on how fast you can add stuff. One of the biggest restrictions of things like Transformers, which can have a lead time of 36 to 60 months and until recently, Transformers have had like a 2 to 4 year waiting list based on what model you were looking at. And without the Transformers doesn’t really matter if you had the generation or not.

So there’s a lot of delays that are just kind of hardwired into this sort of problem. But ultimately it’s about generation. If you can’t generate the electrons to run through the system, the rest of it is kind of a moot argument. And Georgia Power is now admitting in their IRP that coal, at least in the mid-term, has to be part of the solution.

Now, in the long run, coal is definitely going to go away in the United States anyway because natural gas is so much cheaper. And as we continue to make incremental gains in solar and wind and battery, they are becoming more competitive. But the advantage you have with coal is it provides something called baseload. It’s on 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 52 weeks a year.

And that matches up very nicely with most manufacturing processes that run 24 seven, because a lot of it’s automated now and it lines up very well with things like artificial intelligence and data centers, because those server farms will be running 24 hours a day as well. That doesn’t work with solar. When the sun goes down, the electricity stops.

And you really can’t pair most of these new industries that are coming in, whether it’s because of relocation re industrialization or digitization, they just don’t pair well with green tech very well, unless you also put in a huge amount of battery. And by huge I mean massive. The best batteries we have right now can really only discharge four hours of storage.

And there is no place in the continental United States, even in the depths of summer, where you only have four hours of dark. So you have to have something else. And regardless of whether you love it or not, coal is one of those something else’s. So a lot of the coal plants that have been slated for decommissioning or replacement, over the course of the last decade, expect most of those plants to a never be decommissioned, and b if they have been decommissioned but not yet dismantled, expect them to come back, because we’re going to need every electron we can possibly get.

And decarbonization, for better or for worse, is something that’s going to have to wait for at least next decade and maybe the decade after.

Global Economic Growth Patterns (Or Should I Say Decline)

stockmarket candlesticks in the background

We’re looking at some global economic growth patterns today. Unfortunately, we’re entering an era with a lot of unknowns. Between collapsing demographics and industrial challenges, there seems to be more countries in the red than the green.

China is probably the worst off. After rapid growth brought on by urbanization, a large working-age population, and heavy subsidies, their growth has stagnated, and its population is getting more and more top heavy. Without a reversal of these trends, China’s economy is buying a one-way ticket on the struggle bus.

Even advanced economies like those in Europe are feeling the heat. As countries like Germany and Italy face their own demographic issues, new economic models will need to be created to keep their heads above water. Developing nations are a bit behind the curve in terms of aging demographics and industrial buildout, but they’ll need to shift towards higher value industries to ward off economic stagnation. Places like Brazil will also have to deal with China’s predatory industrial policies which have hindered economic progress.

So, it’s not looking great overall. Aging populations and an inability to evolve economically will stall growth in many regions. If these countries cannot navigate industrial transitions, global economic stability is going to look pretty bleak.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from a chilly, foggy Colorado morning. Today we’re going to talk about growth patterns and what it holds for economic growth, for the world, for the future. Take a look at this chart here. Now this is annual change in GDP from a decade earlier. So you’re getting all the long term trends in one graphic.

The first country, of course, have to deal with is China because it’s such an outlier. China has two stories going on. Three stories, number one, they lie about a lot of their data. So, it’s probably not as good as it sounds. It’s probably at least a third. Less. Maybe half. Anyway, it’s still the fastest growth over the last 50 years in the world.

And that requires some explanation.

Two things going on besides the the line. Number one, the one child policy and rapid urbanization, landed, China with a much, much lower birth rate. In fact, it’s been higher in the United States since the early 90s. Now, in the long term, I have no secret that I think this is going to be the end of not just the Chinese state, but the Chinese nation.

The actual hunt of necessity is going to vanish from the world by the end of this century. But in the meantime, when you have a lot of people in their 20s and 30s and early 40s, but no kids and not a lot of retirees, every bit of energy can be focused on a combination of industrial production and consumption, which are the two primary methods for growing GDP.

And if you have that at the same time that you are also subsidizing the hell out of your industry, so you have a lot of investment led production. Yes, you do get growth and yes, it is robust. And yes, it’s such records, but it also sets the stage for the second problem, which is why that chart has just collapsed on the right side and that is that one.

Those people in their 20s, in their 30s and the early 40s become in their 40s, their 50s and their early 60s. Then that growth story is over, and you no longer have the workforce that is necessary to keep the activity going. And then all that’s left is exports and investment and that’s where the Chinese were about ten, 15 years ago.

Well, now in the late 2020s and moving into the 2030s, the people who are in their 40s, 50s and early 60s move on to their late 50s, 60s and early 70s. And then it’s just over. We’re already in a situation where the Chinese have about the same amount of population, and people over age 50 is under age 50.

This is already a terminal demographic. You just can’t get people in their 60s to kick out kids. But it does also mean that unless, unless, unless, unless the Chinese can wildly automate and retain access to every remaining consumer market in the world, that they are almost done. And we’re seeing that in the data. Now, the second story is what’s going on in the advanced world, most notably, Europe.

And that’s a demographic story, kind of like China. Now the Europeans have a much longer trajectory of history and economic policy than China. Really, China didn’t get started until the opening in 1980. Whereas the Europeans have been part of the industrial process for a century and a half. And so you had more well rounded growth. But the demographic story after World War Two was the same people urbanize, and they industrialize and they had fewer kids.

And you play that for 2 or 3 generations and there just isn’t a replacement generation. So just as with China, the Germans and the Italians have a lot more people over age 50 than they do under 50. In fact, they’ve been there for a decade already. And this is the decade where they start having more people over 60 than under 60.

And that is a very different economic model that we have yet to invent. And it’s difficult to see how it will have any growth at all. So as modern economies, a lot of the advanced world is simply fading away and, fading with ever increasing rapidity. That leaves the developing world minus China, which is a different story. When you apply industrial technologies like asphalt and concrete and steel and rebar and electricity, you get a huge amount of growth because you’re basically introducing a fundamentally new economic model on top of whatever your pre-industrial system was.

And in the building of that structure and the growth that you get from those structures, obviously your GDP rises quite a bit. But then the question is whether or not you can adapt to a new era. So what happened here in the United States is we did this much more slowly, but as we applied these technologies, we didn’t simply increase our production of raw and processed materials.

We also got into higher value added manufacturing and ultimately services. In most of the developing world, they have not been able, or at least not yet, to successfully make that transition. They’re still, for the most part, raw commodity economies. And so even when you industrialize but don’t change your underlying economic fabric, you get a really good burst of growth for 20, 30 years.

And then it just stops. And with the exception of, say, the Northeast Asian tigers like, Taiwan and Korea that have made that transition, whether you are in Brazil or Nigeria or even increasingly, South Africa, the jump was never made.

The 80s, the 90s and especially the 2000 were great growth decade.

But by the time you get to the 20 tens, it kind of started to fall apart. And now in the 2020s, it’s gone and they just haven’t made the jump. Now they did kind of have the deck stacked against them. They paid for a lot of this industrialization with borrowed money from the advanced economies. And they all have had some sort of debt crisis, which definitely held them back.

But the bigger issue was China. China used predatory industrial policies to basically gobble up the industrial, capacity of all of these developing countries and moved all that industrial plant to China. The country that has suffered by far the most from that policy is, Brazil, where in the 2000s the Chinese went into Brazil, establish joint ventures with all of these companies were actually solid, maybe even world leading in their sectors.

The Chinese stole the technologies, took them back to China, build up an industrial plant that was subsidized to compete with the Brazilians on the global stage, and not only destroy the ability of the Brazilians to export to the global market. Ultimately flooded Brazil with Chinese product and destroyed those companies at home as well. Anyway, once that is done, you know, the Brazilians today would have to start over.

But they have to start over with the demographic that has changed as well, just as the Chinese and everyone else has aged. That has happened in the developing world as well, just starting from a later point. Now we’re nowhere near the point that the Chinese or the Germans, that this is not the last decade for countries like Turkey or Indonesia, Brazil, but they are aging at nearly the same rate as the Europeans almost as fast as the Chinese.

And if they can’t find a way to change that underlying economic model in the next 20 years, then they’re going to be facing exactly the same sort of demographic pressures that the Europeans and the Chinese are facing today. So it’s not all the same for everybody, but all the trends are they’re just wrapped up in a slightly different picture.

And it does mean that for the remainder of the first half of this century, we’re looking at most of the growth patterns that were established that were very, very fast at the beginning of the century, simply falling apart because there’s no demographic wherewithal to carry them forward, or the countries haven’t been able to modernize and diversify their economic structures enough to get out of the commodity rut.

And that is a pretty dark picture for a lot of countries. There just aren’t enough that have made the transition in order to carry us all along.

Dealing With Chinese Drones

Drones are all the rage right now and China is jumping on the bandwagon. With Chinese plans to create over 1 million combat-ready drones within two years, should the US be worried?

Drones may seem like a foolproof option, but that’s not the case. There are range, payload, and speed issues to consider, as well as ensuring an accurate guidance and targeting system is in place. The Chinese haven’t quite figured out all of those pieces. You must also factor in the US space and tech capabilities, which could render Chinese drones useless if it came to that.

If you want to make the argument that these drones open new doors for the Chinese, consider these factors. China’s drones would likely limit US naval operations near the mainland, but the Chinese air force already does that. Sure, there might be opportunities to make a little cash by offloading these drones in foreign markets, but not enough to move the needle. The only way I see these drones really impacting much would be if a drone-mothership was created and deployed (which the US is working on, not the Chinese).

All this to say, China’s drone production is impressive in scale, but their effectiveness in naval combat will be limited.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from the air in slow burn. And a glacier in New Zealand just to the north of the town of Glenorchy. Today we are taking a question from the Patreon page. And it is how is the United States going to deal with the absolute scads of drones that the Chinese say that they’re going to build?

The Chinese official plan, which I have no reason to doubt that they cannot achieve it, is to have over 1 million combat ready drones within two years. First, let’s talk about the nature of that sort of threat. And then second, what the US Navy has to do differently from what it’s uphill, might have to do differently.

I’m just climbing the marine here.

First of all, a million is a lot. But keep in mind, as we are learning from the Ukraine war, whenever you’re going to have a weapons platform, you have to choose, largely between payload and range. So the farther you’re going to go, the less of a warhead you can carry. And there’s always detection issues too. So even the new rocket drones that the Ukrainians have been using, which have more weaponry and more kinetic force, really only have a range of, low number of hundreds of kilometers.

So if you got a million weaponized systems and you can only throw them, a couple hundred kilometers or less, it’s, never going to even enter the defensive envelope. Of an American destroyer, much less an aircraft carrier. Second, in addition to the balance between range and warhead, there’s also the issue of speed.

For example, the Iranian Shaheed drones, which have been causing a lot of havoc in the Ukraine war, only fly had about 150km a hour. It’s roughly 9100 miles an hour. So, you know, I don’t if you knew this, but naval ships, they move, so move pretty fast. So as in the words of the great man, Mr. Miyagi, best way to avoid a punch is no be there.

Which brings us to guidance. Something we have discovered over and over in the Ukraine war is it doesn’t matter how many drones you have and how fast they are and how big their warheads are. If they can’t see the target. Most drones today require eyes on. They require a controller. And so if you don’t have a controller with a constant telemetry link to the weapon system, the weapon is just going to spin out of control and crash harmlessly.

And you know, when you’re talking about naval combat, that, harmlessly means in the ocean, you might like you can have a lot of collateral damage. Now, there are two ways around this. The first is a problem that the Chinese are struggling with, with all of their other weapons systems. The Chinese have a number of long range systems, especially when it comes to, ballistic missiles.

The problem is targeting. So the United States is really good with its missile forces. If we’re doing something like a ballistic against a land target, you know, you have coordinates. It’s really hard to do anything about that. And if you’re going to use something like a cruise missile, the United States basically loads in geographic information into the brain of the cruise missile.

And the follow is a programed route to hit its target. When you’re dealing with moving targets, it’s a lot harder. You have to have eyes on. And the problem that the Chinese have is while they do have a whole lot of weapons systems and people and manufacturing capacity, it’s really hard to have eyes on something that’s over the horizon that is moving.

So everything is dependent upon maintaining that telemetry link and having eyes in the sky, probably in the form of a reconnaissance satellite. And while the Chinese do have the ability to launch and maintain their own satellite fleet, their space weapons systems are woefully nascent. They’re new. And if we were to have a conflict with any of the technologies that the Chinese currently have in place or deployed, you basically have the United States who’s been playing this game for 60 years, take out every Chinese satellite in the sky in a matter of a few days, if not even a few hours.

And then all of a sudden, all of these longer range weapons systems that the Chinese have are blind and can’t hit anything that can move. And again, that’s way to avoid a punch movie there. Okay. With drones, this is even more problematic. The only way that we have technology today where a drone can reliably get around jamming is to have a fiber optic spool where you literally have a physical cable connecting the drone back several kilometers to the operator.

But several kilometers is like, you know, the range of seeing the horizon when you’re at sea level. You put it on a boat, you might be able to go a little bit further, but nothing weighs nothing. And you’re going to have a spool that goes out 50 K. You know, that’s already beyond the technology that we have today.

So like everything the Chinese do, they do it at scale. But that doesn’t necessarily mean it’s a game changer. It may limit what the US Navy can do within sight of the mainland. But I would argue that all this talk about Chinese drones when it comes to naval combat, does not do anything for them at all. That their air force doesn’t do better already.

So it’s a lot of talk and, it’s interesting because it is a new technology. It will keep evolving, but I think the field where it’s going to be more of an issue is arms exports, because of the Chinese can make lots and lots of these things. They may not be useful, in a sea fight or even in a land fight.

Although if they decided to invade Russia, I could get curious. But they might be useful as an export product. If the Chinese started sending all kinds of stuff in to say, just to pick something out of random, the African theater and arming groups to achieve this or that, that could go some interesting directions. But make no mistake, the places where the Chinese are going to find customers here are not places that are.

How should I put this civilization strong? It’s more likely to be in semi stateless areas, which is going to limit the amount of income that they can get from them. And if they start deciding to supply weapons to quote unquote countries. Who’s it going to be? I mean, no one in Latin America has a territorial dispute. We haven’t seen a war in Latin American, not counting the soccer world worth a bunch of people got lost in the jungle.

I think you have to go back to, like, the 1880s.

They get involved in Europe. The Russians, you know, might buy this stuff in scale. But if the Chinese start supplying hundreds of thousands of weapons systems that are finished to the Russians, we’re in a very different world already. Southeast Asia could be fun, but drones with today’s technology really don’t do well in heavy forest or jungles.

I mean, I tried it. That was an expensive experiment. That just leaves Africa and the opens of places like, say, the Sahel. A booming arms market for a country the size of China. That is not so with today’s technology, with the likely evolution of this technology over the next several years. This is not something I worry about too much.

What would make this change is not just a general improvement in the range and the payload and the accuracy and all that good stuff, but being able to make, a drone mothership, that has all the normal aspects of a military vessel, but also has the ability to manufacture drones at scale, with its own facilities.

And that’s something that at the moment, the Chinese are not working on because they haven’t figured out the tech. That is, however, something that the United States is working on with the replicator initiative, which should be operational by the end of 2026.

AI Drama: DeepSeek, Nvidia, and China

A Chinese firm, DeepSeek, claimed to develop an AI model at a fraction of the cost used to develop competing models. This has caused quite the stir, but what is actually going on?

China’s domestic chip manufacturing is dated and their attempts to catch up have fallen short. I’m always skeptical when approaching topics involving Chinese tech claims, but if the DeepSeek breakthrough is true, it would mean a massive AI leap has occurred. This would reduce the reliance on high-end chips and drastically mitigate supply chain vulnerabilities.

Nvidia had designed downgraded chips for China, but even those were banned by the Biden administration in late 2023. So, even if DeepSeek’s breakthrough turns out to be real, the Chinese will struggle to fully capitalize on the opportunity due to hardware restrictions and access. And Trump could make those restrictions even tighter.

But again, I’m doubtful that we’re getting the full picture out of DeepSeek and I suspect we’ll know what actually happened very soon.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming from Colorado. Lots of people have asked me to comment about recent things that are going on with artificial intelligence from a market point of view. Let me begin by saying I never comment on market movements, and this is not going to change today. What is going on is we’ve had a bit of a rout in the United States for a company called Nvidia, which designs the ultra high end GPUs, as are graphics processing units, which are the advanced chips that are used in almost all artificial intelligence training and applications.

Specifically, a Chinese company called Deep Seek says that it managed to generate an artificial intelligence model, at 1/20 of the cost of what Nvidia has been able to do or what companies had been able to do with Nvidia chips. And in doing so, we basically saw more market value, bleed off of Nvidia in about eight hours than most countries have economies.

It was ridiculous. It’s also probably completely fabricated. Keep in mind that almost anything that comes out of U.S. high tech is proprietary. So the information is circumspect, and almost anything that comes out of China has a degree of fraud involved. And if you’re using either of these two things to color your trading decisions, I can’t help you at all.

But what I can do is talk about where this leaves the industry and what it would mean one way or another. So let’s assume for the moment that this is all fraud, in which case this just all blows away really quickly. And a lot of people who have been trading money and trading stocks feel really stupid in the not too distant future.

I think that’s the most likely outcome. But let’s assume for the moment that it’s real. And this Chinese firm working with subpar chips has been able to make superior, large language model trained AI systems to what the American bigwigs like OpenAI can do. 1/20 of the cost with dumber chips. That would be significant. One of the big problems that we have with the chips right now is the supply chain is so grossly vulnerable that it doesn’t take much of a disruption anywhere in the world to break the ability of the world to make these high end chips at all. And if that happens, then we’re going to have to decide how to ration our chip usage. If you can drop the cost of training these new models by 95%, obviously, that makes, that concern a little bit less of a problem.

But even within that, there’s going to be some very clear breaks geopolitically. So again, assuming that this is for real, let’s look at the chips that were used. The high end chips that are basically three, four and five nanometers that provide the backbone of most AI operations. The ones that we think could be used for training AI models are all under sanctions as of 2022, and the chips that were used by deep seek to do their operation were custom built chips, basically.

Nvidia looked at the sanctions, said that they still wanted a market in China. So they worked with the Chinese company Deep Seek to design a chip that would comply with sanctions, and they dumbed it down, if Deep Six announcements are true. Clearly Nvidia did not dumb it down enough, but the Biden administration, in one of its last actions, decided a couple months ago that, Nvidia has not been playing in good faith and basically banned all of these chips as well.

So if deep secret was able to do this with the dumb down chips, those dumb down chips are no longer accessible to the Chinese economy writ large anyway. Moreover, the most advanced GPU that the Chinese system is capable of manufacturing is about a 14 nanometer. So you’re talking about a dozen generations behind where we are right now?

It’s worse than it sounds, because even to make those 14 nanometers, they have to use imported equipment and a lot of imported labor to do the quality checks. Yes. Yes, yes. We have had a couple Chinese firms make something in the seven nanometer range, but it’s been really clunky. It’s been a massive power hog. They get something only like a 20% success rate.

And most commercial chips, if they’d have anything less than 90%, are considered failures. So if they push and push and push and push and push and throw in an exorbitant amount of resources into it, they can make a chip that is still half a dozen generations behind what would be necessary to do an AI model. So if if Deep Seek is not lying, then we would have a breakthrough in AI that the Chinese would be utterly unable to participate in, and that would generate a very interesting world.

But we’re going to know how this is going to go either way in the not too distant future, because everything that Deep Six says that it did is open source. And we’re going to be able to try to recreate it, in any number of companies, in any number of countries in the not too distant future. One other reason that I’m really doubtful the DPC actually did this.

There are basically two ways you train AI. You basically you teach it like in school, like, you know, x plus two equals y three plus four equals seven. And once you’ve done that and built this kind of catalog of basic information, and you then let it loose on bigger problems, what deep seek is saying is they just skipped the first step, saying that you don’t need to teach basic math to the computers.

You can just set them loose on calculus, if that’s true, which I find exceedingly unlikely. This can be replicated in a matter of weeks to months, not years. So we’re going to know, in the not too distant future, just what actually happened and how many people in the financial world jumped the gun. In a really silly way or not? And even in the, you know, worst case scenarios, the right term, even in the situation where deep secret really, really did generate a bit of a revolution, everyone’s going to be able to play except for the countries that can’t get the chips. And if there’s one thing that we understand about the Trump administration versus the Biden administration, is they have no problem taking sledgehammers to specific companies.

So if it is the understanding of the Trump administration that Nvidia has been playing fast and loose with sanctions, you can count on Nvidia having much bigger problems than simply a Chinese company coming up with an a more efficient model.

Trump’s Political Capital Bonfire

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Trump has used up a lot of paper in his first 10 days in office, but he hasn’t spent much time working with Congress to make his executive orders stick.

Since President Trump doesn’t have the power to raise or reallocate funds, his executive orders are mostly symbolic. He’s also using his available resources on things that might not be the best place to put them, but without an inner circle that would warn him of these mistakes…it will continue to happen.

Many of these executive orders are questionable anyway; like an “Iron Dome” system that doesn’t make sense or freezing federal grants without clear guidelines. Oh, and these aren’t just impacting us domestically, a freeze on foreign aid has disrupted diplomatic and strategic influence abroad.

The main point of all this is that Trump is burning through his political capital at an alarming rate, and it risks the long-term effectiveness of his administration. But hey, no one said that this presidency wasn’t going to be chaotic.

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Hi it’s Michael. I’m in for Peter, who unfortunately, is feeling a little under the weather and has lost the use of his voice. You all were about to watch a video of that Peter recorded earlier today about the executive orders that the Trump administration is issuing. The order in question that is the main focus of this video has in those two hours since been rescinded.

But we are going to continue to share this video because we think that the analysis and conclusions in it ultimately stirring. True. And, the the potential for chaos and confusion that Peter highlights obviously was shared by enough stakeholders, both inside and outside of the government, that the white House, has decided to reevaluate their approach. So if that feel better, Peter, and, we hope you enjoyed the video.

Hey, everybody. Peter zine here, coming to you from Colorado, where I am rapidly losing my voice. We’re about ten days into the new Trump administration, and, well, it’s been. Shall we? But it’s not clear to me that anything has really changed. Donald Trump has issued, dozens are we have to hundreds. Now, I’ve kind of lost track of short executive orders, claiming a lot of stuff, asserting a lot of stuff.

But not once. He’s actually asked for anything from Congress. And keep in mind that the US presidency cannot raise funds or really even transfer funds, from one agency to another so he can squeeze the blob a little bit. But without congressional action, not a lot can happen. But in doing so, Donald Trump has picked a lot of fights that didn’t need to be picked.

And he’s really gone after the core of what a lot of people to consider to their political identity, to be, without a lot of immediate payback. So let me give you an example of this. Donald Trump’s made a very big deal about going after illegal migrants, especially those with criminal records, which I don’t think, especially in the criminal records thing anyone has a real problem with.

But from talking with agents that are within, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, there’s no one who money that comes with these directives. What has happened is other law enforcement branches of the federal government have been to redirect to assist, Ice in whatever they’re doing and going after these people. So you get folks from, like the Bureau of Tobacco and Firearms or the FBI or whatever.

Now collaborating, cooperating with Ice in their roundup operations. And that’s all well and good, but keep in mind that anyone who’s helping Immigration and Customs Enforcement is going after illegals is not doing what they were doing before. So they’re not investigating financial fraud. They’re not investigating smuggling. So the blob has been squeezed and we have more resources going to a specific task, and it has generated a few thousand requests, but it’s come at the cost of everything else just kind of flying by the wayside.

Now, any any middle school adviser to Donald Trump would have been able to warn him that this is exactly what was going to happen. But over the last four years, rather than build up a legislative block that he wants to push through in order to generate a real durable change in the American system, he has since instead purged himself of anyone who might not just tell him no, but yes, but, and as a result, he’s got this shell of dense incompetence around him now where no one will tell him anything other than exactly what he wants to hear.

And so we get these scads of just very, very brief, executive orders that really don’t move anything. Another example is recently Donald Trump signed another brief executive order, to establish an iron Dome system around the United States. Now, Iron Dome is the missile defense system that the Israelis used to protect themselves from mortars and rockets.

Keep in mind that, Israel’s about the size of new Jersey, and the weapon systems that are being launched at them are very, very, very short range ballistic, nothing like what the United States has to deal with in the mainland. So if we were to spend the approximately $40 trillion that it would take to build up a nation wide Iron Dome system, all it would do is protect Detroit from Hamilton, Canada, and San Diego from, Tijuana.

Everything else is too far away. It’s the wrong weapon system. But of course, there’s no money behind this because it’s an executive order, so it just looks really silly to anyone who knows anything about missile defense at the border.

And Trump’s picking a lot of fights with a lot of people that don’t need to be picked. We had a we had a two page executive order from Trump a few days ago that shut down the distribution of all grants, about $3 trillion of funds, most of which are distributed through the states or through private organization or nonprofit organizations.

And this is everything from the small small Business Administration to Meals on Wheels. And according to the directive, until such time as everyone can indicate that they’re complying with the new regulations and attitude, was the right word.

Orientation, I think, is the word, that Donald Trump is trying to establish. The money can’t be distributed. But it’s a temporary hold of three months. Well, there was no guidance in that. Two pages to basically regulate $3 trillion of distribution. And so it’s all been shut down, which means in the not too distant future, you’re looking at like, you know, dead old people because Meals on Wheels isn’t working. I mean, these are unpicked fights.

These are unforced errors. But Donald Trump is making a lot of them and burning a lot of capital to do it very, very quickly. There could also be damage on an international scale because he’s done basically the same thing with an executive order. Very short, very brief, very few details, shutting down any foreign aid that requires dollar transfers, which is, with the exception of some military assistance, almost all of it.

So we’ve seen the US global position diplomatically and strategically basically frozen. And we’ve seen the U.S. domestic position when it comes to the interface between the population and the government in anything except for entitlements basically frozen, with no clear guidelines as to what’s next or what the parameters might be. And Congress has yet to be involved at all.

These are not the sort of mistakes that a second term president should be making, but they are being made by the dozens. And it’s unclear on the other side of this how much Donald Trump’s political capital will remain, because he’s going through it at a pace that I have never seen by any leader in any country in modern history.

But I got to admit, there’s a show and it’s entertaining.

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited NAtions

The Absent Superpower

The accidental superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited Nations

The Absent Superpower

The Absent Superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited NAtions

The Absent Superpower

The accidental superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited Nations

The Absent Superpower

The Absent Superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited NAtions

The Absent Superpower

The accidental superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited Nations

The Absent Superpower

The Absent Superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited NAtions

The Absent Superpower

The accidental superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited Nations

The Absent Superpower

The Absent Superpower

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