Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. I was out backpacking, but there was a forest fire near my house, so I had to run back in. Anyway, it looks like it’s under control. We have some thunderstorms moving in, so I guess that’s a silver lining. Anyway, it gives you an opportunity to hear me talk about a couple of things that have happened in the few days since I’ve been back.

The first thing I’m going to talk about today is what’s going on in Ukraine. As you know, the Ukrainians have become more and more creative at using imported weapons from the NATO alliance, as well as some of their own homegrown stuff, to strike Russian targets further and further away. In the week around the 1st of August, just before and just after, a series of attacks took out a strategic bomber in Russia. Specifically, they hit a refinery deep within Russia, over a thousand miles from the coast, which started a really big fire. They also sank a Kilo-class submarine. You know, that’s a $300 million price tag that the Russians just lost. But the most interesting thing I’ve seen is that a series of attacks took out at least five S-400 air defense systems.

Now, the S-400 is supposedly the most sophisticated anti-aircraft system in the world, capable of shooting down missiles and all that good stuff. However, its reputation has definitely been tarnished in this war. And these aren’t the first ones that the Ukrainians have taken out. They’ve taken out at least another six, to my knowledge. The Russians only started the war with 50 to 56 of these systems, so we’re looking at somewhere along the lines of 20% of them being taken out, with probably a few more damaged as well. Using around 50 of these systems to provide full air defense coverage for the entire Russian mainland is already a stretch, and now they’ve lost 20%. This has escalated from being a tactical theater issue to a full strategic threat, as they’re losing the ability to maintain a periphery for air and missile defense across the entire space.

The Ukrainian goal here is very, very clear. If they can take out enough of these systems, especially in Crimea and to a lesser degree in the Donetsk region, then when the F-16s arrive—which are coming in from Denmark, the Netherlands, and a number of other European countries—the Ukrainians will be able to use their air power without the immediate fear of everything getting shot down.

One of the big problems they had last year when they attempted their counteroffensives was trying to do combined warfare using artillery, rocket systems, drones, men, tanks, and aircraft, which they didn’t have. Attempting a combined warfare project without the air component was a bit of a problem. The Russians were able to call in airstrikes and artillery support and cut up the Ukrainians as they were trying to advance. If enough anti-aircraft systems can be taken out of the equation on the Russian side, then even if the Ukrainians cannot achieve general air superiority, they can certainly achieve temporary air superiority over specific zones where it’s important.

This creates a very different sort of conflict where NATO trainers will prove immensely useful because that’s how NATO operates. Anyway, the first F-16s have been repainted with Ukrainian livery. They are in Ukraine now, and probably over the course of the next few weeks while I’m gone again, we’re going to see the first efforts by the Ukrainians to actually leverage their new air power in league with their ground power. We might see a crack in the line, specifically in the direction of Crimea.

In just the last week, the destruction of the S-400 systems has induced the Russians to evacuate a couple of their airbases, pulling all of the aircraft out because they can’t defend them. Obviously, in the short term, that’s great for Ukraine because it means these aircraft are now going to be flying from Russia proper, much further away. Moving forward, if the Russians lose the ability to do quick turnaround launches when the Ukrainians are operating, then the Ukrainians have that much more leeway in everything else.

Okay, that’s it. Take care.

Hey, everyone. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the south of France and the National Park. One of the questions I’ve been getting repeatedly in Europe is, “Isn’t Russia due for a coup or a revolution or something?” People are looking for a way to end the Ukraine war quickly. Well, there are three problems with that.

Number one, I don’t think we’re going to see a palace coup anytime soon. Most of the people at the top of the Russian political heap are folks that Putin has known or trained for the last 30 years. One of the many characteristics of the Soviet system is that the intelligence folks tended to be in charge, especially after they threw an internal coup back in the early ’80s. That’s when the Andropov, Chernenko, Gorbachev trio came to power, all former intelligence officers. Putin is an heir to that legacy. Remember, he used to be stationed in East Germany to steal industrial secrets from the West. After that coup, everyone else in the communist hierarchy was basically purged. So, those were the people who took over the post-Soviet Russian system.

There are only about 120 of them left at this point, but all of them are personally loyal to Putin from their days in the KGB or are former interns of people like Putin. Take Alexey Miller at Gazprom, literally a former intern. They all see the world through the same lens, and they all owe their positions partly to Putin. Putin has spent the last 30 years purging this group of anyone who might be disloyal. So, number one, they see the world the same way. If something were to happen to Putin, they would probably have a really interesting conversation about who’s in charge next and then just prosecute the war more or less as it’s been going.

Number two, they’re personally loyal. About the only one of the 120 who might have the guts to try something a little scrappy would be Igor Sechin, a former gunrunner who now runs Rosneft, the state oil monopoly. He probably has the guts to kill Putin. But the other 119, if there’s anything they agree on, aside from seeing the world through the same lens, it’s that they all hate Igor Sechin. So, if Sechin did try something, he would probably be dead the next day. So, an internal palace coup is probably not going to happen.

That leaves the option of revolution. The standard of living in Russia is dropping. They can’t access Western goods or Western travel destinations. The economic elite, such as it is, is having a rough time of it. Inflation is an ongoing issue in many parts of the world, Russia included, because now the Russian industrial complex is being retooled to make tanks and refurbish military equipment. So, it’s not available for what paltry commercial goods it was capable of producing in the first place.

So, what about a revolution? Well, the problem is that this is not the West. These are not democratic societies. These are despotisms. As a result, you usually don’t get public uprisings in a place like Russia unless and until the standard of living tanks and the sense of nationhood itself is thrown into question. Russia has had popular uprisings in the past, but the Cold War wasn’t one. Basically, you have to see the Russian army disintegrate in a military campaign to the point that people know the strongmen are gone and broken. We’re not there yet, and there’s nothing on the short-term horizon in the Ukraine war that suggests we’re anywhere close.

For those thinking this is still perhaps the path forward, I don’t want to say you’re wrong because we do have a lot of similarities right now between what’s going on in Russia and what went on in the 1980s: similar economic dislocation, similar failure of state institutions. The best parallel I can draw is the Wagner rebellion of last year. We had a rogue paramilitary commander who marched on Moscow for a thousand miles. Much to Putin’s delight, not a single military officer joined him. But much to Putin’s despair, not a single military officer stood against Wagner either. No one loves Russia, just like no one loved the Soviet Union.

When this does go, and the odds are it will in time, the whole thing goes—the whole regime, the whole governing structure—just like it did in 1992. Because aside from the corrupt, there is no vested interest in maintaining this system. It just has to have some sort of short, sharp shock, like an extreme military defeat, for us to get from here to there.

So, are we going to see a revolution in Russia? Almost certainly. But there aren’t going to be any warning signs until the day it happens. And as soon as it’s over, that’s it for the Russian state. They don’t have enough time, demographically speaking, to try something new. So, when this is over, it’s over.

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Denver International Airport, where I’m about to catch a flight to California for some hiking in the area. This means you won’t get any updates from me on Ukraine or anything else for the next month, as I’ll be out of touch. So, let me give you an idea of what I’ll be looking for when I get back, as there’s a new wrinkle in the conflict worth noting.

The Ukrainian government, over the last five or six weeks, has been reporting a tripling in the tolls inflicted on Russian artillery. Russian artillery is critical to their military strategy. The Russian military is fundamentally an artillery force, rather than an infantry or armored force. Approximately 80% of the casualties suffered by the Ukrainian military have been due to artillery. When the Russians advance into a town, they don’t clear it door by door; they use artillery to reduce everything to rubble and then take control of the ruins.

While I can’t confirm the accuracy of this reported tripling—it’s likely part propaganda and part optimism—independent reports also indicate a significant uptick in artillery activity. However, these reports are often somewhat dated. There are a couple of factors suggesting that the Ukrainians are seeing more success.

The first factor is somewhat technical: a lot of North Korean shells are now entering the field. These shells can’t be used with modern artillery systems. North Korea is many things, but a technological leader it is not, so most of the artillery pieces the Russians have that can use these North Korean shells date back to the 1950s. They have a much shorter range.

Until now, Ukrainian loitering munitions only had a range of about 12 miles, which meant not many Russian artillery pieces were within range. But with the North Korean stuff, some are, and more importantly, the Ukrainians have built up an industry from scratch for robotics and drones. There are now not just dozens, but hundreds, possibly even low thousands, of basically garage shops around the country.

These garage shops are producing more advanced and, most importantly, longer-range drones, with ranges now extending to 20 to 35 miles. This puts a majority of Russian artillery potentially within range. So, it’s really a question of how quickly the Ukrainians can ramp up production. It’s not just the Ukrainians, of course.

Most Western allies have now allowed Ukraine to conduct at least limited strikes within Russian territory using the weapons they’ve been provided. Weapons like the American ATACMS are having a significant impact. However, the number of these weapons is relatively limited, so they’re reserved for large concentrations rather than single artillery pieces.

But if the Ukrainians can produce thousands of drones and deploy a dozen to each target, this could significantly change the frontline dynamics. By the time I get back in a month, we should have a clearer idea of whether this strategy is working. The Russians started the war with about 2,000 artillery pieces in active units and another 19,000 in reserves, in various states of disrepair. If the burn rate on these artillery pieces has indeed tripled, the Russians won’t be able to keep up with new production and refurbishments.

While I hesitate to use the term “game changer,” given the many variables in play, this development could certainly be the most significant happening this summer.

Hey everyone. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from the French-Italian border on the Mediterranean. And today we’re going to take an entry from the Ask Peter forum, specifically, if the goal of the West in Ukraine is to ultimately, break the Russian military, then wouldn’t it make sense to simply go after the what are currently the legal oil revenues, put them under full sanction, actually interrupt the flows? 

right now, the official policy of the Western nations is to keep the oil flowing from Russia, but do so in a way that prevents the Russians from overly profiting from it. there are two ways that the Russians get their crude to market. Number one is in compliance with the sanctions, where other people provide insurance, other fraud shipping on the second is via something called the shadow fleet, which may be as many as 20% of the tankers that are out there now that are no longer registered to anyone. 

they simply shovel crude back and forth doing CTC transfers, taking them from Russian ports direct to third parties who don’t care about the sanctions very much, and allowing the Russians to circumvent things like price caps. it’s a reasonable question. And if, if, if this war is ever going to end in a way that actually breaks Russian power, Russian income has to be destroyed as part of that process. 

But to make that happen, there’s going to be a lot of collateral damage along the way. So a couple things to keep in mind. first of all, if you’re going to take this stuff offline, there’s a lot of it to go. Russia exports roughly 5.3 million barrels of crude per day and about 2.6 million barrels per day of refined product. 

Of that, only about 1 million barrels of crude is exported by pipe to China Direct, and maybe 300 to 400,000 barrels a day of refined product. Israel. That’s China. The rest of it has to hit a port somewhere and then be part of this shadow fleet or the sanctions regime system. So you’re talking about a disruption of at least 6 million barrels per day of oil and oil products. 

That’s huge. that is well over 10% of globally traded, energy product by volume. And for those of you guys who’ve forgotten your basic economics, oil demand and fuel oil demand is inelastic. So if you only have a disruption of, say, 5 to 10% in terms of output and production, you can get a price increase of 50 to 100% or more. 

Because if you don’t have the crude, if you don’t have the gasoline, you just can’t carry out normal economic activity. So your pay whatever you have to. That’s one of the reasons why the recessions in the 70s and the 80s were so severe, because everyone was dependent on this stuff, and when some of it not even very much went away, well, shit hit the fan. 

So if, if, if, if this were to happen, you would deal with a major price shock in the case of a populist government like Joe Biden’s here in the United States, that means inflation. And that means that his perception is that the political floor would fall out from under him. In any chance he had a reelection would go away. 

so this is something that has not been seriously considered in most Western capitals, most notably in the United States. there is one way you can get around that, and that is to use existing power that Congress has already granted the president to sever the United States from global energy markets. right now, actually for nine years now, ever since, I think it was the 2015 omnibus bill, Congress has granted the president the authority to end oil exports. 

And if you did that, since the U.S. is a net exporter now, you’d have a supersaturated oil market in North America, angle America specifically, while you would also have a removal of another 3 to 5 million barrels a day of crude and refined product from the rest of the world. So basically, you double down on the elasticity problem for the rest of the world and cause a massive global depression. 

At the same time, North America has a few problems with crude quality. This lady does on its own way. if if if that were to happen, you could probably kiss the Western Alliance largely goodbye, because the white House would have consciously chosen to favor its own domestic political issues and some economic issues, to be perfectly honest, against the security and economic needs in the long term, basically the entire alliance structure. 

Then there’s also the issue of enforcement. You can’t just, like, wave your hand and say, no, this stuff isn’t allowed. You have to do something about it. And your options are to go in and bomb Russian ports, which would trigger, let’s just say, other issues, or to go after the shadow Fleet itself to take those ships out of circulation. 

I mean, they’re all basically owned by the Russians at this point, but they’re shipping crude primarily to China and India. So if you basically declare or have an undeclared economic war against those two countries, that complicates a lot of things very, very quickly. Now, will we get there in the end? Yeah, probably. but that requires pulling out all the stops and a lot of strategic questions that, would occupy a great deal of political bandwidth for any government. 

In the end, if the United States really if the goal really is to break Russia, then there needs to be changes to military policy to make sure that the Ukrainians can strike logistical hubs within Russia. And it means an end to Russian energy exports at a large enough scale to break the income flows that are necessary to keep the Russian military machine running. 

We are not there yet. I’m not saying we’re not going to get there. In fact, I would argue we are. But that requires a significant change in the political and economic calculus of all the Western capitals, first and foremost, the United States. So good question. I’m not yet.