Hey, all, Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado early in the new year. We’ve had a lot of information drop out of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Ukrainians. A lot of folks on both sides of the conflict in Ukraine that study the war. And we’ve seen a few interesting patterns emerge in just the last four months that I think it’s worth spending a little time talking about. 

The short version is we’re, to a degree, seen a deindustrialization of the war effort, specifically on the Russian side of the equation. The Russians started this conflict with a massive advantage in armored vehicles and tanks, something like 20,000 or so that they had left over from the Soviet period. The Ukrainians had a lot left over as well, but not even a quarter. 

The amount probably closer to a 10th, actually, by most measures. But the Russians go through equipment like they go through men. They run it hard, and they put it into situations that are perhaps not the best. And their doctrine isn’t very good. And everything gets shot up. And that’s before you consider the climactic and, geographic situation in Ukraine, where for large, portions of the year, the area is just really muddy. 

And if you put a tank into mud, it doesn’t move very well. And it’s really easy prey for a drone. And so bit by bit over the war, vehicles have become less important and drones have become more important. But for the Russians, who actually have to bring equipment to the front, vehicles are always going to be more important for them than it is for the Ukrainians. 

Well, it seems that they’ve run out, pretty much all of their pre-war battle tanks are now gone and their ability to replenish them, it is something like 2 to 3% of what they had before. They’re only able to make a few tanks a month. In addition, things like APCs and armored vehicles, they’ve pretty much run out of. 

And now they’re even running out of civilian vehicles and things like golf carts to the point that we’re actually seeing horse charges starting to pop up on the front again. Because horses are available and cars are not, this is really led to a change in Russian tactics, obviously, because if you don’t have the equipment to move your men, you have to move your men differently. 

And so some of the new strategies that we’re seeing on the front is instead of sending a thousand men or 100 men or ten men, it’s sending 2 or 3 men to try to infiltrate a zone. And you do that with 2 to 3000 men over the course of a month. And eventually, hopefully, you have enough people that have infiltrated the zone that they can make it untenable for the Ukrainians to maintain their positions. 

Can this work? Yeah. And it’s probably was used, in places like Cuba and areas, in the Donbas. But the pace is incredibly slow. And the casualties are incredibly high. And more importantly, you have a much higher percentage of casualties that turn into actual fatalities. So best guess is that at this point in the conflict, the Russians have lost between 1 million and 1.4 million men, with somewhere between 200,000 and 400,000 of those being dead. 

And the casualty rates have increased from the 750 to 1000 people per day in calendar year 2024, to probably something closer to 1500 to 1600 people by the time we get to the new years of 2025, 2026. I said about I think it’s two years ago now, that if the Russians keep losing men at the rate they are, they’re not going to be able to mount a military force of any size in 6 to 8 years, which, when I said that would have put us at somewhere around 2030, it now appears that that date has been moved forward because the Russians are suffering casualties faster than Russian boys can be born. 

On the Ukrainian side, the situation isn’t exactly great either. Keep in mind that any battle in which the Ukrainians do not inflict at least a 4 to 1 casualty ratio is a battle that probably, in the long run, the Russians have won just because there’s so many more Russians. But the Russians are now getting to a situation where they are running out of people who are not ethnically Russian. 

All of the various ethnicities that make up the Russian Federation, that are not that ethnically Russian, they’re basically running them dry. And the Chechens are almost tapped out at this point, which is something I never thought I would see. Ukraine doesn’t have that kind of problem. Everyone pretty much who’s fighting in the Ukrainian side of the war is Ukrainian. 

So there’s a much stronger nationalism factor going in. And we are seeing the, weapons systems, in the military industrial complexes of the Europeans spinning up, in order to continue providing arms for, the Ukrainians. Keep in mind that the Ukrainians have given, excuse me, keep in mind that the Europeans have given the Ukrainians significantly more military aid, than the United States has. 

And and we’re almost a factor of three more economic aid. So if the Trump administration changes its minds on a few things, obviously, that will affect the war effort one way or another. But the bottom line is that the European military complex is becoming more capable of supporting the war. As the Russian military complex is becoming less capable. 

So we really are seeing this turn into a proper proxy war with the Europeans on one side and the Chinese on the other side. Most of the hardware that is coming into the Russian system now is originated in Chinese factories. And we’re getting this weird little proxy fight between two countries that are two regions that haven’t really been involved in a direct geopolitical conflict. 

That has a lot of impacts in a lot of ways. Number one, the Europeans are much more amenable to talking to the Trump administration about trade sanctions on the Chinese, because their leaderships are now recognizing that they’re in a direct head to head with Beijing. But it’s also leading to a reorganization of how global military technology works. 

The United States, by stepping back, has seen its pace of technological innovation slow considerably because you have a technical revolution happening in Ukraine that the United States, for the most part, is not participating in. But the Europeans are rearming at a pace that is forcing these sorts of changes into their everyday structure, how that will play out in the years ahead. 

Way too soon to tell. But the United States is no longer clearly at the forefront of either drone technology or drone jamming technology. Those are European concerns. Mostly Ukrainian and the Chinese are now getting it on the back side of this, moving from first person drones to something else, things that are getting incrementally more sophisticated. 

How this will play out. So many of the rules of war have changed in the last 24 months. It’s really hard to tell. But the one country that seems to be going out of its way now to not keep pace is the United States.

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Quick one today. The news is that in the last couple of weeks, the Ukrainian government has announced that they have used a new type of drone, a subsea drone, to attack and destroy a Russian submarine, a kilo class in the Russian port of Novorossiysk. the reason I’ve waited so long to comment on this is because the details were vague. 

The Russians have denied that the Russians deny everything and the Ukrainians haven’t provided a lot of evidence. We do have satellite photos now that indicate there was damage on the inside of the port. Whether or not a submarine was hit or sunk is unclear. I would note that if you put a reasonably sized bomb on the outside of a submarine, that submarine is not going to go underwater. 

Or if it does go under water, it will never come back up again. So it doesn’t take much damage to take one of these out for the long term. And the Russians no longer have the capacity to refit them, because that equipment is in Crimea, and Crimea is under regular air drone assault. So if this kilo class sub was even mildly damaged, it’s it’s out. 

A couple things to keep in mind, however. Number one, on the Ukrainian side. The fact that a sea attack happened in November is extraordinarily bad for the Russians. It was one thing when they lost the ability to base their navy out of the Crimea. So they moved back to overseas because it was out of range of air attacks. Then air attacks started, happened regularly earlier this year. Now we not just have a sea attack, but a sub sea attack. 

There are any number of ways that that might have happened. Maybe there was a mothership involved. Maybe it was smuggled into Russia proper, and then the thing was dropped in the water and sent on. But the bottom line is, is that the targeting suite of these drones is very limited. And if it goes underwater, it’s not receiving signals from anyone else unless it’s on a tether. 

And if it’s on a fiber optic tether, you’d have to have another ship nearby, which it’s really stretches the imagination to think that the Russians would be that unaware of things going on in their own immediate waters. Which means that if this is true, what happened was that the sub was at dock when it happened. We do see damage to the dock. 

We do see damage to the booms. And if this is a fundamentally new weapon from the Ukrainians, they’re calling it a sub sea baby. The sea baby is there. Surface drones, then overseas has become completely untenable for any sort of Russian naval or maritime activity. Remember that this is the Russians largest port in the area. It’s their primary oil export point. 

It’s already been hit a couple of times, and it is now the headquarters for the Black Sea Fleet, which means they’ll have to move down the coast to a place called Tusa, which doesn’t have nearly the, cap capability. So we really are talking about the functional end of the entire Russian Sea Fleet within the next 12 months, if this is true. 

Second, other side of the equation, I wouldn’t get too excited about subsea drones, because we don’t have meaningful guidance or decision trees on naval drones at this point. This is much less useful than a modern day torpedo. It would have to be dropped off relatively close to where it’s going. It can’t track an active signature. It can only go to a preprogramed fixed point. 

That doesn’t mean it’s a nothing burger, because anything that can get around detection is something that Ukrainians or really anyone who’s involved in a naval conflict is going to want. But it is not an at sea weapon. It is an anti port weapon. So that is of significance. But in modern naval warfare, it is certainly not a game changer in its current form.

Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado. And today we’re going to take a question from the Patreon page, a bit of a what if, if the Russians lose the war in Ukraine or what does that mean for national stability within Russia proper? Are we looking at an immediate disintegration or what? Great question. 

Now, there are a lot of examples in Russian history of where the center has broken. And a loss in Ukraine doesn’t necessarily mean that the Kremlin loses power, but there’s really two big pillars of power in Russia. One is the military and the other one is the internal security services. And the important thing to remember about Russia is, unlike a country like Iran, where the country is actually half non Persian, and so the military is primarily responsible for occupying itself in order to keep all the minorities, under control in Russia. 

That’s not the case in Russia, even if, the Russian census data is completely fabricated, which it probably is, we probably have at least 70% of the Russian population actually being ethnic Russian. So among those populations with the possibility of Saint Petersburg, where there might be an economic push for independence, most of the Russians are going to stay put. They’ve been conditioned. They’ve eaten nothing but propaganda for quite some time. And most importantly, most of the young people are gone. Not only is the birthrate in Russia been dropping since before World War two, it plummeted under Khrushchev. Fell even more to Gorbachev and particularly nosedived in the 1990s. You add in a million casualties in the Ukraine war, in another million people under age 30 fleeing. And there really isn’t that youth generation that generally generates, revolutionary activity. And the Russian population will be concerned about losing what little they have left. So the chances of them being really rebellious are pretty low. The other 30%, of course, is a different question. You’ve got a number of minorities, mostly Turkic, of some flavor or Bashkors, Tatars, Chechens, English. This is where things would get really interesting. So, the military’s primary goal is to be on the borders in the Russian sphere and prevent any sort of invasion. And in a post Ukraine scenario where the Russians lost their borders are very, very, very long. And so they really won’t be available for any sort of domestic suppression of rebellion that will fall to the intelligence services, which are just as strong now as they were three years ago. 

So you can have an open rebellion in places like Tatarstan or Bashkortostan and the Russian government remains relatively capable of dealing with those. Now, they can’t deal with it everywhere, as we saw in the Soviet system, when the internal services were much stronger than they are today. If you’ve got two dozen places going into some degree of rebellion at the same time, then you’re kind of screwed. 

But when those two dozen places went into rebellion at the same time last time around, they were Kazakhs and Uzbek and Georgians and Latvians and Estonians and Armenians, and as a Rajani, none of them were ethnic Russians. And when the Soviet system fell, 14 of the 15 constituent republics of the Soviet Union were not majority Russian, and they are now independent states. 

What was left with rump Russia is much smaller, much more difficult to defend, but is actually more ethnically homogenous. So the Russian state, the Kremlin, would have a much better chance of suppressing internal dissent. 

Now, this is all pretty much a starvation diet because they post Ukraine. Russia loses a lot of its income. Its security situation is much worse. 

Its financial position is considerably worse, and there would probably be pressure on it from the entire western and southwestern periphery, because once Ukraine wins, you’re going to have any number of European countries that include, but are not limited to two Finland, the Baltics, Poland and Romania, who are going to be pushing at the Russians to try to make sure they stay off balance. 

The Turks will probably get on that to the EU’s backs down south will probably get into that. And based on the circumstances in East Asia, Japan or China could get in that as well. So I wouldn’t say that a post Ukraine. Russia is long for this world, but it’s not probably going to fall from within without a lot of help. Russia is in a relatively slow motion decline. It’ll probably still be there regardless of what happens in the Ukraine war by 2040. But once you fast forward past 2050, that’s when the demographic shift really starts to shift. And most of those Turkic minorities have strong birthrates. You combine that with what happened in the war, in gutting the younger generation and very, very, very low birth rates and high death rates among the Russian population. 

By the time you get to 2060, you’re in a very different environment and then you can start thinking about an internal disintegration, but it’s going to be from the outside first. And, the end of all of this really does depend on what happens to Ukraine. Because if Ukraine falls, then the Russians have a more secure external border. 

It’ll buy them 20, 30 years. That’s not a rounding error. That’s why they’re doing it in the first place. But we are still looking at the end of the Federation before the end of the century. That’s pretty much just a question, whether it’s front loaded or not.