Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. it appears that we’re about to see a major offensive by the Ukrainians. now, the next couple of days or anything like that. Probably going to be a couple months off. but they’re definitely preparing the ground. what’s going on is that the Ukrainians are preparing to receive a large, allotment of F-16s from NATO countries. 

and that’s right on the heels of a significant arms package, one from Europe, one from the United States, that is allowing the Ukrainians to start to shape the battlefield. What we’ve seen in the last few weeks is the Ukraine is becoming much more aggressive, not just turning the Russian assault on Kharkiv in the northeast into a killing ground for Russian troops. 

not only picking up the pace for some of the counter assaults south of the Dnieper River, where there have been some battles where the Russians have suffered 21 casualty ratios. those are actually the sideshow, the really big stuff in terms of, military strategy is using, middle range rockets and missiles to go after, Russian aviation assets deep within Russia, in some cases 500 miles from the border, and also throughout the Crimean Peninsula, going after anti-aircraft batteries, specifically, the S-300 is in the more advanced S-400s. 

the S-400s are considered the best in the world, and at least the last two weeks, the Ukrainians have taken out at least four batteries, one of which had only been up and running for a few days at the point where it was taken out. what the Ukrainians are doing are trying to deny the Russians as much air defense as possible before the F-16s arrive, because if the Ukrainians can establish regional air superiority or even just local, it is for moments, they can start using some of the training and some of the equipment that the NATO allies provided them a year and two years ago. 

if you remember back to the first wave of counter offenses we had in 2022 and into 2023, the Russians really hadn’t fortified anything. So the Ukrainians were able to punch in and take out a few specific nodes and then just chop up the Russians, inflicting massive casualties and cause massive, if not retreat routes from places like Kherson or near Kharkiv. 

but as the war moved on, the Russians started to take things a little bit more seriously and laid layer after layer after mines, building these multilayered defenses that the Ukrainians had had to punch through NATO training for a lot of Ukrainian forces taught them how to use combined arms, basically combined infantry with mounted infantry with tanks, with helicopters, with missiles, with aircraft. 

But but but the Ukrainians didn’t have the equipment to pull that off, most notably the airpower. So they’d launch this big assault, but they didn’t have air power. And so the Russians were able to call in artillery strikes because they had maybe not air superiority, but the ability to deny the Ukrainians, the skies. And that made these subsequent, counter-offensive basically bogged down in even after a lot of casualties and a lot of equipment and a lot of time, the Ukrainians only made minimal gains. 

Well, what the Ukrainians are attempting to do this time is to prepare the battlefield so they don’t have that air power problem again. So that the new aircraft, when they do arrive, can operate in a less contested environment. And if that happens, then the Ukrainians can return the favor. And any time the Russians try to concentrate forces, they get hit with Ukrainian artillery rather than the other way around. 

we have seen the Ukrainians basically get better and better at this without airpower over the last few weeks, taking out any number of strategic, radar systems deep within the Russian space. So if we get to the point in about a month when these F-16s start to arrive, the Ukrainians might actually have regional air superiority over most of the peninsula. 

And at that point, cutting the remainder of the infrastructure links from Russia proper into the southern front should be pretty easy, because there’s really only two links left. You’ve got the Kerch Bridge itself, which is already damaged, and then you’ve got a supplementary rail system that goes through occupied Ukraine on the southern coast, which is already within artillery range. 

What we’ve been waiting for to the war, this point is for the Ukrainians to use superior speed, innovation and reach in order to chop up the Russians logistical capacity at ease, and basically isolate large pockets of troops and generate the sort of political humiliation that in the past has triggered a Russian climbdown or maybe even a collapse of the government. 

I’m not saying that that’s what’s going to happen this summer. I’m saying that’s what the goal is. And with the way that they are preparing the battle space, it looks like we’re going to have some of these decisive conflicts later in this year. Assuming for the moment, of course, the Ukrainians proved to be as adept on the F-16s as they have been on everything else. 

Still a lot of moving parts, still a lot of unknowns. But we actually do see things building to at least, in Crimea, a bit of a head. that does not mean that the entirety of the war is over. I mean, hell, even if the Ukrainians were able to completely capture Crimea, Russian logistics going into the Donbas in eastern Ukraine are far more robust. 

This war is not over. But if you can trigger a global humiliation. In the past, about half of the Russian governments that have collapsed have been because of a major military defeat. And this is the first potential battle of this war that might fall into that category. 

You’re someone who has famously for a long time predicted and tried to warn people that, not only is Russia’s war with Ukraine inevitable, but Russian national security, national strategy, doctrine dictates that the Russians are likely to expand their war westward from Ukraine. But given this framing of this conflict or this aggression as being from a national security standpoint, why does Russia need to do this if they have such a large nuclear, arsenal? 

And I guess part of it, maybe a tagalong would be, why is Russia enduring what it is in Ukraine if it has nukes, is that sort of a faster way for giving things? The, the non-UK approach has been the Russian strategy for a lot longer than we’ve had. So there’s always that little inertia thing in terms of people’s minds. 

But one of the things that the Russians have discovered since 1990 is they thought they thought that they could do this on the cheap, that they could infiltrate societies, use disinformation, use plants, bribe people, and basically break the democratic processes and the strategic commitments of countries from Estonia to Bulgaria, to Azerbaijan to to take a stand. And what they’ve discovered is they’ve just pissed everyone off. 

The idea was that they could get all the strategic goodies that they thought they needed without actually having to occupy the places, and that has fallen apart everywhere except for Belarus. And so the question then is, can we threaten people to not take strategic decisions that we don’t like? So the United States, we’re going to nuke you unless you give us an aircraft carrier that doesn’t fucking fly. 

And that’s basically the strategy that you’re recommending here, is that we, as they threaten countries between them and the Western world in order for them to do exactly what Moscow wants. the Russians have discovered very, very clearly that the only way to make someone do what you want is to occupy yourself. And while we in the West might not see our way of life as threatening the existence of the Russian state, they obviously have a different opinion on that. 

the only time the Russians have ever, ever felt secure is after World War Two, when Stalin succeeded in conquering all the buffer states and concrete, all of the access points into the Russian heartlands, and that held until 1992. And the Russians are desperate to have that back. Unfortunately for them, the only way they can have that back is to by occupying countries with a combined population of more than their own population, that’s not going to fly in those countries. 

It’s not going to fly in the West. It’s not going to fly in the United States. And so we have a war. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed Moscow to seek some nontraditional, material supply, alliances or partnerships with some of the countries most antagonistic to American leadership. The role and think about North Korea. It’s, you know, in a tighter economic embrace with China. 

It’s getting drones from Iran. Do we see the potential for the emergence of a Moscow led kind of NATO? And I think, you know, we’ve seen this once before. It was the, the US saw it, but, the North Korea, China, Russia, Iran, lesser Cuba into the mix, too. it’s Friday. Do we need, these I hesitate to call them powers, but there’s this assembly of, foreign. 

America’s like the bad guys together, present a considerable credible, worrisome threat to, the American that global order. No. Well, I mean, I don’t think the American led world order is doing that great or is going to last that much longer. But no, I don’t think this is what’s going to tear it down. keep in mind that even at the height of the Cold War, the only Soviet ally that ever deployed troops out side of its own country was Cuba. 

And that was to Angola. You never had Polish troops in Romania, Romania, troops in eastern Germany. and so even at the height of Soviet dominance, they were never able to pull this off. From a purely logistical point of view, forget political or economic. So you might have places like North Korea and China and Russia and Iran and Cuba not liking how things are going if you’re there on the world, but them deploying is a completely different situation. 

In addition, keep in mind that while Russia has figured out how to deploy a small number of troops and things like Wagner, China has only ever had one deployment outside of its home country that’s in Djibouti. That barely counts. North Korea’s never done it, ever. Cuba is not nearly as powerful now as they were 30 years ago. 

So the capacity just isn’t there. Much less coordination, much less the deployment capacity. Now, the dangerous the American let order are primarily in the United States from interest. And I still still still see the biggest danger to that order will be when the United States wakes up one day and realizes that the countries that are benefiting most from its presence are the countries that it is most opposed to, because without America providing global naval coverage for civilian shipping, there is no Russian energy industry. 

There is no Chinese manufacturing sector, there is no Iranian trade. There’s not even anything for Cuba. And if the U.S. starts to use its navy to interfere with those flows, instead of protecting those flows, we’re in a very different world the next day. And the countries if the United States thinks of as the problems are gone the day after. 

Thank you very much for your time, Peter. I enjoyed the conversation and thank you for all our subscribers and followers for your questions. please continue to send them in and I’ll look forward to having conversation like this with you again. Thank you. Take care. 

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Genoa. today we’re talking about something that I’m a little concerned about from the strategic point of view. but first, I want to tell you about a webinar we’ve got coming up next week on the 5th of June, where the issues that I really worry about are going to be in front and center, issues relating to how cocaine can damage the American economic experience, how American politics are at the moment in a position makes it difficult to solve American problems, shortages and electricity and critical material processing, and why social media has unexpectedly and problematically become a national security issue.

All that and more on the webinar. But for today, it’s a double duty of something I worry about. Plus an update on the Ukraine war. Over the past few weeks, the Ukrainians have been launching more and more drone assaults into Russia, and they have now struck something called a container radar in Russia, at least three times two different facilities.

container radars are something that allows the Russians to be aware of aircraft within about a 3000 kilometer range. And since the Ukrainians are about to get American and Western F-16s, the Ukrainians would like to take out those radars as much as they can before the new aircraft come into play. But that is not the primary purpose for those radars.

The primary purpose is for ballistic missile detection. And when it comes to dealing with nuclear weapons, timing is everything. Seconds matter because the flight times are so short. So if the Ukrainians manage to deliberately, of course, take some of these radars off line, it alters the strategic perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic. Whether you’re in Moscow or Washington about what is possible and how much time you have to prepare for something going horribly, horribly wrong.

Now, this sort of readjustment of strategic perceptions this was always going to happen is the technologies involved change, as we’ve seen with the Ukraine war, as we’ve seen in Saudi Arabia, with Iran, the introduction of drones is changing the strategic calculus in a great many ways. And so we were always going to evolve beyond the mutually assured destruction compact that has kept us safe these last 70 years.

The idea is that if both sides have a weapons, and if both sides have the ability to take the weapons in flight, then there is this parallelization. if any desire to launch the weapons, because we all go down together, well, if you damage the detection methods, then that parallelization, that deliberate parallelization might be weakened and all of a sudden we’re in a bit of a looser strategic situation when it comes to the big boy weapons.

We’re now in a position where the war has evolved to the point that major strategic questions in both Russia and the United States have to be evaluated through a different lens. And it’s not clear that we’re ready for that on either side. Of course, we’re never ready for that on either side. You introduce a new weapon system. Everything changes around it, and we’re now seeing the opening stages of a complete readjustment and how we perceive the wider world.