Is This the End of U.S. Biofuels?

A green lit gas station with an oil tanker

The U.S. ethanol mandate in the early aughts reshaped American agriculture by tying corn production to fuel production; this saw corn demand double, with roughly half the corn crop now tied to biofuels. So, the case for diverting large amounts of U.S. corn into fuel production is now becoming less clear.

U.S. energy has become independent following the shale revolution. The environmental benefit has been refuted and moving forward, food security will be far more important than biofuels. Allocating large amounts of U.S. corn for fuel production becomes economically and politically difficult when it’s needed (and more profitable) to use for human consumption.

Transcript

Hey all. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from a snowy Colorado in May. Because that’s what happens in the mountains. Today we’re taking a question from the Patreon crowd, specifically how I see US agriculture evolving over the next several years, specifically in light of the balance among corn and soy and biofuels, with, of course, ethanol being at the top of the list. 

Real quick history lesson for those of you not familiar with the space, the United States has used gasoline and diesel for pretty much everything for transport for the entire industrial age. Until we got to the early 2000, when we got a fuel mandate from the federal government. That said, a certain percentage of most gasoline that you pump has to have a certain percentage of ethanol. 

In most states, it’s in the 10 to 15% range. Now, lots of people have bitched and moan about this for multiple reasons, but basically it took the single largest commodity class that the United States had fuel and cross-referenced it with. The second largest of the United States has, which is row crops, specifically corn. So if you go back to the 80s, a few states in the Midwest, Iowa, of course, did have their own state ethanol mandates. 

But now we had a national one. And from roughly 2004 until today, The total need for corn grown in the United States is roughly doubled, because about half of it is now used for biofuels. Now, that’s not that’s a bit of a blanket statement. The leftover, once you extract the bit that can be turned into ethanol can still be used for animal feed. 

But what it has done is it’s radically changed the agricultural situation of the world’s largest agricultural producer, taking a large chunk of land away from producing stuff for food to instead it being available for fuel that is directly responsible for a lot of the increases around the world. We saw in food prices in the late 2000, because it took ten years for American farmers to produce the volume of crop required, as well as for the United States to build up the infrastructure required. 

Because you don’t take corn to an oil refinery, you have your own ethanol refinery, and then you blend that ethanol in with the fuels at another location. Anyway, in the world that we’re moving into, where agricultural supply chains break down on a global basis, we’re going to be seeing a world that isn’t able to feed itself. And with six or what are we, 7.5 billion people, whatever the number happens to be billions of people. 

And if you have half of the corn crop in the United States going towards fuel instead of human consumption, you can see how this is going to be a problem. It’s just that there aren’t very many countries in the world that have easy access to the inputs, whether it’s the manufactured product, the financial products, or the fertilizer products that are necessary to grow food at scale. 

The United States is by far the largest of them. And if you look at some of the other major producers around the world, most notably China and Brazil, they can’t be agricultural producers without globalization. They import too many of the things that allow agriculture to work. So in a post globalized scenario, if we’re lucky, we’ll only lose a billion people. 

Which brings us back to ethanol. Ethanol is the mandate, because you had a lot of folks in the farm states that were looking for a way to bolster rural incomes in general, and farmers in particular, and the mandate for ethanol and a new one that seems to be being gestating for soy diesel follows similar patterns. But if you remove this, call it conservatively, one third of global food production, then all of a sudden food prices are going to skyrocket. 

And the argument that the United States government should subsidize agriculture to make biofuels kind of falls away. You see, when this all started, the ethanol mandate had a three piece alliance. The farm states obvious environmentalists who thought since it was grown from the ground, it would have a lower carbon footprint. And national security folks who saw this as a way to break our dependance on the Middle East. 

Well, 2026 is not 2000, because now the United States has had the shale revolution. And it’s not just the world’s largest producer of crude oil, and the world’s largest producer of gasoline were the world’s largest exporter of refined product in general. So the national security folks have just kind of faded from this conversation. The environmentalist, who sometimes are a little squeaky with their math, did the math and realize that at best it’s a wash, because the process of growing that amount of corn and moving that amount of corn is actually generating just as much CO2 as what you have to do for gasoline. 

So they went away. So now it’s just the agriculture folks. And if it’s just the agricultural folks, it’s also ultimately going to be about farm income. And if you move into a world where a third of food production falls offline, all of a sudden farmers will be earning less growing food corn for the ethanol mandate than they would growing food for human consumption. 

So regardless of where you are on this equation and what argument you may have had in the past, the macroeconomic situation that led us to doing ethanol at scale is fading pretty quickly. One of the many, many, many outcomes of the Iran wars. We realize just how vulnerable global supply chains were in everything from semiconductors to tractors, because one part of the world produces a lot of the base materials that are used somewhere else. 

That is something that’s going to be reverberating for the rest of the year, and it is something that is really just the tip of the iceberg compared to what is coming. Ethanol was fine in a highly globalized world where there were lots of options. Pretty soon that’s not where we’re going to be.

Global Energy Stressors: Can Anybody Help?

An oil rig on the sunset

Are there any countries that might be able to ease the global energy stress?

Saudi Arabia might be able to ramp up output, but Houthi attacks could take that away in an instant. Producers like Guyana, Brazil, Venezuela, and Canada can only add small, incremental volumes, but most major expansion projects are years away.

So, where does that leave us? The global oil deficit is only going to worsen over the next few months. And with oil market data becoming increasingly unreliable, things are likely already worse than we think…

Transcript

I guess I have a 3.5. This is the backside of that crown. Let’s talk about who might be putting other little volumes in. It’s not a lot. First of all, secondary peak of Bison. Most spare capacity in the world comes from OPEC, specifically from Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates before it left OPEC this year. They’re the only ones who really maintain fields that can turn on off with that in mind. These are all countries that are constrained within, you know, the Saudis would probably be the ones with the best bet. But now that they have to export everything through the Red Sea and the Houthis are regularly attacking ships, most notably tankers, we should actually expect more Saudi crude to go offline rather than come online.

In the Western Hemisphere, we’ve got Guyana, which is a new producer, but their big boost was over the last three years. It’s again only incremental gains, 100,000 here and there, maybe. Venezuela. We, in the best case scenario, now that Maduro has gone might have gotten a fresh million. But now because of the earthquake, if they get half that it’ll be a really good day. Really good year. Brazil no, incremental again. Who am I forgetting? Canada. Canada has audacious plans to massively expand their export capacity, but these plans will not happen this year, next year or the year after. The heavy oil sands of Alberta take years, if not decades, to bring online as well. So the pipeline is only one part of the project.

About the only thing that we might see earlier is that Keystone is being resurrected, and it probably will be built this time, but not this year and probably not next year either. So that’s an issue for 2028, where we might see a half a million to 1 million fresh barrels. That’s not going to help this summer. The only other thing I can think of is Angola.

But Angola is all offshore. It’s all deep and it is failing. So actually the incremental gains that we get out of the Western Hemisphere this year might be enough to compensate for losses out of Angola, but really not much else. It all adds up to a pretty bleak picture for energy markets. I would love to give you pricing advice.

That’s a lie. I’ve no intention of giving you pricing advice, because what’s going on in the markets right now makes very little sense. Keep in mind that oil traders take their price cues from data and the data sucks. Iran doesn’t tell us what they’re producing or what they’re shipping. We’ve got the shadow fleet out of Russia. The Russians aren’t even generating data anymore that you can then look at.

And of course, the Chinese are a bit of a black hole. We know they’ve had a little demand obstruction. We know they’ve had a little fuel switching, but mostly they just don’t publish anything anymore. And it’s unclear if they’re even collecting the data. About the only thing

we can tell is that they have reduced their exports of refined oil product, which has impacted everybody in the Pacific Rim.

And that’s really the end of what we know. Best guess is that the shortage of 10 to 12 million barrels per day is going to go up over the next three months, for the reasons I’ve already talked about. Plus, of course, the Houthis. So the world has significantly less of a buffer now than it did a month ago or three months ago or five months ago.

And at some point that’s going to lead to some sort of market reaction. And when that happens, then we get some of the biggest demand destruction that we’ve seen, at least since the price spikes of 2007 to 2009. So something to look forward to.

Global Energy Stressors: Can Shale Save the World

Close up of shale rock | Licensed by Envato Elements: https://app.envato.com/search/photos/65f10818-30c9-4aa2-8207-5b9626ee65ae?itemType=photos&term=shale

The U.S. shale revolution transformed global energy, but that period of explosive growth is over. Existing pipelines and export infrastructure have reached capacity, meaning future output increases will take a bit of time.

With domestic electricity demand on the rise, U.S. exports will diminish over the coming years. That means America’s ability to offset global energy disruptions is dwindling. Couple that with Asian countries paying premiums for the remaining U.S. LNG, and Europe’s energy picture is only getting worse.

Transcript

Okay. Now. Part three from near the top. Bison peak and all its weird greatness. And then behind me, we’ve got the ten mile range. And the mosquito range. So like quandaries over here and Sherman Sheridan over there. Maybe there…somewhere. Anyway, part three, the United States. Okay. The US shale revolution is different from every other period in energy history, primarily because of the geology.

In a normal Petroleum industry, you’re going to drill through something that’s called a caprock, which is a non-porous rock formation. I got to sit down again so you can see the crown behind me. It’s a non-porous rock formation, ironically. Like these. This is a red granite that oil cannot percolate through, so it builds up pressure behind it. So when you punch through the cap rock, you release that pressure and the well flows, and you maybe get a gusher if you’re lucky.

And even if you’re not, you can always create artificial pressure by pumping water or natural gas or CO2 or something else into the formation to force the oil to the surface. That’s not how a shale revolution well works. In shale, the crude is trapped at the moment of formation into a Petra carbon within the actual rock strata itself. It can’t migrate by definition. So you drill laterally through the formation, have holes in that pipe, and then you pump in pressurized water and sand to crack open the rock. The sand goes into the cracks, and then the little bits of pressure, trillions of little bits of pressure push the water out and back to the surface and it flows by itself.

You can’t do enhanced recovery on a shale. Well, for the most part, there’s some exceptions in there. There’s some gray areas. But anyway, what that means is that instead of the months to years to decades that it takes to bring a conventional well online and then the capital that is required to keep it producing beyond a few years.

Shale is really cheap. It’s up front. All of your costs basically goes into the frack itself, and then you’re done. The downside is that if the shale is in an area where you don’t have existing infrastructure, you have to build a really robust gathering network because you’re going to have a lot more wells traditionally than you will in a traditional field.

You know, there are some of the super fields out there that only have like a dozen wells total. Like that big one offshore in Mexico, which I can’t remember. Cantarell. Cantarell. Ghawar in Saudi Arabia, somewhat similar, whereas you can have dozens, hundreds, thousands of shale wells because they’re only producing a few barrels a day.

That’s gotten better over time, but overall, the logic still holds. Anyway, the United States has been fortunate to this point in that most of the places where we have shale formations, or at least the ones we’ve tapped so far, we also have preexisting infrastructure. So the Permian Basin in West Texas is the best example because it’s been producing crude for

well over a century. But we only started putting shale wells in there in the early 2000. The Bakken in North Dakota. Same general concept. Anyway, what that means is this infrastructure to gather and especially to transport. The crude has been there for decades. And even though those fields by conventional terms have been in decline for decades, as soon as shale came along. There was all this spare capacity and you could just shove whatever you wanted in there. And it wasn’t until about 15, ten years ago that it got so full that we had to actually build new infrastructure. So if you go back and look at the data in some of the early years, we were adding a million barrels per day plus a couple of years I think we even had 2 million barrels per day. That doesn’t happen anymore because now all of the gathering infrastructure, all the transport infrastructure is completely maxed out. And so for the United States to step in and add more oil or natural gas or whatever into the system, we first have to build an entirely new gathering network and then entirely new trunk lines to take it to the ports, and then, in many cases, new ports in order to load it up and send it overseas or refineries or whatever it happens to be.

So the explosive period of U.S. shale oil and natural gas output is now behind us, and we’re now in an incremental phase. And even if that was not the case for specifically for natural gas, we face another problem. Because of the artificial intelligence era, the United States needs massively more electricity. And that’s before you consider preparing for the end of globalization and all the new manufacturing that we’re going to need, and well-being and building things just uses more electricity than digits and numbers.

So whatever spare natural gas production we have right now, we can’t chill down into liquefied form and export because we need to burn it to generate power locally. So what the United States can do to help the world recover or cope with the Iran war and the Ukraine war has already been done, and you’re only going to get incremental increases in US exports from now on, assuming for the moment we even have stuff to export because our power demand is going through the roof.

At the moment, the Asians are bidding up the prices of things like liquefied natural gas. Now, the reason for that is pretty straightforward. Historically speaking, this is a region, especially in Northeast Asia. So China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan that imports 90% of their energy no matter what the form happens to be. And because they import so much, they have to pay more because they just don’t have any good options within 3000 miles.

And so there’s always been this price premium for anyone willing to ship or natural gas to Northeast Asia. The Europeans have always had an easier time of it because they got stuff from Norway and stuff from Libya and stuff from Algeria and stuff from the Russians and stuff from the Middle East. And so their prices have always been at a significant discount to the, the Asians.

And then, of course, the United States has the cheapest energy in the developed world. Well, now that the US stuff is all spoken for, that premium that the Asians have is probably going to spread to Europe, but it just hasn’t yet. So what we’ve seen this year is the Asians paying through the nose. And because they’re paying premiums, all the natural gas and some of the crude that would have normally gone to Europe has made the long trip all the way to Northeast Asia.

But as the Russians vanished from the scene and the Persian Gulf doesn’t recover, we’re looking at that premium spreading to Europe, and we’re looking at prices coming to Europe that they just haven’t seen for the bulk of these past five years, and they’re not ready for it. And it will lead to more deindustrialization impacts and an energy crisis, especially this winter.

And there’s really not a lot that anyone can do about it except for pray that it’s a mild winter, which has happened in the last five years for the Europeans, thank God. But that is a thin reed to base energy security on.

Global Energy Stressors: Europe’s Oil Supply Problem

Oil barrels surrounded by a European flag. Licensed by Envato Elements

As Europe shifts away from Russian natural gas, they have turned to LNG from Qatar to fill the void. Unfortunately, that pivot has brought on its own set of problems.

The Iran War has impacted Qatari exports, leaving the Europeans in a sticky situation. With current storage levels well below average for Europe and Qatar’s force majeure extended to September, the winter months could bring a harsh energy shortage for Europe.

Transcript

Okay, still in bison, peaking on the upper ramparts. That is a McCurdy peak. The double one over there, and I’m now above above Devil’s Playground in just a bunch of really big rocks. Phase two, let’s talk neutral gas, specifically Europe. The Europeans used to get the plurality of their natural gas in piped form from the Russian Federation.

And over the course of the last five years, they’ve been phasing that down to zero. And with a couple of exceptions, they’ve been successful. But that comes at a cost. Not just financial but also security, because things have been so disruptive with the Iran war that the normal path that they had developed to survive in the post Ukraine war environment has been to tap liquefied natural gas from the Persian Gulf, specifically from Qatar.

And Qatar is having some problems. So normally most natural gas in the world, something like 85-90% of it is shipped by pipe. Because it’s a gas, you have to compress it, and it’s difficult to put that into any other form of transport. The one exception, which can get a little ugly from a logistics point of view, by the way, that’s Bison Peak. That’s where we’ll do part three.

A little messy from a logistical point of view is to liquefy it, which basically means you get a metric but ton of electricity, and you operate what is, in essence, a cryogenic freezer and freeze the gas down to something like -270, -300 based on which scale you’re using. And if you do that, it will condense into a liquid.

And then you can put that onto specially designed tankers and send it to any facility that has the technology necessary to regasify it, which isn’t too hard. And then you can treat it like any other normal piped gas within your system. So the Europeans have basically cut Russian pipe gas out and gotten Qatari liquefied natural gas in. One of the reasons this worked is they basically shut down everything in their economy that used natural gas for anything but electricity.

So, for example, the German chemicals industry is basically nosedived, and the combination of switching out supplies and reducing their demand has succeeded. The problem is with Persian Gulf close Qatar’s offline. Qatar got hit very, very hard in the war by Iranian attacks. The specific facility Ras Laffan, that does the natural gas condensation and liquefaction got hit hard. And when the Qataris tried to turn things back on in June, there were several explosions and a lot of people died.

Natural gas is naturally flammable and explosive, and you can imagine what happens with this sort of industrial infrastructure that’s required to turn billions and billions of cubic meters of the stuff into something that you can pour. Since the war began in February, exactly one cargo of Qatari LNG has made it out of the Persian Gulf. That was about three

weeks ago, when we had this nice little moment when traffic in and out of the Gulf reached something like three quarters of what had been pre-war.

We’ve never reached that number again. Most days were less than 10%, with single digits of ships coming or going. There’s no reason to expect that to change anytime soon. It’s going to take a lot more than a cease fire for that to pick back up. And unlike oil, which is relatively easy to produce and store in basically a tank.

Liquefied natural gas, you really can’t do that, especially when there’s a chance that missiles or cruise missiles might hit your storage facility. So Ras Laffan, for all intents and purposes, remains offline. The Qatari this week this, past week declared force majeure extended their force majeure through the end of September. And now we’re talking winter. And right now the winter storage for the Europeans for gas is less than half the normal. It’s the lowest it’s ever been going into a winter. Russian gas is gone, Qatari gas is gone. And as we will talk about in part three, the United States cannot ride to the rescue on this one.

Global Energy Stressors: Kazakh Oil Exports

Flag of Kazakhstan

Global energy markets are all over the place. So, we’re doing a short series on the major energy stressors across the globe and how this all is going to play out. Up first, let’s look at the Ukraine War’s impact on oil exports from Kazakhstan.

Ukraine is ramping up strikes on Russian energy infrastructure, but Kazakhstan depends on those same pipelines, processing facilities, and ports to get its oil out. Exports have already fallen off a cliff, and there’s no reprieve in sight.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the lost wilderness near Denver in Colorado. I am on the lower ramparts of Bison Peak. Bison peaks right over there. That’s my next stop. And today we’re going to stitch together a few things that have come out in this past week that I think are worthy of discussion. First things first. The Kazakhs have published data about how much their exports have been hit by what’s going on with the Ukraine war. Quick recap is that over the course of March through June, the Ukrainians have gotten ever bolder in targeting Russian infrastructure pipes, pumping stations and especially ports. And this really matters for Kazakhstan because it’s landlocked. So it has to use the infrastructure of other people in order to get its stuff to market, by the way. We’re going through the Devil’s Playground area of Bison Peak right now. The key ones are on the Black Sea, specifically Tuapse, and especially Novorossiysk. That is where roughly under normal circumstances, about three quarters of Kazakhstan’s oil exports flow. In addition, the Ukrainians have hit things like processing centers on the Russian side of the Kazakh-Russian border and some of those processing facilities specifically for the Karachaganak field are ones that primarily actually process Kazakh throughput. And without those processing facilities, you can’t pull the sulfur or the natural gas out of the crude stream. And so you can’t put into the normal pipeline network. Anyway, all of these things and more have been hit over and over and over. And according to the Kazakhs, they’ve been looking at a 50 to 70% reduction in output from all of their major fields. So Karachaganak has been hit. The two big ones in the Caspian Sea area are Kashagan, and especially Tengiz and Tengiz actually dates back to the 80s, is the first foreign investment deal ever into the former Soviet Union. The companies that are most affected by this, are Russia’s Lukoil, which is now just an arm of the state, and America’s Chevron and Exxon, the three of those together, the majority of the output here. I’m not counting the Kazakh energy company because it doesn’t do anything it just takes a cut. Anyway, The problem is there are really no good options for the Kazakhs really at all. The in the last month, the Ukrainians have gone from simply attacking physical infrastructure to going after shadow fleet vessels directly both on the Sea of Azov and now in the Black Sea. So I would expect this 50 to 70% drop to be kind of the norm. And this is a country that used to export 2 million barrels a day. And by used to I mean like two months ago. There are really no good alternatives here. Kazakhstan does have a patched together Frankenstein system that exports some crude to China, basically from their eastern and southern regions, but that is typically only a quarter of a million barrels per day. Or on a really, really good day, they might reach a half a million. Everything is really the Black Sea or bust. There is a bypass pipeline in Azerbaijan called the BTC: Baku. Tbilisi Ceyhan starts in Baku. The capital on the Caspian Sea goes through the inner Caucasus zones to Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia, and then on to the Mediterranean port of Ceyhan on the Turkish coast. BTC can handle about a million barrels a day, but it’s primarily an Azerbaijani line and is always at least at half full. So if the Kazakhs were to ship tanker crude across the Caspian Sea, which is its own problem, they could offload at Baku and go to the BTC. But if you take that combined with a Chinese route on a really, really good day, they’re only looking at getting maybe, maybe, maybe, maybe three quarters of a million barrels out. Everything else is going to fall, and it’s highly unlikely that it’s ever going to come back, or at least until such time as the Ukraine war is over. Unlike the Biden administration, that was really hard ass with the Ukrainians about going after Russian infrastructure. The Trump administration really doesn’t care, even though we’re having problems over in the Persian Gulf. And so the Ukrainians are taking out anything they possibly can, and they’ve proven that they can track the tankers that the Russians are using at sea. And now that the ports have been damaged, especially the loading tanks, the tankers can only load up at roughly the pace that the crude is coming in. So it used to be that the tankers would pull up to a dock and you’d have 4 or 5 tanks that were full and they’d all drain down at the same time, and so the tankers could get out of there in just a couple of hours. Now it takes the better part of the day. And with that sort of scenario, the Ukrainians, just using commercial satellite photos know exactly where the tankers are and where to target. So we’re looking at over a million barrels per day going offline, probably permanently. And there’s really nothing we can do about that. That’s piece one.

A Canadian Pipe(line) Dream

Flag of Canada waving in the wind

The Canadians are fed up with being dependent on U.S. markets for their oil exports. So, they’re looking to diversify their export options.

The Canadian government has backed a pipeline project that would allow Alberta’s oil to reach overseas markets. With global demand rising, this project makes a lot of sense, but there are a few problems. No export terminal has been selected since all the potential sites face significant logistical challenges, and even on the most optimistic timelines, construction wouldn’t be completed until 2034.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. And today we’re going to talk about energy in Canada. Most of the energy production in Canada comes from the province of Alberta. And most of that is heavy, sour crude that has a limited market in the wider world. At the moment, most of it is transported by a combination of pipe and rail to the United States, specifically to refineries in the American mid-continent and down into Texas that were designed to run on heavy sludge. 

Most advanced refineries in the world, some of the worst crude in the world. However, Canada has always been frustrated. Alberta has always been frustrated with the price that they get because when you sell primarily via pipeline into a closed market, you’re kind of a price taker. And so there have been a number of times where while Burton Crude has sold it not just a discount, but sometimes like $25 a barrel. 

That’s before we have the diplomatic falling out between the Canadians and the Trump administration. And now Canadian-American relationships are at the worst since the arguably the War of 1812. So the Canadians are desperate to find any other outlet. The problem is, is that Alberta is landlocked, and not anybody else really wants Albertan crude, because they would have to retool the refineries. 

But there’s there’s a definitely beggars can’t be choosers situation going on in the world right now because with the Persian Gulf still majority offline and Russian crude and danger in Venezuelan crude questionable, any fresh crude source, no matter what it is or where it is, we’ll find a buyer if you can get the crude to them. So. Just last week, Prime Minister Kearney of Canada has dusted off a plan and says that there is now state backing for a 35 to $45 billion pipeline that will export crude from Alberta to the west coast of Canada in British Columbia, and then allow it to be sold wherever it happens to be. 

Now, there is already one of those pipelines in place, the Trans Mountain. It’s less than a million barrels a day. This new one is intended to be even bigger. But aspirations do not make policy, even though it has been announced by the Prime Minister. At the moment there is not a route. They have tried six different ports where this might technically be done. 

None of them worked out, so they just have a placeholder of a place called Delta, which is just to the south southeast of Vancouver. So if you were to export the Delta, you’d have to actually run the pipeline through the most densely populated part of British Columbia, including Vancouver proper, which is not exactly a conservative bastion. All that to get to a port that is not deep enough to handle a fully loaded supertanker. 

So at the moment they don’t have a port, they don’t have a destination. What they do have a state backing. And since you’ve got a prime minister who used to be a central bank chief who’s pretty good at the math, this is going to move a lot faster than previous projects, but they still have to worry about all the niggling details about how to get it to wherever they’re going to get it. 

This is still early stages. Best case scenario, they hope to begin construction in 2027. Best case scenario, they hope to finish construction by 2034. So if everything goes perfectly, this is an issue for the middle of next decade. Until then, Albertan crude stays mostly trapped within North America with all the negatives that come from that. And now I think you might be seeing why the Albertans keep talking about independence, because if they can get a different relationship with the United States, then all of a sudden a lot of that mechanical stuff just disappears. 

Anyway, that’s it for now. Take care.

U.S. Oil Export Restrictions Coming Soon

An oil tanker in the ocean sailing

If global energy supplies remain constrained, the U.S. government will prioritize U.S. consumers over international markets. This would take the form of export restrictions.

These restrictions could take several forms. The first would be halting U.S. crude exports, which would keep more oil at home, but would also strain storage capacity and hurt shale producers and refiners in the process. The more likely option would be taxing exports of refined products, which would lower domestic prices and push the burden onto global markets.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from above the valve at all in New Mexico. We’re coming up on golden hour, so I’m just going to sit here for a little bit. Anywho, today I am taking a question from the Patreon page. Specifically, do I think that the United States government is going to restrict energy exports in order to keep prices under control, as the international system basically loses energy?

And absolutely, absolutely, absolutely. The question is how there are a few options. None of them are great and all of them have side effects. But let’s start with the basics. As of the third week of June, we have somewhere between 1 and 1.3 billion barrels of crude that were never produced and delivered. That has drained global inventories to record lows.

And even if the strait were to open tomorrow, it’s going to be years before Persian Gulf producers can be producing again. So we’re going to have to have some demand destruction. That will probably involve a protracted, sharp price spike. And there is no way that a president is populist, as Donald Trump is going to let that pass without doing something.

So two options. The first one, the legal option is probably the least clean back under the Obama administration, Congress granted the president the right to end all oil exports just by saying so. That would trap the crude in the United States and probably send crude prices in the United States. Negative, because there’s just not enough storage. Well, Let me back up and take that back a little bit. Storage is running really low in the United States because of what’s going on in Iran. So step one would be to fill up all of that storage. And the question would be whether or not the shale wells, which fall off pretty quick, would fall off before the storage was filled.

You see a shale well, it can be brought online in just a few weeks, but half its lifetime production is produced in the first year. So if it takes, say, three months for the storage to fill up and nobody drills at all during that time, things might work out kind of kind of. I don’t want to. I don’t want to ever play that.

If not, prices are going to go negative because there’s just no where to put it. We had the negative price situation for a while in Covid, if you remember. That was all kinds of fun. If you were an oil producer. Anyway, what that does is it floods the system with crude. And if you are a US refiner, you now have basically a bottomless supply of light, sweet crude to shove through your refinery and make product.

However, US refineries don’t like light, sweet crude. They were designed for a different world where we imported a lot of cheap, heavy, sulfur laden crude. Ever since the shale revolution really got going back and say 2010. I mean, we got our first production back in

2007, 2008, and then it just exploded after that. US refineries have been changing their refineries.

Bit by bit by bit. But it’s been very slow. They’ve been fighting it at every step of the way. And in this circumstance, the ones that have basically been dragging their feet would be hosed, because you can damage your refinery if you run the wrong crude through it. And at a minimum, you’re going to have a really high refinery loss anyway.

That’ll go for a few weeks and then we’ll see basically an implosion in the shale fields, because nobody is going to want to produce if they can’t export. A lot of infrastructure is added, especially in Corpus Christi in the last decade to facilitate those exports. And if they go to zero, they go to zero. So probably you’re looking at at another one, maybe one and a half, maybe, if we’re really lucky, 2 million barrels per day of product, of which they will try to make more gasoline and diesel and jet fuel.

So that might, might be half of it, but that’s it. And everything else that’s in the surplus basically gets shut down because there’s nowhere to send it. So it would give a moderate boost to consumers over the mid and long term. Refiners would just be besides themselves with the damage to the refineries and producers would go out of business.

That’s option one. That’s the legal option. Option two is to do something to restrict fuel product exports. Right now, the United States exports about 5 million barrels per day of refined product, which is more than any other country on the planet has ever even exported of crude. And if you were to do something that it would strike that and trap that in the country, that would have an immediate effect on prices and an immediate effect on supplies to the global system, just like shutting off all exports would.

The problem here is that Congress has granted the presidency that power. And there’s a lot of questions as to how you would do it. Probably the most effective would be to just put a really fat export tax on it. I think that would play to Trump’s preferences. It would still result in higher prices in the United States, but nothing compared to everywhere else.

And we wouldn’t have a supply shortage anyway. Those are the two options. Probably find out within a couple of months which one the Trump administration is considering, because we’re getting really close.

Say Goodbye to Kazakhstan Oil

Flag of Kazakhstan

The Ukrainian strike on the Orenburg natural gas processing complex could impact more than just Russia. Unfortunately, Kazakhstan’s energy industry is highly dependent upon that facility.

Natural gas, propane, and oil from the Karachaganak field all flow through Orenburg. As these strikes continue, more and more of the energy projects that foreign companies have invested in throughout Kazakhstan will be threatened.

Russian infrastructure and transit networks remain critical to Kazakhstan’s energy industry. If these strikes continue, there are few viable alternative routes for Kazakh exports, which could end Kazakhstan’s ability to get energy products to global markets.

Transcript

Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado today is 24th of June. In the news is the Ukrainians have just blown up part of the natural gas processing center at a place called Orenburg, which is in southern Russia, hard up on the Kazakh border. Now, Orenburg is not something that’s industrially central for the Russians, but it is for Kazakhstan. 

You see, when the Soviet system ended, there wasn’t a lot of oil or natural gas production in Kazakhstan proper. And as nobody wanted to go into Russia in the 1990s, Kazakhstan seemed a lot more stable. So ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Chevron, all the big major companies and since then the Indians, the Chinese and others have all poured into Kazakhstan because they just find it easier to work with the Kazakhs than the Russians, because the Russians are always insisting on bribes and their infrastructure isn’t maintained, and the rule of law is weak. 

Not that Kazakhstan is, you know, Delaware or anything. It’s probably more like new Jersey, but it’s better anyway. Infrastructure was built out,bit by bit, while pipelines, wells, all that good stuff. But it can take decades to really build out a mature natural gas and oil industry, especially when some of the fields are more complicated. So across the border from Orenburg is a place called Karachaganak, which is one of my favorite words ever. 

It is a sour gas wet gas field that produces liquefied petroleum gas like propane as well as natural gas as well as. But all of it is really, really rich and sulfur. So you can’t just put it into a normal pipeline. So what they do is they put it into a cluster of short pipelines that go across the border to Orenburg in Russia, where the existing infrastructure from the Soviet period is already in place and it can pull the sulfur out of all the products. So once you do all the math, it comes out to about a quarter of a million barrels per day of crude and about 1,000,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas that get processed in Orenburg and then are shipped through the Russian network to the rest of the world. And now it’s on fire. 

What the Ukrainians are doing is basically systematically destroying any infrastructure that’s within about 700 miles of their borders, anything that gives the Russians any sort of economic wherewithal. And so what has been happening between Orenburg and Karachi is very simple. Crutch wouldn’t be viable without the Russians. And so the Russians take the lion’s share of the profits, because it has to go through their processes and facility and their infrastructure get to wider world. 

And honestly, almost all Kazakh and oil and natural gas output falls into that category. Foreigners do the investment, the Kazakhs own it technically, but most of the benefit goes to the Russians because they’re the interface with the wider world. Well, the Ukrainians have now decided that program no longer works. And so Orenburg is in flames, assuming for the moment that the Americans and the Europeans and others do not convince the Ukrainians to not do this, and so far everyone’s been silent, you should expect to see more and more attacks like this on Russian infrastructure that largely exists to serve Kazakh needs, and the single largest place where the Ukrainians can have an outsized impact is going to be something called the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which takes crude oil from places like Tengiz and cash again on the Caspian Sea, ships it through Russian territory to export facilities on the Black Sea. And while as is only a quarter of a million barrels per day, Tengiz alone is over a million. And so we’re talking about secondary hits on Kazakh production that really has nowhere else to go. 

And that, more than anything that the Ukrainians have done to Russia direct, can just have a huge impact, because all they have to do is take out the pumping stations or section of the pipeline, or if they’re getting really chunky, some of the port facility in places like Novorossiysk, which they’ve already been hitting over and over and over. 

Bottom line, Kazakhstan’s oil and natural gas output was never going to last long term. It’s depended on too many pieces and too many countries and too many basins, because once the crude actually hits the Black Sea, it then has to go out of the Black Sea, through the Turkish Straits, through the Red sea, right by all the pirates in Somalia, across the entirety of the Indian Ocean basin to get Asia. So, you know, none of this was ever going to last. But the Ukrainians are proving that it can stop it almost right at the starting point. And we should see a lot more attacks like that in the days and weeks to come.

A Massive Energy Break Coming Soon

An Oil Tanker in the ocean

We’re slipping closer and closer to a major oil supply crunch. With the Persian Gulf still shut in, global inventories almost depleted, and threats to other oil supplies, the world doesn’t have enough oil to keep things running for much longer.

The Chinese have been able to substitute some of their oil demands with coal-based products, but this is just a band-aid. Eventually, oil prices will spike, and certain consumers will no longer be able to afford petroleum products, leading to demand destruction.

Northeast Asia will be hit hardest due to its heavy reliance on imported oil, but even Europe will have issues, despite having alternative supply sources.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. I wanted to give everyone an idea of just when the oil crisis is going to hit, because we’re about their short version is that since the Iran war started, we’ve had somewhere between nine and more, currently about 13 million barrels per day of Persian Gulf crude that isn’t even getting produced, much less exported to the wider world. 

And we are well past the point where the last tankers of exports pre-war have reached their destination. So everyone’s just been burning through stocks and at some point in either June or early July, we’re going to reach basically minimum operating levels for inventories and half the world, if not more. 

We’re looking already about 1.25 billion barrels of crude that haven’t been delivered. With every day goes by. That’s 10 to 13 million barrels of crude that have to be pulled from inventories. And because prices haven’t dropped, which is kind of weird. Demand really hasn’t dropped all that much. We’ve seen a little bit movement in some subsectors, like say, jet fuel and diesel, but for the most part, people are continuing to consume crude like this isn’t a long term problem. 

Oh my god. Anyway, at some point in June or early July, we’re going to hit the wall. The primary reasons why it hasn’t happened already is we’ve got two little factors in play. The first are the strategic reserve releases that the IEA approved two months ago. Now, in the case of the United States, this has really helped out Europe because the United States is a net exporter of crude and refined product by a large margin. 

So we don’t need the crude that is being released. So roughly 2 to 2.5 barrels a day of crude from our strategic petroleum reserve are just crossing the Atlantic and helping out the Europeans. And since the Europeans are so much more efficient at energy use than we are, that has really helped them kind of square the circle in the mid-term. 

It won’t last much longer, but for now it’s holding on the Asian side. Something else has helped out. That’s a little odd. 

When you make petrochemicals, you usually use a mix of feedstocks. You turn oil into something called naphtha. That’s your primary feedstock, but you also use liquefied petroleum gas like ethane and propane and butane. Some of these have partial substitutes, specifically the naphtha. 

And what the Chinese are doing is trying to cut out as much naphtha from their system as they can, and instead substitute it with a kind of processed liquefied coal. Now, this is wildly inefficient and expensive and especially polluting. But when you’re in a throughput driven system like the Chinese, it’s not so big of a deal. So headline. 

The Chinese petrochemical sector uses about 4 million barrels a day of product, of which about half, maybe a little less, is naphtha. And they’ve been able to substitute coal for maybe a third to half of that which is bought Asia. A little bit of wiggle room and has prevented the Chinese from having runaway price increases. You combine that with their large scale application of very, very, very small electric vehicles and a grid that primarily runs on coal anyway, and they’ve bought some more buffer that way too. 

But all of this is going to evaporate over the course of the next 3 to 6 weeks. So we’re very close to the break assuming nothing else goes wrong. And as we have seen in the past, that if we do get into a hot war situation again, the Iranians have easily demonstrated that they can hit any part of the export infrastructure from the Persian Gulf that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz, specifically the bypass pipelines of the United Arab Emirates and the Saudis have so were, ironically, in probably the best that can be hoped for right now. 

No hostilities, but the Persian Gulf still closed. If the Persian Gulf were to reopen tomorrow, it would be months before any new crude would flow, because it just takes that long to turn these fields back on and in some cases, years. So the late June and into July deadline is probably going to happen regardless of what happens with the negotiations that are ebbing and flowing back and forth. So get ready for a fun summer. 

How this usually happens is when you’ve got this sort of disruption. Prices go through the roof because there just isn’t any throughput. It’s not that people have cut refinery runs for the most part. It’s just that we’re not going to have feedstock. And when that happens, you get this lovely thing called demand destruction, where prices rise to a point that some parts of the economy, some people in some parts of the world simply can’t afford the crude derived products at all. 

And when that happens, their demand is destroyed. Till such time as prices fall back into line. The last time the world experienced this scale of disruption, it wasn’t the oil crises in the 70s or the 80s. It was World War two when everything got sunk. So historically unprecedented is the term. And keep in mind that with the global happened, some version of this was going to happen in a large scale. 

Regardless, the parts of the world are going to be most affected. At the top of the list is Northeast Asia, because this is an area that imports well over 90% of their crude. And until recently, all of that crude has really come from the Persian Gulf. They do get a little bit of a kicker from the former Soviet Union now, a little bit from the Western Hemisphere, but not enough to make a material difference. 

And the second worst will be Europe, where they also import 90% of their crude. But they have the potential of tapping more regions, most notably North America and North Africa and West Africa. So here we go.

America’s Leg Up on Petrochemicals

Petrochemical plant

The Iran War has caused a massive disruption in global petrochemical production. Since most of the world relies on oil-derived naptha, the ~12 million barrels/day shortage is taking a toll.

Many countries in Asia and Europe are beginning to feel the pressure, but the U.S. has a leg up on everyone else. Thanks to the shale revolution, America’s cheap and abundant natural gas is used to produce its petrochemicals. This has enabled the U.S. to avoid shortages and become a dominant global supplier of key petrochemical inputs.

Nearly every industry, from plastics to fertilizers, is impacted by these materials. So, the global industrial landscape is getting shaken up once again.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Walla Walla, Washington. Today we’re talking about the Iran war and the impact that it is having on petrochemicals. 

The way most of the world decides to make petrochemicals is they start with crude oil and then refine it into an intermediate product called naphtha and then naphtha. 

Then it goes on and is processed into tens of thousands of things that we all use every day. That’s not how it operates in the United States. In the United States, because of the shale revolution, we have basically a bottomless supply of natural gas. Based on whose math you’re using, roughly one third of the natural gas that is produced in the United States, it’s produced is a waste product, or at least as an associated production of oil, which means that in the United States, natural gas is significantly cheaper compared to the cost of oil. 

So in the rest of the world pre-war, the ratio between oil and natural gas on a point of view was about 5 to 1. In the United States, it’s closer to 2 to 1. So we use natural gas to produce products that, everyone else would use naphtha for. Well, what has happened? Two things. Number one, all that natural gas means that the United States can produce most petrochemicals at a significant cost advantage versus everyone else. 

Second, with the Iran war going on now, there’s a global shortage of oil to the tune of about 10 to 12 million barrels a day. So everyone else is hardware is designed to turn oil into naphtha, into petrochemical products. But all of a sudden, the price of oil on the availability of oil means that basically everyone in the East Asian rim, and very soon, everyone in Europe, simply can’t access the product they need at all, and they don’t have access to enough natural gas in the first place to switch over. 

And even if they did, they’d have to change their hardware to be able to do it. So the United States is becoming, from an economic point of view, the only real functional, large scale supplier of the butadiene and methyl groups, which is where we already had, huge advantage. And that’s things like, particleboard and silicones and octane for gasoline and nitrogen fertilizers and melamine, plastics, a lot of things like that. 

Whereas everybody else is now discovering that they don’t have the price structure that’s necessary to maintain competitive production of really any of this. Third problem, because the United States, is able to have an advantage now in all of the product sets. We’re seeing a significant shift in production quantities as well as qualities. So let me show you this chart here. 

If you start at the bottom left, that gray bars oil, you turn into naphtha, which goes on to make all the water products go to the right side. At the bottom you start with natural gas. You crack it to get ethylene, and then you turn that into products. But this whole set can be made with natural gas. 

And so the United States has not just a price advantage now, but just a huge advantage in the quantity, the type of products that can be made in mass. You play this forward for six months, two years, which is easily going to happen because of the Iran war. And we’re looking at a shattering of the petrochemical supply chains on a global basis outside of North America, and that’s going to have massive impacts downstream on pretty much every industrial sector.