Iraq, Oil, and a Break for Chevron

Iraq Map With An Oil Sign licensed by Envato Elements: https://app.envato.com/search/photos/c777eb9c-aa98-4f24-b652-fc6ac6385c3c?itemType=photos&term=Iraq+oil

We’ve all heard the claim that the Iraq War was a war for oil, but American energy firms barely wanted to touch Iraq after Saddam fell. Things might be shifting now.

U.S. sanctions on Russian firms, such as Lukoil, forced Iraq to nationalize projects. This opened the door for Chevron. Should they come in, production in the West Qurna 2 oil field could double.

Once Iraq’s parliament gives the green light, Chevron would mark this as a much-needed win, as it would be the largest recent international asset and comes as the firm could be losing ground elsewhere, such as in Kazakhstan.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Good morning from Colorado today we’re and talking about oil in Iraq. If you guys remember back to Iraqi freedom and the Iraq war in the war on terror, you know, 20, 23 years ago now, there is a lot of argument back then from people who didn’t like the George W Bush administration that this was a war for oil. 

We were pre shale revolution at that point. So the US was the world’s largest importer of crude and natural gas. Now we’re the world’s almost largest exporter of both based on how you’re doing the numbers. But if you remember back to how the war concluded, American oil interests moving into Iraq were thin. There were a few people who moved into Kurdistan in the north, and that was about it. 

The reason was a combination of things. Number one, there was an active insurgency going on. And while oil companies generally have a high tolerance for damage, in this sort of environment, when the 100,000 American troops in the country were like, no, that’s just way too hot for us. Second, the Iraqi government, post-Saddam was wildly disorganized, and sharply sectarian and basically on off in a stage of civil war in parts of the country, parts of the country that had oil. 

So a a few companies did move in, but it didn’t really work out for any of them, and they ended up moving out. That may may be changing now. The Trump administration has sanctioned Russian oil companies, most notably Lukoil, in this conversation, and Lukoil was the manager for a really easy, shallow, huge field called West Qana two, which is in the southern part of the country near the secondary capital of Basra. 

And after 20 years of operating in the country, they were able to get oil production there up to about 450, maybe almost 500,000 barrels a day. But now they’ve been sanctioned and they can’t US dollar markets. And if you’re producing crude for export, it’s all denominated in US dollars. So they have basically had to shut themselves out. 

So the field was nationalized by the Iraqi government. It’s currently being managed by something called the Boss Route Oil Company, which is a state entity, and they have entered into negotiations with America’s Chevron to take over the project. Now, none of this is done. There is no ink to even be dry yet, but, Chevron is in the first position to enter negotiations. 

Take it over. And the current expectation we’ll see is that a year from now, they will be the sole operator, or maybe in league with the Iraqi government. This would be the single largest asset that Chevron has picked up internationally in quite some time. Almost a half a million barrels a day. And unlike Lukoil, which doesn’t have great technology or capital access, Chevron is one of the big five of the world. 

And we would probably see the West kind of two project expand to over a million barrels a day in a very short period of time, probably no more than five years. It’s a technically simple field. It’s large, it’s close enough to a population center to be able to tap labor, but not so close to be a security problem. 

And it already has an existing pipeline going to the coast, and it already has an offloading facility. So in terms of supporting infrastructure, everything that it would need is already there. About the only obstacle at this point is would have to be ratified by the Iraqi parliament, which can be a little snarly, and that will depend upon relations with the United States. 

But one of the things that prevented American companies from getting involved the last time around is that the only real stable part of the country was up north in Kurdistan. And so that’s the first place people went to sniff around. Well, Kurdistan is viewed by the rest of Iraq as secessionist. So if you cut a deal with the Kurds in the north, it was very difficult to get a deal on the south, on top of that, the technical challenges for the fields in the North were really, really sticky. 

And if you wanted to get the crude out, you either had to send it north through Turkey. And the Turks hate the Kurds and the Kurds hate the Turks. Or then you had to send it south through the Arab part of Iraq. And they didn’t like the Kurds anyway. So basically anyone who took the early deals with Kurdistan, lost out on the South, independent of the fact that the South was a difficult operating environment. 

But no longer applies today. And Chevron has no assets in Iraqi Kurdistan. So from a geopolitical point of view, this actually seems to be set up to be a meaningful deal for Chevron, which, considering they’re probably going to lose what they have in Kazakhstan because of the Ukraine war, from them is a fantastic development. They’ve always kind of been second fiddle to Exxon. 

This is one of those situations where they might actually have a significant leg up.

Belgium Seizes Shadow Fleet Vessel

Flag of Belgium

The Belgian government has seized a tanker of the shadow fleet. With the United States, India, and now the Europeans intervening, it is only a matter of time – months at most – before the entire fleet is shut down.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey everybody Peter Zeihan here. Coming from Colorado, it is the 1st of March. And today we’re going to talk about Belgium. Earlier today the Belgian government grabbed a Russian shadow tanker and escorted to port and opened a criminal investigation, all in one. I’ve been watching the Shadow fleet for, well, almost four years at this point. The primary way that countries like Venezuela, Iran and Russia have been earning oil income while under sanctions. 

They put out a bunch of really old ships. They fake their papers, they give them fake insurance policies, and then they sail kind of under the radar. Of late, the United States has gone after the Shadow Fleet. That was involved with Venezuela. 

And now we have had several instances where Russian shadow tankers have been grabbed, some by the United States, one by France, which was then summarily released because the French quote, didn’t know how to prosecute, which made them look really stupid. 

But the Belgians apparently have figured it out, and they’ve already opened prosecution. Now, I don’t say positive things about Belgium often, but weather is awful. The food isn’t that great. The beer is questionable. The Dutch part of Belgium is in the north. The French part is in the south. They don’t interact. They rarely have a government. Yet here they have all their ducks in a row. 

So, you know. Kudos, Belgium. What this means is if we can have a small state, Belgium is not a power player. Going after the shadow fleet, then there’s really no excuse for the bigger countries to go after it, as well as countries that are closer to Russia, like, say, the Baltics. Sweden. So, we are seeing a cracking in the shadow fleet, left, right and center number one, the United States broke the seal when it went after, about ten shadow vessels that were taking Venezuelan crude. 

Number two, we now have the Europeans gearing up to do the same. The Brits look like they’re on the verge, for example, of jumping into this. And because of the channel, that’s pretty much everything that matters. And you get the Belgians and the Danes and the Dutch and Swedes. 

Then all of a sudden the Baltic Sea is shut down. Third, the war going on in Iran. Iran feared that this was going to happen. And so they moved a lot of the crude that they had in storage onto floating cargo ships, basically tankers that don’t have a destination yet and something like 200 million barrels. That’s a big chunk of the shadow fleet and all of a sudden they can’t leave the Persian Gulf because of the war. 

They’re just floating there. And it’s only a matter of time before the U.S. Navy decides to go and confiscate all of them. And when that happens, the Shadow Fleet will well and truly be dead. And the way that something like 4 million barrels a day has been getting to market over the last couple of years simply withers and dies. 

So kudos, Belgium. The Europeans are probably going to line up behind them within a matter of days and weeks, and the US Navy will be going after the Shadow Fleet undoubtedly, within a couple of weeks. The US Navy only really has enough ordnance on station for two weeks of the current tempo. But here we are in day two, and they’ve already obliterated the Iranian Air force and Navy. So there’s really nothing that Iran can do to protect the shadow fleet. 

They’re just basically sitting in a bathtub of the Persian Gulf. So we’re looking at the entire shadow fleet being wrapped up here in a matter of weeks to a few months, which will generate an entirely new energy market on a global basis.

India Takes on the Shadow Fleet (Bonus Video)

An Indian War Ship off the coast of India with fishing boats on the shore

India’s navy has begun seizing shadow fleet tankers in its exclusive economic zone. If India continues down this path, other countries will likely join the bandwagon, marking the end of the shadow fleet.

Disruptions to the shadow fleet wouldn’t just impact Russia’s key export income, but also global energy markets. With 3-4 million barrels per day funneling through the shadow fleet, everyone would feel that. India has maintained close ties with Russia, so this move comes as a surprise to many and signals a major realignment.

As I’ve said in other videos covering the shadow fleet, once the first domino falls…the rest will quickly follow. We’ll just have to wait and see if India is willing to topple the first one.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado. I have kind of a weird one for you today. There was a report in the Wall Street Journal today confirming information that was originally released on the Indian Navy’s Twitter account. That was then subsequently deleted, that the Indian Navy has been carrying out raids and capturing shadow vessels in India’s exclusive economic zone. Starting almost two weeks ago on February 5th. Today is the 17th. 

Back story. The shadow Fleet is a group of roughly 1000 oil tankers that carries crude for sanctioned countries, most notably Venezuela, Iran and Russia. And apparently, these ships, the three ships that the Indians have so far grabbed, come from some combination of those three, with the Russians absolutely involved. 

The United States, after it captured the now former president of Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro, has gone after the parts of the shadow fleet that were actively carrying Venezuelan crude at the time, chasing them up on their way to Europe, chasing them into the Indian Ocean, I believe about eight have been captured so far. Eight out of a thousand is not a lot. 

But when the world’s naval superpower decides it wants to do something on the high seas, it’s really not hard for the United States to do it. And now it appears that the Indians are getting in on the act as well. This is really interesting from my point of view, for three reasons. Number one. Once another country joins the United States in targeting the shadow fleet, it’s probably only a matter of days. 

Two weeks before many, many other countries do it. There are a lot of countries that don’t like Venezuela or Iran or Russia. Especially the Europeans. And now that India of all countries is joining in, we should expect a couple of dozen other countries to do so as well, which would completely remove the shuttle fleet from functioning, in less than a few months, considering that there’s something like 4 to 5 million barrels a day transported in this matter that can have a really big impact. 

Economically or politically, based on who decides to take advantage of the situation. So that’s one. Number two, the fact that, the Indians are involved. India has been the second largest beneficiary of the shadow fleet since it really started getting going in the early days of the Ukraine war back in 2022. Basically what happens is someone affiliated with Russia or around or Venezuela goes out and buys a decommissioned oil tanker that probably doesn’t match current safety norms, gives it a fake insurance policy, puts a fake flag on it, and sends it to pick up the crude from one of those three countries. 

That crude then comes somewhere in the high seas, where it comes up against another shadow vessel, and they pump the crude from one to the other in a sea to sea transfer. Relatively dangerous. But these guys are busting sanctions anymore, so that’s not their primary concern. That then happens once, twice, three times more. Maybe they mix two crudes into another hold, or something. 

Anyway, eventually, another shadow vessel disgorged that cargo in a purchasing country, typically India and China and the Indians and the Chinese say, oh, we have no idea where it came from. You know, it’s just a convenient fiction. It’s just a question of who decides to enforce maritime law. Well, like I said, India is one of the big beneficiaries here and historically has been the second largest beneficiary of this process. 

And so for them to go out and grab ships in their own economic zone, who have been doing these CDC transfers for four years now to break that policy changes, the economics of the shadow fleet in the politics of India very, very deeply. A couple of things here. Number one, India has always, always, always been pro-Russian versus pro-American and has sided with the Russians. 

Because of the affiliation they had with them back during the Soviet period. So, you know, went away. Modern Russia has nothing to do with the Soviet Union. But the Indians kind of are still fighting the cold War ideologically from a certain point of view. So them flipping, matters. Second, because these are Russian vessels that have Russian flags. 

Having the Indians go against a Russian situation so boldly is really, really notable. It’s also been 11 days since this happened. And the idea that just happened once for three vessels is kind of curious. So I don’t understand why the Indian Navy posted this. I do understand why they tore it down right away. 

Because this is the sort of thing that will reverberate through the shuttle fleet very, very dramatically. Because if their ships are being confiscated and captains are losing their vessels, the entire capital investment is lost. And it won’t be long before the other captains basically throw in the towel or enough of them are grabbed that it changes the economics of shipping this stuff. 

So all of that combined is number two lot going on there. Number three. 

Russia. Russia. Russia. Russia. Russia. The Russians have been exporting somewhere between 3 and 4 million barrels a day this way for four years. And it is their primary source of income now. And if this is about to go away, then we’re going to see some very dramatic changes in a number of things in the eastern Hemisphere. Number one, the Ukraine war, if the Russians have lost their single largest source of income that will manifest on the battlefield, the Chinese may be supplying the Russians with all the gear that they can pay for. 

But the key thing there is pay for. And if the Russians can’t, then a drone war where the Russians can’t get enough drones is one where the Russians start losing territory. And we’ve seen just in the last 96 hours how when the Russians lose communication equipment, they start to lose coherence on the front line. 

And can no longer advance. This would be far more dramatic. Two. If the Americans and the Indians are seen eye to eye on things like the Russians, those are two big changes I’m going to talk about India, but about the United States. There are a number of people within the Trump administration who have been blatantly pro-Russian in this entire conflict, but now it appears that that might be changing. 

One of the fun things that happened about three weeks ago is we had a summit between US President Donald Trump and the Indian prime minister Narendra Modi and Trump said at the end of their meetings, the United States was going to drop its tariffs by more than half to allow Indian products back in the United States. 

And in exchange, the Indians were going to stop using Russian crude. The Indians said, thank you, Mr. Trump, for the tariff withdrawal, but not a single Indian government person statement post has ever said anything about not using Russian crude until now. And apparently now it looks like maybe less than two weeks after that summit, the Indians started going after Russian tankers. 

So maybe Trump really did get a deal. Just the Indians are doing that. A little bit on the down low. But now that they’re actually confiscating tankers, it’s not very down low anymore. And if you have the Indians stabbing the Russians in the back, and the Americans and the Indians now starting to get along in economic and strategic matters, 

That changes all the economics and the politics and the strategy of everything in South Asia, because the United States has reasonable relations with Pakistan. It’s been India that’s been clinging on to the Soviet era. If that’s no longer the case, if Russian influence has really been purged, then we’ve entered into a fundamentally new era. And if the Indians are stopping crude from Russia getting to India, you can bet your pretty ass that they’re going to stop it from getting into China, because now China is the only country that has been taking that is still taking Russian crude in volume. 

And now all of a sudden, we’re talking about the entirety of the 3 to 4 million barrels of the shadow fleet being gouged out of the Chinese economy. Now, a lot of this is a couple steps removed from what we know right now. I don’t want to say that all of this is destined to happen, but you remove that much crude from the system all at once, and the whole system feels it. 

You remove it all from one country’s system all at once, and that country is fucked. So we’re looking at a broad, structured rearrangement of things in Russia and Ukraine and India and China, perhaps all at once. The question is whether or not the foreign policy team in Washington can actually hold that together, considering how much they’ve purged the decision making apparatus in the State Department and the National security apparatus and in the military. 

This is a lot to hold in your head all at once. But if we are moving in that direction, we are looking at the single biggest shift in international politics of at least the last four years. And that will keep me very busy for months to come.

The End of the Shadow Fleet? – French Edition

French military vessel | Licensed by Envato elements: https://app.envato.com/search/photos/d93044ee-6076-4af6-a69b-29bbfe8f6cd3?itemType=photos&term=french+navy&sort=relevance

France has seized a shadow fleet tanker suspected of carrying sanctioned oil under a false flag and has taken it to Marseille. Should this ship be formally impounded, the entirety of the shadow fleet would fall.

If a precedent is set here, everyone could begin detaining similar vessels. And it wouldn’t be hard to rapidly clear the waters of these vessels via major maritime choke points. A maritime services firm has kindly offered to legally take possession of seized shadow fleet ships and dismantle them (most of these floating rust-buckets should have been scrapped years ago, but instead were used to evade sanctions).

So, the shadow fleet could fall within months, but that creates a new series of problems. That’s 5 million barrels per day of crude going offline very quickly, making global energy markets quite volatile.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re looking at the Russian shadow fleet, specifically non-U.S. countries going after the fleet. What was really interesting from my point of view is, on the 22nd of January. So last Thursday, the French grabbed a ship called The Grinch, for suspicion of flying an inaccurate flag and carrying sanctioned oil which would define every ship that the Russians, the Iranians, and until recently, the Venezuelans have been using to transport their oil. 

The reason why this really matters is, with the exception of the Venezuelan enforcement actions that the U.S. is engaged in, right now, no country has pulled over any shadow fleet vessel for those reasons. Maybe they think that there’s a drone launch system on board and they see it as a security issue. Maybe the ship is having engine trouble. 

They need to tow it to port. Those things have happened, but never one has ever tried to use military force to enforce the sanctions on Russia, or to try to break the shadow fleet. This would be the very first instance of that. And the French have grabbed the shift and towed it to Marseilles for investigation. And obviously it’s false flags and obviously it doesn’t have an insurance policy. 

And obviously it’s part of the shuttle fleet. So we are watching this very closely because if this actually results in the ship being impounded and its cargo seized and distributed, however the French decide to handle it. We will then see every NATO country and probably quite a few non-NATO countries basically going through and gobbling up the entire shadow fleet in a matter of weeks, because it is very easy to do so now. 

The French are a competent naval power. They grab the ship in the Mediterranean, but, you know, most of them is not going to be that complicated because you’ve got places like the English Channel or the Sky around, or the Turkish Straits, where the ships have to pass through a narrow choke point in an area where local labor powers are more than capable of grabbing civilian traffic that isn’t supposed to be there. 

The second piece is that a company called GM’s Global Maritime Services has applied for permission to o. Fact, that’s the Office of Foreign Assets, or works with Treasury in the U.S. departments to basically manage foreign assets. Has basically said, hey, we are here. We are ready to take possession of these shuttle fleets, will bid on it, will pay for them, and then we’ll break them down and remove them from service completely. 

None of these ships are new. Most of them are just floating rusted buckets. They’re accidents waiting to happen. And if it hadn’t been for the existence of, the Russians needing to create the shadow fleet, the Iranians needed to create the Shadow Fleet. All of these ships would have been decommissioned years ago. So let us do our job and help you do your job. 

And we can easily take more than 100 of these things in the next six months. There’s probably about a thousand shadow vessels out there anyway. GM’s is the largest company that has expressed an interest in playing a role in this. They’ve applied directly to the U.S. government. And so we’re seeing the institutions now starting to move to grab the shuttle fleet, remove it from contention, and then permanently dismantle it so that it can never be rebuilt. 

If this goes the direction it seems to be going, this next six months is going to be wild in energy markets, because these tankers are collectively carrying something like 5 million barrels of crude a day. Removing all of that in a short period of time is going to cause a lot of pain in a lot of places, but nowhere more than the countries that will no longer be able to sell their crude. 

Most notably Iran and the Russian Federation. So you’re is off to a rolling start and here we go.

Venezuela’s End: The Oil Question

Photo of black oil barells

Venezuela only has one realistic path forward: Oil. That doesn’t mean it’s a sure thing, though. So, let’s lay it all out.

Most production comes from the Orinoco Belt, but it’s complex and expensive crude. Without foreign investment and involvement, this is a no-go. The Lake Maracibo region offers lighter, easier-to-refine oil, with better export access and infrastructure. However, this is a bit of a lawless region, so it would necessitate lots of troops in addition to any investment.

Russia and China come out of this as clear losers, but some US refiners are going to take a hit, too. This isn’t the energy-security play that the US is looking for or needs. Venezuela has likely seen its last days as a major energy producer.

Full 12 minute analysis available exclusively on Patreon below:

View full 12 minute analysis
Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here coming from Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about Venezuela. But from perhaps a positive scenario point of view. The core issue is oil. That’s where all the money comes from. And if you’re going to reconstruct the country in any form, that’s where it’s going to be able to pay for itself. I really don’t see the Trump administration dumping $100 billion and regenerating the infrastructure. 

So let’s talk about what’s necessary and why and how it might might happen. Venezuelan crude falls today into two general categories. The first chunk, the chunk that is responsible for about 80% of the production is a place called the Orinoco Belt, which is down in the Amazon. It is not crude in the technical term. It’s something called Bitterman, which requires incredible amounts of energy and steam injection to liquefy it enough that you can bring it to the surface, and then you run it through something called an upgrader, which is kind of like a refinery, just to make it liquid enough to be stable for shipment. 

And then you have to inject something called diluted into it. So again, it can flow, and then you pump it north to the coast, where it’s loaded for export. This makes it the most expensive crude in the world per barrel produced and requires incredible technical acumen to function. Historically speaking, most of the work on the Upgraders, has come from US multinationals a little bit from, say, total in France. 

Schlumberger, Baker Hughes, all of those, oil services firms were heavily involved in the development of the program. And eventually they trained at PDVSA, which are PDVSA, which is the state oil company, to do a lot of the work. But that kind of came to a crashing halt back in 2002, when we first had a political coup against Chavez, followed by kind of an economic resistance against the professionals within PDVSA. 

When that process was over and Chavez re consolidated control over the country, he purged PDVSA. And what we found out was basically everyone who had an engineering degree didn’t like the guy and joined in the coup, and so he got rid of all of them. And since then we’ve had a steady degradation of what PDVSA can do. It’s no longer one of the most capable oil companies in the world. 

It’s barely holding together. And if it wasn’t for the presence of U.S. super major Chevron in some of these projects, most of them probably would have shut down, in order to get the Orinoco back up to what it could be. So it’s producing one 2 million barrels a day. You’re talking about investment, at least in the tens of billions, probably closer to 200, because there’s several stages to this process. 

Think of it kind of like what the Canadians do with oil sands, but remove easy capital access, remove the skilled labor, remove the rule of law, remove the physical pipeline linking it to the world’s largest consumer market. They have to do this all in the Amazon, more or less by themselves, without cash, but still bringing in foreigners. 

Very, very expensive projects. And I think the most likely outcome is that this is going to eventually fall down to zero, because they’re simply not going to be able to maintain it. The second part of the Venezuelan oil complex is a little bit more interesting from a functional point of view, if not a chemistry point of view, and that is the Lake Maracaibo region. 

Now, Lake Maracaibo is a large bay in the western part of the country and Zulia State that is connected to the Caribbean that has a mix of onshore and offshore production. If you go back to the mid 1990s, it was producing somewhere between 1.5 and 2 million barrels a day, which was the majority of Venezuelan oil production. And it is kind of a medium light mix instead of the Biderman that exists over in, southern Venezuela. 

As a result, produce production is a lot more basic. The geography is a lot more friendly, and most of the physical infrastructure to process the crude actually exists locally. There’s a large complex that technically could process about a million barrels a day, whereas Venezuela barely processes anything of that of the stuff that comes out of the Orinoco. But most importantly, you know, the Orinoco is basically asphalt, and so getting asphalt out of the ground is a bit of a bitch. 

Whereas the stuff in Orinoco again, light, medium, sweet, much easier to process. And the export options because it is on the water are much easier as well if there’s a solution here. For Venezuela, it lies in the Maracaibo region. A couple reasons. Number one, there is a line of the Andes that cuts the Maracaibo region and Zulia from eastern and central Venezuela. 

And so there’s always been kind of a semi secessionist view of the world compared to Caracas. So Caracas is a Republican project that was formed after the collapse of the Spanish empire, very anti-colonial, very pro-independence. But Zulia and Maracaibo are more like a post-imperial remnant who never really fully bought into the Caracas project. And while they’re not secessionist in the traditional sense, they definitely feel that they’ve been robbed blind by Caracas government, not just under Maduro and Chavez, but all the governments have come before, all the way back to the Spanish breakup. 

So I can easily see a devolution of the state of Venezuela or Western. Venezuela under Maracaibo kind of goes one way and Caracas goes the other way. Caracas falls apart, Maracaibo is more stable. And that’s before you consider things like the United States getting involved, because if you are an American energy company, the Mark region is a far more friendly environment to operate in than the Orinoco. 

You don’t have to deal with the jungle. You don’t have to do the interior. You don’t have to deal with the capital. You don’t have to deal with, you know, to fight the geography. Everything’s just easier. But easier is not the same thing as easy. Because this is a region that has been denigrated by Caracas for decades. 

Centuries, almost. It’s not a great place, especially right now. Civil control and law enforcement has largely collapsed. You have organized crime, gangs running rampant through the area. The Trump administration said that the Caracas government was facilitating drug shipment to the United States. 

Maybe that was true, but there’s a lot more going through, more Acabo. Maracaibo also has literal pirates like Arg and Eyepatch, that basically raid the entire area. All the time. So if, if, if you’re going to have an economic renaissance in Venezuela or even just one in Maracaibo, in Zulia, first thing you have to do is secure the area and reestablish law. 

And because Venezuela is not a naval power, you’ve got Maracaibo city on the far north side of Lake Maracaibo and the rest of the population of Zulia on the south side. You’re now basically talking about occupying, stabilizing two disconnected sections. So you’re talking about tens of thousands of troops. If you want to make this happen. But that is still the low hanging fruit in this question. 

So much easier than Orinoco, even with all those complications. So let’s talk winners and losers. Most likely this isn’t going to work. Most likely we’re seeing the beginning of the end of Venezuela as an energy producer at all. First loser is, of course, Russia. The Russians bring no technology whatsoever to this fight. Basically their presence was geopolitical. 

To stick it to the Americans, that goes down to zero. They’ll lose absolutely everything that they put in. Second biggest loser is China. China has spent the last 25 years expanding its refining complex to run crude, different kinds of crude from different parts of the world, including Venezuela. The idea being that eventually they’re going to have a fight with the United States. 

And the more diversity they have for options, the better. And so they have sunk tens of billions of dollars into Venezuela to basically prepay for crude. And right now they are owed about 15 to $20 billion in Venezuelan crude. That is now all complete right off. In addition, the refineries that they have built in Shandong and near Shanghai to specifically process Venezuelan crude, they have now lost their only source of crude. 

They will not get it back. So this has been a huge risk for the Chinese that now is being manifested as a complete loss. Other big losers. It really depends upon what happens with the oil sector. If I’m right and this all goes away, then the biggest loser is probably the refineries in the US Gulf Coast region. 

A lot of them were designed to run on this sort of crude, and it’s just going to stop. They can still use, Canadian crude, but the price differential is not going to be as favorable if Venezuelan crude falls off the market altogether. So even if they can replace all the barrels they need, the cost per barrel is going to rise, and that’s going to force them to take a more diverse type of crude. 

And that means less heavy and more sweet. Keep in mind that the U.S shale industry produces exclusively super sweet, super light. So we’ve been in this weird position in U.S. refining for the last several years, where the refiners on the Gulf prefer to take Venezuelan Canadian crude and the United States exports its light sweet to the rest of the world. 

All we need to do is switch that so that we process our own. But that’s easier said than done. If you’ve spent a few billion dollars upgrading your refinery to run the heavy stuff. Heavy crude is typically used for things like asphalt, industrial products and diesel, whereas light sweet crude is usually used for gasoline consumer products. anyone who’s in refining will tell you that is the short story and hides a lot of nuance. I agree, but this is not a video about that. Winners in that scenario, of course, are Canada, because one of the problems that Canada has been having is it sells most of its crude into the American market. 

The American market is the most super saturated energy market in the world. And anything coming out of the Caribbean, Venezuela goes to the US Gulf. So they’ve basically been selling at a massive discount, but sometimes it’s $25 a barrel that now closes and should allow the Canadians to get a better leg up. And that’s before you consider that they have a pipeline that’s kind of sort of working, shipping crude to their West coast now. 

All right. What am I leaving out here? This isn’t an energy security play for the United States. I know a lot of people said that the United States was doing it for oil. And Trump is all about oil. United States is the world’s largest producer of crude. We export 5 million barrels a day of refined product, which is significantly more in refined product than Venezuela ever, ever exported in terms of raw crude. 

So while there might be an economic play here for Exxon and Chevron in the rest, if if the country stabilizes the investment required to make it stabilized and you have to do that first is massive, then you have to go in and physically reconstruct infrastructure that has been dilapidated for decades. And in most cases, just needs to be ripped up and replaced wholesale. 

The one possible exception is Maracaibo, where in theory, in five years you could get output up from its current 200,000 barrels a day to maybe a million. And in theory, the refining complex there, while massively outdated, is still broadly functional and could be rehabilitated without a complete reconstruction. But you are still talking about investment on the front end in tens of thousands of troops, and on the back end in tens of billions of dollars. 

That is not something that I think the American population will support. That is not something I think the Trump administration is interested in. And that’s not something that I think the American super majors are going to get involved in it anyway, considering that there’s so much more crude and other places that are so much easier.

The Beginning of the End of the Shadow Fleet

A photo of an oil tanker set against a red orange sunset

Global oil markets are nearing a massive shock as the shadow fleet edges towards collapse.

With mounting pressure from US seizures, Ukrainian drone attacks, and European interdictions, the roughly 1,000-tanker-strong shadow fleet is in the crosshairs of…everybody. As ships are confiscated, disabled, or destroyed, the numbers stop making sense for captains to run the risk.

This could trigger a severe tanker shortage, driving oil prices up, and making it harder for sanctioned countries to export. We’re not just looking at an immediate price spike; this will be a prolonged oil shock impacting everything from transport to production.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re taking another look at the shadow fleet and the coming shock that’s coming to the oil markets. For those of you who saw the video last week, you know that we basically have a two track path here. The Shadow Fleet is a group of ships that have been transporting Russian crude most recently, and for over a longer period of time, Venezuelan, Iranian crude. 

The idea is that you hide the ownership behind a series of shell companies and flags of convenience. And evade sanctions. Now you have to sell your crude at a discount when you do this. And the captains and the shipping companies that operate the vessels get risk premiums. But in a world where daily demand for crude is 100 million barrels a day, you can’t really shut out all the major players, no matter what you want to do. 

So the Shadow fleet has formed and now has over 1000 vessels worldwide. Well, as of now, it has six less. So we’ve got three things going on at the same time. First, with the United States, the United States has enacted an embargo of Venezuela and has so far, confiscated three tankers, two of which were part of the shadow fleet and one of which was actually completely above board. 

But the Trump administration doesn’t really care right now. So it’s roughly a million barrels a day from Venezuela that is going to go offline. Number two, the Ukrainians have demonstrated that they’re perfectly capable of taking some of their drones, loading them in the back of pickups or into shipping containers, taking them to a different part of the world completely and launching them. 

So in recent weeks, they have upped their attacks on the shadow fleet, and most recently took out a pair of shadow fleet tankers that were in the Black Sea. But over the weekend, we saw attacks on patrol ships in the Caspian Sea, which is nowhere near Ukraine, and they even almost sank a vessel in Rostov on Don, which is a Russian port, just off the Black Sea, and then disabled a shuttle fleet vessel, off the coast of Libya in international waters. 

So the Ukrainians are showing very clearly that you don’t have to be a superpower to use drones against civilian tankers. 

This is going to cut into the profits of anyone who’s operating the shuttle fleet pretty quickly. Because it’s not clear if any of the insurance companies, which are all Russian state or Chinese state that have insured the companies, are going to pay out on any of the claims, because why would you. It’s functionally illegal. And so if you’re a ship captain, all of a sudden there’s a very real risk that you’re going to lose your vessel. that certainly dissuades people from sailing to certain places. That’s number two. Number three, another Shadow Fleet vessel broke down, just outside of Swedish international waters. And the Swedes went and took it over and discovered Russian military personnel on board. 

So now that the Russians have basically started to treat the shadow fleet like a strategic asset, it will start to be countered as a strategic asset. And we’re basically looking at a not so slow motion collapse of the functionality of the fleet and probably on a global basis. So what happens when you remove a thousand tankers from the fleet? 

Well, all of a sudden you go to a severe tanker shortage, which dries up the price of crude for everyone and countries that are under sanctions, Iran, Venezuela, Russia are going to see a significant reduction in their ability to ship. Couple things to keep in mind on that. One Venezuela. Most of the crude production is something that’s called Orinoco Heavy sour. 

It is very difficult to produce and process and ship. And if you have a slowdown in the flows, it will take them months, if not years, to get it back on line. That’s problem one. Number two. Russia. The, Ukrainians aren’t simply attacking the shadow fleet. They’re going after every part of the energy infrastructure, from pipelines to pumping stations to refineries. 

And if the Russians cannot get crude out of the country, they will have no choice. If they want to save their pipelines, but to shut down production in Siberia. And they have maybe a one, maybe a 1.5 million barrels a day buffer where they can shut down their southern fields where it doesn’t get too cold. But after that, they have to start shutting down the northern fields. 

And if they shut down fields in northern Siberia in the winter, they will freeze shut and they will need to be drilled. That will take years. The last time that functionally happened, it was the end of the Soviet period, and it took the better part of 20 years for the Russians to get all of their wells back on line. 

So we’re not just looking at a shock in the oil markets coming next year. We’re looking at a multi-phase shock that hits transport and production in at least two countries. Runs almost a footnote in this. 

Oh, one more thing. The Russians treating the shadow fleet as a strategic asset. That also means a military asset. Now, the Germans and the Danes are directly accusing the Russian government of using the shadow fleet as it’s transiting through the Baltic Sea to launch drones to overfly critical infrastructure like airports. So, if you may remember, before Thanksgiving, there were a number of reports of drones in Europe that were shutting down airspace, that that was all Russian. 

That was all coming from the shadow fleet. So we now have the Europeans in a position that for military purposes, for economic purposes, they feel they have to shut the fleet down. And since the Ukrainians and the Americans are either confiscating or blowing up the fleet, I’m sure the Europeans will come up with something that is much more appropriate to their toolset. 

So expect a lot of interdiction in European waters in the not too distant future. So really exciting times. And as more stuff blows up, I’ll let you know.

The Beginning of Venezuela’s End

A person walking draped in a Venezuelan flag against a desaturated background

The first domino of regime change in Venezuela has been toppled, as the Trump administration has imposed a naval blockade on the main oil export ports.

No oil exports mean Venezuela’s income vanishes. That means food imports stop. Food shortages will give way to unrest, which will give way to regime collapse. So, what kind of situation will we be looking at once the final domino falls and Maduro relinquishes power?

It’s not going to be pretty. We’re talking about a grim humanitarian outlook, a scary security picture, and an ugly transition of power.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado. It is the 17th of December. You’ll see this on the 18th in the morning. And we are. Go for regime change in Venezuela. The Trump administration has started a formal blockade of the ports, specifically to prevent the state of Venezuela from generating any foreign currency, which is used to not to support the regime but hold the country together. 

There are three ports. There’s one just off of Caracas, which is the really minor one. There’s two larger ones, to the west, and east of the country. There’s no interconnection of the oil pipelines among the three. So you basically have fields in the markova region that generate somewhere between one fifth and one third of the country’s crude, very easy to block. 

There’s a very narrow network. Basically, you can do that with one ship and you’ve got to Port Jose out on the east side, which is where about two thirds to three quarters of the exports flow. That’s a little bit more difficult. But again, for the US Navy, this is very, very, very minor. Not hard to do at all. 

And so Venezuela is now going to go from a country that exports about a million barrels a day of crude to one that exports none. And this is something like 90% of the hard currency earnings of the country. And that money is what is used to maintain the regime and to purchase the roughly 80% of the country’s food that is imported. 

So within a matter of days, we’re going to be having food riots because they really don’t have much stored up. And then without the currency, you we’re probably going to see the regime start to crack. A couple things to keep in mind. First, locally in Venezuela and then the broader world. Number one, this is a country that is armed to the teeth. 

That doesn’t mean that I think that it helps the government. But back under Chavez, over a million ak47s were handed up to the population. And so any force that goes in or any force that’s local that tries to assert authority, regardless of their political backdrop, is going to have a horrific time. And we’re not so much looking at a civil war or a civil breakdown, in a country with over million people. 

So the outcomes for Venezuela are beyond dire, and we should expect a general breakdown of civilization here over the course of the next several months, unless the Trump administration changes its mind really aggressively. You’re not going to have a foreign force that can put this right. You’re not going to have a local force that can maintain authority. 

There just too many weapons in too many hands for that to be one of the reasonable options. Which brings us to the second thing, that the oil that comes out of Venezuela is going to go away for at least several years. Right now that’s only a million barrels a day. But something the Trump administration has shown is that we can now have a sovereign state going specifically after oil tankers of the shadow fleets. 

And a lot of these tankers don’t just service Venezuela, they also service Iran and Russia as well. And we have now broken the Seal and other countries, or maybe the United States as well, is probably going to start going after those other shadow tankers as well. A 1 million barrels per day disruption out of Venezuela for a market that is at the moment probably oversupplied is not a big deal. 

But then you add another million from Iran and perhaps as many as 4 or 5 million from Russia. And you’re talking about a very different world. So we are at the start of a very significant international shock in energy. And calendar year 2026 is going to be a wild ride.

What’s the Deal in Canada?

Canadian flag flying over Parliament

While we Americans were carving up our turkeys last week, the Canadians had a political breakthrough. The Prime Minister and the Alberta Premier made a compromise to advance a new pipeline route for Alberta’s heavy crude.

This pipeline would extend through northern British Columbia, requiring the repeal of federal bans on pipelines and tanker loadings in the region. In return, Alberta will adopt a national carbon-pricing framework. This marks a dramatic shift following Trudeau’s 15 years of hostile relations.

Carney’s restoration of a political middle seems more feasible following this compromise. While there is still plenty of uncertainty about what this next chapter looks like, I’m cautiously optimistic.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from a chilly Colorado. It’s only about ten degrees right now, which is like -12 Celsius y Celsius. Well, we’re going to talk about Canada today, specifically on America’s Thanksgiving Day. We had a breakthrough political agreement between the prime minister of Canada, a guy by the name Carney, and the premier, which is kind of like a governor of Alberta, Miss Smith, very, very short version. 

It was a civil conversation that ended in a compromise that will probably benefit almost all parties. It’s like wild, exclusively dealt with energy. Basically, the Canadian government at the federal level has agreed to now push a Bitterman pipeline. That’s that heavy, thick crude that Alberta produces by basically electrifying the ground crazy technology. Anyway, it comes up thick. 

It comes up dirty, requires a lot of specialized processing and handling. And so Alberta has always sold its crude into the American market, because the United States is the only that really process it at scale. But it’s always sold it into a big discount, because it’s a captive market and the United States is an oil exporter itself. 

Now, the federal government has committed to a pipeline across British Columbia, to the northern part of the province. Right now, there’s a federal ban on oil pipelines and tanker loadings, in northern BC. So that will have to change in exchange, Alberta has agreed to a carbon pricing regime with the goal of getting Canada as a whole down to zero emissions by 2050. 

Now we can discuss the pros and cons of that at a later time. But the bottom line is that Alberta has always vociferously avoided any sort of carbon pricing or emissions trading because it is an oil economy, whereas, Canada tends to be relatively green. And even though Alberta is a single largest source of income for the federal government, the fact that it’s all based on the back of oil, has never really gone over well in Ottawa or many other other provincial capitals. 

Now, there are many, many, many, many, many details that remain to be worked out. But a couple things to keep in mind. Number one, we have had the federal government and the Alberta and provincial government screaming at one another. For the best part of the past 15 years. The reason is the no longer in power government of Justin Trudeau was basically had a collective IQ wattage of about four, and couldn’t even pretend to have an adult conversation about any of the topics at hand. 

Does not mean for a second that the Albertans were flexible. But if the federal government really wasn’t willing to entertain discussing real issues with Alberta, of course nothing was going to happen. Now it seems that that is changing. Which brings us to number two. The political middle in Canada has been this vacant parking lot for over a decade. 

The Trudeau government could only rule, even as a minority government, by catering to lots and lots and lots of special interests, of which Greens were one. And that made it very difficult to get anything done at the national level. Even before you consider the Alberta question, Carney, campaigned on returning to the political middle. And if he can lead Canada’s Liberals, which are not a great comparison of the kind of like America’s Democrats, if he can lead Canada’s Liberal Party into the political middle, he’ll dominate a lot of things for a long time. 

But third, like I said, lots of fine print, lots of things that remain to be done at the moment. Canada’s First Nations are not part of this deal. They have facto veto power over many decisions. Number two, British Columbia, which is the province that the pipeline has to go through, is not part of this deal. 

And in the past, they’ve screamed bloody murder to basically scrap anything that Alberta has ever wanted to do. Basically, think of this as the clash between Texas and California just in Canadian politics. And then third, Canada has yet to set up that pricing regime. And until we know what the number is, one of the other components of this deal, which is a carbon capture program, we don’t know how that’s going to work. 

Carbon capture is the idea is that as a side effect of an industrial process, you produce carbon dioxide, and then you inject it into the ground rather than letting it go into the atmosphere. From a cost benefit point of view, it’s a really bad idea. From an environmental point of view, it’s probably a broadly good idea because it gets the carbon work, can’t get in the atmosphere, but it’s not free. 

And until they figure out how much carbon credits cost, no one knows how much you will benefit from this sort of market by putting the stuff in the ground. So lots and lots and lots and lots and lots of details to get into. But the fact that, Carney and Smith were all smiles and had such a broad arrangement of compromises and agreements, we have not seen this in Canadian politics for really the better part of a generation now. 

I’m hopeful, but they’ve got a lot of work ahead of them.

Can Anyone Replicate the US Shale Revolution?

An oil rig on the sunset

The US shale revolution has altered the trajectory of the US energy sector, but can that success story be replicated anywhere else? Let’s head down under and examine Australia’s shale potential.

The Aussies have some promising geology, but lack practically every other metric that contributed to the success of the US shale revolution: abundant water, proximity to cities and infrastructure, deep labor pool, fast-moving regulators, and favorable mineral rights for landowners. That last one is the big one, because without that monetary incentive for landowners…what’s motivating anyone?

There are some other countries that have a better shot at replicating the US shale boom. Argentina already holds the second-largest shale industry. Mexico and Canada have the shale resources, but their industries are so tied to American infrastructure and markets that the US would have to help.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re taking a question from our Patreon page, specifically from one of our friends down in Australia, wondering if it would be possible for Australia to recreate the sort of energy complex that the United States has, courtesy of the shale revolution. The United States is now just a gross over producer of both oil and natural gas. 

It’s driven down energy costs in the country, especially electricity costs, which are now among the lowest in the world. And it’s generated a robust processing and manufacturing system with downstream work and a significant export industry, Australia having a smaller population, but almost as much land could they do it? I don’t want to say no, but there’s some things you have to keep in mind. 

Number one, geology is just the first step. So in order to have a shale industry, you have to have a lot of sedimentary layers that are petroleum bearing that just the right age to generate oil, natural gas. And the United States has that because in the past, the North American continent, especially our part of it, has had a series of shallow seas. 

And then geology would change, and then you’d get another shallow sea and you basically got these stacked layers so you can drill down and hit multiple petroleum producing zones. In fact, in some places in West Texas, you can have upwards of 20 layers that you can all access from one vertical. Now with shale technology, you go down it until you hit that layer and then you go horizontally. 

And that brings us to the second thing. You need water. The way shale works is you make this suspension of water and sand, and that is pumped into the lateral through a series of holes that basically crack the, rock open and release the petroleum. And then back pressure pushes all the liquid out and eventually oil and natural gas comes to the surface. 

Don’t have to pump the stuff, but you have to have the water to do it. And part of that folds into the third issue, which is proximity. You have to have relative proximity for your oil and natural gas production. Two population centers are places that can take the stuff for processing. And in this this the United States is pretty good. 

We have shale zones in Texas, which of course can get pumped to corpus Christi in Houston. And the rest we’ve got some in Colorado which benefit the Denver area. We’ve got some in Ohio which can be pumped into the Northeast and Pennsylvania. Same thing. Australia’s problem is that most of the geology that looks promising is in the outback. 

So not only is it a long ways away from any potential population centers, you’re in the middle of a literal desert, so the water access is more difficult. You can access groundwater that’s done in the United States, too. But all of these things incrementally raise the cost of development. Let’s see what else. Regulatory structure. This is one where a lot of countries, trip up shale wells, as a rule, generate somewhere from the hundreds of barrels to thousands of barrels a day, which sounds great, but it’s not like the mega wells you’re going to get a place like, say, Saudi Arabia. 

So you’re going to have more of them and they’re more involved from a technical point of view for production. So you have to have a more advanced educational system to generate that sort of workforce. And the United States really does stand out among the world when it comes to petroleum engineers, because we’ve been doing it for so long. 

The shale revolution at this point is about 20 years old. In the United States. Our first oil deposits were back in the mid 1800s. So this is something that we’ve been going and going and going. It’s not that the Australians don’t have that, but most of what the Australians have been doing for energy production in the last 30 years has been offshore, where they tap foreign labor almost as much as local labor. 

So there’s there’s a labor crunch there. In addition, if you live in Houston, you can work in West Texas. If you live in Sydney or Brisbane, you’re probably not going to be working on the northwest shelf. It’s just too far. So linking these together, and then on the regulatory side, you have to be able to do things on the fly very, very quickly and have a regulatory structure. 

That’s okay with that. So in Texas, the Texas Railroad Commission, which is the one that regulates the space issues, permits 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. They drill on Sundays, they drill on Christmas. And if you don’t have an institution set up to handle that, everything else gets pushed back. This is one of the reasons why the shale attempt in Poland just didn’t work out, because the poles tried to work European hours and it just didn’t fly. 

The geology wasn’t as good either. But the most important thing, the single most important thing is landowners have to have an interest in the industry. So in the United States, unless you have signed it away, you own the mineral rights on your land. So if a petroleum company comes and wants to drill in your land, you get a chunk of the proceeds. 

We’re the only country in the world that does it that way. So when the United Kingdom tried to kick in the shale that ten years ago, they discovered huge amounts of local opposition because the companies would take all of the money, and that would be that the locals had to deal with the noise and the traffic and all the rest, and they saw absolutely no benefit. 

Australia is kind of in that camp. So if, if, if this is going to happen, it’s going to take a lot more money and put a lot of pressure on the labor force and require a regulatory and maybe even a legal overhaul of property rights in Australia in order to generate the sort of outcome that you might want to see. 

There are three countries, however, that are worth keeping an eye on when it comes to shale that are closer than Australia to achieving something like the United States. The first, ironically, is Argentina. They already have preexisting infrastructure in a place called vacuum worth a dead cow fields which are very close to populated Argentina, including Buenos Aires. The socialist governments of the past set a price floor. 

So anyone going to invest knows how much they’re going to get out. So even though the property law structures are weird and it’s Argentina. So if they’re very weird, if you know the rules of the game on the day that you start, you can get some projects going. And so Argentina already has the second most successful shale industry in the world. 

The other two to watch are Mexico and Canada. both have a shale fields that in many ways are extensions of the American geography, especially northern Mexico. The weird thing about Canada in Mexico, though, is their closest population centers for most considerations around the American side of the border. So if we’re going to ever see a successful shale industry in those two countries, it will be because they’re accessing American infrastructure, population structure, processing infrastructure and basically linking into a greater North American energy grid. 

Doesn’t mean it can’t happen, but if you’re in Ottawa or Mexico City developing a local energy sector to serve another country, let’s just call that a bit of a political complication.

The Pressure Is Dialing Up on Russia’s Oil Network

A russian oil refinery

I’ve been discussing the potential for Russian crude supply shortages and a broader collapse of the Russian oil system since the Ukraine War started…so, is it finally happening?

Ukraine’s recent attacks on Russian energy infrastructure have brought a potential oil crisis within arm’s reach. The Ukrainians are getting smarter, striking critical nexus points and ports; refining capacity is dropping, crude is backing up, and storage capacity is running out. These bottlenecks create pressure in the pipelines and wells, and you can imagine what happens next. Should this extend into the winter, frozen wells could add onto the crisis.

Since much of the energy infrastructure in Russia relies upon Western-tech and labor, that leaves them with few options at resolving these issues in a timely manner (if at all). And then you factor in Ukraine’s strikes on the shadow fleet and things begin to get really spicy.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here come to you from Colorado. And today we’re going to talk about the net effect of all of these recent waves of attacks by drones and by the Ukrainians on energy infrastructure in Russia. Now, this is following up to a video I did a couple of weeks ago talking about how we were starting to see some really very real damage in the energy complex of Russia, with somewhere between 15 and 20% of the refining capacity going offline. 

Since then, the Ukrainians have massively upped their target set, going in and hitting things that are further away. Now, some of these attacks are more political and mine the ones that places like Moscow, where the political elite lives, or Sochi down in the Black Sea, where the political elite vacations. But the far more important attacks, from the two general categories. 

The first one is the Ukrainians are showing that they can hit targets more than a thousand miles away from their borders. Specifically a place called Bashkortostan. It’s a province in western Siberia, eastern European Russia, populated by ethnic Bashkuri, who are, a Turkic minority. Pretty large one in the Russian space. 

But the fun thing about Bashkortostan is it sits at a pipeline nexus that links pretty much all of the southern Siberian energy fields into the European pipeline network. And so if there’s meaningful damage in Bashkortostan and you’re not just looking at problems with refining their production, you’re talking about upwards of 3 million barrels a day that could get locked in. 

And the Ukrainians have figured out that going after a pumping station is a really good idea if you want to disable some of the pumping infrastructure. That’s part one. Part two. Primorsk. Primorsk is a port on the Gulf of Finland, very close to Saint Petersburg. Gulf of Finland an arm of the Baltic Sea. 

It is arguably, Russia’s top export destination. That the Gulf of Finland writ large. Not only is there Primorsk, there’s a place called Ust-Luga. Both of them have been hit recently, and both of them now are operating below half effectiveness. So Primorsk used to export about a million barrels a day. Now it’s about half that Ust-Luga. 

It used to be about 700,000 barrels a day. Now it’s about half that. You put all this together, and the Russians are facing a crisis point in their energy sector that honestly, I’m a little surprised it hasn’t happened to this point. You see, the Russian energy sector has limited export points that are not well linked together. They’ve got a single spot out on the Far East that kind of has its own network and then out on the western side, they’ve got a few ports on the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, and the rest are piped exports that go through Ukraine or Belarus into Europe proper. 

Those pipelines have now been shut down. That just leaves the maritime ports. And if something happens, that would prevent crude from, say, reaching for some might be able to go to the Black Sea, but none of it could go out to the Far East. So the Russians are losing flexibility within their system. And now that we’ve got roughly three quarters of a million barrels per day of throughput on the Baltic Sea that can’t flow, and now that we have 20% of refining off line, all of a sudden there’s somewhere in the vicinity of about 2 million barrels a day of crude produced that can’t go anywhere. 

Unlike the American system, where there’s massive tank farms in every major city, the Russians don’t have that. They’re used to producing crude, sending it to refineries, having it turned into fuel and consumed locally or exported. And the rest goes to an export point and is exported. If you have friction in that system where the fuel can’t be produced, then the crude has to go somewhere else. 

It has to go to a port, and if the ports can’t take it, pressure builds up back in the pipeline system all the way back to the wellhead, which means if something doesn’t change in just the next 2 or 3 weeks, there’s going to be so much pressure in the system that either we’re going to have a rupture in the pipeline, which would be really, really bad for any number of reasons, or the Russians are going to have to shut down their production sites back at the wellhead and lock in a million barrels a day or more. 

The problem is, it’s already late September. Winter is almost upon us. And if these pipes are shut down, or if those wells are shut in in the winter, the crude will freeze in the wellhead. And if they want to turn it back on, they can’t just flip a switch. They have to re drill the well. And a lot of these wells are either old or were produced with Western technology, which means it has to be done from scratch with what the Russians can do with themselves or import from the Chinese, which isn’t sufficient for the technology required in order to make it all work. 

So we could be three years into this war, finally on the verge of a crude shortage, because the Russians just can’t play. Well, no. Real soon, repairing things like refineries takes time. Especially if you’re talking about this distillation columns that the Ukrainians have been hitting, the pressure testing that is required to make sure the thing doesn’t explode is something the Russians and the Chinese cannot do themselves. 

They import all of that from the West. It’s going to be a problem getting the parts. And in the case of Primorsk, not only did the Ukrainians hit a pumping station, they also had a couple of ghost fleet tankers. So all of a sudden, whatever insurance the Russian government or the Indian government or the Chinese government has been providing to these ships all of a sudden has to be paid out. 

And that hasn’t happened yet. And so, lo and behold, tankers aren’t going to risk in the volume that they need to be going if the pipeline system is going to stay online. We’ve been waiting for all of these things to happen, either one or the other, for three years, and all of a sudden they’re all happening at the same time. 

It’s kind of exciting.