South Korea Goes All-In on Drones

Drone Aircraft Dropping Bombs over Misty Landscape | Photo licensed by Envato Elements: https://app.envato.com/search/photos/c058515b-6f36-40c6-837a-4f0644a0809e?itemType=photos&term=military+drone

The South Koreans are going all in on drone warfare, announcing that every soldier will be trained to operate drones. This is a relatively inexpensive way to offset the challenges facing South Korea.

South Korea has shown time and again that it can pivot on a dime. So, incorporating drones into its military strategy to remedy demographic decline is a natural progression. And since they already possess a large industrial base, producing these drones at scale in the coming years isn’t a stretch. South Korea is also facing increased threats from North Korea and weakening U.S. security guarantees, so the case for drones is even stronger.

While the drone warfare of today will likely look far different in ten years, South Korea is well positioned to lead the next generation of military drone technology.

Transcript

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about South Korean defense policy. Specifically in June, the Koreans decided that they’re going to make every soldier competent. Drone operator. Five big things come from this. Number one, why they needed to do it primarily is a demographic situation. Korea has been one of the great success stories for turning a backwards agrarian economy into a forward looking technocracy. 

Doing it really in just a generation, generation and a half fastest infrastructure build out in human history, and a fast urbanization rate that was surpassed only by the Chinese couple of decades later. Anyway, you combine that with the heavy drinking male culture and women deciding that, you know what, maybe there’s an option for me other than the home and you’ve got a high divorce rate, a low marriage rate, and arguably the lowest birth rates in the country. 

And so this has been going on for over half century. And so the Koreans now have more people in their 60s and their 50s and the 40s and the 30s and their 20s and 30s and kids complete inversion of the demographic pyramid. So a normal military structure is to take a lot of young men in their 20s and put them on the front line. 

That’s that’s just structurally not an option for the Koreans anymore. And so they’ve been exploring new possibilities. Drones appear at the moment to fit the bill. Second problem, of course, is North Korea, the North Koreans, while there’s their economy, is a shriveled raisin compared to the robustness that is the South. Something like a third of GDP goes to defense spending, not to mention a not insignificant nuclear arsenal, but more importantly, somewhere between 10 and 15,000 artillery emplacements within range of Seoul. 

So in the case of a war, by the time the first shell hits Seoul, there will be tens of thousands in the air already, and there simply is no conventional or even nuclear solution to that. But maybe with drones there might be. We’ll see. Third problem is the United States. The United States is in the process of ripping up all of its alliances. 

And for countries like South Korea that have faced artificial restrictions put on them by the Americans on what sort of military technologies they can develop, that really puts the Koreans in a bind. So, for example, one of the ways you might be able to counter the North Korean nuclear program and all that artillery to develop your own ballistic missile program, the Americans flat out have barred that since 1955. 

And so the Koreans are now coming into this period where the Americans have become unreliable to absent, and they just don’t have the tools of statecraft or military craft that are necessary for the strategic environment which they find themselves in. Drones offers a cheap and fast way to move into something new. Maybe we’ll see. These technologies are still being developed. 

And that brings us to the fourth thing the industrial plant. Most countries who are moving into drone warfare are discovering that almost all of the parts come from China. And since China is the primary sponsor with Russia of North Korea, the South Koreans definitely don’t want to become dependent upon that. But unlike other countries that have been starting to move into the drone space, the Koreans are already a premier technological manufacturing power. 

And you don’t have to do a lot of creative thinking in order to convert what the Koreans already have and things like aerospace and weapons and automotive and turn it into a drone industry, everything right down to the microchips and the the batteries. So when the Koreans say they’re going to be producing millions of drones a year within a few years, I tend to believe them because they have a lot of the base industrial plant already in place. 

It just requires modification. Now, as the plan stands and it is very early in development. The idea is you make everybody a drone controller and with the technologies of literally yesterday, that makes a lot of sense. But that’s not the technologies that are likely to be used on the battlefield in two, three, four, five, ten years. You see, at this point, most of the drones that have been used by the United States, the Russians and the Ukrainians have been what are called first person view drones. 

Basically, you have a live telemetry fee to your drone. You can see through its optics and you can direct it manually. And that works in any number of circumstances. But it faces two problems when you’re dealing with, say, North Korea. Number one, that link can be jammed. And while there are fiber optic drones with ranges upwards of 50km now, which is nuts, that’s not enough to get all of the potential artillery that could target Seoul. 

So some decision making has to be put into that drone. So it’s not simply unmanned, but it’s to at least a degree autonomous. The way you’ve been doing that to this point is with something called Nand, which is flash memory, cold memory. Think of thumb drive. Nand memory can hold a short decision tree. So you can tell your drone to look for 4 or 5 things and select a target among that list. 

And once the target has been selected, there’s nothing can be jammed because the decision was made on board. You then have to kinetically intercept the drone, which is a lot harder. But there’s another generation of memory beyond Nant. It’s called Dram dynamic random access. Hot memory much faster can hold a much larger decision tree instead of 4 or 5 steps, maybe several thousand steps. 

You’re trained on pilot data, which the Ukrainians have been generating in mass. And the Koreans. South Koreans tend to like the Ukrainians because the Ukrainians are fighting North Koreans. Now, North Koreans have sent troops to assist the Russians in the war. So the South Koreans have become one step removed anyway. The the Dram approach is a different sort of drone with a lot more autonomy. 

And it’s better at, say, following a roadway until it finds a train and then targeting specific parts of the train, for example. Now this is new technology. It is not being used in Ukraine yet. It’s in the process of being invented, quite honestly. But the prototype, the first generation drone, Zeta Zidane is a South Korean product. It’s not militarized yet. 

It’s still in the kind of advanced testing stages of the prototypes, but it already exists. And once you modify those drone brains, for lack of a better term, to a more of a combat chassis, then you really are opening up a new phase of warfare. It’s not swarm intelligence, it’s not a eye where you can throw anything at them and they’ll be able to interpret. 

We don’t have that hardware, but it is a significantly large enough decision tree to in many ways mimic full decision making capabilities. And guess what? Remember I said that South Koreans are already a technological economy? About 90% of the world’s high end dram comes specifically from South Korea. So what’s likely to be the next phase of the drone revolution is something that the Koreans are already the world leader at. 

You put it all together, and by 2030, the Korean military is going to look very, very different. The only question is to the degree to which they decide to go all in on drones. Because if you take one of the world’s top ten manufacturing economies and apply these technologies and the strategic need, which is very, very real and very present, and the Koreans have proven time and time again that they can change direction on a dime and build huge amounts of functional product in a matter of months. So we’re going to see a significant shift, not just in the way that drone warfare happens, but in a number of strategic environments around the world that appear to have been locked in stasis for decades. 

The DMZ and the Korean Peninsula probably being at the top of that list.

The Future of Drone Tech: Ukraine’s Innovation

Camo clad man flying a drone outdoors | License by Envato Elements

The U.S. has finally secured its first contract to manufacture Ukrainian-designed drones, but don’t go celebrating quite yet.

The F10 drone that will be produced is a small FPV quadcopter built entirely from non-Chinese components. This is a big step for the U.S., but it’s not nearly the crème de la crème of Ukrainian tech.

The facility where these drones will be made is yet to be built, so even this initial order of 2,000 drones will take several years to complete. Regardless, this is a step in the right direction that will hopefully lead to further cooperation down the road.

Transcript

Hey all. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today is the 1st of July and the news is good news. We have our first contract granted by the Department of Defense to have a US manufacturer produce Ukrainian drones under license. There’s not a lot of information out at this point. It’s all super secret, but I’ll share what I know and give you a couple of guesses based on what we know what that means. 

So step one, the American company involved is called Ukrainian Defense Drones. Catchy name. And the Ukrainian company on the other side is called F drones. F drones is one of the big boys in Ukraine for producing ever more innovative policies and doctrines and designs and getting them to the front their F7 drone from last year, 2025, yeah, was basically voted the drone of the year for how good it was against emplacements and vehicles. 

The new drone that the United States is going to be producing is called the F10. We know it’s 100% non-Chinese parts, and aside from that, we just know that the ten means it’s ten inches across, which means it’s a quadcopter and it is a first person drone. So you’re going to have a dude with a controller relatively close to the front line that suggests from its size that it has some range limitations, probably only 25 to 40km, and it probably can only carry a warhead that’s 3 or 4 kilos. 

That’s probably not enough to take out a tank, but more than enough to wreck the day of, say, an artillery crew and go after personnel or trucks. That’s the good news. The bad news is there’s no sign at the moment that the F10 is one of the drones that has the terminal guidance that the Ukrainians have been starting to introduce across the front and across the entire drone fleet this past year. Those are the things that load a decision into the drone, so that when it gets over its target area, it can actually look around and pick a target for itself. And once it does that, it can’t be jammed. Now, this is just a contract. It’s part of the American program to try to get 200,000 drones in active service before the end of 2027, just next year. 

But this is going to be a late bloomer in that, because the facility that has been tagged to build these drones in Ohio hasn’t begun construction yet. We only got go ahead for the construction last week, and they’re not expecting to finish construction until December of 2029. So three and a half years from now, and then they’ll start building out the first packet of drones. 

And they’ve only ordered 2000 of them and at a rate of, say, 650 to $700. You know, these just aren’t particularly sophisticated drones, which is fine. The key thing is that for the first time, we have a direct contract from DoD for Ukrainian equipment, which is something we’ve been desperately to get in this country. I would argue, even though all of our Western allies and Middle Eastern allies are way ahead of us on this front, because they know they can’t rely on American hardware, there’s a lot of things can still go wrong. 

For example, the reason we don’t have a contract until now is that Donald Trump personally despises President Zelensky of Ukraine. And it’s entirely possible at this moment that Trump is unaware that this contract even exists. And as soon as he finds out, he may well squash it. But hopefully it is the first of several thousand contracts to come that it would allow the United States to take advantage of the war zone in Ukraine, to help test an entirely new set of weapon systems and take advantage of the Ukrainian skill sets, which were by far the most advanced in the world when it comes to the designing and the use and the development of doctrine for these new types of hardware. Early days. Once this facility is constructed, it’s supposed to be producing a wide variety of defense equipment, of which Ukrainian drones are just one tiny little piece. So it’s a step in the right direction regardless. And I just hope that’s a small step all around a very long path of tighter partnership. 

That’s probably just wishful thinking from me, but at least we have the first step.

The U.S. and Ukraine Make a Drone Deal

Image of a drone firing missiles

The U.S. has finally secured its first contract to manufacture Ukrainian-designed drones, but don’t go celebrating quite yet.

The F10 drone that will be produced is a small FPV quadcopter built entirely from non-Chinese components. This is a big step for the U.S., but it’s not nearly the crème de la crème of Ukrainian tech.

The facility where these drones will be made is yet to be built, so even this initial order of 2,000 drones will take several years to complete. Regardless, this is a step in the right direction that will hopefully lead to further cooperation down the road.

Transcript

Hey all. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today is the 1st of July and the news is good news. We have our first contract granted by the Department of Defense to have a US manufacturer produce Ukrainian drones under license. There’s not a lot of information out at this point. It’s all super secret, but I’ll share what I know and give you a couple of guesses based on what we know what that means. 

So step one, the American company involved is called Ukrainian Defense Drones. Catchy name. And the Ukrainian company on the other side is called F drones. F drones is one of the big boys in Ukraine for producing ever more innovative policies and doctrines and designs and getting them to the front their F7 drone from last year, 2025, yeah, was basically voted the drone of the year for how good it was against emplacements and vehicles. 

The new drone that the United States is going to be producing is called the F10. We know it’s 100% non-Chinese parts, and aside from that, we just know that the ten means it’s ten inches across, which means it’s a quadcopter and it is a first person drone. So you’re going to have a dude with a controller relatively close to the front line that suggests from its size that it has some range limitations, probably only 25 to 40km, and it probably can only carry a warhead that’s 3 or 4 kilos. 

That’s probably not enough to take out a tank, but more than enough to wreck the day of, say, an artillery crew and go after personnel or trucks. That’s the good news. The bad news is there’s no sign at the moment that the F10 is one of the drones that has the terminal guidance that the Ukrainians have been starting to introduce across the front and across the entire drone fleet this past year. Those are the things that load a decision into the drone, so that when it gets over its target area, it can actually look around and pick a target for itself. And once it does that, it can’t be jammed. Now, this is just a contract. It’s part of the American program to try to get 200,000 drones in active service before the end of 2027, just next year. 

But this is going to be a late bloomer in that, because the facility that has been tagged to build these drones in Ohio hasn’t begun construction yet. We only got go ahead for the construction last week, and they’re not expecting to finish construction until December of 2029. So three and a half years from now, and then they’ll start building out the first packet of drones. 

And they’ve only ordered 2000 of them and at a rate of, say, 650 to $700. You know, these just aren’t particularly sophisticated drones, which is fine. The key thing is that for the first time, we have a direct contract from DoD for Ukrainian equipment, which is something we’ve been desperately to get in this country. I would argue, even though all of our Western allies and Middle Eastern allies are way ahead of us on this front, because they know they can’t rely on American hardware, there’s a lot of things can still go wrong. 

For example, the reason we don’t have a contract until now is that Donald Trump personally despises President Zelensky of Ukraine. And it’s entirely possible at this moment that Trump is unaware that this contract even exists. And as soon as he finds out, he may well squash it. But hopefully it is the first of several thousand contracts to come that it would allow the United States to take advantage of the war zone in Ukraine, to help test an entirely new set of weapon systems and take advantage of the Ukrainian skill sets, which were by far the most advanced in the world when it comes to the designing and the use and the development of doctrine for these new types of hardware. Early days. Once this facility is constructed, it’s supposed to be producing a wide variety of defense equipment, of which Ukrainian drones are just one tiny little piece. So it’s a step in the right direction regardless. And I just hope that’s a small step all around a very long path of tighter partnership. 

That’s probably just wishful thinking from me, but at least we have the first step.

Nukes for All! (But Finland First)

nuclear bomb with a mushroom in the desert

Finland knows all too well what a confrontation with Russia would mean. So, the Finns are preparing…

As traditional security guarantees begin to fall apart (i.e., the U.S. signaling reduced willingness to provide military support in future European conflicts), it won’t just be Finland looking for a nuclear deterrent. Other countries near Russia will likely follow suit, and then nations in East Asia will jump on the train, and then everyone will have nukes!

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. No fancy backdrop today. Sorry. The news we need to discuss happened last week on the 18th of June. And it’s that the finished parliament, with a two thirds majority, voted to basically legalized nukes. The transport of them, the storage of them and the production of them. Finland has always been in a difficult position vis AV1 country, Russia. 

They only have a few million people in Finland. They’re all concentrated basically on the southern coast and in and around the capital of Helsinki. They’ve always faced down the Russians, who outnumber them in any meaningful fight, several to one. The last big fight was the Winter War of 1942 1941, where in some of the battles, the Finns inflicted 40 to 1 casualty ratios on the Russians, which is crazy. 

But eventually they knew they would have to suffer some sort of peace deal, and in the peace deal, they gave up territory where almost a quarter of their population lived. There is no version of any future in which Russia exists, where another war is not inevitable. And when the Ukraine war started back in 2022, the current phase of the Ukraine war started back in 2022. 

Sorry, the Finns knew that eventually that fight was going to be coming for them from the Russian point of view. There is no version of their western periphery that doesn’t include, among other things, a big chunk of Poland, all of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and another big chunk of Finland 

The Russians feel they need to occupy all of that in order to have a better cordon in a defensive manner. That’s great for the Russians, but it’s bad if you happen to live in Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Finland. And so the fins are rearming and they’re getting ready for that fight. And they know at the end of the day, there is no guarantee that they can win. Because just like the Winter War in 1940 and 1941, they are massively outnumbered, even if they can get allies to come to their aid. 

Well, in just the last week, the United States said that if there is a war with the Russians, they’re not sending any appreciable hardware to assist. And that absolutely colored the decision making in Finland. So the Finns will not simply be hosting somebody else’s nukes, they’re going to develop their own deterrent, and they will not be alone, because the Finns aren’t the only ones in this situation. 

We’re also going to see nuclear programs expanding in Sweden and Poland and Germany and Romania, all countries that already have the technical skills necessary to make a nuclear program a reality. We’re also probably going to see something like this in East Asia, where the United States is equally odd these days, and that means you should expect to see meaningful nuclear programs in Japan, in Korea, South Korea and Taiwan as well. 

The only way you can convince the Finns and the Japanese and the rest that this is not necessary, is for a robust multilateral alliance guaranteed by the United States. But that is exactly the circumstances that the Trump administration is unraveling. So instead, we’re going to get at least another half a dozen nuclear powers in the broader world.

France and Germany’s Fighter Jet Program (FCAS) Is Dead

Artist's illustration of the FCAS aircraft in flight, after the project as of 2022 | Photo by Wikimeda Commons: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Future_Combat_Air_System#/media/File:SCAF_NGF-523616-P-BEF36-987.jpg

The joint French and German Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a next-generation fighter jet project, has collapsed. Between conflicting national priorities and countless disagreements, the two countries opted to abandon the project.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. The news is that in early June, the Germans and the French abandoned their effort to build a joint new fighter program. Fifth generation. It’s called the FCS Future Combat Air System. They started working on this, I believe, nine years ago, and it hasn’t gone far. The very short version is that you’ve got a company or a country like France that is very into state control of certain specific types of economic activities and security activities. 

And the Germans, who are really good at producing things at scale. It was always going to lead to a bit of a friction. In fact, the Dassault CEO dissolved, being the French aerospace company said, you know, I don’t know why everyone thinks that we might need to work with the Germans, build a fighter jet. We already have the Rafael, which is one of the world’s best fourth generation fighter jets, which is true. 

Anyway, they couldn’t decide what to build, where and how to do it. There are some fun stories with Airbus about how they had to build specific kinds of barges to transport wings from one facility in Germany to another facility in Spain, to a third facility in England. It was stupid. 

Anyway, doing high and avionics is difficult and expensive and there’s a lot of pieces, but if you have it spread among multiple companies, it becomes a real disaster. 

Anyway, they ultimately decided to pull the plug on it last week. Two things that come from this. Number one, this really does put the Europeans behind when it comes to developing a fifth generation fighter jet. Right now, the only real option is the USSf 35, which is not a good match for a number of reasons, most notably range. 

And that’s before you consider that the American government, from the European point of view, has really gone off the reservation and has become, if anything, more of a security threat than a guarantor. Put that to the side for the moment. This suggests, with the possible exception of the next generation of Swedish Griffon or the next generation of French Rafael, there really isn’t going to be an indigenous European fifth generation jet. 

And that’s either good or bad based who you’re talking to. So much has changed in the world of defense technology with drones in just the last six months, that it’s unclear whether a fifth generation jet is really worth the cost anymore. So yes, this is bad for European integration. Yes, this is bad. If your goal is to have a fifth generation jet at all costs. 

But let’s consider the second issue here. If Germany is ever going to be an independent power, it has to have a completely indigenous defense industry. And if this latest operation with the French has now failed, that’s not going to happen soon. Or at least it’s not going to happen with the conventional technologies that we understand. And if the Germans can’t build their own fighter jet, even in partnership with the French, well, then anyone who has a strong air force can prevent the Germans from getting to uppity. 

Countries that fall into that category include, are not limited to France, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Italy. So one of my concerns as the globalization gives away, as populism rises and the supply chains breaks, is that the most powerful economic country in Europe? Germany will eventually become the most powerful military in Europe and start to act like a powerful country with a powerful military. 

And every time that’s happened in the past, things have kind of gotten spicy in Europe. Well, if they don’t have an air force that has functional independence, that can only go so far. So it doesn’t mean that Germany is immune to the political ebb and flow that we’re seeing all over the world as a result around economic nationalism, populism. 

They certainly still are vulnerable to that. And their political system at the moment is deeply fractured and has a lot of unsavory characters in it. But if they can’t act on it effectively, then all of a sudden I sleep a little bit better. Keep in mind that Germany is in the heart of Europe. 

There is no version of a strong Germany that insists in such a way that the neighbors it has are not concerned. But if we can have an economically viable Germany without power projection, that’s a very different discussion. And now, for once, it seems that we’re moving in that direction. 

So I applaud this decision, mostly because it helps me sleep a little bit better.

The Future of Drone Tech: Hybrid Drones

A quadcopter drone with mountains in the background

A new drone has appeared on the scene in the Ukraine War. This hybrid drone blends the precision and control of FPV quadcopters with the range and payload of fixed-wing drones.

Almost every drone style has been battle-tested in Ukraine. We’ve seen FPV drones wreak havoc on the frontlines and fixed-wing drones strike deeper inside Russian territory. However, these new hybrid drones offer the best of both worlds.

Ukraine is already seeing early success with the hybrds, meaning these drones could be a game-changer when combined with other innovations we’ve seen. Russia will develop countermeasures eventually, but we’ll see if Ukraine can capitalize on the opportunity this summer.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Hello from the Vegas airport at 0 dark 30. Today we’re going to pick up on the drone tech series and talk about different kinds of drones, specifically first person drones, which are typically quadcopters or hex copters. Verse is glide drones and flight drones, which are more fixed wing. Both of them have their own places. And one of the things we’re seeing in the Ukraine war today is that they’re starting to merge a little bit. 

So first quadcopters or hex copters, you’ve seen them. These are the hobbyist ones that have been pressed into military use, with new models coming out pretty much every week. The advantage of a quadcopter is control. They can hover. They can land to conserve fuel. You have direct control over them at all times, and that means you can do really crazy things like position them above a military asset, like a tank that has a hatch open and drop something on it, or even drop the helicopter right into it. 

You can fly into a hangar and look around and figure out what it is you want to go after the repair bay and aircraft, a fuel tank, whatever it happens to be. The degree of precision really is extreme, but the problem is, is these things have to have the rotors spinning all the time, so that really limits the range. 

At the beginning of the Ukraine war, these things really only had a range of 2 to 3km, which is about the same as a javelin missile by the way. So the way to extend range was to fly them towards an enemy position, land a lot of nearby and then send one ahead to Scout, and then the others would spin back up. It would buy you a little bit more control and flexibility, but ultimately range was the issue. But as the batteries have gotten better, specifically lithium phosphate batteries and they’ve improved aerodynamics, the range has gone from 2km to 5km to ten kilometers, 20km to 25km. 

And that has turned the entire front line into an area just littered with drones all the time. There’s also a lift issue, so their warheads generally are 10 pounds or less, with most of them being like 3 pounds or less. Fixed wing are different. They require some sort of launching system, which sometimes is no more complicated than kind of a large scale slingshot. They can carry more. They get a lot more lift because they have a wing system that gives them lifts. Quadcopters have no lift. You just have to have the rotors running. And this means that the fixed wing drones have significantly larger range, typically four and five times as long. If you’re spending the same amount of money and a significantly larger payload, because once they get up to a certain altitude, they can just kind of glide for a while and conserve fuel. 

And you can also build larger models. There’s definitely an upper limit when you come to a quadcopter. As they get bigger, you the lift to weight ratio changes against you, so you can only get so big, whereas a bigger and bigger and bigger airframe for fixed wing generates more and more lift proportionally. And so it’s the fixed wing ones that are carrying the bombs that are in excess of 100 pounds, who can fly 600 to 700 miles, really without any major problem. 

And those are the ones that are being used against most distant targets, and especially things like refineries and infrastructure. The advantages pretty extreme there. You can bring a lot of destructive power at significant range. The problem is control. With an FPV drone, you generally have either a digital tether from, say, satellite or cell phones or a fiber optic cable. 

But when you’re starting to talk about a fixed wing drone, the further away they get, the more the chances are that they can be disrupted by electronic warfare. You never have a line of sight to them anymore, and if they fly through an zone, you probably are going to lose the drone. Although there’s certain things you can do with buffering that allows them to kind of stay the course in the hopes that they’ll emerge on the other side of it. 

And you can pick up the signal again. But as a rule, the further away you go, the greater the chance you’re just going to lose control altogether. So these two broad classes have kind of defined everything with the war fees for close in and fixed wings for further destruction of infrastructure. But what we’ve seen in just the month of May is a new hybrid drone coming out that looks a little bit like a biplane, but the most of the rotors are horizontal as opposed to vertical, or the Ukrainians are starting to do is put detachable wings on the drones to get some of the best of both worlds, so you still use the horizontal rotors to achieve the thrust that’s necessary to leave the ground. But as they get going. The wing bevels into place and they can get lift from that as well. And in their first iteration of these things that have popped up in just the last few weeks, we’re already seeing the Ukrainians using these new hybrid drones to go 100km, which is double what we had before just in April. 

And it’s 20 times what these sorts of drones could do at the beginning of the war for years ago. And what that means is, in one stroke, these new drones are roughly doubling the strike range of Ukrainian closing drones, increasing their weight capacity a little bit, too, because of the extra lift. That is something that the Russians are wholly unprepared for. Basically, with each stage of this war as a new weapon has been developed. There’s a period where the attacker, whoever that is, achieves local supremacy and a significant tactical advantage. 

And then the other side developed countermeasures or copies of the technology, and the situation equalizes. But we’ve had so many Ukrainian innovations hit just since March that the Russians are reeling. So we now have memory drones that are hunting and self-selecting targets 50, 60, 100, 150km behind the front line, completely eviscerating the entire logistical system and now close in. 

Individual Ukrainian drone operators have doubled their hunt range. So any sort of movement within 50 to 60km of the front on the Russian side is becoming a no man’s land. Russian positions are becoming isolated and without the Ukrainian suffering any blowback whatsoever. It’s not that the Russians have had to abandon all offensive capability, but they can only focus in specific points. 

And that requires a degree of massing of forces. And those massing of forces usually happened more than 30km away, but less 100km away. All of a sudden, that is no longer viable. So we’re seeing a disintegration on the front right now. The question at this moment is whether or not the Ukrainians have enough offensive plunge and mine removal capacity to take advantage of that in any sort of sustained way, or we’re just waiting for the Russians to adapt these tactics adopt them to their own. 

It’s just too soon to know. But considering that this is happening in the first week of June, we have all of June, all of July, all of August, all of September in the first half of October, which is kind of the ground fighting season when the climate encourages offensive activity. And the Ukrainians have now spent the last 2 to 3 months preparing the battlefield in a way that has just completely decimated the entire Russian order of battle and pre-positioned logistical caches. 

At the same time, preventing troops on the front from being supplied with new men, new equipment, food, water, all the rest of the things. So I don’t want to overplay this because Russia’s defensive capabilities are immense. But it does look like this could be a summer where the Ukrainians break multiple parts of the front, and if they can get through those minefields, then we really are in a new game.

The Future of Drone Tech: Naval Launch Platforms

Photo of a US Naval Carrier

Naval drone warfare is nothing new, but the Ukrainians are now finding ways to spice up the Sea Babies and MAGURA drones.

Ukraine is using these naval drones as mobile launch platforms for smaller aerial drones. Since the naval drones can travel farther and are harder to disrupt, they can take canisters full of FPV aerial drones closer to targets and deploy them. This gives Ukraine better operational reach around Crimea and along the Dnieper River.

This opens up a whole new strategic envelope for Ukraine, allowing it to carry out surprise attacks without pre-positioning troops or drone teams.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Good morning. From Rome, where the building that I’m staying in is. If you can see this curve here at the converted interior, that 2200 year old Roman bathhouse. The bathhouse has gone. But they recycle everything here over the years. Anyway, today we’re continuing on with the drone series, new military technologies that are in the process being unveiled and used right now. And today we’re going to talk about naval drones. Naval drones aren’t new. The Ukrainians have been using them against the Russians, really, since the start of the war, especially the second year. The sea baby is the primary variant. There’s also something called the Megara that has a pretty good track record. The idea is you basically take a small boat or a jet ski or something like that. Hook it up to an automated system pilot it remotely. The advantage of a sea drone, of course, is wait. You can put a bomb that waste several hundred pounds in it and then center on its way. 

And because most vessels don’t have the ability to shoot down at things that are in the water, they’re designed to shoot at other ships. Really, all they can do is put some people on the deck with machine guns or RPGs or something like that, and try to take shots as they come in. And so the Ukrainians have had immense success with these. 

The problem is simply range. And you can solve that with more fuel tanks to a certain degree. So we’ve seen a number of attacks that have gone quite a distance, even going as far as Novorossiysk, which is the major Russian port on the Black Sea and has made the Russian Navy’s position at places several completely untenable. And so the Russian Navy has actually had to evacuate Crimea. 

That’s all old stuff. What’s new, what’s happened in just the last month is that the Ukrainians have now regularized the installment of aerial drones on naval drones. See, one of the fun things about naval drones is because they’re on the water. They’re really hard to interrupt with electronic warfare and jamming. So you can basically right up to your target, whether it’s a port or a ship, before there’s any danger of it being interrupted. 

Whereas an aerial drone, if it’s flying in, sometimes it gets within a kilometer or a couple hundred meters of a target. And the ECM that the Russians use will then interrupt the signal and the thing will crash. That’s one of the reasons why these new memory drones are so important, because they get around that by giving decision making to the drone and the terminal phase. 

With naval drones, there’s really no chance of them being intercepted along the way. So what the Ukrainians have done is have built canisters that are incorporated into these sea drones. And when they get to a certain point, maybe ten, 20km away, they then eject aerial drones that are technically first person drones controlled by a pilot. And those fly into target things, which means that if you put it on a fiber optic tether, which they are, you get somewhere between a ten and a 50 kilometer range where you can send smaller drones out by about a half a dozen at a time. 

A couple of things that have already happened. Number one, they’ve got these canisters to launch them. So this isn’t an experimental technology already. It’s already in full deployment. The Ukrainians just kind of sprung it on everybody just a few weeks ago, which is causing a lot of havoc. Number two, you’re limited in terms of payload because those FPV drones typically can only carry a payload of 10 pounds or less. 

So they’re great for anti-personnel or maybe even anti vehicle, but you’re not going to use them to blow up say a battleship. But if you know what you’re doing you can target strategic pieces of ship, strategic pieces of refineries or ports and cause a lot of havoc in a way that the Russians haven’t yet to invent a technology to cope with, except for maybe a net that only gets you so far. 

Third, and for the war, the moment. Most importantly, there’s a lot of naval frontage in play. If you remember from the early phases of the war, the Russians invaded from the east and the south, with about 100,000 people moving north from Crimea to the Kherson area and east from the territories that the Russians had captured in the last war back in 2014, all the way to the Dnieper River. 

And that whole southern and eastern front is in place to a certain degree. Well, with these naval drones, the Ukrainians can now do whatever they want around Crimea and can go up the Dnieper River and hit the Russians in any number of spots without having to first preposition forces, much less drone pilots that can use long range transmission or even satellite communications to control the naval drone and then tether that through the existing telemetry out through the fiber optic cables to the first person drones. 

So the degree to which the Ukrainians just surprise assault really, anything at this point is only limited by the number of drones that they can have on the water. Now, this does change the nature of the sea babies and things like them, because now they’re becoming drone carriers as opposed to just suicide drones. That will probably trigger a new evolution in the manufacture, because right now they’re designed to be one way and that’s it. 

But from an engineering point of view, that is actually a very, very simple problem. Taking a suicide drone, taking the explosive off of giving it more fuel, more range capacity, and then ultimately more of these canisters. That’s something we’re probably going to see within a month or two. I could almost do that in my garage, and I’m kind of a technical invalid when it comes to things like that. 

Big shifts in that space. That’s it for now.

The Future of Drone Tech: Mid-Range Drones

Photo of a military drone

The battlefield of the Ukraine War continues to be transformed by drone innovations. The latest is the (affordable and scalable) modification of existing drones to travel farther and independently identify and strike moving targets.

This has eliminated the notion of a safe rear area, as these drones can strike anywhere and anything. This makes moving troops, fuel, and ammunition much riskier for the Russians. If Ukraine can continue to produce these modified drones at this rate, we’re looking at a much different battlefield in just a few months.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Italy, Rome. This is the let’s try column there. And we are in the forno de, which I again doubtfully mispronounced. Anyway, continuing with our open ended drone series, there’s a couple of things that are going on in Ukraine that are fundamental breaks with previous military technology in the mid-range drone category, so that’s things that are free flowing roughly 10km to 200km. 

So not quite mid-range, not quite short range somewhere in between. Basically you’ve got a two step process. Step one is you have a pilot that kind of directs a drone to an area. And step two, the drone has the capacity with just a little bit of memory and a little bit of optics to kind of look around and pick a target and zoom in on it. 

This is already a significant step up from just what the Ukrainians were using two months ago, because it can actually target moving targets now, speed, which this is unraveling and shifting is really crazy. Anyway, what this means is that the concept of a front line from a logistical point of view, is basically collapsed. Used to be that the front line was a real danger zone, where if you were within 20km of it, then the fiber optic drones and the first person drones could target anything and do so in the hundreds of drones per day. 

Further back, you’d have things like the American app cams or advanced artillery that maybe came from the French. That would push back the Russians to force logistical support into an area that was more than a couple hundred kilometers from the front, so they’d be out of range, because we all remember from two years ago when the cams arrived in Ukraine. 

Then all of a sudden, all of these ammo dumps and airfields started blowing up. So the Russians just moved everything back. Well, with these new pieces of equipment, it’s not individual strikes, it’s not dozens of strikes. It’s hundreds of strikes every day. And they’re targeting everything from individual troops to trucks, which means that the entire logistical tail, not just the depots, the entire logistical tail going all the way back from the front line to wherever the supplies are, is now under threat every day from every angle. 

And we’re seeing a de facto collapse and the Russians capacity to even man the area. And so what we’ve seen in the last is 3 or 4 weeks is significant Ukrainian gains in any number of parts of the front, because the Russians can’t bring troops forward, they can’t bring fuel for they can’t bring ammo forward. And if they try, the Ukrainians just dice them up. 

So nobody has superiority in this area. But instead of having this shadow zone of 10 to 20km around the front, it’s now stretching halfway to Moscow. And in that sort of environment, the Russians don’t have a strategy, can’t have a strategy, because they’ve always relied on strategic depth to protect them. But that doesn’t work when you can have a free ranging weapon system that’s in the hundreds and very soon in the thousands that’s going over this entire zone, and anything that’s on a road or train is suddenly a target. 

This single point advantage isn’t going to last forever. Eventually, countermeasures will be developed, but it’s much more difficult for the Russians to do that than for the Ukrainians. But we’re going to save that topic for another day. Oh, one more thing. It raises the question of how financially viable this is long term for the Ukrainians. And the short answer is extremely. 

These are not fundamentally new drones. These are modifications made to existing proven models like the Seth or the dart, for example. Really, all you need to do is plug in a small processor and a moderately sized memory chip, nothing that was considered cutting edge in the last 15 years, so nothing’s under export control are really inexpensive. Total modifications, probably top out, about $100 per drone and in some models no more than 15. 

So yeah, they can do this in the tens of thousands per month. No problem at all. 

The Future of Drone Tech: Long-Range Strikes

Drone firing a missile

Ukraine has ramped up its long-range drone program, allowing it to strike targets up to 1,800 kilometers away. So, what does this mean for Russia and its oil?

With Ukraine able to strike targets well into Western Russia, energy infrastructure is increasingly vulnerable. Thanks to the recent surge of foreign financial support rushing into Ukraine, drone production has ramped up. Russia might be able to shut down and restart the southern oil fields, but any fields shut down in the permafrost would take years or even decades to repair and restart.

So, expect Russian transport and export capacity to continue to drop, especially if these longer-range strikes continue throughout the summer months.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter here still in Rome, approaching all the forums, continuing our open ended series about the changes of military technology. Now we’re going to deal with longer range drone system things with an excess of 300km. The Ukrainians have launched a series of systems over the course of the last roughly ten weeks that have increased their range upwards of 1800 kilometers total. 

So for those of you in metric, that’s roughly 900 to 1000 miles. And Moscow was only about 300, 350 miles from the front line. This means that Ukrainians can relatively reliably strike anything that is west of the Urals at this point, and even a few things opposite the URLs, if they really push it. These things are carrying warheads that are typically in excess of 100 pounds. 

They’re using them to heavily target not so much military assets directly, but infrastructure related to energy production and transport, pumping stations, refineries, ports, that sort of thing. Now, pre-war, the Russians exported about, oh, 2.5 million barrels per day of oil and about another million and a half barrels per day of refined product that is now facing some sphere problems. 

It’s really hard to give you accurate numbers because everything is changing day by day, and the Russians aren’t just sitting there. They’re repairing things as they go. So let’s talk about the technology and then talk about the impact. So first the technology, unlike the modified short to medium range drones where it’s just a matter, you know, just a matter of putting a couple new pieces of semiconductor to give it a limited decision making capability. 

This is a range issue. And so with the range issue, Ukrainians are limited by their industrial base, which they’re rapidly building out. We’ve had the number of drones per day in use, roughly Quinn Tipple over the course of the last ten weeks, and there’s no reason to expect that to slow. If anything, it’s probably going to accelerate. One of the things to keep in mind is because of the Iraq war and America’s inability to provide adequate air defense and missile defense to the Arab states, as we now have a cavalcade of countries in the Middle East and Europe that are providing funding for the Ukrainians to expand their industrial plant all over the place, and that’s giving them cash that is necessary to expand industrial plant and build out at home. Keep in mind that there are so many startups in Ukraine that are providing drone technology now that the Ukrainians actually ran out of money to fund them all. That’s not a problem anymore. So everybody is in the process of spinning up, and by the time we get to mid-summer, we’re probably going to be seeing daily strikes in dozens, if not hundreds of these things across the length and breadth of Russia regularly, every single day, most likely in terms of impact. 

It’s hard to get firm numbers on this because everything is a moving target. But oh yeah, fun little fact. The Romans had so much marble they used it for like, dust boards. Anyway, what this means is that we’ve had over 80 discrete energy targets across Russia come under sustained attack, sometimes getting hit three and four times a week. 

Major ports have gone offline and back. Online tanks are gone, pumping stations getting damaged. Even direct pipe strikes probably. There’s really no average here. But I would say on average, we’re looking at an overall reduction of somewhere between 1.5 and 2.5 million barrels per day of a combined transport and pumping and port capacity, and that gets well into the danger zone for the Russian system. 

The Russian oil complex kind of has two big phases down in the southern provinces. You can have some older fields that are basically supplied by water injection, and those you can run on reduced capacity or even shut them down safely and bring them back later. But collectively, that’s only about one to maybe 1.2 million barrels per day. Everything else is in permafrost territory, and because of heating and cooling problems, you can’t maintain a steady temperature at the production site at the bottom of the wellbore. 

In the pipelines and the pumping stations, everything cracks apart. Or in the case of some things, wax congealed in it. And then you have to replace the infrastructure completely. We’re now on the point where that has to be shut down, at least in part, and that stuff cannot be restarted on anything less than a multi year time frame. 

The last time this stuff all got shut down, it was in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, and it took the Russians 20 years to bring it back up to snuff like they had it during the Soviet period. So we are now already today at the beginning of the end of Russia, as a country that can even export petroleum or petroleum products at all to its west. 

And if you keep up this crescendo of attacks throughout the summer, by the end of the year, the Russians really won’t be an oil power in the western provinces at all. And that includes most of the western and northwestern Siberian fields as well. That’ll just leave what is out on the east side of the Urals, which is a separate infrastructure. 

But at the rate the Ukrainians are going as entirely possible, that that may be in range by the end of summer anyway. So from a war point of view, this is how Russia pays for everything. All is the single largest inflow point for the Russian state budget, which funds. Of course, the military natural gas is kind of like the kicker on the side, but most of the natural gas, a lot of the natural gas has already been shut in because it can’t be redirected in the way that liquid oil can be. 

So the Ukrainians haven’t felt the need to go after it. They’ll probably find some reasons in the next few months, as energy targets become harder to find, because there just won’t be all that many left. And that’s Palatine Hill behind me. That’s one of the original seven cities of Roman, where most of the rich folk lived during the High Imperial period. 

One more detail. We already have reports from several Russian oil officials talking about shut ins in places like Tatar, Saturn and Bashkir stand, which is where the water recovery basically pumped down. Water increased well pressure, and the oil comes up and you skim the oil off the top, where that’s already been shut down by a significant margin, at least in the high hundreds of thousands of barrels. 

But we’re also getting that’s the stuff you can turn back on. We’re also getting some reports of things further north, where we were getting some panicked reports about wells that will never come back on at all. So we’re already well into this, and the Ukrainians aren’t letting up, if anything. Intensification over the summer.

Taking Naval Options Away from China

A Chinese Naval chip in harbor

There were some recent tests in the Philippines involving the Japanese Type-88 anti-ship missile system and the U.S. Typhon launcher. These truck-mounted systems can move throughout the islands, rather than relying on fixed bases.

Deploying these systems across the first island chain would limit China’s naval access to the wider Pacific. We’re also seeing Japan step into a new era of defense policy, reflected by a broader regional effort to contain Chinese naval power.

Transcript

Hey all. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Queta in Umbria in Italy today. We’re talking about a couple of events that happened in the Asian rim in the Philippines specifically last week. We had two test fires of weapon systems. First, the Japanese launch something called a type 88 anti-ship missile. And the United States launched something from what’s called a typhoon. 

Excuse me, typhoon launcher, which is basically a tomahawk, those long range cruise missiles the US is famous or infamous for, based on whether you’re target or not. Both of them launched from the Philippines. Both of these are truck mounted systems. The Chinese threw a bit of a shit fit, but there’s really not a lot they can do about them. 

The issue is two things. Number one, the first island chain, which is the line of islands including Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Indonesia, they’re all at least nominal US allies. But more to the point, they block the Chinese from accessing the wider world unless these nations allow it. What are the things that has held up during the Cold War? 

The post-Cold War era is that the United States has not reinforced the first island chain, because during the Cold War, China was an ally against the Soviet Union. And it’s only in the last couple of decades that that has really changed in the last few years, where they’ve become outright hostile, which means that we are now in the early stages of fortifying the island chain, not just the United States, but the countries in question. 

Because if you can install weapons systems that can hit ships, then the Chinese are permanently locked into the lake that is the west side of the the island chain. And now that is happening. Second, like I say, we have three things. Second, the weapon systems involved are truck launched. So you don’t even need a fixed installation. The Typhon Tomahawk launcher, you know, has the range of a normal tomahawk, which can be pushing 1500 miles. 

And the type 88 is shorter. It’s actually an older system that only has a rate of about 100 miles. But they have newer systems that they haven’t just put into place in the area right now. But you take the Philippines, which is one of the most erratic, probably the best word countries in the region with the lowest military capability. 

You have a bunch of trucks running around, some driven by the Japanese, some driven by US Marines, and all of a sudden everything within several hundred miles of the archipelago is completely no go for Chinese vessels. And that’s before you consider more capable states such as, say, Taiwan. So these two weapon systems are basically enough to completely castrate the entire Chinese military position. 

So of course the Chinese are kind of losing their minds. Third thing, this is the first time that Japan has tested an offensive weapon system outside of home islands since World War two. 

Japanese were forced by the United States in the aftermath of the war to have permanent neutrality, and that is now rapidly eroding away. And if you take a country that has the second most capable navy in the planet, you allow them to start stationing military assets outside of their country. And it doesn’t matter, really, what the relationship with the United States happens to be. The Chinese aren’t going anywhere. So we’ve now had a very, very clear example of what can happen with these new systems or even old systems. 

Something to keep in mind. There are a number of countries in the world that, operating all by themselves, that have the ability to completely destroy the Chinese economy because they can interfere with any sort of corporate shipping. China is the most dependent country in the world on globalization because they import a lot of their food, they import the inputs they need to grow their own food. 

They import the raw materials they need to make their manufactured goods, and then they have to export the manufactured goods to pay for it all. You interrupt the sea lanes and it all falls apart. So Japan and the United States obviously have the direct naval power to do that whenever they want to. Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia do, because they control the straits that allow the Chinese access Middle Eastern crude and European end markets. 

The Australians have weapon systems that can reach that entire zone as well. And now the freaking Philippines has a bunch of dudes running around on trucks that are getting weapons systems so that they can do it to the degree to which the Chinese are in a box here is immense. So it really doesn’t matter from my point of view, what happens with demographics or relations with the United States or globalization in general? 

Every time you look at this from a fresh angle, the Chinese are screwed and the state media really realizes that, which is why they’re having such an outrage rejection of what’s going on right now. And the Japanese side, this is barely even talked about. They’re just kind of sneaking in the background. Anyway, that’s it for me for today. Until next time.