The Art of Trump’s Trade Deal

Official White House Portrait of Trump for 2025

Robert Lighthizer, the former US Trade Representative during Trump’s first term, declined to return for a second term? But why?

Well, Lighthizer had all the credentials and strategy, but he saw the s*** storm he was about to walk into. Between the federal bureaucracy breakdown, the hollowed-out trade office, and the pure chaos of navigating hundreds of Trump’s trade deals at once, it wouldn’t take a genius to know to sit this one out.

The current USTR, Jamison Greer, walked into this storm on his first day and, to no fault of his own, hasn’t made any meaningful trade progress. Frankly, I’m not holding my breath for any new deals.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here, taking a question from the Patreon page today. Specifically, it’s about Robert Lighthizer, who was the trade representative under the first Trump administration, but who declined to accept a trade role in the second. The question is, if Lighthizer had come in with his general strategy of isolating China been successful. For those of you who don’t remember, Lighthizer has been an old hand in American trade law going back 40 years, and has always approached it from a far more bare knuckle approach than some of the more, shall we say, genteel negotiators. 

He was really, really, brass tacks when it came to say, the Plaza Accords during the Reagan administration or trade deals with the Japanese. This time around, his general approach was to strike meaningful trade deals with all of America’s allies first, and then basically bring everybody together into a solid block to force concessions out of the Chinese. 

Now, do I think that would have been a better strategy than what the Trump administration is doing, which is basically picking a trade fight with everyone at the same time? Well, yeah, but there’s really no point in crying over spilled milk because Lighthizer did not take the job. Now the question is why not? And what does that mean for the trade authority? 

Now Robert Lighthizer is getting up there. He’s, I believe early, late 60s, early 70s. Now, I’m really not sure. Anyway. It’s not spring chicken. He’s been doing this since the Reagan administration. So it makes sense that he wouldn’t want to work Washington hours for another four years. But more importantly is the structure of what is happening at the federal government and how that limits what the trade representative can do. 

Two things here. Number one, when Trump came in, he cleared out the entire upper echelon of senior civil servants. Only about 5% of the men have been replaced. Normally when a president comes in, they just take out the top layer and leave all the people with the institutional knowledge. But Trump just fired everybody. And so all of the federal bureaucracy is basically having a problem functioning because the upper middle and upper management are simply empty. 

So there’s no one to carry out Trump’s orders. He’s got some people at the top with the secretaries and maybe a few undersecretaries. And that’s just it. And all of those people are political appointees that are basically new to the industries. So there’s no one to make sure that the president’s orders can be followed. Problem one. Problem two. 

It’s worse for the U.S. Trade Representative Office. Joe Biden was only the second president in recent American history to negotiate no new trade deals. And his trade representative, Katherine Tai, was good at her job. But she focused on enforcing the previously negotiated deals and having a bunch of memorandums of understanding. So during the four years of the Biden administration, the USTR office was slimmed down considerably. 

And now under Trump two, it has not been re expanded. So not only is the USTR missing its upper leadership, it’s missing a lot of the rank and file people who would normally negotiate trade deals. So that’s number two. Number three trade deals. They take a lot of time. There’s a lot of details. The fastest trade deal the United States has ever negotiated was with Singapore. 

That took ten months. And that’s because Singapore is a city state. It doesn’t have an agricultural sector. So there weren’t a lot of sensitive topics that really need to be ironed out. Most trade deals take in excess of three years. Some of them take significantly longer. And so if you were Robert Lighthizer and you’re looking at this and you realize you’re going to have no staff, no assistants, no deputies, and the Trump administration is going to want you to negotiate 200 trade deals at the same time. 

He was like, I’ll pass. Thanks. the person who is the USTR now is basically a former protege of Robert Lighthizer. His name is Jamison Greer. He was actually served in USTR during Trump one as Bob Lighthizer chief of staff. The guy is far from incompetent. 

He’s pretty good at what he does from my point of view. But he has those three problems. He has no deputies. He has no staff. And he’s expected to negotiate 200 trade deals at the same time. So the end result is we’re not getting anything. Of the two deals that have been agreed to so far, the two deals, the first one is with the Brits, where they basically they were planning on buying a number of Boeing jets over the next eight years. 

So they cut that order in half, said announced it. And Trump’s like it’s a deal. And that’s all that happened. And with the Chinese deal all it was was an agreement to talk. Of course there’s no one in Washington to speak with. Because there’s no staff. So, we’re kind of stalled. And I don’t blame Lighthizer for saying pass on this one.

Finally, a Productive NATO Summit

Flag of NATO

I don’t know what was in the water at the latest NATO summit, but something got Trump to be cooperative. Perhaps it had something to do with Mark Rutte greasing his wheels.

Mark Rutte, the former Dutch PM, wasn’t just working his magic on Trump, he secured buy-in from several other leaders with his flattery and strategic diplomacy. This helped pre-summit defense spending agreements get formalized and saw countries like Germany step into a leadership role.

Even if all that comes from the summit is that the US stays (minimally) committed to NATO and Europe continues to ramp up defense, Russia is in trouble. The balance of power in this region is shifting, and should Europe continue navigating this diplomacy game effectively, the Russian position gets muddy quickly.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey, Peter Zeihan here. Company from Colorado. And today we’re going to do a bit of a recap on the recent NATO summit in Europe. Donald Trump went there and everyone was concerned that it was going to be a blow up, like most of his international, events. And it was not, all of the pre-summit agreements that have been made on defense spending increases were basically codified. 

Basically everyone in NATO has agreed to double or triple the defense spending, bringing it up to a new threshold of 5% of GDP, up from the old number of 2% of GDP, with the Germans, who have long been one of the biggest laggards. Basically, picking up the baton and running with the topics, saying that we know that a war with Russia is coming in one way or another. 

We need to prepare, with Trump specifically, in past NATO’s summits, he’s basically blown up the alliance and said he doesn’t plan to defend anyone. And this time, I don’t mean to suggest thatTrump wasn’t on display. I mean, let’s not get crazy here. But most of the discussion about it was how he came as a friend and he left as a better friend. 

The person who was singularly responsible for everything going so well as former Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. Who? Sorry, I’m not Dutch. Can’t roll my eyes. He was prime minister basically, since, what, 2010? Like, like from back when Biden was merely old and now is the secretary general of NATO. And he has spent the last few months courting not just Donald Trump, but all of the leaders of the alliance to get them to preemptively agree to this sort of defense increase. 

And while Trump was in town and in the lead up, he went out of his way to basically cozy up to Trump, saying all kinds of wonderful things about how nice he was and how powerful he was, and how decisive he was and how good his hair was and, how sometimes daddy has to be strong. 

During a European leader talk about the American president as a daddy, was a little disturbing, but whatever. Basically, the Europeans, ten years in are finally figuring out how to manage Donald Trump. You don’t do it with honesty. You don’t treat him like a friend. You don’t treat him like an ally. You stroke his ego, you kiss his ass, you slob as knob. 

You tell him whatever he wants to hear, and then you get your way. The Chinese leader XI Jinping figured this out years ago. Vladimir Putin of Russia figured out years ago. And this time around, an increasing number of Europeans are figuring it out as well. Italian Prime Minister Meloni is probably the first one that really got it going. 

And if you do that, Trump says wonderful things about you and he turns his attention somewhere else. Clearly the Canadians have not figured that out yet. 

Rutha was famous for this, dur for the last 15 years in European politics, for being the marriage counselor to make it all work. The Netherlands sits in a spot equidistant between London, Berlin and Paris. And while it is actually one of Europe’s major countries, it’s like the seventh most populous country. 

It’s a small chunk of territory that is in a very invasion prone zone. And so the Dutch have always had to figure out how to manage all the neighbors around them. And they do so by being efficient and easy to work with and very, very direct. So if you’re German or French or British and you don’t want to deal with the Germans or the French or the British, you go through the Dutch and they’re kind of the middleman and Rita specifically has been very, very good at being the marriage counselor among these three countries and helping them reach agreement before then going to the broader European Union and 

selling whatever the deal happens to be. Doesn’t mean that the Dutch always get their way. Doesn’t mean that the Germans always get their way. But there’s always made sure. Ruto has always made sure that the conversation continues on at multiple levels, so that it doesn’t have a chance to evolve into a crisis. And if there’s one thing we’ve learned about the American press that he loves a good crisis, and so he really deserves credit for kind of lassoing this all together because the Europeans are not fans of Trump. 

Trump is not fans of the European. And lo and behold, we’ve just had an amazingly successful summit. 

What this means for the Alliance. If all that happens with the United States is a continuing verbal commitment to defend Europe in time of a war with the Russians, if we can hold that level of commitment, even if the rhetoric goes a little off the rails time to time, then the Russians are really in a pickle. 

Because if the Europeans double and triple the defense spending, if the Ukrainians keep pushing for a completely new type of warfare with drones, and if you start to marry Western economic strength to those new technologies, then the Russians aren’t simply outnumbered and outgunned, but they’re outclassed now. A lot can go on between now and then, and the influence of the Russian state and intelligence operations within the white House remains strong and is still growing. 

But if the Europeans have figured out how to play the game two, then it’s a different game.

The Revolution in Military Affairs: Ditching Artillery

Military vehicle shooting artillery

Next up in our series on the changes in military tech, we’re looking at artillery.

Gone are the days of endless artillery barrages. The Russians have relied on this tactic for years, but drones and acoustic detection are changing that. When a cheap drone is capable of quickly spotting, targeting, and eliminating artillery, something clearly needs to change. And no, a “shoot and scoot” strategy isn’t sustainable.

There’s still a case to be made for artillery, but it is quickly waning. In future conflicts, new systems that prioritize speed, precision, and decentralization will be essential.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Okay. Peter Zeihan coming to you from Arches. We’re continuing the Revolution military affairs series, and today we’re going to talk about artillery. Artillery has been one of the three most important military breakthroughs of the last couple of centuries because it allows, a force to assault another force from literally miles away. The artillery that the Russians, for example, areas in Ukraine generally has a range, between 10 and 20 miles based on what piece of hardware they’re using. 

But you throw drones into the mix where a single first person pilot a drone costs less than an artillery shell. You change the math. So I am no artillery expert here. And the technology is changed very quickly. So the purposes of today’s video is basically just to talk out loud through what we’ve seen and where it might lead. 

Countries that rely on artillery really do fire on it. The joke in the military is that Russia is an artillery force. It just happens to have some tanks. Hold on. 

Okay. Where were we? Right. Russia. So in the Napoleonic Wars, France, which had the most technologically advanced military at the moment, invaded Russia, made it all the way to Moscow. And the Russians kind of got their asses handed to them. And if it wasn’t for some very stubborn defense and Partizan attacks, and especially a very, very rough winter, Moscow probably would have fallen. 

And the Russian lesson from that was that they needed to do an upgrade for their military. However, this is a country that was basically entirely serfs. There were no technical skills among the population. They didn’t have much of a intelligentsia from a technical point of view. And so they settled on artillery because aside from the guy who was like pointing and aiming, everything else was just kind of like looking around. 

And that Russian serfs could do and that the Russian, Crown would trust them with. Because artillery is really not the best weaponry for. So, you know, taking on Red square. Anyway, so they invested heavily in that and that is basically dominated Russian and then Soviet military planning ever since. Very low value added soldier base and just focus on obliterating anything in front of you from miles away. And don’t advance until there’s nothing but rubble. 

So the problem the Russians are facing now is that it’s not that the artillery is irrelevant. It’s just it’s incredibly vulnerable. And they basically have to do something that called shoot and scoot, because between, acoustic detection and radar, they really can only get one shot off before counter battery fire starts. 

The Ukrainians, in order to detect drones coming in, basically built an acoustic detection system around the perimeter of the country and all over the front lines so that as soon as the drones are coming in, they can translate the sounds for what kind of drones are coming on, what vectors, so they know what air defense to activate. 

It works for us as artillery too. So it used to be that once an artillery shot fell, you’d use radar to basically track it back and then shoot back. But now with the acoustics, they can figure out when it fires and so the kind of battery fire can actually happen before the shell is even hit. So artillery an order of magnitude less useful than it used to be. 

So the Ukrainians and the Russians are discovering that what they were trained on during the Soviet periods is no longer how war works, because the technology has left the artillery piece behind for the most part. This won’t necessarily be true everywhere. When you consider things like the Paladin system, for example, that the US has, not only is it self mobile, but it can fire multiple shots at different angles and then hit the same target at the same time. 

It’s kind of cool, mobile being the key thing there. But for most artillery, you know, it’s in the past, it’s no longer cost effective for what it can do. Which brings us to a different sort of problem. So a big attraction, for artillery, for the Russians. Was that anyone, any idiot, any village idiot could operate? 

Most of it because it’s just lugging stuff from point to point with drones. It’s first person shooter. You basically have to fly it manually and direct it, and that’s all. Well and good. And that doesn’t require a huge amount of skill either. Outside of, you know, the Tendo, the problem is in manufacturing, you can produce, artillery shells and artillery back in your industrial plant and then send to the front line. 

And you need a limited source because, you only make a few of the tubes and you make a lot of ammo. Well, with drones, the Russians and Ukrainians are both using thousands of these things a day. So it’s a very different workforce. It is much more technically skilled. It needs to be an a lot larger number. In Ukraine, which was the heart of the old aerospace industry back during Soviet times, this has not been too heavy of a pull. 

And based on whose numbers you’re using, the Ukrainians have gone from producing about 5 to 20% of the parts for their drones at home to now 70 to 90% based on the style. The Russians are nowhere near that good, because the Russians don’t have anywhere near that sort of technical skill within the country. And most of the people with those skills left, either in the 1990s or the 2000 or more recently to avoid the draft. 

So they’re bringing in talent and technical skill from places like Iran and North Korea, and especially China, where you can use the Chinese industrial plant to produce the parts that then flow into Russia and then make it to the front line. Anyway, bottom line of all of this is this is very much a work in progress. We’re only three years into the war. 

have a secondary power. Russia fighting a tertiary power, Ukraine. And the rules are changing every week, every month. So to think that we have a firm idea of how this is going to play out is silly, but to think that the weapon systems that we’re used to seeing on the battlefield are the weapons of the future is also silly.

The Revolution in Military Affairs: USS Nimitz

The aircraft carrier USS Nimitz. Photo from Wikimedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Nimitz#/media/File:USS_Nimitz_(CVN-68).jpg

This video was recorded back in April of this year, hence the snow.

The Nimitz is making its final voyage (with a recent detour to the Middle East), before it’s set to be decommissioned and replaced by the more advanced Ford-class carriers. However, a shiny new toy isn’t enough for the US to maintain global influence.

While these massive carriers are a significant component of US power projection, the true strategic advantage lies in the global alliance network. This network provides basing rights all around the world, enabling the US to get around quickly and affordably. If the US continues this current trajectory, the logistical backbone of US power projection would go limp.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here coming to you from snowy Colorado. And today we’re going to talk about a major change that is going to come to the U.S. armed forces and most notably the Navy in the years to come. It all has to do with the USS Nimitz, which was the first of the Nimitz class, a super carriers, of which ultimately we have ten and have been the backbone of American military power projecting throughout the world for really since the 1960s. 

But it’s been a hot minute, Anyway, at last, Bremerton, Washington, on the 28th of March for what is intended to be its last sail. The Nimitz are being replaced by a new carrier class, the Ford class, which are larger, can carry more, planes, can launch and recover them faster. All that jazz? Definitely superior platform. 

Not that the Nimitz is anything to sneeze at. Anyway, the whole idea is these things have been in service for well over a half a century, and it’s time to start taking them out of circulation. As technologies change, and we can move to a military force that is more lethal and faster, and that is not going to happen. 

One of the things that people forget when they start talking about how we don’t need this country or that country is arguing the single greatest advantage that the United States has right now is its alliance network, and not necessarily because in a fight, we get to take over their armies and navies and control them ourselves, although we do have that, and that is a big deal. 

But it’s basing rights. The United States is one country, and part of our security comes from the fact that we have oceans between us and everyone else. But that means if we want to influence things somewhere outside of North America, we have to get there first. And that means a long logistical chain linking up, not just soldiers and sailors and ships, but tanks and men and ammunition and supplies and diesel all around the world. 

And with the basing network that we have right now, there are very, very few spots on the planet that we can’t reach in a very short period of time with a lot of firepower, but if the United States leaves NATO like it sounds like it’s going to if the U.S. breaks the alliances with the Japanese and the Koreans, which it looks like it’s going to, then America alone has a very different force posture. 

And one in which it can’t get much of anywhere. So what we’re going to see is, on a very large scale, the recreation of a tactic that the United States use during the early months on the war on terror. We needed to get to Afghanistan, but we didn’t trust the Russians and we didn’t trust the Pakistanis. So what we ended up having to do is take one of our older carriers, the USS Kittyhawk, and park it off the Pakistani coast and use it as a mobile base. 

It was by far the most expensive way we could have possibly done it. But in the early days after nine over 11, it was considered worth the cost. Well, with the direction that the Trump administration’s foreign policy is taking us now, any time we want to deploy anywhere, we’re going to have to do something like that. And that easily cost ten times as much as simply having an ally with a patch of ground that we can squat on. 

When you lose your alliances, you lose the ability to project power cheaply. And yes, we spend a lot on our military, but it’s nothing compared to the budget line. Items were going to be seen in the future, as we have to take things like the Nimitz and repurpose them from being some of the world’s best warfighting assets and basically being floating rafts.

The US Strikes Iran’s Nuclear Facilities

United States Air Force posted rare photos of a GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker buster bomb being transported at Whiteman Air Force Base. Photo by wikimedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_strikes_on_Iranian_nuclear_sites#/media/File:Deleted_GBU-57_MOP_photo_(2).jpg

Over the weekend, the US launched a major airstrike on Iran, targeting critical nuclear sites. We don’t know the extent of the damage as of yet.

While the US strike will cause setbacks in Iran’s nuclear program, it didn’t destroy everything. So, we’ll have to wait and see if Iran rebuilds or escalates through other avenues.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here comes to you from Colorado. This video is a little late getting to you, because I was hoping we were to get some more information on what happened when the United States dropped some bunker buster bombs on Iran over the weekend, but it does not seem like anything has clarified. So I’ll give you an idea of what’s happened and now what we’re waiting for. 

So, number one, United States dropped a couple dozen major bombs on the Iranian nuclear facilities, specifically a place called Fordo, which is basically under a mountain, Natanz, which is where they do a lot of their centrifuge work to enrich uranium. Some of which of the facilities are heavily reinforced and underground and is from, which is a facility where they do most of the machining and the physical construction. 

The first two sites got hit with by bunker busters, most notably Fordo, where as it’s from was primarily hit by Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from submarines in the Persian Gulf. We do not have damage assessments from any of these places, which is part of the reason that I was kind of waiting. And we’re probably not going to get anytime soon. 

Donald Trump has said, of course, at every facility, the United States has been blown up and to smithereens, and there’s no danger whatsoever. The Joint Chiefs are like, no, we really don’t know. And until somebody does an inspection, there’s no way to know. The truth, obviously, is closer to the, the general position than Trump’s. But what’s new there? 

Iran doesn’t have a conventional military. They can’t reach out and touch someone with tanks and planes in the way that you might expect a country of 80 million people to do, their military is designed to occupy their own populations. 

It’s a civil patrol force. They have normally reached out to touch people through sectarian groups that get hopped up on weapons and drugs and basically send out to cause carnage, groups like Hezbollah, for example. But groups like Hezbollah have basically been neutered. The Gazans are in no shape to do anything. And even if they were, you know, Americans are no, we’re close to them. 

And the U.S. military footprint in the region is down to less than a quarter of what it was at its peak and continues to trend down. So the the more normal military option is really off the table and they’re more normal paramilitary operation is off the table. And that just leaves things like terror attacks, for example, dirty bombs, which might work, but they take time to put together and time to ship in into place and they can be intercepted. 

And so it could be a big splash, but then it would be an attack on, say, the United States, which United States would definitely respond with something more than some bunker busters. Okay. What do we know? Or what are we waiting for? The bunker busters, the GBU 57. I think that’s the acronym. Anyway, this is the first time the United States has ever used them against an actual target as opposed to testing. 

And we dropped 20 for the suckers. These are the 30,000 pound bombs. If anything can blow up a place like Fordo, it’s probably these guys. But again, it’s the first time we’ve ever used them. We don’t know. So in many ways, this is a test case for the United States, as well as a question for Iranian actions. 

And what everyone oh my God, what everyone wants to talk about is whether this is going to make it more likely be a deal or less likely. Folks, there is never going to be a deal. Iran has never signed and implemented a security deal with anyone. In fact, the only thing that even comes close is the 1987 ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War, which was never turned into a peace agreement. 

They haven’t signed a deal with Iraq or with Turkey or with Pakistan or with anyone. We’ve got some cooperation, deals on economics and say nuclear sharing with the Russians and the Chinese, and that’s about it. So if you’re obsessed with a deal on oil or technology or security, you just waste your time obsessing about something else. This is not how Persian society works. 

I would love to be wrong, but I’ve been right since 1979, when I was five. Oh my God. Oh. Anyway, so this is what a holding pattern in the Middle East looks like. People throw weapons at one another, things explode. But we’re waiting for someone to fundamentally change the nature of the relationship. And I just don’t see that happening on the Iranian side anytime soon. 

Oh, one more thing. The Israelis have proven that while they can take out, Iran’s air defense, and while they can’t operate with impunity above Iranian skies, they lack the deep strike capability that is necessary to take out something like the Iranian nuclear program. Now. So now it’s an open question whether the United States lacks that capacity, and not just because of the size of the bombs. 

The Iranians have been preparing in some form, for this sort of attack for decades, and that means that while these are the three most important sites that the Iranians have, they have dozens of others now, collectively, they’re not as important as these three. So while this undoubtedly has set setback, that it because the program quite a bit it’s certainly not over. 

And the question now is whether the Iranians try to spin the paramilitary forces back up, spin their nuclear system back up, or try something new. We’re not going to learn that in the next two days.

The Revolution in Military Affairs: Naval Advances

Photo of a US Naval Carrier

Trying to predict the long-term future of naval warfare may be futile, but we can examine some of the weapon systems emerging in current conflicts.

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that naval vessels are becoming expensive floating targets. From jet skis packed with explosives to other low-cost drones, the closer a ship gets to shore, the easier and cheaper it becomes to destroy. However, when naval assets remain offshore, they lose much of their tactical effectiveness.

Two technologies will be at the forefront of this shift: detection and jamming. Identifying threats through drones, satellites, and radar systems will be essential. And the ability to operate at extended ranges with greater flexibility will define the future of naval power. There’s still much to figure out, but one thing is becoming clear—the era of close-shore naval operations is coming to an end.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Arches National Park in Utah. And today we’re doing another episode of our Future of Military Technology series. Basically, we’ve had a series of breakthroughs in energy transmission and data processing, digitization, materials science that are basically opening up a whole new wave of military technologies that we’re inventing as we go. 

So anyone who says that they know what’s going to be the weapon system in five years, ten years, 20 years, whatever. We’re kind of making this up as we go. Don’t be too harsh. But what we know now from the Ukraine war is that. Wow. If you have a conventional military warship that requires to be within 160 miles of the coast, you’re going to lose that ship. 

Basically, if it can be seen, it can be targeted, and it can be targeted with weapons that you might not be able to detect until they’ve blown up the size of your vessel. The Ukrainians in particular, have taken motorboats and jet skis and things like them, loaded up with, equipment and with bombs and either gone out and used them to shoot down things like planes and drones, or simply ram the ships on the other side. 

And naval vessels are among the most expensive things that a military can field. So to be taken out by a jet ski is kind of embarrassing. From both, strategic and political and of course, a financial point of view. But that’s just where we are now. The question is, how far out does the range have to go before a naval vessel is safe? 

And if you’re talking about a military asset being safe because it has to be so far back that it can’t function, it’s no longer really serving the purpose anymore. At the moment in Ukraine, 100 miles is absolutely the death zone for any Russian vehicles. In addition, the Ukrainians have shown on multiple occasions that they can strike much further away sometimes, as much as 350 miles, if they know where the target is. 

And that at the moment means that we can’t be a mobile target. So they can say attack ports at places like Novorossiysk, with limited effectiveness, certainly anywhere in the Crimean peninsula. But they can’t necessarily go after a ship just because it’s out there. So the whole World War Two story of sending destroyer squadrons out to find the other guy’s aircraft carriers, that is not what we’re talking about. 

Or at least not with today’s technology. Ten years from now, who knows? Which means that in this interim period, while these technologies are still being developed, detection is going to be the big thing, and that is going to be a combination of service radar, satellite recon, in a sense, and a network of drones that can go out at distance and network their information together. 

Just keep in mind that at the moment, getting a clear signal from your operator to your drone is the limiting factor in drone warfare. One of the reasons why those fiber optic spools that can go out several miles are so important because they can’t be jammed. Put any jamming out. However, in a drone that’s a hundred miles from shore, it’s just going to fall into the sea because it can’t report anything. 

It can’t be directed, you can’t see through its eyes. So we’re going to see this kind of arms race with two technologies when it comes to naval issues. Number one detection. And that can combine the old with the new. And number two jamming. And the question is how powerful the jammer can you fit onto a naval asset? 

I don’t have an answer for that. Like I said, these are being invented as we go, but the old days of being able to do easy amphibious landings. When I say there’s nothing easy about an amphibious landing or patrolling relatively close to the coast, that those are pretty much in the past now. And any country that has naval access that is somewhat constrained. 

So basically, if your ports are within, say, 500 miles of anybody else, those ports are no longer functional for military assets in the world. We’re in. That includes every port in Russia, that includes every port in Saudi Arabia, that includes every port in China. And we need to start thinking of naval power in a completely new way. 

That is a lot more flexible and has a lot more range.

The Revolution in Military Affairs: Europe’s Future

Last time we chatted about the misalignment between American weapons systems and European needs. So, what does the future of Europe’s military strategy look like?

A growing threat from Russia means European countries are rearming, and quickly. Between Polish conscription, Swedish and German defense budgets climbing, and everyone else preparing infrastructure at home, there’s a lot happening. The big question on everyone’s mind is who/what can replace the Americans and their weapons systems?

European jets are too limited in supply, so a different direction is being pursued. Think drones and jamming systems. After seeing success in Ukraine, the rest of the Europeans are treating these options as viable way of fighting wars and defending themselves. And they’ll get some tech and help from Ukraine.

While there are still capacity and infrastructure issues that will have to be dealt with, this is solid alternative to relying on the Americans. Obviously, there’s still a need for infantry, navy, and manned aircraft, but this is the first step in shifting Europe’s military future.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re going to continue our open ended series on the future of military technology. And we’re gonna look specifically at Europe. The Americans under the Trump administration have gone from being Europe’s security guarantor to perhaps even a security threat. And everyone in Europe is trying to figure out if there’s any pieces of the relationship that can be salvaged. 

And in the meantime, laying the groundwork for whatever is next. The problem, of course, is the Europeans know in their bones that the Russians are coming for them. And if Ukraine falls within 2 to 3 years, they’re going to be fighting on European territory. So we already have the poles, which have basically reestablished something equivalent to the draft for all men of potential fighting age. 

The European Union is encouraging its people to build basically prepper kits that allow them to deal for three days on their own minimum, without any sort of government services. The Swedes are announcing a tripling of their defense budget. The Germans are doing something similar. And on and on and on. But the common refrain and all of these things are two things. 

Number one, the Russians are coming. We have to get ready now. And number two, the Americans can’t be relied upon. And that includes American equipment. Historically speaking, since World War two, about half of all European military procurement has come from American firms, and most Europeans are basically looking to drive that number down to zero as quickly as possible. This isn’t necessarily a political issue from the European issue. It’s a practicality issue. 

Legacy systems like fighter aircraft can take decades to design, years to build out the industrial plant, and then you get only a certain flow through of production per year. So if you look at the options that are in front of the Europeans right now, there’s really only four. First is the American F-35, which is by far the best in terms of overall capabilities, but it has a couple giant, flaws in it. 

Number one, it’s over $100 million in airframe and then triple that addition over the lifespan of the vehicle. So, you know, the Europeans just don’t have that kind of money. But the other options Europe has designed for themselves don’t look great. 

The best one is probably Sweden’s Gripen. They can make about 25 of those a year. That’s great for Sweden, but it’s not enough for anyone else. The French have the rifle, which they can also do about 25 a year. Again, because the French have been maintaining an independent defense. Identity for decades. That might might be enough for just France, but there’s no more for anyone else. 

And then you’ve got the Eurofighter Typhoon, which is kind of the European equivalent of the F-35, but older technology, which is of questionable use in a lot of situations. It’s designed the industrial plant is designed for 60 year, but it’s really never run more than 20. So the idea that you can spin this up is a question mark. 

But the bottom line is, you know, if you’ve only got 2 to 3 years and you’re talking about needing about a thousand airframes, there’s just no version of traditional fighter jets that works for you at all. And so the Europeans have to turn the page on military technology and try something fundamentally new. 

Consider the system in Germany, which is kind of emblematic of what’s going on and what will be going on. They’ve invested nowhere near enough for the defense industry to be self-sufficient on any stretch of the imagination. And me personally, the idea of a relatively unarmed Germany. I consider this a plus from a security point of view personally. 

Anyway, now that the Americans are proving to be a little whacko, the Germans have to do their own thing. And so they’re looking at the legacy systems that they’ve invested in. After the Ukraine war began in 2022. The Germans decided to belatedly sign up to the F-35 program that the Americans run, on the condition that the manufacturing for the German airframes actually happen in Germany. 

So the Americans basically worked with the Germans in 2023 and 2024 to build a facility that can handle the construction, but it’s not happening fast enough. I mean, the first plane began manufacture in 2024. It won’t be finished until 2026. First deliveries to the German Air Force won’t happen until 2027, and the 35 airframes that the Germans have ordered won’t be completely built into around 2040. 

And it’s only 35 frames for a country the size of Germany, that is almost pointless. But the cost of these planes is, you know, 100 to $110 million in airframe. It’s a waste of money, especially for an airframe that is not appropriate for the German strategic needs. So why did the Germans do it at all? 

Well, two reasons. First, that implicit security guarantee you get from the Americans because you know, you’re using their hardware. Trump administration has shown that that is absolutely worthless. So that logic has gone away. And second, they want to learn the technology. And so what’s going to happen in Germany is because what’s going to happen a lot of places, assuming they continue with the F-35 program at all, it’s just so that they can do it long enough to master the technologies involved. 

Then they’ll, under the contract, walk away and use those technologies to build something that they actually have a use for. And at the moment, the only thing that looks sufficiently promising to replace ground strike air power, is a combination of air defense and drones. And in that the Europeans do have a couple things going for them. First is resources. Drones cost a lot less. The most advanced rocket drone that the Ukrainians have fielded so far only costs about $1 million, compared to a $110 million for an F-35. Smaller drones that are used on the battlefield to go after tanks are an order of magnitude less. 

And the anti-personnel drones that the Ukrainians have been kicking out in the millions because two orders of magnitude less. There’s also a range advantage of the shaheen’s that come out of Iran, much less the Ukrainian and the Russian. Duplicates of those technologies have the same range as the J35, and you can send them out in the thousands if you want to, which means that any sort of forward positioned air facility is going to have to have great jamming, because if a few of those suckers get through, you’ve lost airframes that you simply can’t replace. 

So the Europeans are terrified, and rightly so, because they have to turn the page on the technological book that they’re used to, but they have to do it because there’s no way they can build out the industrial plant that is necessary to generate what they need in time. There are only a very few countries in Europe that have been able to even try this, and it’s ones that started years ago, specifically mentioning the Swedes and the French, who have always had an independent defense identity and maybe mentioned poles, who have been working with the South Koreans to build out their capacity. 

They brought in a couple hundred tanks. They’re building out construction facilities right now with the intent of starting mass production next year. But even that might not be soon enough. So it’s drones, drones, drones, drones, drums. And if you look at what the Europeans were planning on spending on the F-35 program, it was supposed to be about $80 billion for procurement and then about another 220 to 250 billion for, life cycle. 

You know, that’s a lot of money that you can put in other things. And so the Europeans are going to be doing just that. So resources probably not going to be an issue because the technologies are much more appropriate to the needs the Europeans have than what the Americans would have sold them otherwise. 

The second issue provides even some more, hope and that’s Ukraine. Ukraine, out of necessity, has become the world leader in drone based technologies. And it’s got everything from those small first person drones that have a range of a few kilometers to fiber optic drums that are immune to jamming, that have a range of upwards of 60km long range ones like their rocket drones and their version of Shaheed, which can go 600 to 1000km. 

And increasingly, we’re seeing the manufacturing being more and more components that come from Ukraine itself right now. Probably, when they started, it was like 10 to 20% of the components were made in Ukraine. Now it’s closer to 70 to 80%. The biggest challenge of the Europeans are going to have is building out the industrial plant that’s necessary to build these parts. 

Right now, a lot of this stuff just comes from the United States of China, off the shelf. They’re gonna have to build that themselves. But the Ukrainians have shown, with a relatively strict budget on a tight timetable while under air assault, you could actually make a lot happen. So if you start doing this in, say, Belgium, while you’re in a very different security situation with a lot more money, that you can throw these problems. 

But perhaps the best advantage that you have of working with Ukraine? Well, there’s two of them. Number one. This is where the things are going to be used. And every drone that is used in Ukraine against the Russians is one that doesn’t have to be used in Germany, against the Russians. That provides you a lot more flexibility. Not to mention an amazing testbed. 

But second. The Ukrainians have promised to fully share all of their drone technology with any country that is willing to put boots on the ground in Ukraine, either as part of a peace agreement, as for on training, or to fight the Russians directly, and for the Europeans who are watching the Americans exit stage right. That’s a really attractive offer. 

Now, will this work? Revolutions and military affairs caused by changes in technology. These are tricky things. You don’t know what’s going to work until it comes up against its equivalent on the other side and up against legacy systems on the other side. 

the determining technology that I have identified at the moment. And keep in mind that, you know, anyone who makes these guesses is just that. 

It’s just a guess. It’s jamming. Because if you can prevent the drones from functioning, then they really can’t target anything. Now again, the Ukrainians have become the world leaders in electronic jamming technologies and the most expensive jammer they build right now is only $5 million. That’s like 1/20. The cost of what comes out of the United States. And the Ukrainian system is far, far, far superior. 

The American systems really can’t jam drones at scale. So you basically get the Europeans looking to bankroll Ukraine’s military industry with the hope of copying and advancing as much of it as possible as part of Europe’s own defense matters. Now, this doesn’t solve everything. They’re still gonna have to figure out infantry. They’re still gonna have to decide if they’re even going to have a navy. 

And at the end of the day, there are certain missions that you need manned aircraft for that drones can’t do. But that is today. If you had told me three years ago there’d be something called a rocket drone with a range of almost a thousand miles that was basically immune to jamming. I would have laughed at you. But necessity, invention, all that good stuff. The Europeans are operating under necessities lash.

Israel’s Uncertain Endgame in Iran

Aftermath of Israeli strike at the IRIB building. Photo by wikimedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Israel_war#/media/File:Attack_on_IRIB's_Live_News_Broadcasting_Studio_07.jpg

Israel and Iran are still in the thick of an air war, which is really their only option given the several countries between them. But are things going to ramp up here soon? Is nuclear war coming? Will the US get involved?

This conflict began because the Israelis wanted to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The reality is that Iran wasn’t even close to having a fully fleshed out nuclear weapon, they’re only just at the early enrichment stage of the process. So, cross that one off the list. What else could Israel be pushing for then?

Israel might be working towards instigating a regime change in Iran. A quick history lesson will teach us that Iran is a theocracy, seated deeply in a mountainous region, with thousands of years of continuity; simply killing the Supreme Leader isn’t going to change anything. But what if the Israelis got some help?

US involvement would most likely come in the form of air support, and it would require lots of bunker-busting bombs, with no guarantee of permanent success. But again, this wouldn’t spark regime change or revolution. Is dragging the US into a deeper conflict without a clear end goal worth it?

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from sunny Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about what’s going on with the Israel Iran war, the possibility of the United States getting involved and what you should look for and why. Core issue is that Iran and Israel not only don’t border one another, there’s a couple of major countries in between them with some major population centers, most notably Iraq. 

So there is no way for these countries to get at each other in terms of land action. There are only two ways they can interact. One is basically an air war, which we have right now. And the second option would be an exchange of nukes. On that front. The Israelis have about 150 nuclear weapons, mostly tactical scale. 

And the Iranians have none. Now, one of the reasons people have been arguing for striking Iran for a long time is to prevent them from getting nukes, but keep in mind, it’s a multi-stage process. And the Iranians haven’t completed the first one. So step one is you get uranium or you spin it until you get enough weapons grade fissile material that you can then make an explosive core. 

That is the stage that the Iranians were close to completing. However, once you have enough fissile material, you then have to build some explosives that make a perfect implosion to force the nuclear reaction to happen. They don’t have those. Then you have to make an explosive device. They haven’t done that. Then you have to ruggedized that system so it can survive an attack. 

They haven’t done that. And then you have to miniaturize it. So you can either put on a bomb that a plane can carry or a missile. And they haven’t done that. So even if they had enough to make a uranium or God forbid, a plutonium core, they don’t have any of the additional steps. And at the pace that they’ve gone so far just to get to this step. 

We’re not talking about this being a reasonable threat this century. That’s piece one. So if you want to talk about regime change, you now have to shift to a different sort of conversation. Yes, Iran is a deeply authoritarian system, but it is not a dictatorship. It is not a one man rule. This is not Putin’s Russia. This is not Xi’s China. 

This is something else. This is a theocracy. So even if the Grand Ayatollah who’s in charge of everything right now, where to kick it tomorrow with either because he’s older than dust or because a bomb drops on his head that doesn’t remove the regime. There are over 15,000 mullahs that are part of the ruling class. And while regime change certainly could lead to a period of instability. 

It doesn’t fundamentally change what Iran is. And what Iran is, is Persia. Iran is a bunch of mountains. It’s not a chunk of plains like Mesopotamia. It’s not a single seaside community like Israel. It’s about 80 million people who live in mountains. 

Some version of Persia has existed almost since the beginning of the human story. It is one of the original civilizations of our species. And yes, the government has fallen from time to time, but really, we’ve only had seven regime change that are worthy of the term in 6000 years. We’re not going to see one this year. And the United States lacks the capacity to force that issue, even if it does get involved. 

Now, in this heartbeat, the United States does not have any carrier stationed in the Persian Gulf somewhere on the way. This heartbeat. We don’t have a large military force in Iraq any longer. So if we want to do a ground invasion, we’re talking about some months of prep. Hopefully none of that happens. But if the United States was to get involved in the air war version of this, keep in mind that the various aspects of the Iranian nuclear program have been preparing for an American air war for the better part of the last 40 years. 

And so it’s dispersed. It’s hardened. It’s underground. And does the United States have enough bunker busters to take them all out? Because you would probably need a couple thousand. Maybe some of these facilities would probably take several dozen all by themselves. And yes, that might remove the theoretical future of a nuclear program which is nowhere close to producing a weapon. 

But then what? Iran is still Iran. Persia is still Persia. The United States can’t send in a military force on the ground to clean up the entire clerical class. No. If there is going to be a meaningful regime change, if Iran is going to enter a fundamentally different governing age, it’s going to have to be a revolution. And you don’t sponsor a revolution with bombs dropped from the air. 

So where does that take us? I’m honestly not sure. Donald Trump’s inner circle on national security issues is small and incompetent, and being nudged by the Russians to get us directly involved in the fight as quickly and as deeply and up to our eyeballs as is possible. It is unclear, from my point of view if Donald Trump is falling for it, yet he keeps his own counsel on issues like this. 

It’s one of the few things he’s quiet on. But forces are moving into the region. So we are all going to find out probably within the next week or two.

The Revolution in Military Affairs: Weapons Sales

An F16 Fighter jet

Our series on the revolution in military affairs continues with the geopolitics of weapons sales. Why does Europe buy US weapons? And will they continue to do so?

Let’s start with the US weapons. They are designed for fighting like an American, aka fighting wars far from home against greater numbers and tough conditions. But that’s not quite what the Europeans need. The Europeans are facing off with a much closer adversary in Russia, who churns out cheap, mass-produced, short-range weapons like nobody’s business. And those Europeans should probably be taking a page out of the Russians playbook here.

So why is it that Europe continues to buy US weapons systems? Well, there’s that sweet little thing called an implicit security guarantee. You know, if you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours. And sure, having weapons that are consistent across NATO doesn’t hurt either. Oh, and those billions of dollars that have already been committed aren’t helping. But, that oh-so-important “implicit security guarantee” might be crumbling.

If Trump continues down his current path, the Europeans can’t be sure that Uncle Sam will step in if (and when) they need him. So, it’s looking like it might be time for a sourcing trip somewhere else…

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about the geopolitics of weapon sales, particularly American weapon sales or what the US builds, the sort of weapon systems that fields. And so therefore what it sells are largely driven by America’s own geographic options and constraints. The whole goal going back to the time of reconstruction 150 years ago, has been to make sure that if the United States is going to be involved in a war, that it happens over there and not over here. 

So we have a forward deployed military, wherever possible, that tries to keep potential violence as far away from American shores as we can, preferably away from the entirety of the Western Hemisphere. And over the decades, weapons systems that we use, have evolved to mirror that prerogative. So we started with the Monroe Doctrine and blocked sea access to the United States. 

Then we projected out on our sea lanes, and then eventually with World War One and World War Two, were actually fighting in the Eastern hemisphere in major conflicts. And the weapon systems that have evolved since then reflect the fact that the bulk of the fight happens over there. So if you look at every weapon systems that the United States has, it’s built on two basic cons or three basic concepts. 

Number one, we will always, always be outnumbered no matter where we are. And so the weapon systems have to punch much harder than everybody else is to make up for it. Second, we’re going to be fighting at the very end of a very long logistical chain, which means that the US has to excel at logistics and have allies that can help with logistics. 

And then the weapons systems themselves have to be much longer range than anything they’re fighting against, both because basing can be limited. And we have to make sure that the fight is happening as far away from our bases as they possibly can. And then the third system is these systems have to be durable. So whether it’s the F-16 or the Abrams or the now the F-35, it has to be able to fight in a contested environment that will always be contested by a greater number of things. 

And it has to be able to take as many hits as possible before it goes down. So yes, the US Abrams is the most badass tank on the planet, can take several direct hits and probably just shrug them off. Things like the F-16 can actually take anything shy of a missile hit and keep flying. And of course, the F-35. 

It’s a stealth issue. These aren’t by accident. This isn’t something that the United States just stumbled across. It’s something that we discovered with blood and with money over the decades for what was necessary for us to project power. And it affects everything from the hardware to the alliance structure. The Russians have a very different system. The Russians knew that all fights are always going to happen on their immediate periphery. 

And so they don’t need a long range system. 

They don’t need an excellent logistical tale. They don’t even need durable stuff. They want numbers. They want to be able to mass the other side with more jets than anyone else can field. They can be short range. That’s fine. They’re fighting from their own territory. They don’t need to worry about the logistical tail. They don’t have to be particular lethal. Sure. 

Maybe the opponent vessel can take eight hits. Hit him with 100. And so you go for cheap, short range and disposable. You fight with numbers, which makes the American Alliance with Europe somewhat odd. Why the U.S. wants to fight in Europe is obvious. 

Keep the fight over there and why the U.S. wants American basing rights in Europe is obvious. You want that logistical tale in place with competent people. But why? The Europeans would purchase American weapons? That’s a bit of a mystery, because ultimately the Europeans know that their fights are going to be in their near abroad. The Russians are right there. 

And if Ukraine falls over there, right, right. Right there. So you would expect the Europeans to develop systems that are much shorter range, that are much less durable, that are much cheaper, that can be fielded larger and larger numbers. And when you look at the weapons systems that the Europeans have fielded themselves, most of them crowd into that category. 

And yet they still buy weapons from the Americans. In fact, half of their military procurement is from the United States. But their weapons systems that are broadly inappropriate for their needs. They do this for two reasons. Number one is the NATO alliance. If there ever is a fight, the United States assumes immediate control of all European militaries, and interoperability of military forces is critical, especially to the United States, considering its robust logistical needs. 

The second reason is a little bit more tutti frutti. The Europeans would like the Americans to offer the Europeans as many security guarantees as possible. And while NATO is there from a legal structure, using American systems implies a degree of involvement in European militaries, because the manufacturing is in the United States, the services comes from the United States, the technicians from the United States. 

All the equipment comes through the United States, and the weaponry comes from the United States. And so maintaining that commercial relationship maintains an implicit security guarantee that is every bit as important as the article five guarantee of NATO. Or at least that’s where we were a few weeks ago. The last few weeks, the United States has proven the Trump administration has proven to the Europeans that none of this means anything. 

United States is clearly moving away from supporting article five on any issue that matters to the Europeans, most notably Ukraine and Russia. The United States is publicly debating whether it should withdraw from military command of NATO, which is the basically the same thing is withdrawing from NATO itself, since it’s illegal in the United States for any other country to command U.S. forces. 

That would mean an end to the NATO alliance. and that is the explicit security guarantee. And the Americans have already withdrawn weapons support and intelligence support for Ukraine, which is, you know, the fight of the age from the NATO point of view, especially from the European point of view. And the Europeans seen that the Trump administration is directly militarily threatening NATO allies now in places like Denmark and Greenland. 

Everyone’s wondering, why did we buy any of this stuff in the first place? If ultimately the Americans simply are going to stop supporting it. And so the Europeans, every country is basically in the midst of having a debate with itself over whether and how to stop buying American weapons systems and moving to something that is more appropriate for their needs, their geography, and especially the war that is on their horizon right now. 

A great example is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a fighter bomber with stealth capabilities. It’s perfect for the United States. It’s got stealth capabilities, got okay range, really good hitting power, very tough plane, largely pointless for everyone in Europe. It’s got too much range for what they need. Cost too much. Over $100 million per platform. And so far, the Europeans have committed to purchasing enough to spend about 75 to $80 billion. 

And then over the lifecycle of the jet, that’s another 250 to 300 billion. That’s a lot of money to spend on a relatively small number of planes that are not designed for your theater or your needs. And so the Europeans are looking to back away from all of those purchases and spend it on something that’s more appropriate. 

Now, at break of European purchase of American weaponry means a lot of things to a lot of people in a lot of places, and will require a lot of words for me to explain all the connotations. And that’s going to have to be tomorrow’s video.

What is Israel’s Victory Condition in Iran?

Attacks by Israeli Air Force in Tehran. Photo by Wikimedia: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a0/Pictures_of_the_Israeli_attack_on_Tehran_1_Mehr_%282%29.jpg

Israel and Iran are still going at it, but things have not significantly escalated. Here’s a breakdown of the situation and what could come next.

Israel has been able to take out Iran’s air defenses and strike some key nuclear sites, especially at the Natanz facility that enriches mid-grade uranium. However, all of Iran’s advanced stuff is dispersed and hidden deep underground, which is beyond Israel’s current strike capabilities. Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes have been largely ineffective due to poor targeting capabilities and strong Israeli defense systems.

So, Israel can continue to hit targets that delay and stall Iran’s nuclear program, but outright destroying the nuclear program probably isn’t in the cards. The question then becomes – what is Israel’s victory condition? If fully eliminating Iran’s nuclear capabilities is off the table, will they turn towards crippling Iran’s economy?

It remains unclear where and how far the Israelis will take this campaign, but unless they escalate their effort, they’ll just be buying time.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey, all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. We are going to talk about the status of the air war between Iran and Israel. Today it is the 16th of June. You’ll be seeing this one in the morning. Short version. It hasn’t gotten all that serious from a physical damage point of view, especially on the Israeli side. 

Iran lacks meaningful long range power production capacity. They’ve got a lot of missiles. But they’re not particularly smart. And the Israelis have a pretty good theater missile defense. And that’s before you consider the Americans are helping as well. So no appreciable damage inflicted within Israel at the moment. Going the other direction. The Israelis have been primarily targeting air defense, which has proven to be woefully inadequate, on the Iranian side and have taken out the easy targets in the Iranian nuclear development program, most notably the centrifuge complexes at Natanz. 

That is where most of the centrifuges are. That’s where they take raw yellowcake, which is processed, uranium ore and turn it into a kind of a mid enriched uranium. From that point, the stuff is then sent to other facilities to go to highly enriched uranium. And the idea would be that if you get highly enriched enough that you could make a actual bomb. 

No indications at the moment that the Iranians have been getting to the level of enrichment that is necessary to then go to the next part of the process. The problem that the Israelis are facing is that those more advanced centrifuges, the one that goes a higher percentage of fissile material, are underground. They’re buried. They’re dispersed. 

Keep in mind that the Iranians have kind of been playing with their nuclear industry for 30 years now, and the Iranians always assumed that when the bombs actually fell on them to break up their nuclear program, it was going to be the United States dropping the bombs. And the United States would have had things like aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf that would be flying out of places like Kuwait and gutter. 

And so there would be lots and lots and lots of sorties dropping very, very advanced bombs that are designed to penetrate very, very deep places. Israelis don’t have any of that. They’re flying from an extra thousand kilometers away. They don’t have the deep penetration capacity. So can Israel hurt Iran? Of course. Can they take it all out? I really doubt it. 

It’s an open question whether the United States could, which means that the Iranian nuclear program is only stalled so long as the bombing continues, and Israel only has so many weapons that can be used in this conflict. So the question we need to start asking ourselves is, what is the victory condition for Israel? Because their ability to actually destroy everything in the nuclear program is probably not going to happen. 

So what they seem to be doing is going after the power infrastructure and the access infrastructure to delay what’s left of the Iranian nuclear program as long as possible, which is a reasonable plan. And then the question becomes whether or not they decide to do more to set back Iran. More generally, going after military sites is kind of pointless because Iran’s military, for the most part, is infantry based. 

And if you’re doing long range pinpoint attacks, you’re just not going to break it up in any meaningful way. But you could torpedo the Iranian economy by going after the oil refining capacity. Iran is an oil exporter, not merely what they used to be back in their heyday, probably only about a million, a million and a half barrels a day. 

Today. That includes the smuggling, but they are highly dependent upon fuel processing at home just to keep the country together. So if you go after the refineries, which are much easier than going after the oil fields, the Israelis could achieve two things. Number one, that could destabilize the internal regime, because if there’s not fuel, it’s really hard to maintain an industrial level economy. 

And second, it would actually probably pour some literal oil on troubled waters, because if the Iranians can’t process the crude into fuel, they would then be forced to export more crude, which would actually weirdly push oil prices down. Something to consider. No sign that the Israelis are doing that right now, but considering their limited options for actually removing the nuclear card from the board, it’s something that seems pretty feasible to me.