China No Longer Controls North Korea

Monument of hammers raised in North Korea

To simply call North Korea a Chinese puppet state doesn’t capture the complexity of that relationship. To fully understand it, we must look back at three generations of the Kim dynasty, the current partnerships with other powers, and Kim Jong Un’s aspirations.

However, the biggest takeaway from Xi’s meeting in Pyongyang is that North Korea is becoming more of a geopolitical wild card. China and the rest of the region must now deal with greater uncertainty from a nuclear power right at the doorstep.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today is the 8th of June. And the big news is that chairman, XI Jinping of the People’s Republic of China is in the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea. Who summits. Fun stuff. Anyway, I thought it might be useful to give you the rundown of what’s brought us to this point and what the status of Chinese North Korean relations are, because it’s not what most people think. 

If you go back in time to the early Cold War years, we had a guy by the name of Kim IL sung who was kind of the grandfather, well, literally the grandfather of the current Kim who’s in charge, and Pyongyang. Anyway, Kim IL Sung is the guy who founded North Korea as a state. He fought the Japanese during World War two, had lots of gravitas, good military leader. 

But then he ran this hermit kingdom, as people like to call it, with a ideology called, which basically translates into self-reliance. And so while the entire world advanced into the industrial age, North Korea just kind of stalled, really famously. Pyongyang is really the only city in the country until recently that has even had electricity. And if you were an affiliate of the Kim dynasty, you got food. 

And if you weren’t, life kind of sucked. That continued on until the Cold War ended and when the Soviet Union collapsed. Kim IL sung realized the writing was on the wall, and that the Jewish ideology just wasn’t going to work in a world that was globalizing. Without the ongoing payments that came in from the Soviets. So, according to the best collective guesses of the world’s intelligence agencies, and by that I mean American, Japanese, Chinese, South Korean, British, French and others. 

Kim IL sung had invited himself to Seoul to meet with the then South Korean leader, Another Kim, and to talk about reunification in a practical sense, as the story goes. Within a couple of days, the generals who had fought with Kim IL sung back during World War Two killed him. And because they knew that in any version of a reunified Korea, their jobs would be gone. 

Because if you’re not fighting the South and the Army doesn’t need to be as big, and if the South and north and integrate, you don’t need as many generals. And the southern generals certainly had more military expertise with better equipment. So they off the guy. And that left Kim IL Sung sun, Kim Jong IL. He’s the crazy one. 

The one always looks like this. Yeah. Left him in charge and Kim Jong IL was best way to phrase this. Well, he was batshit crazy. He had been educated in North Korea, grew up drinking the Kool-Aid in the ideology, and didn’t really understand how the rest of the world worked. So he’s most infamous for leading a series of agricultural reforms that ended up triggering mass famine and killing 2 million people and gutting what little hydropower of the country had. 

And as the story goes, the generals who had offed his dad were like, oh shit, that’s totally not what we meant to happen. We’ve got to make sure that the next generation isn’t like this. So they sent the third generation of kids who were only now teenagers, out into the wider world to learn how the world actually works. 

And Kim Jong UN, who is the current leader, the son of Kim Jong IL and the grandson of Kim IL sung, was actually in Switzerland in middle school and high school. 

Any who Kim Jong IL, the crazy one, deliberately got bad medical care on the orders of the military and eventually died relatively young, which meant that Kim Jong un, at the tender age of I think it was 23 or 26 at the time, got recalled from his studies to basically run the country. 

And that set up a really interesting power dynamic. On the one hand, you had these generals who knew that modernization was inevitable. Some degree of openness with the South was inevitable. They just didn’t want it to happen on their watch, because they didn’t want to lose their prospects and their wealth and their position. And then you had Kim Jong un, whose father had been killed by these guys and who’s or mistreated from his point of view, and whose grandfather had been killed by these guys. 

He was like, I really hate these guys. So you had this interesting situation where the crazies of the second generation were still around, and the iron clad dictators of the first generation were still around, and then you had this kid alone who suddenly was the nominal leader. And so what happened over the next decade is Kim Jong UN. 

He’s the chubby guy, learned how the system worked, and whenever he had an opportunity, he offed one of his father’s generation. So we had a guy in Singapore who got hit with some sort poisonous nerve agent. My personal favorite are the Minister of Railways, who got run over by a train, and a defense attache who accidentally got shot by an anti-aircraft gun. I mean, you just imagine the mechanics of that. Anyway, thinning out the crazy generation and waiting for the first generation to die. Well, folks, it’s been 80 years since World War two. Anyone who fought with Kim IL Sung in World War II is now long gone. And the generation that rose to power in the 50s, 60s and 70s are mostly gone as well. 

So it’s just Kim Jong UN now. Now, let’s bring that from ten years ago to roughly the present. Most people assume that North Korea is just the yippie and rabid Chihuahua on the end of a leash, controlled by Beijing and under Kim Jong IL, the crazy one. There was something to that, but that’s not the case anymore. North Korea has an independent streak and is looking for, and has been looking under Kim Jong UN for any sort of leverage, not just to strengthen his personal power and that of his family and entrench the regime in North Korea. 

But more importantly, to make sure that Beijing can’t just dictate 

So if you go back to 2017, 2018, 2019. That’s when Kim Jong UN started expressing a degree of independence that Beijing really didn’t like. There was a series of bilateral meetings between chairman G. And China and Kim Jong un. Most of these meetings happened in Beijing. 

And basically, to sum it up, it was chairman G who’s a short dude standing or sitting with a boost so he could lecture down to Kim Jong un and lecture the wayward province about how things were supposed to be. And the Chinese citizenship ate that up because it made China look important, but it just infuriated Kim Jong un. 

And after one of those summits, he’s basically on his train coming back. He doesn’t fly coming back to North Korea. And he directs his staff to call up Donald Trump, who had been using about maybe having a summit. And he basically said, Call Donald Trump, tell him the summits on. never going to talk to these fuckers again. 

And over the course of the next few months, we had two summits between the younger Kim and Donald Trump, one in Singapore and one in Vietnam. Now, that’s from the American point of view, where it ended. Trump didn’t really read the briefing materials, as we know now that the State Department and the CIA provided to him. And after the second meeting, which I believe was in 2019, he basically just moved on to other topics. 

And from the point of Kim Jong UN, who felt that he had really put his neck out, there, he was. He was pissed. And so not that American North Korean relations have ever been great, but if there was a chance for a break, that was the moment in the moment past, which meant Kim Jong UN in North Korea all of a sudden were kind of out of luck if the Americans were not paying enough attention to cut a deal, and he was still worried about whatever was going on in China and them dominating North Korea, there really wasn’t anybody else left because the Russians had fallen so far. 

Enter the Ukraine war, because all of a sudden in 2022, the Russians found themselves just as isolated from international markets as North Korea was. And all of a sudden, Kim Jong UN was like, hey, there’s an opportunity here for us. And if you fast forward another year, suddenly we’ve got over 10,000 North Koreans at a time, fighting in places like Kursk, in the Russian Ukrainian borderlands and ultimately in Ukraine itself. 

And we have decades of built up supply, stockpiles of North Korean artillery that is being sent by the trainload to the Russian front with Ukraine. And at one point it’s not that way anymore. But at one point, well over one third of the artillery shots that the Russians were using were sourced from North Korea. And that partnership has continued to a degree. 

There’s still North Korean troops. There’s still North Korean weapons. And then exchange. The North Koreans are getting Russian technology, most notably intercontinental ballistic missiles. Because remember, Russia, even in its weakened state, is still a space power. And so you could argue that while they haven’t tested it, the North Koreans could easily launch an ICBM and strike anywhere in the continental United States. 

Now, that’s all water under the bridge anyway. Bottom line is that Kim Jong UN and North Korea found their out in Moscow. And while being friends with Moscow these days doesn’t get you a whole lot. It certainly is an interesting piece of leverage to use against Beijing. Which brings us to today, chairman G is in Pyongyang meeting with the younger Kim for only the second time that he’s actually been to North Korea. 

And the entire topic of the talks is China’s effort to rake North Korea back into the Chinese sphere instead of being in the Russian sphere. The North Koreans, Kim Jong un, specifically, have long been just as allergenic about cutting deals with the Chinese as they have with the Americans and everyone else. So if G is going to actually get this, he’s going to have to offer quite a bit, especially when you consider that the normal goalposts for bilateral relations economic aid, technological aid, money, energy, the North Koreans are really getting everything they could need right now from the Russians. 

So for China to get back into the position where they’re the dominant external power in North Korea, it’s not just that that it would have to offer a lot more, but they’d have to offer it without strings. And from China’s point of view, that kind of defeats the point. Because China wants a regime, it can control that. All of that is kind of piece one. 

Piece two is that Kim Jong UN has done more to change the strategic position of North Korea just this year than any leader in North Korea has done since its formation at the end of the Korean War, beginning of the Korean War. He’s changed the Constitution so that North Korea now defines itself as an independent state that is not seeking reunification with the South. 

One of the polite fictions slash aspirational goals of both Pyongyang and Seoul has been that the division of the Korean peninsula was imposed by outsiders, namely the Soviet Union and the United States. And at some point, they would really like to be reunified into a single entity. Now there’s a billion details as to how that might happen, and nobody agrees on any of it, because you know who’s in charge, for example. 

I mean, the South Korean population is twice the size of the North, that it’s a first world technocracy. Much of North Korea is still pre-industrial. If it was a straight up merger, it’s obvious who would be in charge. And if there’s one thing that Kim Dynasty cares about, it’s regime preservation because that’s their power. Anyway, the official position of North Korea now has shifted that reunification is completely off the agenda. 

It’s an independent state. It does not seek union still hostile to the South, still hostile to Japan and the United States. But it’s no longer even rhetorically aiming for state merger, which means it really has come of age as a wild card in international affairs. It’s playing the Russians and getting a lot of really advanced tech from their point of view, that low cost of just a few thousand troops that just get massacred. 

The Chinese see it as an unknown that they can’t manage, which I personally find delightful. It’s got fairly reliable short and medium range ballistic missiles and a fairly advanced nuclear program for a state that has under 30 million people. And all of South Korea and all of Japan are in the easy hit zone. And now, courtesy of their alliance with the Russians, it probably could nuke the United States or at least send the missile whether we could intercept it or not as an open question. 

So it’s a different North Korea now than what we’ve been dealing with before. And the first world leader to go there and get a taste of it is Chairman Ji of China. And he’s there right now. And from what few communiques have been released so far, reading between the lines, it’s clear that she is not having a good time of it, which I also find delightful, but with the one caution that if an authoritarian madman like she doesn’t care for the new North Korea, imagine what everybody else is going to think. 

So this is a good for drama and good for shaking up the strategic map, but it is something that is gestating at the edge of Asia, in the heart of some of the most dynamic economies in the world, in a way that’s going to cause a lot of pain in the not too distant future.

The Future of Drone Tech: Hybrid Drones

A quadcopter drone with mountains in the background

A new drone has appeared on the scene in the Ukraine War. This hybrid drone blends the precision and control of FPV quadcopters with the range and payload of fixed-wing drones.

Almost every drone style has been battle-tested in Ukraine. We’ve seen FPV drones wreak havoc on the frontlines and fixed-wing drones strike deeper inside Russian territory. However, these new hybrid drones offer the best of both worlds.

Ukraine is already seeing early success with the hybrds, meaning these drones could be a game-changer when combined with other innovations we’ve seen. Russia will develop countermeasures eventually, but we’ll see if Ukraine can capitalize on the opportunity this summer.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Hello from the Vegas airport at 0 dark 30. Today we’re going to pick up on the drone tech series and talk about different kinds of drones, specifically first person drones, which are typically quadcopters or hex copters. Verse is glide drones and flight drones, which are more fixed wing. Both of them have their own places. And one of the things we’re seeing in the Ukraine war today is that they’re starting to merge a little bit. 

So first quadcopters or hex copters, you’ve seen them. These are the hobbyist ones that have been pressed into military use, with new models coming out pretty much every week. The advantage of a quadcopter is control. They can hover. They can land to conserve fuel. You have direct control over them at all times, and that means you can do really crazy things like position them above a military asset, like a tank that has a hatch open and drop something on it, or even drop the helicopter right into it. 

You can fly into a hangar and look around and figure out what it is you want to go after the repair bay and aircraft, a fuel tank, whatever it happens to be. The degree of precision really is extreme, but the problem is, is these things have to have the rotors spinning all the time, so that really limits the range. 

At the beginning of the Ukraine war, these things really only had a range of 2 to 3km, which is about the same as a javelin missile by the way. So the way to extend range was to fly them towards an enemy position, land a lot of nearby and then send one ahead to Scout, and then the others would spin back up. It would buy you a little bit more control and flexibility, but ultimately range was the issue. But as the batteries have gotten better, specifically lithium phosphate batteries and they’ve improved aerodynamics, the range has gone from 2km to 5km to ten kilometers, 20km to 25km. 

And that has turned the entire front line into an area just littered with drones all the time. There’s also a lift issue, so their warheads generally are 10 pounds or less, with most of them being like 3 pounds or less. Fixed wing are different. They require some sort of launching system, which sometimes is no more complicated than kind of a large scale slingshot. They can carry more. They get a lot more lift because they have a wing system that gives them lifts. Quadcopters have no lift. You just have to have the rotors running. And this means that the fixed wing drones have significantly larger range, typically four and five times as long. If you’re spending the same amount of money and a significantly larger payload, because once they get up to a certain altitude, they can just kind of glide for a while and conserve fuel. 

And you can also build larger models. There’s definitely an upper limit when you come to a quadcopter. As they get bigger, you the lift to weight ratio changes against you, so you can only get so big, whereas a bigger and bigger and bigger airframe for fixed wing generates more and more lift proportionally. And so it’s the fixed wing ones that are carrying the bombs that are in excess of 100 pounds, who can fly 600 to 700 miles, really without any major problem. 

And those are the ones that are being used against most distant targets, and especially things like refineries and infrastructure. The advantages pretty extreme there. You can bring a lot of destructive power at significant range. The problem is control. With an FPV drone, you generally have either a digital tether from, say, satellite or cell phones or a fiber optic cable. 

But when you’re starting to talk about a fixed wing drone, the further away they get, the more the chances are that they can be disrupted by electronic warfare. You never have a line of sight to them anymore, and if they fly through an zone, you probably are going to lose the drone. Although there’s certain things you can do with buffering that allows them to kind of stay the course in the hopes that they’ll emerge on the other side of it. 

And you can pick up the signal again. But as a rule, the further away you go, the greater the chance you’re just going to lose control altogether. So these two broad classes have kind of defined everything with the war fees for close in and fixed wings for further destruction of infrastructure. But what we’ve seen in just the month of May is a new hybrid drone coming out that looks a little bit like a biplane, but the most of the rotors are horizontal as opposed to vertical, or the Ukrainians are starting to do is put detachable wings on the drones to get some of the best of both worlds, so you still use the horizontal rotors to achieve the thrust that’s necessary to leave the ground. But as they get going. The wing bevels into place and they can get lift from that as well. And in their first iteration of these things that have popped up in just the last few weeks, we’re already seeing the Ukrainians using these new hybrid drones to go 100km, which is double what we had before just in April. 

And it’s 20 times what these sorts of drones could do at the beginning of the war for years ago. And what that means is, in one stroke, these new drones are roughly doubling the strike range of Ukrainian closing drones, increasing their weight capacity a little bit, too, because of the extra lift. That is something that the Russians are wholly unprepared for. Basically, with each stage of this war as a new weapon has been developed. There’s a period where the attacker, whoever that is, achieves local supremacy and a significant tactical advantage. 

And then the other side developed countermeasures or copies of the technology, and the situation equalizes. But we’ve had so many Ukrainian innovations hit just since March that the Russians are reeling. So we now have memory drones that are hunting and self-selecting targets 50, 60, 100, 150km behind the front line, completely eviscerating the entire logistical system and now close in. 

Individual Ukrainian drone operators have doubled their hunt range. So any sort of movement within 50 to 60km of the front on the Russian side is becoming a no man’s land. Russian positions are becoming isolated and without the Ukrainian suffering any blowback whatsoever. It’s not that the Russians have had to abandon all offensive capability, but they can only focus in specific points. 

And that requires a degree of massing of forces. And those massing of forces usually happened more than 30km away, but less 100km away. All of a sudden, that is no longer viable. So we’re seeing a disintegration on the front right now. The question at this moment is whether or not the Ukrainians have enough offensive plunge and mine removal capacity to take advantage of that in any sort of sustained way, or we’re just waiting for the Russians to adapt these tactics adopt them to their own. 

It’s just too soon to know. But considering that this is happening in the first week of June, we have all of June, all of July, all of August, all of September in the first half of October, which is kind of the ground fighting season when the climate encourages offensive activity. And the Ukrainians have now spent the last 2 to 3 months preparing the battlefield in a way that has just completely decimated the entire Russian order of battle and pre-positioned logistical caches. 

At the same time, preventing troops on the front from being supplied with new men, new equipment, food, water, all the rest of the things. So I don’t want to overplay this because Russia’s defensive capabilities are immense. But it does look like this could be a summer where the Ukrainians break multiple parts of the front, and if they can get through those minefields, then we really are in a new game.

A Massive Energy Break Coming Soon

An Oil Tanker in the ocean

We’re slipping closer and closer to a major oil supply crunch. With the Persian Gulf still shut in, global inventories almost depleted, and threats to other oil supplies, the world doesn’t have enough oil to keep things running for much longer.

The Chinese have been able to substitute some of their oil demands with coal-based products, but this is just a band-aid. Eventually, oil prices will spike, and certain consumers will no longer be able to afford petroleum products, leading to demand destruction.

Northeast Asia will be hit hardest due to its heavy reliance on imported oil, but even Europe will have issues, despite having alternative supply sources.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. I wanted to give everyone an idea of just when the oil crisis is going to hit, because we’re about their short version is that since the Iran war started, we’ve had somewhere between nine and more, currently about 13 million barrels per day of Persian Gulf crude that isn’t even getting produced, much less exported to the wider world. 

And we are well past the point where the last tankers of exports pre-war have reached their destination. So everyone’s just been burning through stocks and at some point in either June or early July, we’re going to reach basically minimum operating levels for inventories and half the world, if not more. 

We’re looking already about 1.25 billion barrels of crude that haven’t been delivered. With every day goes by. That’s 10 to 13 million barrels of crude that have to be pulled from inventories. And because prices haven’t dropped, which is kind of weird. Demand really hasn’t dropped all that much. We’ve seen a little bit movement in some subsectors, like say, jet fuel and diesel, but for the most part, people are continuing to consume crude like this isn’t a long term problem. 

Oh my god. Anyway, at some point in June or early July, we’re going to hit the wall. The primary reasons why it hasn’t happened already is we’ve got two little factors in play. The first are the strategic reserve releases that the IEA approved two months ago. Now, in the case of the United States, this has really helped out Europe because the United States is a net exporter of crude and refined product by a large margin. 

So we don’t need the crude that is being released. So roughly 2 to 2.5 barrels a day of crude from our strategic petroleum reserve are just crossing the Atlantic and helping out the Europeans. And since the Europeans are so much more efficient at energy use than we are, that has really helped them kind of square the circle in the mid-term. 

It won’t last much longer, but for now it’s holding on the Asian side. Something else has helped out. That’s a little odd. 

When you make petrochemicals, you usually use a mix of feedstocks. You turn oil into something called naphtha. That’s your primary feedstock, but you also use liquefied petroleum gas like ethane and propane and butane. Some of these have partial substitutes, specifically the naphtha. 

And what the Chinese are doing is trying to cut out as much naphtha from their system as they can, and instead substitute it with a kind of processed liquefied coal. Now, this is wildly inefficient and expensive and especially polluting. But when you’re in a throughput driven system like the Chinese, it’s not so big of a deal. So headline. 

The Chinese petrochemical sector uses about 4 million barrels a day of product, of which about half, maybe a little less, is naphtha. And they’ve been able to substitute coal for maybe a third to half of that which is bought Asia. A little bit of wiggle room and has prevented the Chinese from having runaway price increases. You combine that with their large scale application of very, very, very small electric vehicles and a grid that primarily runs on coal anyway, and they’ve bought some more buffer that way too. 

But all of this is going to evaporate over the course of the next 3 to 6 weeks. So we’re very close to the break assuming nothing else goes wrong. And as we have seen in the past, that if we do get into a hot war situation again, the Iranians have easily demonstrated that they can hit any part of the export infrastructure from the Persian Gulf that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz, specifically the bypass pipelines of the United Arab Emirates and the Saudis have so were, ironically, in probably the best that can be hoped for right now. 

No hostilities, but the Persian Gulf still closed. If the Persian Gulf were to reopen tomorrow, it would be months before any new crude would flow, because it just takes that long to turn these fields back on and in some cases, years. So the late June and into July deadline is probably going to happen regardless of what happens with the negotiations that are ebbing and flowing back and forth. So get ready for a fun summer. 

How this usually happens is when you’ve got this sort of disruption. Prices go through the roof because there just isn’t any throughput. It’s not that people have cut refinery runs for the most part. It’s just that we’re not going to have feedstock. And when that happens, you get this lovely thing called demand destruction, where prices rise to a point that some parts of the economy, some people in some parts of the world simply can’t afford the crude derived products at all. 

And when that happens, their demand is destroyed. Till such time as prices fall back into line. The last time the world experienced this scale of disruption, it wasn’t the oil crises in the 70s or the 80s. It was World War two when everything got sunk. So historically unprecedented is the term. And keep in mind that with the global happened, some version of this was going to happen in a large scale. 

Regardless, the parts of the world are going to be most affected. At the top of the list is Northeast Asia, because this is an area that imports well over 90% of their crude. And until recently, all of that crude has really come from the Persian Gulf. They do get a little bit of a kicker from the former Soviet Union now, a little bit from the Western Hemisphere, but not enough to make a material difference. 

And the second worst will be Europe, where they also import 90% of their crude. But they have the potential of tapping more regions, most notably North America and North Africa and West Africa. So here we go.

Armenian Election Signals It’s Done with Russia

Flag of Armenia in front of an apartment complex

Armenia has long depended on Russia for just about everything, from energy to security, and even broader economic integration. However, the weekend election results in Armenia reflect a rejection of pro-Russian politics and a desire to find a new path forward.

This was likely to happen anyway, as Moscow has its hands full with everything else going on, but the big question remains: who can fill Russia’s shoes? Not many Armenians will like the answer…

Transcript

Hey everyone. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about Armenia. America is one of the former Soviet republics that is in the South Caucasus, in a little pocket between Azerbaijan and Turkey. East and west and north and south. Former Soviet Republic of Georgia. Not. Not Atlanta and Iran. It’s a difficult position to be in. 

There’s only 4 million people now, and a population has been hemorrhaging ever since the Cold War ended. It’s a little state that has been completely dependent on security guarantees granted by the Russians, and in fact, in a series of conflicts with John. If it wasn’t for those Russian security guarantees. It Armenia would have ceased to exist a long time ago. 

But as much as we talk about drones in the Ukraine context, what a lot of people forget is that the first real wave of these new generation of drones that are changing warfare were used between Armenia and Azerbaijan, with the Azerbaijani using a lot of Turkish weapons and basically completely obliterating the Armenian Air Force, its tank forces and its artillery in a one month war that happened all the way back into 2020. 

I believe since then, Armenia has panicked is probably the best word for it. They’re landlocked. They don’t have their own energy. Most of the electricity comes from a single nuclear power plant, the fuel provided by Russia, and most of the security comes from a Russian base as well. Well, with the Ukraine war and all these new drones Armenia’s position has gone from untenable to something flirting with state collapse. 

And so there is a recognition among the political elite of Armenia that something’s got to change and that Russia can’t be part of the solution, because if Russia was going to be part of the solution, they would be doing more. But they’re completely consumed with the Ukraine war and especially today, now that the Russians are basically watching their entire front line collapse in real time, there is not going to be any help for Armenia. 

So today is the 8th of June and we had elections over the weekend. The ruling party, Civic Armenia, ruled by a guy by the name of passion, got about 50% of the votes, swamped the other parties. The Russians have been using their old playbook that they have used in Ukraine and in Georgia, in the United States and in Germany. 

And the United came everywhere to try to discredit their foes and boost their chosen proxies. And it’s kind of funny, with the exception of the United States, it really hasn’t worked anywhere. But it’s generated so much backlash from the non-Russian forces that people really turned out in numbers anyway. The guy, the party who are trying to find a new path one decisively. 

They’ll have an absolute majority in the Parliament. And the question now is what’s next? There is no good path. Let’s start with that. The Armenian mindset globally is defined by the Turkish genocide during the end times of World War one, when hundreds of thousands, some people would say 1 million or 2 Armenians were killed in Turkish territory. And that singular memory is seared into the brains of all the survivors and their descendants. 

And so the idea of having any sort of long term deal with Turkey is something that is really just rejected. But now that the Russians are no longer part of any possibility, it’s something that they have to consider. You’ve got Azerbaijan on the east, which are allied with the Turks, get their weapons from the Turks, coordinate with the Turks. 

From the Armenian point of view, they’re just as bad to the south. You’ve ever run, which has always been a window on the world. But the recent degradation in relations between the United States and Iran means that Iran is no longer a viable option for goods coming in and out. And that just leaves Georgia to the north, which is in the process of sliding into authoritarianism. 

I guess that is another place where Russian misinformation has worked, and it’s not reliable either. So really the bottom line is either they cooperate with the Turks to a degree or they have nothing. So we do have real talks going on among Yerevan, Baku and Ankara about what is next. And this has to involve some sort of trade quarter. 

It has to involve some sort of Azerbaijan energy so the Armenians can keep the light on. The Trump administration has gotten involved with handshake deal. JD Vance was there a few months ago basically saying that we will provide nuclear fuel to your facility. It’s not clear if that is an above board or possible outcome, because this is a nuclear power plant that is ancient and decrepit, and it’s not clear that the Americans can even make fuel rods that will fit into it. 

But it’s at least the start of a place to talk. And now that we’ve had the vote, we’re going to see if this old new government can actually take concrete steps. But anything that does not involve a formal deal with Turkey is something that’s not going to go anywhere. So they’re going to have to take the hardest step first. 

And screaming in the background you have the Armenian diaspora, which has always been very, very gung ho when it’s Armenian lives in Armenia that are a threat as opposed to their own. And of course, the Russians looking to sabotage this at every opportunity. I don’t mean to suggest that the Russians haven’t taken a hit in global and regional affairs in the last couple of years. 

They obviously have, but I would not count them out when it comes to the ability to sabotage political deals. That is something they are very, very good at. So this election is really the start of a very difficult process, and we’re not going to see it wrapped up this year.

Insulating the President with Loyalists

Bill Pulte, New Director of National Intelligence official portrait

It looks like we have a new acting Director of National Intelligence, Bill Pulte. You may know his name as he’s both a housing executive and the current head of the Federal Housing Finance Agency.

So, we’ve got a new Director with at least two full-time jobs and no meaningful experience in intelligence…yeah, that sounds about par for the Trump Administration’s nominations. But at least Gabbard is out of the office.

Anyways, this move will likely result in the intelligence agencies losing influence in presidential decision-making and reinforces the trend of Trump isolating himself from anyone smarter than him.

Transcript

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Vegas. Had to find a quiet corner for this one was a little hard with all the people running around anyhow. Today we’re talking about the new acting Director of National Intelligence. Guy by the name of Bill Pulte. If you’re familiar with homebuilding, Pulte homes that Bill Pulte. He already has a position in the government. 

He’s a Trump loyalist. And he’s appointed to the civic of this right FH for the Federal Housing and Financing Agency, which is responsible for, among other things, back stopping about 70% of American mortgages. So big job. And most of the insurance agencies under FHFA, most notably Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are in conservatorship and have been since the financial crisis. 

So it’s a big, important full time job. The fact that he comes from housing and is now managing the mortgaging system suggests a conflict of interest. When he was going through confirmation hearing year, several senators piped up about that, most notably Elizabeth Warren. But you know, she hates everybody, so it’s hard to take that too seriously. 

Anyway, he has now been deputized as the acting head of national intelligence, and his job there is to coordinate the dozen plus federal agencies that have intelligence arms, everybody from the NSA and the CIA to law enforcement. Anyway, that is a full time job as well. And what it really tells us is President Trump, doesn’t really care about the national security agencies at all, and he certainly doesn’t want them talking to him about what’s going on in the world. 

Trump feels the need to be the smartest person in the room. And if somebody from the intelligence agency is there talking about Moldova or Kyrgyzstan or Bolivia, they will obviously know them more than the president about that topic. And so they’re just not allowed into the room. Now, the outgoing director of national intelligence was Tulsi Gabbard, who had some foreign leanings and so seen her gone as great, but now replacing her with somebody who is completely unskilled and there’s no background in intelligence or military affairs or project management is really not great either. 

About the only good news I can say is at least this guy is not beholden to foreign interests like Tulsi Gabbard was. He’s a loyalist, so he’s unlikely to tell Trump anything that he doesn’t want to hear. Which probably means that all of the intelligence’s basically now have a ceiling above them, between them and the president. So Trump is continuing to go down this path of being the least informed leader that we have had in modern history. 

The only other one that is even remotely in the same bucket would be Barack Obama, who was famous for not wanting anyone in the room at all. This is just the other side of that coin. So good news. Not really. But considering that Donald Trump doesn’t have anyone in his circle with real foreign policy experience except for Marco Rubio, who has similarly been banished and now heads two agencies State Department, for the similar purposes of keeping him in arm’s length from the president, keeping those institutions away from the president. It’s kind of par for the course.

The Future of Drone Tech: Naval Launch Platforms

Photo of a US Naval Carrier

Naval drone warfare is nothing new, but the Ukrainians are now finding ways to spice up the Sea Babies and MAGURA drones.

Ukraine is using these naval drones as mobile launch platforms for smaller aerial drones. Since the naval drones can travel farther and are harder to disrupt, they can take canisters full of FPV aerial drones closer to targets and deploy them. This gives Ukraine better operational reach around Crimea and along the Dnieper River.

This opens up a whole new strategic envelope for Ukraine, allowing it to carry out surprise attacks without pre-positioning troops or drone teams.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Good morning. From Rome, where the building that I’m staying in is. If you can see this curve here at the converted interior, that 2200 year old Roman bathhouse. The bathhouse has gone. But they recycle everything here over the years. Anyway, today we’re continuing on with the drone series, new military technologies that are in the process being unveiled and used right now. And today we’re going to talk about naval drones. Naval drones aren’t new. The Ukrainians have been using them against the Russians, really, since the start of the war, especially the second year. The sea baby is the primary variant. There’s also something called the Megara that has a pretty good track record. The idea is you basically take a small boat or a jet ski or something like that. Hook it up to an automated system pilot it remotely. The advantage of a sea drone, of course, is wait. You can put a bomb that waste several hundred pounds in it and then center on its way. 

And because most vessels don’t have the ability to shoot down at things that are in the water, they’re designed to shoot at other ships. Really, all they can do is put some people on the deck with machine guns or RPGs or something like that, and try to take shots as they come in. And so the Ukrainians have had immense success with these. 

The problem is simply range. And you can solve that with more fuel tanks to a certain degree. So we’ve seen a number of attacks that have gone quite a distance, even going as far as Novorossiysk, which is the major Russian port on the Black Sea and has made the Russian Navy’s position at places several completely untenable. And so the Russian Navy has actually had to evacuate Crimea. 

That’s all old stuff. What’s new, what’s happened in just the last month is that the Ukrainians have now regularized the installment of aerial drones on naval drones. See, one of the fun things about naval drones is because they’re on the water. They’re really hard to interrupt with electronic warfare and jamming. So you can basically right up to your target, whether it’s a port or a ship, before there’s any danger of it being interrupted. 

Whereas an aerial drone, if it’s flying in, sometimes it gets within a kilometer or a couple hundred meters of a target. And the ECM that the Russians use will then interrupt the signal and the thing will crash. That’s one of the reasons why these new memory drones are so important, because they get around that by giving decision making to the drone and the terminal phase. 

With naval drones, there’s really no chance of them being intercepted along the way. So what the Ukrainians have done is have built canisters that are incorporated into these sea drones. And when they get to a certain point, maybe ten, 20km away, they then eject aerial drones that are technically first person drones controlled by a pilot. And those fly into target things, which means that if you put it on a fiber optic tether, which they are, you get somewhere between a ten and a 50 kilometer range where you can send smaller drones out by about a half a dozen at a time. 

A couple of things that have already happened. Number one, they’ve got these canisters to launch them. So this isn’t an experimental technology already. It’s already in full deployment. The Ukrainians just kind of sprung it on everybody just a few weeks ago, which is causing a lot of havoc. Number two, you’re limited in terms of payload because those FPV drones typically can only carry a payload of 10 pounds or less. 

So they’re great for anti-personnel or maybe even anti vehicle, but you’re not going to use them to blow up say a battleship. But if you know what you’re doing you can target strategic pieces of ship, strategic pieces of refineries or ports and cause a lot of havoc in a way that the Russians haven’t yet to invent a technology to cope with, except for maybe a net that only gets you so far. 

Third, and for the war, the moment. Most importantly, there’s a lot of naval frontage in play. If you remember from the early phases of the war, the Russians invaded from the east and the south, with about 100,000 people moving north from Crimea to the Kherson area and east from the territories that the Russians had captured in the last war back in 2014, all the way to the Dnieper River. 

And that whole southern and eastern front is in place to a certain degree. Well, with these naval drones, the Ukrainians can now do whatever they want around Crimea and can go up the Dnieper River and hit the Russians in any number of spots without having to first preposition forces, much less drone pilots that can use long range transmission or even satellite communications to control the naval drone and then tether that through the existing telemetry out through the fiber optic cables to the first person drones. 

So the degree to which the Ukrainians just surprise assault really, anything at this point is only limited by the number of drones that they can have on the water. Now, this does change the nature of the sea babies and things like them, because now they’re becoming drone carriers as opposed to just suicide drones. That will probably trigger a new evolution in the manufacture, because right now they’re designed to be one way and that’s it. 

But from an engineering point of view, that is actually a very, very simple problem. Taking a suicide drone, taking the explosive off of giving it more fuel, more range capacity, and then ultimately more of these canisters. That’s something we’re probably going to see within a month or two. I could almost do that in my garage, and I’m kind of a technical invalid when it comes to things like that. 

Big shifts in that space. That’s it for now.

The Future of Drone Tech: Mid-Range Drones

Photo of a military drone

The battlefield of the Ukraine War continues to be transformed by drone innovations. The latest is the (affordable and scalable) modification of existing drones to travel farther and independently identify and strike moving targets.

This has eliminated the notion of a safe rear area, as these drones can strike anywhere and anything. This makes moving troops, fuel, and ammunition much riskier for the Russians. If Ukraine can continue to produce these modified drones at this rate, we’re looking at a much different battlefield in just a few months.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Italy, Rome. This is the let’s try column there. And we are in the forno de, which I again doubtfully mispronounced. Anyway, continuing with our open ended drone series, there’s a couple of things that are going on in Ukraine that are fundamental breaks with previous military technology in the mid-range drone category, so that’s things that are free flowing roughly 10km to 200km. 

So not quite mid-range, not quite short range somewhere in between. Basically you’ve got a two step process. Step one is you have a pilot that kind of directs a drone to an area. And step two, the drone has the capacity with just a little bit of memory and a little bit of optics to kind of look around and pick a target and zoom in on it. 

This is already a significant step up from just what the Ukrainians were using two months ago, because it can actually target moving targets now, speed, which this is unraveling and shifting is really crazy. Anyway, what this means is that the concept of a front line from a logistical point of view, is basically collapsed. Used to be that the front line was a real danger zone, where if you were within 20km of it, then the fiber optic drones and the first person drones could target anything and do so in the hundreds of drones per day. 

Further back, you’d have things like the American app cams or advanced artillery that maybe came from the French. That would push back the Russians to force logistical support into an area that was more than a couple hundred kilometers from the front, so they’d be out of range, because we all remember from two years ago when the cams arrived in Ukraine. 

Then all of a sudden, all of these ammo dumps and airfields started blowing up. So the Russians just moved everything back. Well, with these new pieces of equipment, it’s not individual strikes, it’s not dozens of strikes. It’s hundreds of strikes every day. And they’re targeting everything from individual troops to trucks, which means that the entire logistical tail, not just the depots, the entire logistical tail going all the way back from the front line to wherever the supplies are, is now under threat every day from every angle. 

And we’re seeing a de facto collapse and the Russians capacity to even man the area. And so what we’ve seen in the last is 3 or 4 weeks is significant Ukrainian gains in any number of parts of the front, because the Russians can’t bring troops forward, they can’t bring fuel for they can’t bring ammo forward. And if they try, the Ukrainians just dice them up. 

So nobody has superiority in this area. But instead of having this shadow zone of 10 to 20km around the front, it’s now stretching halfway to Moscow. And in that sort of environment, the Russians don’t have a strategy, can’t have a strategy, because they’ve always relied on strategic depth to protect them. But that doesn’t work when you can have a free ranging weapon system that’s in the hundreds and very soon in the thousands that’s going over this entire zone, and anything that’s on a road or train is suddenly a target. 

This single point advantage isn’t going to last forever. Eventually, countermeasures will be developed, but it’s much more difficult for the Russians to do that than for the Ukrainians. But we’re going to save that topic for another day. Oh, one more thing. It raises the question of how financially viable this is long term for the Ukrainians. And the short answer is extremely. 

These are not fundamentally new drones. These are modifications made to existing proven models like the Seth or the dart, for example. Really, all you need to do is plug in a small processor and a moderately sized memory chip, nothing that was considered cutting edge in the last 15 years, so nothing’s under export control are really inexpensive. Total modifications, probably top out, about $100 per drone and in some models no more than 15. 

So yeah, they can do this in the tens of thousands per month. No problem at all. 

The Future of Drone Tech: Long-Range Strikes

Drone firing a missile

Ukraine has ramped up its long-range drone program, allowing it to strike targets up to 1,800 kilometers away. So, what does this mean for Russia and its oil?

With Ukraine able to strike targets well into Western Russia, energy infrastructure is increasingly vulnerable. Thanks to the recent surge of foreign financial support rushing into Ukraine, drone production has ramped up. Russia might be able to shut down and restart the southern oil fields, but any fields shut down in the permafrost would take years or even decades to repair and restart.

So, expect Russian transport and export capacity to continue to drop, especially if these longer-range strikes continue throughout the summer months.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter here still in Rome, approaching all the forums, continuing our open ended series about the changes of military technology. Now we’re going to deal with longer range drone system things with an excess of 300km. The Ukrainians have launched a series of systems over the course of the last roughly ten weeks that have increased their range upwards of 1800 kilometers total. 

So for those of you in metric, that’s roughly 900 to 1000 miles. And Moscow was only about 300, 350 miles from the front line. This means that Ukrainians can relatively reliably strike anything that is west of the Urals at this point, and even a few things opposite the URLs, if they really push it. These things are carrying warheads that are typically in excess of 100 pounds. 

They’re using them to heavily target not so much military assets directly, but infrastructure related to energy production and transport, pumping stations, refineries, ports, that sort of thing. Now, pre-war, the Russians exported about, oh, 2.5 million barrels per day of oil and about another million and a half barrels per day of refined product that is now facing some sphere problems. 

It’s really hard to give you accurate numbers because everything is changing day by day, and the Russians aren’t just sitting there. They’re repairing things as they go. So let’s talk about the technology and then talk about the impact. So first the technology, unlike the modified short to medium range drones where it’s just a matter, you know, just a matter of putting a couple new pieces of semiconductor to give it a limited decision making capability. 

This is a range issue. And so with the range issue, Ukrainians are limited by their industrial base, which they’re rapidly building out. We’ve had the number of drones per day in use, roughly Quinn Tipple over the course of the last ten weeks, and there’s no reason to expect that to slow. If anything, it’s probably going to accelerate. One of the things to keep in mind is because of the Iraq war and America’s inability to provide adequate air defense and missile defense to the Arab states, as we now have a cavalcade of countries in the Middle East and Europe that are providing funding for the Ukrainians to expand their industrial plant all over the place, and that’s giving them cash that is necessary to expand industrial plant and build out at home. Keep in mind that there are so many startups in Ukraine that are providing drone technology now that the Ukrainians actually ran out of money to fund them all. That’s not a problem anymore. So everybody is in the process of spinning up, and by the time we get to mid-summer, we’re probably going to be seeing daily strikes in dozens, if not hundreds of these things across the length and breadth of Russia regularly, every single day, most likely in terms of impact. 

It’s hard to get firm numbers on this because everything is a moving target. But oh yeah, fun little fact. The Romans had so much marble they used it for like, dust boards. Anyway, what this means is that we’ve had over 80 discrete energy targets across Russia come under sustained attack, sometimes getting hit three and four times a week. 

Major ports have gone offline and back. Online tanks are gone, pumping stations getting damaged. Even direct pipe strikes probably. There’s really no average here. But I would say on average, we’re looking at an overall reduction of somewhere between 1.5 and 2.5 million barrels per day of a combined transport and pumping and port capacity, and that gets well into the danger zone for the Russian system. 

The Russian oil complex kind of has two big phases down in the southern provinces. You can have some older fields that are basically supplied by water injection, and those you can run on reduced capacity or even shut them down safely and bring them back later. But collectively, that’s only about one to maybe 1.2 million barrels per day. Everything else is in permafrost territory, and because of heating and cooling problems, you can’t maintain a steady temperature at the production site at the bottom of the wellbore. 

In the pipelines and the pumping stations, everything cracks apart. Or in the case of some things, wax congealed in it. And then you have to replace the infrastructure completely. We’re now on the point where that has to be shut down, at least in part, and that stuff cannot be restarted on anything less than a multi year time frame. 

The last time this stuff all got shut down, it was in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, and it took the Russians 20 years to bring it back up to snuff like they had it during the Soviet period. So we are now already today at the beginning of the end of Russia, as a country that can even export petroleum or petroleum products at all to its west. 

And if you keep up this crescendo of attacks throughout the summer, by the end of the year, the Russians really won’t be an oil power in the western provinces at all. And that includes most of the western and northwestern Siberian fields as well. That’ll just leave what is out on the east side of the Urals, which is a separate infrastructure. 

But at the rate the Ukrainians are going as entirely possible, that that may be in range by the end of summer anyway. So from a war point of view, this is how Russia pays for everything. All is the single largest inflow point for the Russian state budget, which funds. Of course, the military natural gas is kind of like the kicker on the side, but most of the natural gas, a lot of the natural gas has already been shut in because it can’t be redirected in the way that liquid oil can be. 

So the Ukrainians haven’t felt the need to go after it. They’ll probably find some reasons in the next few months, as energy targets become harder to find, because there just won’t be all that many left. And that’s Palatine Hill behind me. That’s one of the original seven cities of Roman, where most of the rich folk lived during the High Imperial period. 

One more detail. We already have reports from several Russian oil officials talking about shut ins in places like Tatar, Saturn and Bashkir stand, which is where the water recovery basically pumped down. Water increased well pressure, and the oil comes up and you skim the oil off the top, where that’s already been shut down by a significant margin, at least in the high hundreds of thousands of barrels. 

But we’re also getting that’s the stuff you can turn back on. We’re also getting some reports of things further north, where we were getting some panicked reports about wells that will never come back on at all. So we’re already well into this, and the Ukrainians aren’t letting up, if anything. Intensification over the summer.

The Future of Drone Tech: Israel’s Iron Dome

Photo of Iron Dome missile defense system firing

Fiber-optic-controlled first-person drones are the star of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah. As Hezbollah deploys more of these drones, holes in Israel’s Iron Dome defense network are beginning to appear.

Iron Dome was designed to intercept rockets and missiles traveling in visible ballistic arcs. These drones use completely different attack approaches; they fly low and are connected via fiber-optic cables, so jamming won’t work either. You couple that with widely available components, and it becomes clear that Israel can’t defend against these drones on its own.

The other major player in drone-tech and defense is Ukraine, so I wouldn’t be surprised if we saw closer cooperation between these two countries soon. We’ll continue this discussion on the future of drone tech tomorrow.

Transcript

Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Saint Peter’s. Feels weird to do a video in here. So we’re just going to do the opener. I’m obviously in Vatican City, and today we’re going to talk about some new things in the world of military technology. All right. Continuing. Oh yeah Swiss Guard back there. Anyway, the news is over the course of the last month, we’ve seen some significant shifts in terms of the technologies used in the Lebanon War. 

Now, for those of you who have forgotten, Israel launched an invasion of Lebanon at the same time that the Iraq war started with the airstrikes by Israel and the United States against Iran. And it’s been continuing, it’s turned into a long term occupation, with the Israelis indicating they really never planned to leave at all anyway. What’s changed in the last few weeks is that we’ve started to see first person drone. 

This place is pretty cool. We’ve seen first person drone attacks. Now those are the ones where you have a pilot with a unit who’s controlling a specific drone, and they’ve got a live telemetry feed that allows them to make decisions in real time. The drone itself has no intelligence or strike capability independent of the pilot. What’s unique about what we’ve seen recently is that we’ve seen now at least a dozen situations where Hezbollah has used these first person drones, but has used them with fiber optic cables, with at least one of them confirmed it would be at least ten kilometers long. 

So with some hints indicating there’s been a couple with fiber optic cables that are about 20km long. Now, a few things to keep in mind about this. Number one, Israel arguably has the absolute best theater missile defense in the world with its Iron Dome system. And lots of folks think that the United States should at least partially copy it. 

And there’s something to be said for that. But keep in mind that Israel is a very small place. So the missile defense you’re going to do in a place like Israel is very different for what you do in the United States. Second, the nature of Iron Dome is primarily designed to intercept short term rockets and maybe some short to mid-term missiles. 

Every time Israel comes under attack, you get some really dramatic visuals, different kind from here, where you can see ballistic arcs that are pretty clean on one side of the photo, and on the other side, you’ll have a swirl of intersecting and spiraling threads, and then they meet. The swirling and intersecting ones are the Iron Dome system. Basically, they fire interceptors into the air. 

They don’t know how many things are going to come in, and then the interceptors lock on to those ballistic arcs and take them out. That really doesn’t work for low level drones at all, because you’ve got a fiber optic around this just flying a few feet to, or maybe a few hundred feet off the ground. They don’t get high enough to be registered by radar, even if they had the components to be detected by a radar. 

A lot of these things are plastic or carbon fiber. That’s real problem, because it means that the entire Iron Dome system has been designed now for a weapon system that is starting to be used against Israel, and there’s very little of the technology that goes into these things that is restricted at all when it comes to suppliers. You really have to. 

You then have the Russians who have contacts with militant groups throughout the Middle East. Hezbollah is no exception. And when you come to the fiber optic spooling, most of that is made in China. So we’re having this really fun intersection of technical overlap, skill overlap, and increasingly geopolitical overlap among countries and forces that have been general been anti a lot of things American for a very, very, very long time. 

There’s not a lot that Israel can do in the short term to counter the sort of activity. Their radars and their interceptors right now are woefully ill designed to deal with this sort of threat. And because of the fiber optics, jamming doesn’t work either. So really, all you can do is kinetic intervention. And at the moment, the Israelis don’t have enough skills in that set to make a meaningful difference. 

The one exception, the one thing that might be coming, is partnership with Ukrainians, who have been developing a lot of models to intercept exactly this sort of drone and have had a fair amount of success. But that also means stationing things at dozens, hundreds of points in order to get it wherever it happens to be launched from. So it’s changing the nature of what it means for Israel to be in a war. 

And it’s dramatically shifting the power balance between the Israeli military, which is one of the best in the world, and Hezbollah, which we thought had largely been shattered as of just a year ago. One more thing. A high end fiber optic spool that a drone can carry today has a range of up to 50km. So with something half that just a mid-range quality, somebody launching a drone from the Hezbollah Lebanese side of the Israeli Lebanon border could strike anywhere in Haifa and with a significant margin. 

So you can go after anything you can see can’t be jammed with a that’s physical infrastructure, vehicles, soldiers or the components that allow the Iron Dome to do Iron Dome things. So big game changer. All right. That’s it by.

Should Alberta Secede from Canada?

Cityscape of Alberta, Canada

Apologies for the wind on this video, one of the downfalls of recording with a view…

Enough signatures have been gathered to force an independence referendum and vote in Alberta. Just a reminder that secession is legally possible in Canada following a successful referendum.

The economic case for independence centers on Alberta’s youth and energy sector. With stronger demographics and a booming oil industry, some Albertans feel they disproportionately contribute without the respective influence in government decisions.

While some of this is true, an independent Alberta would still face major economic problems. We’re talking rapid inflation and labor shortages, necessitating a trade agreement with Canada or integration with the U.S. Bottom line is that the grass ain’t always greener on the other side.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Rocca Calascio which was in Ladyhawke. If you haven’t seen it, add it to your list. The news today is that we are going to have a referendum on independence in Alberta. They, the people who are in favor of independence, got the 10% of the provincial citizenry to sign the petition. 

So later this year, probably at the end of the summer, we’re going to have the vote. The premier that’s kind of the governor of Alberta has already signed off on it, and away we are for the races. I’m not going to predict how it’s going to go. It is up to the people of Alberta and no one else. 

But I want to outline three things. Number one, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled decades ago in the case that if there is a plebiscite and they vote for a referendum, you’ve got to let them go. So this this is legal by Canadian law. Technically, something like this would not be legal in the case of the United States. The Constitution forbids secession. We fought a little war over it. But Canada is different. So that’s piece 1. Piece 2. The economic argument for independence is basically the idea that Canada is aging very, very rapidly and Alberta is not. And Alberta has a dynamic energy sector that has been growing for some time. And as the rest of Canada gets older and Alberta does not. The financial transfers from Alberta to Canada have been getting bigger and bigger and bigger, and the Canadians don’t really give the Albertans much say in how that money is spent, so you can see why they’re a little agro’d. I want to point out a couple of things that have changed in the relationship, though. Over the last 20 years, Canada has really brought in a surge of migrants that have partially addressed some of the demographic issues. So the financial transfer issue is not as horrible in relative terms as it used to be. In fact, at this moment, in relevant terms, Alberta is actually in decent position financially versus the rest of Canada. It’s still by far in net providers the richest province by far. But the imbalance is not as bad as it looked like it was going to be when I first started talking about this issue 15 years ago. 

And then finally, should this pass and Alberta become independent, it would be screwed. Alberta is landlocked and their primary exports are oil and grain, and those are US dollar denominated commodities. And so if you have an independent Alberta exporting for hard currency, you have a very inflationary environment very, very, very quickly. That it would be difficult to survive in a country that now has a very, very limited labor pool. So the cost of an independent Alberta would be immense, which means that independent Alberta would need to do one of two things. Number one, negotiate some sort of extensive free trade pact with Canada that would be worse for Alberta than provincehood is right now. It’s kind of like the situation that Brits are dealing with as they talk about going back on Brexit and reentering the EU. 

Or number two, apply for US statehood and join the United States, in which case Alberta is still the richest province, would still be a net donator to the national budget, but it wouldn’t be nearly the same. The stretch, the delta between an Alberta state in the United States would not be nearly as large. Anyway, these are the decisions in front of them. How they play out? That’s entirely up to them. The campaign this summer is going to be wild.