Why I’m Bullish on Southeast Asia

Busy night in Hanoi, Veitnam

The world as we know it is going away. The large, interconnected systems that span the globe are breaking down, so those smaller, regional blocs are growing in importance. That’s why I’m bullish on Southeast Asia.

There’s a massive checklist of things that will be key in a deglobalized world, but let’s highlight a few that Southeast Asia exhibits. Strong trade networks (especially with the US). Solid demographics (thanks to Vietnam and Indonesia). A full production ecosystem, meaning low-skill to high-tech capabilities. Limited historical conflict thanks to strong geographic barriers between countries.

We’re going to be dealing with a fractured global economy, and Southeast Asia will weather this storm better than most.

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Transcript

Hey all Peter Zeihan here comes to you from Barney Lake in the Hoover wilderness. That is the juggernaut behind me. I am not going to claim that from this side. Maybe the other side to walk up. Anyway, I’m, I’m out on me. Is somebody trip? And I downloaded all of the questions that everybody at Patreon had. And so the first one we’re going to do today is about Southeast Asia. 

It’s an area that I’ve been relatively bullish on. And the question was basically asking for clarification, whatever details I can provide. So let me kind of give you the rundown. Globalization in its current form is trade among a medium sized number of countries that are relatively large or a part of blocs. So you’re China’s, you’re Japan’s, you’re Korea’s, your European Union’s, you’re United States, Canada, Mexico, countries like that. 

It’s not that smaller countries can’t play, but smaller countries have a harder time carving out a niche in this sort of world, unless they can cohere into something bigger. That’s problem one for smaller countries. Number two, when you break down the ties of globalization, all of a sudden these countries have to be reevaluated on different merits. 

So, for example, I talk about demographics in China being a deal. Enter, for the most part, and so you have to look at the demographic picture of what countries will be like five, ten, 15, 20 years from now and whether or not they’re going to have enough people to have a workforce to have a consumption base. 

And as these two things shift, Southeast Asia is well positioned to take advantage of both of them. First of all, the the overall globalization angle, if you remove big globalization, we’re going to have a series of little globalization, things like NAFTA, maybe the European Union, if they get really lucky, where a number of smaller countries can band together and form a smaller network. 

Well, the Southeast Asians have already done that. It’s called Asean. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Asean negotiates trade deals with bigger countries already. So here we’ve got a number of countries that already have trade deals with Japan, with Korea, with China, with the United States, with Australia. And if you remove the big globalization and go to a more regional format, they’re already halfway there. 

Second, on the demographic situation, these are some of the youngest countries in the world, and they’re all industrializing very quickly. Vietnam and Indonesia specifically are two of the best structures we have, having a balance of people who are more mature, generating more capital, doing more value added skills. And then people in the lower end who do more of the lower value added skills. 

In addition, within Southeast Asia, there’s a third factor. Not all the countries are the same. You actually have, in many cases, the full production suite just within this network. At the top you have Singapore, which may be small but is one of the world’s most advanced manufacturing countries as well as a financial hub in the middle. You’ve got countries like Malaysia and especially Thailand who have been high up in things like automotive and computing since the industry started and already are fairly wealthy. 

And then coming up from below, you’ve got the big countries, Vietnam and Indonesia, each which have over 100 million people, who are filling out the lower skill set. And in the case of Vietnam specifically, it is rapidly moving up the value added chain. And it if it keeps going at its current pace, 

It will actually have a more sophisticated economy than China. Probably within five years. And if, if, if, if the politics work out and who knows. You have countries like Myanmar, who are much poorer, but have an excellent internal transport network and a lot of people who could do the very low end things like assembly, you partner this sort of region with, say, Australia and New Zealand for food and resources, or the United States for technology and and markets. 

You have a really powerful combination. But my favorite thing about Southeast Asia is this isn’t like the North European Plain or the Eurasian Steppe or northern China, where their history is defined by not just centuries, but millennia of war and genocide. These are countries that really haven’t fought one another for over a thousand years. They are peninsulas. They are mountainous. 

They are islands. They have got jungle. Normally, these are not the sort of things that you want in your backyard. If you want to economically develop easily, they’re more expensive geographies that are harder to integrate, but it also means that these countries have never really duked it out, certainly not in the modern age. And if you take away big globalization with its big ships, all of a sudden little globalization with smaller ships in Southeast Asia looks really, really hot. 

And based on what happens with India, they’re right next door. So it doesn’t really matter what the future of the post globalized world looks like. these countries, look good on their own. They look good with their nearby partners. They look good with the United States.

“Made in China” Becomes “Made in Vietnam”

A made in China tag crossed out. Photo by Envato Elements and licensed

Vietnam has been clawing its way up the American import leaderboard. With Trump’s July 9 tariff decision-day quickly approaching, let’s look at why Vietnam is next in line to China.

Vietnam is geographically close to China. It has a highly skilled and large workforce. And it has the industrial ambition that matches US needs. But if we already have Mexico, why do we need Vietnam? They scratch different itches. Think of Vietnam as V2 of China – made up of integrated industrial clusters like Ho Chi Minh City. Mexico has geographically isolated centers that focus on whole products, rather than sharing production across cities. Each valuable, but perhaps Mexico is better suited for a deglobalized world.

Vietnam will still have to navigate the tariff situation, which might be a cluster-f*** given the lack of personnel and systems in place. However, that doesn’t make Vietnam any less crucial, it just means there will be some hurdles to jump.

China’s Central Military Commission (CMC) has the combined power of that of the US Joint Chiefs, Secretary of Defense, and President. The Chinese military is run by party loyalists, rather than experienced strategists; this, along with the constant purging of leadership, shows just how deep the instability runs.

I’m not saying that the US should just ignore the Chinese, but maybe we should take their military capabilities with a grain of salt.

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Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here. Coming from Colorado today, we’re gonna talk about Vietnam. We are approaching July 9th, which is the self-imposed deadline for the Trump administration’s for setting tariff levels for the whole world. So if you remember back to April 2nd, tariff day, that kind of kicked all this off and set the world into trade chaos. 

He has paused that process, but it restarts on July 9th, so we’re going to have a show. But Vietnam is a country that has been discussed a lot in the last few days, and I think it’s worth underlining why and why this is one of the countries that really matters. Arguably more so than almost any other country that’s outside of NAFTA. 

So background, back before Covid, everything was trying to try to try to try to try to try to try to trying to China. And with Covid, when the Chinese obviously prioritize their own system for supply chains, everyone started to adopt something that was called a China plus one strategy, where we admit that we still have a lot of exposure and a lot of commitment to our investments in the Chinese system, and that we’re dependent upon the Chinese for everything. 

But we really do need at least a partial backup since then that is involved into what they call an anything but China ABC. And for whether it’s the China Plus one or the anything but China. Vietnam has always been at the top of the list for everyone. And so in the time from 2019 until 2025, the American trade relationship with Vietnam has exploded, in percentage terms, far more than anyone else. 

And the reason is pretty straightforward. Number one, it’s proximate to China. So whether the Chinese are investing in Vietnam or the Americans are investing in Vietnam, Vietnam is a logical place to move things either from China or through Vietnam, from China, or to simply replace the production capacity, from China. It’s just right there. Number two, the Vietnamese have been working very hard at making themselves very attractive. 

Roughly 40% of college graduates, from Vietnam are Stem graduates. So if you want to build something, especially if it’s talking about technical work, Vietnam is a logical choice. In addition, this is a country with a very large workforce, roughly on par to what we have in Mexico. So it’s been a good match for a lot of industries. 

And then third, the Vietnamese are very ambitious. They’ve invested a huge amount into their educational system, as opposed to the Chinese system where they’re trying to go more white color and design, the Vietnamese are going into more technical work, and they’re basically trying to leapfrog China from a technological point of view. And they’re doing a really good job of it. 

They’re not teaching rote memorization and intellectual property theft, of the Chinese style. They’re actually getting their people just in to do more of high value out of manufacturing. So it’s been a solid choice. It’s worth spending a minute talking about the difference between Vietnam and Mexico. However, because these are two very different economies that approach manufacturing in a very different way. 

And while to a degree they are competitors, really, it’s a more complementary system. So in China you’ve got your major population centers. And for the most part they are surrounded by a line of secondary manufacturing centers. It’s a very similar system to how we were set up in the United States before NAFTA. 

So for example, you have Detroit, which is obviously a hub for automotive, but Detroit draws upon other communities in the area going out to say, say, Milwaukee. In order to add value, add it reaches across the border to, to Ontario as well. And so you have your central node and a lot of secondary manufacturing that contributes to that primary node. 

That is similar to the system that we have in China that is similar to the system that we have in Vietnam. So you really can, with the right amount of capital, pick up the industrial plant in China and then go and drop it in Vietnam. And we have seen that happen at a significant scale. That’s not how things work in Mexico. 

All of the Mexican cities that are integrated with the United States through NAFTA are desert cities. So when you get to the edge of town, there’s nothing, with the possible exception of Monterrey, where you have a little bit more rainfall. And so there are secondary centers, you basically have places like Chihuahua City or to what do you want to that are unique to themselves and there’s nothing near them. 

So these places, instead of having a multi-step manufacturing system where product, intermediate product goes back and forth among the various cities on the cluster, you simply have a city with a bunch of industrial parks, and most of the steps have to be carried out locally. That generates a different sort of industrial profile, because when you’re around Ho Chi Minh City or Hanoi or Shanghai or Detroit or Houston, you have all these other places that specialize in specific things. 

And so you basically have a cluster of specialization that comes together to make a product. In Mexico, it’s different in Mexico, they focus on one product per urban center. And then that product start to finish is done. There and that product is shipped out. So an example, if you’re in Detroit and you’re making a car, you’re probably going to be drawing spark plugs from across the border. 

You’ll probably make the transmissions yourself. You’re probably bringing the engine blocks from somewhere else. But if you’re in Mexico, you do the whole seat assembly for an airline share. For example, whether it’s the seat belts, the fabric, the molding, the metal framing, whatever it happens to be, it’s all done in Chihuahua City. And then that semi-finished product is shipped somewhere else for inclusion. 

Same thing for engines, same things for engine blocks. It’s not that one is better than the other, it’s that they function differently because of the economic geography they have to deal with. So when you look at Vietnam and you look at Mexico, it’s not that they’re competitors in the traditional sense. They build things differently. And as we’re moving into a world with fewer connections where we have to do more locally, the Mexican strategy by default almost works better because they’re not as dependent upon inputs of various types from somewhere else. 

They’re not as integrated into a broader supply chain system as we are normally used to. Thinking of. That doesn’t mean that the system isn’t going to work. As China degrades with or without a trade war, we are going to need more places like China in order to keep product flowing. And Vietnam is a very solid contender for that role. 

But it doesn’t take anything away from American integration with Mexico. We’re moving from a situation where we have something like 2 to 3 billion workers linked up through free trade to something significantly smaller. We need different approaches, and these are two that work pretty well. 

One more thing about Vietnam that is different. There are charges, legitimate ones, that the Vietnamese are not simply engaging in normal manufacturing in a way that the United States can process, that they are also serving as a translocation point. So Chinese product is finished, it’s shipped to Vietnam, it’s stamped Made in Vietnam, or maybe had some very light value, had done. 

And the ship to the United States, that is happening. And that’s part of the reason why the trade, between the United States and Vietnam has expanded so much over the last several years. Most of it is legitimate. Some of it is this, pass through trade. So one of the things that the Trump administration seems to be doing, which I think is a good idea, is finding a way to tariff those things differently. 

Now, I am of the belief that tariffs to Vietnam overall aren’t the greatest plan, because it’s just the wrong tool for the job. But if your goal is to break down, Chinese trans shipment trade in order to break the link between the United States and China, which I think is a good idea, using tariffs and a two tiered system makes a certain degree of sense. 

So the numbers that are being thrown around today are 20% from Vietnam, which I think is ridiculous, and 40% for the trans trade, which I think is reasonable. The danger here, as always, with tariffs, is going to be administration because someone will have to look at every product that comes in from Vietnam and assign a category. 

So it then has a tariff level. Considering that the Trump administration still hasn’t staffed out over 80% of the positions at cleared out in its first month, it is unclear who is going to do this, because it would require a significant expansion of customs officials in order to handle what is basically tens of billions of dollars of trade. 

Now, if, if, if a way can be found to handle that, then we’re in a different game. But at the moment the administration has not developed the technology, the personnel, the procedures that is necessary to do that at the scale required. So A for effort, D for approach.

Tariff spotlight: Vietnam

Photo of flag of Vietnam with tourists on top of a mountain

One of the countries who got caught up in the ‘Liberation Day’ crossfire was Vietnam. Through an arbitrary and poorly informed process, Vietnam was slapped with a 46% tariff.

Trump’s team is filled with loyalists that lack any semblance of expertise in their designated areas, so these inflated tariffs are more about pleasing Trump than logic. Which doesn’t make for great economic policy in case you were wondering.

Vietnam has been a key ally in reducing US dependence on China, but since Vietnam doesn’t import enough from the US due to the income disparity, Trump and his lackeys sniffed a trade deficit and bibbidi, bobbidi, punitive tariffs.

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Transcript

Hey all, Peter zine here, coming to you from a snowy Colorado. Don’t worry, it’ll be 70 degrees tomorrow. Any who, one of the countries that Donald Trump put tariffs on or. I mean, I guess, but not on all countries. But one of the bigger ones was Vietnam, who got a 46% tariff increase. There’s three things going on here. 

All of them are pretty stupid. So first of all, there’s the method. I have it from good sources that as of noon, the day that the Trump administration put the tariffs on everybody, which was at 4 p.m. on April 2nd. As of noon on that day, they still hadn’t really figured out the numbers or anything. And what they did is they took the trade deficit, divided it by how much the US exports. 

And that gave us the number. It had no indication that they had even glanced at what actual real tariff levels were. They certainly hadn’t done a study of non-tariff barriers. They just took the one measure that Trump is obsessed with and made it a penalty. And so Vietnam got a 46%. Now, why did it go down this way? 

Well, the first and most important thing to understand is that Trump has no help. It’s just him. Normally when someone spend some time out of power, they go through and recruit people who know things that they don’t know so that when they get back into power, they can hit the ground running, do some legislation, build up a system that will last beyond them. 

Trump’s done none of that. He actually fired everybody in his inner and his outer circle who had anything to do with anything, including everyone within the Republican Party, within the apparatus, and just built a nice little cult of personality around himself. And now that he’s in the Oval Office, he’s built an Obama esque shell of incompetence around him, surrounding himself with people who literally don’t know what’s going on. 

The two people who are most relevant to this conversation, we have a trade adviser for manufacturing called Peter Navarro. Navarro is an academic. He’s never actually worked with a company at any level. So everything that is in his mind on tariffs and trade and manufacturing is all stuff that he’s thought up and maybe studied, but never actually done in the real world. 

And he has a particular bone to pick with Canada. So that explains where a lot of the vitriol has come from on that front. The second person is the Commerce secretary, a guy by the name of Howard Ludwick. And how, geez, did a little looking into this guy. A lot of people have a lot of strong opinions. 

I think the nicest thing that I’ve ever heard anyone say about him is that he’s a Venal and craven. Anyway, he has earned a lot of enemies within even the upper echelons of the movement as being completely inflexible and completely immune to reality. And he has spent most of his time at Trump’s side basically telling Trump whatever he thinks Trump wants to hear. And so since he thinks Trump wants to hear about tariffs, he’s talking to Trump about how tariffs are such a great idea and how you have to make the numbers as large as possible. 

They don’t have to be rude in actual relationships and everything like that. And then of course, remember below, these people, especially a lot like Donald Trump, cleared out the entire Commerce Department. So there’s no one who can even try to inform the president, through the Secretary of Commerce, about what is actually going on in the world. As to Vietnam, specifically, Vietnam’s tariff rate on average, product by product is about 9.5%. 

And if you do it on a trade weighted basis. So whatever we trade more with, give that one more weight. It’s actually closer to 5%. It’s nowhere close to the 45%, that it is now. The reason it’s this high is because of the way the Trump administration manufactured the data that was necessary to give a high number. 

And the reason it’s so high is because of a huge success in American economic and national security policymaking. You see, the Vietnamese hate the Chinese way more than we do. And when Covid hit, and we found ourselves with a lot of supply chain disruptions that were Chinese related, American firms went into Vietnam in a very big way to build industrial plant, to diversify supply chains away from China. 

So in the last four years, we’ve seen a significant boost in exports out of Vietnam, specifically designed to cut China and Russia out of the loop. And the projects have been pretty successful. But in the short term, the Vietnamese aren’t wealthy yet, so they can’t afford to purchase American products. That manifests as a trade deficit. And the way that the Trump administration has made up the data, that means that they come in, looking pretty red. 

So this is a great example of where you take a country, Vietnam, that is going to undoubtedly be part of the American economic and security future and make the process of making that reality as complicated, as painful as possible. Hopefully the Trump administration and the Vietnamese government are going to find a way to get through this real quick. 

The problem, of course, with declaring success there is because the Trump administration’s data is literally manufactured. It can go whatever direction Donald Trump’s mood goes, and he’s got a couple of people whispering in his ears things that are both wrong, and are wildly misrepresented of the reality of the situation. So will it work? God knows. 

This isn’t based in fact any more. It’s just a fantasy, and it is already causing an extreme amount of pain and unwinding several years of very successful efforts to move away from the Chinese system.

Mr. Putin Goes to Hanoi

Photo of Vladamir Putin

With Russian President Vladimir Putin heading to Vietnam, some American security experts are getting concerned about the future of the US-Vietnam relationship. To understand why the Vietnamese are working with Russia, we need to take a quick history lesson.

Every American remembers the Vietnam War…the French have an even worse history in Vietnam…but both of those histories pale in comparison to China’s two millennia of conflict with Vietnam. All that to say, the relationship we’re seeing between Russia and Vietnam is simply a materialization of the phrase – “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”

Essentially, Vietnam is using Russia as a bit of a counter-balance to China; think of it as an extra layer of security for the Vietnamese peace of mind. Don’t let that fool you though, US-Vietnam interests are aligned against China and will continue to grow closer over the coming years.

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Transcript

Hey, everybody, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from the Turks Trail near Denver, Colorado. It is the 20th of June, and the news today is that Russian President Vladimir Putin is on a state visit to Vietnam. He landed in Hanoi last night. He’ll probably be seeing this tomorrow anyway, some American security folks are having a bit of a conniption fit because, they thought Vietnam was now firmly in the American camp. 

And that is not a very, nuanced understanding of why Vietnam and the United States are going to be good allies in the future. quick story. So there is a plaza, kind of an open air museum in Hanoi, near the Capitol complex where they commemorate basically all the conflicts of the past. And there’s this two foot tall structure, little obelisk to commemorate the U.S. Vietnamese military know was the Vietnam War. 

I was about 20 years. And right next to it, there’s another structure about ten feet tall to commemorate the France Vietnamese War, which lasted about two centuries. And next to that is the largest structure in the facility, which is about two stories tall, which is to commemorate the Chinese Vietnamese conflict, which lasted the better part of two millennia. 

you see, American and Vietnamese interests are converging because they are both concerned about China. And for Vietnam, this is typically their first and foremost, their their first or last, their only security concern because they’ve been conquered more than once. And if any number of military conflicts with a vastly superior power in terms of numbers, and they fought back just like they did and are now over and done pretty well for themselves anyway. 

Bottom line is that, will always see its security interest through that lens. And so if you go back to the Vietnam War, when we were on the other side, they saw it the same way. And so in the Vietnam War, you’re talking about things that happened after the Sino-Soviet split. And when you all of a sudden had Maoist China and Soviet Russia staring down one another, all of a sudden Vietnam came into play from the Russian point of view. 

So the Russians were back in Vietnam, not just because we were involved, but because the Chinese were involved. And so the Vietnamese became used to having the Russians as a counterweight to Beijing, not just Washington, and said, if you look at the relations that the Russians have with everyone around the world, they’ve gotten significantly worse with almost everyone with the West, with the United States, with the northeast, Asian countries like, Korea, Taiwan and Japan. 

That’s pretty straightforward. It’s straight up Ukraine war, but with other countries it has to do with military contracting. Russian weapons systems have proven to be not a lot advanced, especially when it comes to things like jets and air intake aircraft and missiles. And so countries like India that have literally soaked billions of dollars into the Russian military complex, only to discover that most of the money now was stolen. 

And most of the technologies that the Russians said they were developing just weren’t. And then, of course, there’s the weapon systems, the legacy weapon systems, billions of dollars of that going back years that don’t work as well as they thought they did. And the Russians are even combing the world for things like artillery shells and hoovering them up in order to have them in the war. 

This doesn’t really affect Vietnam. Vietnam doesn’t have an artillery army. It doesn’t use a lot of aircraft. It doesn’t use a lot of missiles. It doesn’t use a lot of armor. They want machine guns. They want RPGs. They want things that can be shoulder launched. They want anti-ship missiles. These are things that haven’t underperformed, in the Ukraine war to this point. 

So from Vietnams point of view, it’s almost unique in the world of arms, absorbers importers that they haven’t been disappointed yet by the performance of what’s gone on in the war. And so for the Americans out there who are concerned about the ally of the future, maybe not being all that, don’t worry about it. For the issues that matter to the United States in the region, we’re actually on the same page. 

It’s trying to trying to trying and trying to China. Now, I don’t doubt if you fast forward a couple of years, failures in the Russian military complex means it won’t have the capacity to export arms to Vietnam any longer. And then that part of the conversation changes, too. We’re just not there yet. 

What Makes Vietnam a Valuable US Ally?

Biden recently announced that he’d be making a trip to Vietnam, which will likely occur in September when he visits other regional powers. But what makes Vietnam such a valuable asset to have in the US portfolio of allies?

Is it because they’re a major regional power? Or because they have a better demographic profile than others in the region? Sure, that factors into it, but it really comes down to positioning and attitude.

Due to geographic challenges, the integration process (and political unification) following the Vietnam War has been an ongoing endeavor. While there’s no brushing past the ‘history’ that Vietnam and the US share, that pales in comparison to their history with the Chinese. If there’s one thing all the Vietnamese can agree on…it’s that they hate China.

But let’s not forget that the Vietnamese bring more to the table than just a desire to crush the Chinese. They would be a solid trade partner with strong demographics, a sound education system, and excellent relations with other regional allies. Sounds like a damn good deal for the US. The only sticking point is the Chinese-style political system that still exists in Vietnam…

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are not only free, they will always be free. We also will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Support medshare's ukraine fund
Support medshare's global efforts