America and Vietnam Set Sights on China

President Obama kicked off a trip to Asia with a visit to Vietnam, where he announced that the United States is fully lifting the arms embargo on Hanoi. In a joint press conference with Vietnamese president Tran Dai Quang, President Obama finished a process that has been proceeding incrementally throughout much of his term in office, namely slowly rolling back the vestiges of the United States’ bitter two-decade war against Vietnamese communists. Sentiments among many American Baby Boomers regarding Washington’s slow-but-steady outreach to Hanoi are mixed, but President Obama’s visit and decision to end the arms embargo reflect the United States’ determination to restructure Cold War alliances in a nod to today’s shifting global environment.

Countries like Vietnam are emblematic of the future of American alliance structures.

  • Hanoi is an inveterate land power—having proven itself sufficiently scrappy to resist centuries of Chinese encroachment and both French and US military might.
  • Lifting the arms embargo is unlikely to cause serious heartburn down the line for other friendly US states in Southeast Asia — namely Thailand and Singapore — because Southeast Asian geography is sufficiently rugged that Vietnam does not pose a threat to these states.

  • It helps strengthen pro-US sentiments among Vietnam’s vehemently anti-Chinese military leadership, a vital bulwark against Beijing’s regional interests for both Washington and Hanoi’s fellow ASEAN member-states.
  • Vietnam’s long eastern coastline is home to Cam Ranh Bay, the finest natural deep water harbor in South East Asia. Cam Ranh has hosted French, American and Soviet fleets in the past century.
  • Vietnam lies along the South China Sea and claims the Paracel and the Spratly Islands, rocky outposts that have become flashpoints in the powder keg of the South China Sea. Vietnam’s views on China and the South China Sea mean that its geographic and strategic positions are now in-line with American interests, rather than threatening them. Vietnam’s geographic position is now more strategic than ever, and its stance on China has opened the door for American influence.

  • Washington’s outreach to Vietnam cannot be defined purely through military or anti-Chinese positions. Vietnam’s large and youthful population represents a strong future growth market, and getting in on the ground floor of Vietnam’s push toward industrialization will be a boon to American manufacturers looking for both cheap skilled labor and a market for higher-end, US made goods. Vietnamese power and transport infrastructure is in desperate need of foreign technology and investment, and the country’s offshore energy assets represent several opportunities for US supermajors experienced in deep-water energy production.

The United States and Vietnam are burying the hatchet. Hanoi still has work to do on its end—economic and political reforms and the kinds of asides about human rights concerns US leaders habitually mumble about in front of journalists—but Washington is committed to working with the Vietnamese leadership to see that this process is carried out in-line with American regional interests. The process will have hiccups and headaches along the way, but the United States is committed to moving forward in what will be the bedrock of expanded US-ASEAN cooperation.

Cuba: Life After the Cold War

Outside of the political protestations regarding Obama’s visit to Cuba (it is a presidential election year, after all), the United States has a strong strategic interest in returning Havana to the American sphere of influence.

The geopolitical rationale is twofold:

A hostile Cuba, backed by a meaningful external power (such as the Soviet Union during the Cold War) could threaten control of America’s internal waterways—most notably anything exiting the Mississippi, as these exports have to pass either the Florida or Yucatan straits. Also at risk are the Intracoastal Waterway along the Gulf Coast. As the US becomes less interested in international trade, domestic exchange becomes more important, and so too does the political relationship with and within Cuba.

Cuba is the only portion of the Western Hemisphere through which American power does not thoroughly penetrate. That it is so close to US shores only heightens Washington’s interest.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Venezuela became Cuba’s key political and economic ally. With Caracas itself caught in the throes of political and social unrest, Cuba has no choice but to normalize relations with the US. And so it is.

There will be three primary changes that will emerge from the thawing of the last vestiges of the Cold War:

1) Tourism. Already underway, Cuba’s tourism sector is poised to soon become the top Caribbean destination for American tourists, and within a decade should be well on its way to resume its position as a sort of tropical Las Vegas. The embargo doesn’t even have to be lifted for this to happen.

2) Sugar. Cuba’s sugar industry is historically far stronger than America’s, and has operated with far lower costs. The island’s proximity to the Intracoastal Waterway and the Mississippi will vastly simplify the logistics of the sugar trade and distribution within the US market. Sugar production is set to at least double in the half-decade following the lifting of the embargo as investment flows into Cuba’s cash-and-tech starved sugar industry. The biggest obstacle is the US sugar lobby (far more powerful than most people realize), but America’s other agricultural producers will likely prove more formidable as they clamor to access a Cuban market heavily dependent on food imports.

3) Manufacturing. Perhaps one of the most frequently overlooked impacts of an American détente with Cuba. Although Cuba’s educational and vocational training system is vastly outpaced by the United States, Cuban wages are a mere fraction of what they are in the US. Cuba’s proximity means that the island can be integrated into US infrastructure and supply chains relatively easily, as well as NAFTA/CAFTA. Training, infrastructure and industrial plant buildout will take a decade, but the economic argument behind integration is solid.