The U.S. Gets a Taste of Corruption

Photo of a bronze trump doll on stacks of 0 bills

Trump is no stranger to helping out his cronies, but this new settlement that creates a $1.8 billion fund to compensate conservatives allegedly targeted by past Justice Department actions is a bit on the nose, even for him.

This slush fund is a reminder of the legal and regulatory erosion that the Trump administration is responsible for. The rule-of-law system that has supported the U.S. economy and government is now on some very shaky ground.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Vasto, Italy. Today is the 18th of May. You’ll see this later in the week. Short version is. We’ve probably had the single biggest step backward in rule of law in the United States of the second Trump term, which is, you know, saying it’s saying something in of itself. And the fact that I’m telling you this from Italy is a little concerning. 

The short version is today, the Trump administration settled a lawsuit that had brought against the US government while Trump was president. So basically Trump suing Trump and then settling with Trump to establish a slush fund of about 1.8 billion USD. Technically, it’s $1,000,000,776 million to compensate conservatives who have been prosecuted by the Justice Department in the past. Everyone who has been shortlisted to get a payout, as somebody who is one of Trump’s close political allies and in essence, this is a slush fund. 

This is the sort of operation that people in Italy have been telling you, like even the most crooked of our politicians would have never dreamed of doing something so obvious and brazen. This has a lot more in common with how Nigerian governments in recent decades have handled slush funds, basically suing yourself, controlling both sides of the negotiation, and then handing out the money to whoever you wanted to in the first place. 

Although even Nigeria has moved away from that model in the last 20 years, the most recent governments to do things like this were Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela and Hugo Chavez. This is hardly the first time the Trump administration in round two has done this. I really doubt it’ll be the last. The judge that oversaw the settlement basically said in legal terms, what the actual fuck? 

But here we are. This is what happens when you have an executive who sees the rule of law as part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. We should expect significantly more things like this. And this kind of dovetails with what has functionally happened with the tariff situation. Whereas the tariffs policies have changed so often that the only way that you can stay ahead of them is to have a really good relationship with the regulator, which is another way to say bribery. 

What was the other comparison I wanted to make? Give me a minute. It’ll come to me. Oh yeah. On the regulatory question, the Trump administration has gutted several of the regulatory bodies so that enforcement of the regulations that are on the books, even some of them from Trump, one can’t really be done in a timely manner, but they’re not bothering to staff these agencies with people who could strip out regulations from, say, the Obama or the Biden years. 

They’re just telling companies to not abide by them and put themselves in deep legal jeopardy that that a future administration might come after the before. But the Trump administration is saying, you know, all you have to do is not follow the law in its current form, and we’re not going to prosecute you. So it’s breaking down the rule of law that allows us business to be the most dynamic in the world. 

And basically following a model that the Russians had during the 1990s and the 2000, where you deliberately have conflicting guidance from the Kremlin and from law and from regulation, and the only way to stay on the positive side of that is to bribe everyone in sight. So mazel tov from Italy, a country that used to be run this way but found a different way.

Using U.S. Energy as Leverage

Two LNG tankers at port

Trade relations between the U.S. and Europe are on the fritz. The latest in all the noise is the suggestion that the U.S. could restrict LNG exports to the EU if trade negotiations break down.

This is a low blow, as Europe imports most of its gas. And if you haven’t noticed…the world is in a bit of a shortage at the moment. Cutting off exports would be legally and practically difficult, but a distressing notion nonetheless.

While the idea of using U.S. energy dominance as a negotiating tool isn’t surprising, I had originally pictured this strategy as being reserved for rivals, not allies. But there’s the Trump administration for you.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Pozza Della Cava caves in Ovierto, Italy. Today we’re looking at some of the strange things that are happening in US European relations. As you may or may not remember, the Trump administration is carrying out 200 simultaneous trade talks and none of them are really going anywhere, which means it’s really up to secondary officials that normally wouldn’t have much power in negotiations to kind of set terms. 

And one of them, Andrew Pozner, the US ambassador to Europe, has said that if talks between the Trump administration in Europe don’t go well on things like, well, this is neat on things like auto tariff levels that the United States is going to stop sending liquefied natural gas to the continent. Now, that’s it’s a total dick move, but that doesn’t mean it won’t work. 

Two things. Number one, Europe imports nearly 90% of their natural gas. And before the Ukraine war, it was more or less an even split between stuff from North Africa liquefied natural gas. It was imported from multiple countries, stuff from the former Soviet Union and then Norway. What’s happened now is that two of those got away because of the Ukraine war. The flows from Russia have stopped and because of the Iran worshiping strait, a former flows from Qatar, which is the largest LNG supplier to Europe pre-war, have also stopped. That means US natural gas is one of the few sources of energy that the Europeans can still access, and if that is to go away for any reason, then the Europeans are kind of screwed. 

So that’s kind of piece one. Piece two is how this would happen. It’s kind of difficult to imagine. That doesn’t mean it can’t happen, though. The issue is private enterprise. The United States doesn’t have a state or company. It just has private companies that are buying natural gas on the American market, cooling other facilities, typically on the Texas or Louisiana coast, and then shipping it out. So if the United States was going to bar those companies from selling to Europe as part of negotiations, there were definitely a bevy of lawsuits. But if there’s one thing about this administration that we really do understand is it’s deeply disinterested in general business conditions or the role the government plays in business, and it’s really not constrained by legal norms at all. 

So while from a clear, clean legal point of view, I don’t see how this would happen, I don’t think that would really dissuade the federal government under this administration at all. So will this work? This is one of the things that in my projects, in my books in the past, pre Trump, I said we should probably expect that the United States will try to leverage its energy, security and economic strength in order to get whatever it wants out of anyone. It’s just a little frustrating from my point of view, to see this used against allies as opposed to potential foes, but, you know, bygones.

Impacts on the U.S. Power Grid from the Iran War

Satellite view of north american lights and energy

The U.S. is relatively insulated from the conflict in Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, since it’s a net exporter of nearly every major energy source. Most other countries aren’t so lucky…

However, there are plenty of indirect risks for the U.S. Global energy shortages could spike commodity prices (like coal) and disrupt supply chains; this would affect key U.S. imports like aluminum, copper, and transformers.

So, the U.S. power grid is likely safe in the near-term, but secondary effects on infrastructure and manufacturing could complicate things down the line.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today, we’re taking a question from the Patreon page. Specifically, it’s whether or not I think that there are any parts of the US power grid that are particularly vulnerable to what’s going on in Iran right now, because of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, for example, 20% of global liquefied natural gas is locked in. 

And if you happen to be an importer of that, that’s a bit of a problem in any number of ways, because you can’t keep the lights on. Nothing else really matters. This is something where I’ve got some good Not only is the United States insulated because it’s in a different hemisphere, but the United States is a net exporter of every type of energy, whether that is raw electricity that’s already been generated, natural gas or jet fuel, naphtha, coal, all of it. 

Which means that unless there is a direct price link back to the United States through something that is used to make electricity, you’re kind of in the clear. The only fuel out there that really has that sort of link is liquefied natural gas. And the United States is the world’s largest exporter of that now. So there’s at the moment, no direct link. 

Now there’s plenty of indirect links. So for example, if you use coal in the United States and the United States is a coal exporter and the price of coal goes up on a global basis because of energy shortages related to other countries having power problems, and you might feel indirectly, or if you want to take a longer step in something, we’re all going to feel probably by the end of the year, the sort of rolling energy crisis that we’re starting to see in East Asia and to a lesser degree in is absolutely going to hit manufacturers markets. 

And the United States imports. A lot of the things that we use to stabilize our own power grid, whether that’s aluminum cabling for things like power lines, copper for anything that goes into electronics, and more advanced pieces of equipment like transformers, which take over a year to build. Because of the complexity, we will be feeling that in our power grid, but that is very indirect. 

That is not this month. That is a problem for probably the fourth quarter of this year. So for what it’s worth. I do have a little bit of good news from time to time.

Iran Diplomacy Has Yet to Begin

Two diplomats shaking hands in front of flags. Licensed by Envato Elements

The administration’s centralized and personalized approach to foreign relations has collapsed U.S. diplomacy across multiple fronts, including stalled Iran talks, poor relations with allies, and uncertainty ahead of future negotiations with China.

Transcript

Hey all. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re taking a whole batch of questions from the Patreon page and kind of lumping them together. And the general topic is diplomacy in the Iran war. Now, a lot of folks have been wanting me to comment on every ebb and flow in every Trump administration initiative or Truth Social post. And, you know, number one, that would be exhausting. 

Number two, to the bigger point, most of these things don’t matter. The way diplomacy normally works is you have a cadre of people in the State Department and the CIA and the Defense Department in the national security apparatus, whatever it happens to be. And they all have their own contacts that they maintain on behalf of the government on the other side. 

And you have back and forth communications that all of these people at lower levels, medium levels, higher levels, and those people are used to shape the conversation so that when the president comes in, all the groundwork has done been done already. The issue we have with the Trump administration is most of those people have been fired, and the ones that haven’t have basically been barred from carrying out any sort of diplomacy because Trump sees this as his personal purview. 

So, for example, when you look at the Chinese summit that’s supposedly is about to happen, it wasn’t until last Friday and Thursday and Friday when, for the first time, major CEOs were starting to get approached about whether they could join the president’s delegation. All of the groundwork that is normally done to make sure that the president isn’t wasting his time, none of it is being done. 

And so the president will go. It will either be a completely pointless summit, or chairman G will probably be able to convince Donald Trump to do things that the United States really, really, really, really would not want him to do. Basically, Trump has become the biggest dove in the administration in relationships with almost every country, because he sees himself as the only one who can make a decision, which is true. 

But he also sees himself as the only one who’s even worthy to talking him to, which is not. So you play this toward the Iran war, when the State Department is out of it, when the national security is out of it and the Defense Department is out of it. You basically have what’s left is just the president and whatever individuals who chooses to appoint. 

What we’ve seen so far are three people that have been appointed JD Vance, the vice president, who was sent once and it was such a disaster, he was removed from the team completely. We have Steve Wycoff, who is in competition for being the dumbest man in America and has never come back to the white House with anything that is useful except for the propaganda of the other side. 

And so relations, when Whitcomb is involved, are generally stalled with everybody. And then Jared Kushner, who is the son in law of the president, who is not an idiot but always is coming at things from the point of view of I want to walk away from this with a real deal. And so you get these New York Jewish real estate folks who are going to places like negotiations with Iran. 

And shockingly, not a lot of us happened. So what happened at the end of last week is probably the best example I can give you. There was a one page, one page memorandum that the United States sent the Iranians, which wasn’t rejected out of hand, but is already being stretched onto a two week process to evaluate one page, because that’s about all the attention span Donald Trump has. 

Like you could resolve everything in Israeli-Arab-Persian relations in one page. So while that was going on, Donald Trump also pushed forward this other idea called Project Freedom, where the US Navy would start escorting vessels in and out of the Persian Gulf. Now, there’s a lot of tactical reasons that won’t work. 

I think I’ve dealt with that already, but let’s talk about the diplomatic reasons why it didn’t work with the whole Iran war. Donald Trump refused to consult with any of the allies in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East, with the exception of Israel. Of course, that was party to the war, which means that when the war did not resolve in the way Donald Trump wanted to, none of these countries felt that they could or should get involved, because they had no say in how it was carried out in the first place. 

That also carried forward with Project Freedom. After one day, the Saudis said, you can’t use our airbases for this anymore because you’re not taking negotiations seriously. So unless and until you cancel Project Freedom and start talking to the Pakistanis, who are the interlocutors again, you can’t use Saudi air bases to enforce Project freedom. So the thing was canceled after two days after a grand total of two ships were escorted. 

Unless and until Donald Trump realizes that the US doesn’t have the military force to break open the Persian Gulf until he realizes that only a political deal with Iran is going to end the situation. We’re just in this holding pattern with the entire region is offline. Now, I would argue that Trump aside, a lot of the stuff is never coming back anyway. 

But as long as Donald Trump is the president, until he changes his negotiating tactics. We haven’t even begun meaningful negotiations at any level on this topic, because he doesn’t allow the lower level people to do their jobs. He thinks it has to be him. And so he’s established himself as a single point of failure throughout the entire bureaucracy of diplomacy that we have with absolutely everyone on every topic. 

And lo and behold, we don’t have a meaningful trade deal with anyone. After a year and a half, Iran talks are stalled and relations with all of the allies are at the worst that they have been in decades. It’s going to be really interesting to see how this China summit goes, because the same lack of preparation and consultation that has happened with everything else, with the administration, applies to the second most powerful country in the world as well. 

So it’s going to be some good watching. But don’t expect anything to be a meaningful deal in the way that most people mean the term.

So You Want to Break Iran…

Satellite view of the Strait of Hormuz

The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has forced Iran to get creative with its oil storage.

Iran hasn’t been able to get its oil out of the Gulf, so they’ve started using available shadow fleet tankers as floating storage near Kharg Island. But as the other tankers begin to return from their delivery routes from before the blockade, dozens could get stuck waiting to get home.

Now, I’m not one to give targeting advice, but if the U.S. needed to do something that would force Iran to the negotiating table…I can think of a couple of really appealing targets.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Utah today. Today we’re going to talk about an aspect of the energy crisis is going on in the Middle East and a possible partial solution. I don’t want to oversell. It has to do with what you go after. Now, I don’t provide military targeting data. Oh my God, no. But if I were to, this is where I would nudge things. 

It has to do with tankers. We know that with the double blockade in place, the Iranians are losing access to places to put crude. Normally they export about 2 million barrels a day, mostly on shadow tankers, mostly in violation of sanctions. That goes out of the Strait of Hormuz to India, around India, around the Strait of Malacca and up into Northeast Asia, primarily China, but also a little bit to Taiwan, Korean time and Japan. 

Anyway, that is currently blocked for them. So they’re pulling tankers out of mothballs, parking them near Kharg Island, which is their primary export point in the northern extremes of the Persian Gulf, and loading them up to use as floating storage. They can do this until they run out of tankers. Here’s part two. The type of tankers that the Iranians use are very large. 

You either have the literally VCs, very large crude tankers that can carry up to 2 million barrels, or even a few ultra large crude carriers. It can carry up to 4 million barrels. Now, when those things take this trip, they can’t go through Malacca, especially the ulcers, because the strait isn’t deep enough. And the draft of these ships, when fully loaded, makes them detour further east around a place called Lombok. 

Well, getting from Cargo Island out of the strait around the subcontinent, through Lombok and up to Northeast Asia, that takes about 28 to 30 days and then about five days for them to kind of turn around and queue into port, unload everything, and then come back, usually come back through Malacca because they’re not as heavy then. You do that time frame and you look at the point where the US really started the, blockade, and next week is when the last of those tankers comes back. 

So what we’re seeing is the development of a tanker parking lot off the coast of Iranian parts in the Indian Ocean, which means there’s already about 20 there. We’ll probably have another ten there next week, and then that’ll be all of them. Well, these are all Iranian government owned. These are all shadow tankers. And if something were to happen to them, then the Iranians, even if the sanctions were lessened, couldn’t export without using unsanctioned tankers. 

So if you’re looking for a way to force the Iranians to accept a deal that also closes down the shadow fleet, this is probably the way to go. And since these tankers are being held out in the Indian Ocean well away from population centers in Iran, you also wouldn’t face the same degree of damage or threat from Iranian military capabilities if they were to all be seized and relocated. 

So again, I don’t provide targeting information, but if you’re looking for an economic way to force Iran to the table in a more serious way, going after the royal production is probably not the right way. But if you take away their transport options, then they really don’t have another choice.

This Ain’t Your Father’s Tanker War

Navy warship with guns facing forward

No, the U.S. can’t escort tankers in the Persian Gulf today as it did during the 1980s Tanker War.

Back in the 80s, the U.S. swooped into a regional conflict where attacks on shipping were limited, and the Strait remained open. Neither of those is the case with the Iran War. The U.S. Navy has fewer ships today than it did back then, so widespread protection is a much different conversation (especially with thousands of commercial ships trapped). And of course, modern warfare has evolved. We’re dealing with drones and missiles that leave the U.S. Navy much more vulnerable.

You add all that up, and we’re looking at a very different Tanker War than the one your daddy saw in the 80s. So, the only path forward is likely a political one.

Transcript

Morning everybody, from a foggy Colorado. Today we’re taking a question from the Patreon crowd specifically why the US can’t escort tankers and civilian ships like them to and from the Persian Gulf like we did back in the 1980s during the Tanker war? Well, three big differences. Number one, first, the nature of the conflict. 

The last time around in the tanker war, the United States was a late comer. It was originally a conflict that was a subset of the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988, and by the time we got to the town of that conflict, both sides were trying to destroy the other’s economic opportunities. And since they lacked the military capability to make a meaningful pushes towards oil production, they went after concentrations like the tankers. 

And so you had Iraqi aircraft that were Iranian tankers, and the Iranians would use a combination of surface ships, speedboats and missiles like the Chinese Silkworm to go after Iraqi and everyone else in the street was just kind of caught in the crossfire. 

Most of the damage done, most of the attacks were in the northern part of the Gulf, where most of the was originally exported. And so the United States came in with an aircraft carrier battle group, put it in the Gulf along with multiple task forces. And at any time involving 40 to 80 ships and some ships like Kuwaiti tankers would be reflagged and others would just be escorted in. Each cluster typically had five destroyers and a number of Coast Guard cutters assigned to it, and they would go in big convoys. 

That’s all different this time. This time it’s a direct conflict between the United States and Iran. And Iran has chosen shutting down the strait as a direct means of attack in the United States has chosen shutting down Iranian shipments as a direct means of attack. So unlike last time when the strait itself was open and the Iranians and the Iraqis were selective in their targets, now are on is willing to attack, pretty much anything in the United States is blocking all shipments from all Iranian ports. 

So that’s the first big difference. The nature of the conflict is very, very, very different. Second, the the nature of the US Navy is very, very different. Back then the United States had a 500 plus ship Navy. Today we’re under 300. And while today ships are faster and tougher and far more lethal, they are fewer in number. And so putting as many vessels into the Persian Gulf is just not an option. 

Also, something that was present back then was the Coast Guard. But the Coast Guard has been steadily whittled down over the course of the last 40 years and doesn’t have enough ships to spare. In addition, the US ships that are involved are tend to be larger and tougher, and if they’re going to slow down in order to convoy, that’s a bit of a problem. 

So remember, there were like 60 ships at any given time that were part of the escort effort last time. Today we only have 60 destroyers, and half of those at any given time are designed to protect the carriers and United States under Donald Trump, I think, wisely, has chosen to not put a carrier in the Gulf. Yes, you would be able to use closer munitions that are cheaper and easier to replace, and that’s our very real consideration. 

But it also means that a carrier could be attacked by the third difference, which is a new generation of warfare. Back then, Iran was only emerging. I was on the tail end of a really long, grueling war with Iraq. Its weapons choices were somewhat limited. You had the Chinese silkworms that had a range of about 50 miles and 1,000 pound warhead, and the Persian Gulf isn’t 50 miles wide. So it was pretty easy for something like a carrier to be over the horizon, be basically immune to anything that the Iranians can do. That’s not where we are anymore. Today’s drones might need GPS targeting, but we now have a series of things called super heads, which don’t, which means that they can choose their own target when they get close. 

And if there was a carrier in the Gulf, I can guarantee you that the United States would be under constant missile bombardment. And as we’ve seen with the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf, the U.S. is basically run out of interceptors, and the ability to protect its own ships would be limited. Over the weekend, when we saw the first effort by the United States to escort vessels, that was really the first time we’d seen major surface combatants from the United States in the Gulf at all. 

In this conflict, we’ve been doing everything at arm’s length. That means we’re running out of long range munitions, which is a problem. But it also underscores the degree to which that this is contested space now. And the United States can’t just sail in and break it open. In addition, when we did this in the 1980s, you were talking about typically 11 ships at a time as part of the convoy group. 

There’s 2000 ships trapped in the Gulf right now. So we’ve got different ships. It’s a different kind of conflict. We don’t have the numbers, and the numbers that need to be moved are just massive. The only way to open the Gulf is with a political solution with Tehran. And again, talks have yet to begin on that topic. 

About the only good news I can give you is that we’re now seeing early signs that the Iranians are starting to shut in oil production because they don’t have anywhere to put it. Just keep in mind that the Iranians do consume a couple million barrels a day themselves, and that will never get shut in. So they can be selective about what they’re shutting in. 

It’s not like you just flip a switch tomorrow and all of a sudden they’re out of money. But for the first time in the conflict, we are now seeing economic pressure on the elements of the regime that are making the security decisions. That is encouraging conversation. Those conversations just haven’t really started yet. The biggest takeaway is that the United States is the world’s most powerful navy, with the best projection power in human history, and we now know for the mix of geographic reasons and economic reasons and technical reasons, that the US Navy no longer has the ability to impose a strategic reality on a local basis against a to be perfectly blunt, fourth rate security power. This is a big change in how the world works. It is very, very, very easy to deny civilian access now. And it is very, very difficult to restore it. And you can play this specific scenario out on almost any place in the Eastern hemisphere. And it’s difficult to see the US Navy doing any better. So if we do get into a fight with a real country in the future, we should count on those waterways being closed for at least the duration of the fighting.

Why U.S. Deployments in Germany Matter

German military doing exercises in the field

Relations between the U.S. and Germany are quickly deteriorating. German Chancellor Merz has criticized the U.S. for lacking a coherent negotiation strategy. President Trump responded by floating the idea of reducing U.S. troop deployments in Germany. It’s one big mess.

The issue with Trump’s proposal is that it assumes the only reason for the bases is to defend Germany. These bases aren’t just some peace offering; they are the backbone of U.S. global power projection.

Without key facilities like Ramstein Air Base and Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, U.S. operations in the European theater (and beyond) would cease.

Transcript

Hey all. Peter Zeihan here. We recorded this video on German relations with the United States and the future of U.S. military power. Back on the 1st of May. That was Friday for release today on May 4th. But events have kind of accelerated. So we need this little topper. Very, very short version is Donald Trump announced the imminent withdrawal of 5000 US troops from Germany. So it’s not a threat to more. It’s actually happening. This is the beginning of the end of the alliance with Germany specifically, which has huge implications for everything the United States does. But we’ll get to that in the video. 

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about the most recent leg of the American alliance system that looks to be breaking. That is the relationship between the Americans and the Germans. The key issue is that last week, Mertz said  Mertz is the chancellor of Germany, said the quiet part out loud that the United States doesn’t have a negotiating strategy and doesn’t even really have negotiators. 

And it’s just kind of embarrassing to watch how the Iranians, who have both are humiliating the Americans at every turn. It’s an assessment that is not particularly controversial outside of manga circles. The State Department has been gutted. The prime point person for American negotiations is Jared Kushner. Not that he’s incompetent, but his assistant is Steve Wyckoff, who is incompetent. 

And the only other person who’s been involved at this point is JD Vance, who has never negotiated anything. So, yeah, it’s going really badly for the United States in these talks. And in the meantime, the global economy is starting to sag. Something impressive. Anyway, Donald Trump being a little sensitive, a little sensitive snowflake decided that now is the time to talk about cutting the American troop deployment into Germany. 

So I thought it would be useful for everyone to understand what the United States gets out of that. There’s this feeling in some parts of Washington, the American political spectrum, that the American deployments to Germany are about protecting Germany. And there is a degree of truth to that. But keep in mind that Germany has not been a front line state since the expansion of NATO in the early 2000. 

And now there’s this whole Poland thing between them and the Russians. So the two main facilities that the United States has are an air base in the hospital. Ramstein is one of the largest air bases in the world and allows the United States to project power throughout the European, the former Soviet spheres, directly and then indirectly into the Middle East. 

We basically ferry troops and equipment through there. And then there’s Landstuhl, which is the military hospital that over the course of the war on terror, serves as the primary evacuation destination for any forces operating throughout the broader Middle East who were injured and in the end, probably saved 100,000 lives. If you’re going to slim down the American position to either of those facilities, and collectively they are, one of America’s top three deployments, kind of moves around with Korea and Japan. 

That is it for American power projection in Europe, in the former Soviet Union and in the Middle East. If we were to try to project power to any of those three regions, without those German facilities, we would have no logistics support and no backup should something go wrong. And as we’ve seen in every single military conflict the United States has ever been involved in any of those three regions, something always goes wrong. 

That’s just the nature of war. We would also, and perhaps this is the one that will resonate more with some people. We will also have significantly higher death rates. Landstuhl is a crisis center for medical needs. And so if you get hit by an IED or shrapnel at the time it takes to fly you back to the American mainland, you’re probably not going to make it. 

But if you only have to make the Germany, that’s a different question. Anyway, bottom line is, with the possible exception of American military forces in Okinawa, in Japan. This is arguably the most important footprint the United States has anywhere in the world for power projection. And if a real effort is made to slim that down, you honestly can’t slim it down too far before it simply becomes nonfunctional. 

It takes 30,000 American forces to keep these things open to the degree that’s necessary to facilitate American military power. Now, if you just want to abandon the entire Eastern Hemisphere to its own devices, then yeah, by all means, close it down. Just be prepared for spending a lot more than $2 trillion a year on the defense budget, because at that point, doing everything alone means having to have the equivalent of carrier stationed around the world at all times simply for logistical support. 

That is by far the most expensive way to do.

Markets Flash Back to the Past

Stock market candlesticks trending upwards

Before you get too excited, NO, I’m not giving away any financial advice. However, whatever the global markets are doing right now doesn’t match the physical reality of the Iran war.

We’re seeing major disruptions, yet prices and trading patterns reflect high confidence that everything is fine. That’s far from the truth. A quarter of globally traded oil is gone. Key industrial inputs are gone. Refineries in Europe and Asia are stuttering due to supply issues. Commercial and strategic inventories have been tapped.

The discrepancy comes from the way markets are designed; they’re meant to respond to marginal changes, not a catastrophic loss in production capacity. Markets just don’t know how to factor that in and price it appropriately. And sooner or later, reality is going to catch up to everyone…

Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re going to do something a little different and talk about markets. Don’t worry, there’s no trading advice in this. I don’t do that. But markets have been very, very strange since the Iran wars started. They’ve been gyrating but really have not shown any understanding of the threat that we have been facing. 

We have roughly one quarter of all internationally traded oil that floats on the water that has not simply been disrupted, but is gone. Even if the war were to end the second, most of that’s not going to come back on before the end of the year. Some of it will be gone for a couple of years. That’s before you consider natural gas or alumina or aluminum or fertilizer or the various products that come out of gutters, natural gas processing facilities, these things, these things are gone. 

We now have a weapon system in place that has a reliable range of 600 miles, which is triple what they need in order to disrupt things on the other side of the Gulf. They are difficult to jam, they are difficult to intercept. And with the technologies in place and in existence at the time, it can’t be done at cost in any sort of reasonable cost. 

The markets are pretending to themselves that we are simply hours away from peace and going back to things as they were before, and with every Trump troop social post, we get gyrations up and then something like, say, the United States hijacking a supertanker comes along and we barely get a response. This degree of retardation in the markets makes very little sense to me. 

And then I thought about it a little bit more. It is because the markets are being presented with something they’ve never been presented with before. You see, since 1945, we’ve had a globalized system where the United States upholds what makes it all work. And I remember that whenever I walk into a room full of finance people explaining that the world after 1945 is based on American security guarantee, this is something that surprises them. 

In the United States, the idea that economics for the US is a subset of security is something that really never gets processed, and the financial crowd is arguably either the top or the second most globalized of America’s industries. So for them, the idea that the entire underpinning of their sector is now gone is something that really takes a while to get their mind around. 

And so the money keeps flowing. So stock markets are stable to up all prices despite the gyrations have been trading within a reasonable band. And we haven’t seen anything like the disruptions in oil markets like that we saw back in 2007 at the dawn of that financial crisis, and those disruptions were largely non-existent. The ones now are permanent. 

So what is going on here for real, and what should we expect? Well, let me give you a few items. Just kind of file away in the back of your head. Number one, we are seeing reduced refinery runs across Europe and across East and southern Asia. This is not demand destruction. Demand destruction is when prices reach a certain point that people change their economic activity because they can’t afford the energy or what product, whatever it happens to be, that’s not what we’re seeing. 

We’re nowhere near those 2007 highs that triggered real demand destruction. And that’s before you consider inflation index terms were barely half of that level. No, the refineries aren’t slowing down operations because there’s no demand. They’re slowing down operations because there’s no feedstock. We’ve had such a deep and ongoing disruption to energy outflows from the Gulf that over half a trillion barrels of crude now have not been produced, have not been shipped to port, have not been loaded on tankers, have not sailed out of the Strait of Hormuz, have not gone to their end destinations. 

Which means that if we’re seeing refinery runs reduced, it’s not just that there’s not enough crude making it out of the Gulf, it’s that the crude oil reserves of the various companies and countries are being depleted to the point that it’s affecting refinery operations. We’re also seeing already reductions in things in shipping, most notably diesel. In the case of trucks in places like Australia or China or Europe, and jet fuel pretty much everywhere except for the United States. 

That means that these shortages aren’t just a throughput issue. They’re not just a reserve issue. It’s a commercial inventory of refined product issue. And that sort of breakdown is something we have never seen in the post-World War II environment, not once. And markets don’t know how to price that, because how do you price a barrel of crude that is never produced in the first place? 

What modern markets do is they look for price signals, slight changes in supply or demand from this market or that market or that subsector, whatever it happens to be. And then the price of crude adjusts around that, and that provides forward price signaling for things like producers. We are not seeing that because that is not happening. We have seen a gross dislocation of the structure of production and transport, and they don’t know how to price that. 

Under normal circumstances, higher prices would stimulate more production. But most fields take somewhere between 4 and 11 years to come online. In the United States, that has shrunk down because of the shell revolution to weeks to months. But that just is at the wellhead. If you want to export crude to a world that can’t get enough of it. 

Well, then you need export infrastructure. And you don’t do that in a day or in a month or in a year. Which means at some point in this year, we have a fundamental break between the reality of what’s going on in the ground with energy and this facsimile that exists in the financial markets. What we’ll look on the other side of that break, don’t know. 

But two things. Number one, it’s coming soon because we’re reaching the point. There just isn’t enough product to carry out normal activity. And number two, I can guarantee you it’s going to involve rationing. And rationing is not something the market does well. That’s something that requires government intervention. And when that happens the question is what our markets what is their purpose then it’s supposed to be about the efficient allocation of capital. 

But that’s not the world we’re about to be in. We’re going to be in a world of absolute energy scarcity and the financial markets arguably not going to be a player in that. Now, whether that’s a buy or sell trade, I will leave up to you. I don’t think it really matters at this point. One of the things that most people forget is over the long run of global history and the period before World War two, it was the nature of almost every market in existence to ultimately go to zero, as the foundations that allowed it to exist broke. Well, get ready return to the past later this year.

The Iran War Approaches a Tipping Point

Missiles with Iranian flags on them

The Iran war is approaching a painful tipping point this week. Global energy flows remain in a chokehold, and economic conditions are worsening worldwide.

This week’s shift will be caused by Iran’s oil storage reaching capacity. Once that happens, Iran will have to shut in wells, which will cause long-term damage to production capacity. The fallout from that will be sure to get the IRGC riled up.

Now that the real decision-makers will feel the pressure, there will be an opening for policy change. The outcome, however, remains uncertain.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Nashville. You are going to see this video on Monday the 27th. And this week is going to be a big week in the Iran war. We’re in this painful economic state where both the Iranians and the United States are blockading traffic in and out of the Strait of Hormuz, which has caused any number of problems downstream, whether it’s jet fuel shortages or just general economic dislocation, it’s bad. 

It’s getting worse. It will continue to get worse for months. This is not something we’re going to fix this year or probably even next year. But for the first time, by the end of this week, the people in Iran who matter will finally feel some pain. One of the aspects of the American blockade is to make sure that the Iranians cannot get crude out. 

Now, normally, Iran only exports about a million barrels a day, but based on buffers in their storage system at a place called Kharg Island, they can surge out if they have stuff that’s already on site. What that does mean, however, is that once the blockade is in, that storage starts to fill up. Most people estimate that they have between 30 and 35 million barrels of storage and Kharg. 

And that’s really all the storage they have in the country for crude. And now that we’ve had the blockade in place for quite a bit, we’re probably going to see that storage hit full capacity this week, probably on Thursday or Friday, which means for the first time, it’s not an issue of short term income disruption. It’s a question of the Iranians then having to forcibly shut in their wells. 

You see, it’s one thing to cut off their day to day income for a few days, a few weeks, a few months, a few years, whatever happens to be if they know they can ultimately still get it out. But if you clog up the system and prevent exports completely, then they have to shut in wells, and those wells will never come back on in the same way. 

And they might have to do some redrawing, which means a long term degradation of their capacity to generate income at all over the years to come. Now, the people who are calling most of the shots right now are with the IRGC. That’s the paramilitary organization that enforces security, that controls the missile force that has been doing most of the drone attacks, and they make their money by a combination of smuggling and oil sales. 

So for the first time in this war, they actually have a reason to change policy. Is that something that is going to happen? You know, who knows. But this is the first time they will actually feel pain. And if there is going to be something that the Trump administration is going to do to take advantage of that, we get the beginnings of that strategy by the end of this week. 

Way too soon to suggest that there’s going to be success or failure in any particular direction. But this is the first thing that the United States has done for long enough that matters to the people who are actually making the decisions.

America’s Leg Up on Petrochemicals

Petrochemical plant

The Iran War has caused a massive disruption in global petrochemical production. Since most of the world relies on oil-derived naptha, the ~12 million barrels/day shortage is taking a toll.

Many countries in Asia and Europe are beginning to feel the pressure, but the U.S. has a leg up on everyone else. Thanks to the shale revolution, America’s cheap and abundant natural gas is used to produce its petrochemicals. This has enabled the U.S. to avoid shortages and become a dominant global supplier of key petrochemical inputs.

Nearly every industry, from plastics to fertilizers, is impacted by these materials. So, the global industrial landscape is getting shaken up once again.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Walla Walla, Washington. Today we’re talking about the Iran war and the impact that it is having on petrochemicals. 

The way most of the world decides to make petrochemicals is they start with crude oil and then refine it into an intermediate product called naphtha and then naphtha. 

Then it goes on and is processed into tens of thousands of things that we all use every day. That’s not how it operates in the United States. In the United States, because of the shale revolution, we have basically a bottomless supply of natural gas. Based on whose math you’re using, roughly one third of the natural gas that is produced in the United States, it’s produced is a waste product, or at least as an associated production of oil, which means that in the United States, natural gas is significantly cheaper compared to the cost of oil. 

So in the rest of the world pre-war, the ratio between oil and natural gas on a point of view was about 5 to 1. In the United States, it’s closer to 2 to 1. So we use natural gas to produce products that, everyone else would use naphtha for. Well, what has happened? Two things. Number one, all that natural gas means that the United States can produce most petrochemicals at a significant cost advantage versus everyone else. 

Second, with the Iran war going on now, there’s a global shortage of oil to the tune of about 10 to 12 million barrels a day. So everyone else is hardware is designed to turn oil into naphtha, into petrochemical products. But all of a sudden, the price of oil on the availability of oil means that basically everyone in the East Asian rim, and very soon, everyone in Europe, simply can’t access the product they need at all, and they don’t have access to enough natural gas in the first place to switch over. 

And even if they did, they’d have to change their hardware to be able to do it. So the United States is becoming, from an economic point of view, the only real functional, large scale supplier of the butadiene and methyl groups, which is where we already had, huge advantage. And that’s things like, particleboard and silicones and octane for gasoline and nitrogen fertilizers and melamine, plastics, a lot of things like that. 

Whereas everybody else is now discovering that they don’t have the price structure that’s necessary to maintain competitive production of really any of this. Third problem, because the United States, is able to have an advantage now in all of the product sets. We’re seeing a significant shift in production quantities as well as qualities. So let me show you this chart here. 

If you start at the bottom left, that gray bars oil, you turn into naphtha, which goes on to make all the water products go to the right side. At the bottom you start with natural gas. You crack it to get ethylene, and then you turn that into products. But this whole set can be made with natural gas. 

And so the United States has not just a price advantage now, but just a huge advantage in the quantity, the type of products that can be made in mass. You play this forward for six months, two years, which is easily going to happen because of the Iran war. And we’re looking at a shattering of the petrochemical supply chains on a global basis outside of North America, and that’s going to have massive impacts downstream on pretty much every industrial sector.