Can Mar-a-Lago Solve the Leadership Vacuum in Europe

Photo of Trump's residence in Mar-La-Go

The Europeans are having a bit of a leadership crisis at the moment, and it’s coming at an inopportune time…you know, with the Ukraine War raging on. Countries like France and Germany are facing the biggest hurdles, so let’s break those down.

President Macron of France saw his government collapse after a no-confidence vote, which left them with six months of gridlock and nothing to show for it. In Germany, Chancellor Scholz’s coalition has collapsed, and the elections that are likely coming could open the door for some unsavory characters to make their way into office.

When France and Germany struggle with leadership, so does the rest of Europe. And with Trump entering office across the pond, certain European nations are looking to get on his good side before he starts waving his policy wand.

There’s more than just a couple figureheads at stake here. This leadership vacuum risks undermining European cohesion, at a time when it is crucial that these countries lock arms and work together.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from tomorrow’s work. The wood pile. We need to talk about your, because we’re having the collapse in leadership at a really critical time, both in France and Germany. So first, let’s deal with France. France had, parliamentary elections about six months ago. That ended in a hung parliament, with no single party getting more than a third of the votes. 

In fact, we’ve got like a kaleidoscope of crazy from the hard right to the hard left. The President Macron, is in a difficult situation because under normal circumstances, the president and the parliament are controlled by the same party, or at least that’s the idea. And so you have a very strong president who appoints a prime minister, and then the prime minister forms the government, and all of it basically serves the interests of the party and is dictated by the president. 

But when the parliament is controlled by another party, you get something called cohabitation, which gets really awkward with the prime minister kind of taking the lead on domestic affairs when the president taking the lead on foreign affairs. But because power is split and prerogatives are split, it’s very difficult to get anything really substantial done. What’s going on right now is much worse than that. 

Because of that kaleidoscopic nature, no single alliance, much less no single party, controls the parliament. And so Macron had to cobble together a government out of disparate groups. And it only took three months to build, and it’s only lasted three months. And just a few days ago, we had a vote of no confidence, which destroyed the budget and the prime minister and the government. 

 

And they now have to start over. But starting over doesn’t allow them to go back and have fresh elections to try to get a better result, because there’s a clause in the French constitution that I call the can’t we all get along clause that says you can only call general elections once a year? So we have at least six more months of dysfunction in France, where the president has no mandate and where the parliament is incapable of making a government. 

 

And so the thing is just rolling over in a series of emergency measures, which is really unhealthy for any number of reasons. But if you’re looking to France for leadership at the moment, it’s just not going to be there anytime soon. Well, the situation in Germany isn’t any better. It’s just different. The German constitution prevents votes of no confidence. 

 

If you want to kick the government out, you have to provide from the seats that are in the current Bundestag. That’s their parliament. Just a different party makeup. And so when, Chancellor Schulz dismissed his finance minister and kicked one of the minor parties out of the governing coalition, he basically set the stage for fresh elections, which is something that doesn’t happen in Germany very often. 

 

We’ll probably have those in February. The problem is that in the post-Cold War environment, the German system is really fractured. And we’re seeing a lot of extremist groups getting into the political system. Traditionally, there are four parties in the German parliament, the SDP, which are the socialists, who are currently, controlling the government. That’s where all of Schultz is from. 

 

You’ve got the Greens who are just what they sound like, who control the Foreign Ministry are in the government as well. You’ve got the Free Democrats, which are kind of like a pro small business, libertarian group, which are also in the government. And they can until recently controlled the finance ministry and then in opposition, you’ve got the Christian Democrats, who at the moment are the most popular party. 

 

And if elections were held, they’d probably come in first. But all of that together, 

 

under current polling and actually polling, going back for the better part of a year suggests that those four main parties which have formed the entirety of every government we’ve seen in Germany since 1945, would only get about two thirds of the seats if elections were held today, yesterday, six months ago, a year ago, whatever, with the other third of the seats going to a grab bag of crackpot and crazy and radical and communist and Nazi and just generally nasty parties. 

 

The prohibition in Germany against, extremism is gone. And if we were to have elections, they’d gobble up a third of the seats. Now, the four main parties have all sworn left, right and center that they will never rule with groups like this, that, for example, don’t repudiate the Nazi past. But if you’re going to do that, if going to form a majority government where you need 51% of the seats when a third of the seats aren’t available, that means you’re going to have another three party coalition. 

 

One of the things we’ve seen under Olof Schultz, which I think the guy has done an okay job, considering that the restrictions he’s been under. Anyway, one of the thing is that whenever a decision has to be made, that wasn’t part of the original negotiation to form the government 3 or 4 years ago, everyone has to get together and hash it out. 

 

So whether that issue is labor policy or tax policy or budgetary policy or European policy or security policy, or Ukraine or Russian units, whatever happens to be, they all have to get back together and so here you’ve got the most powerful country in Europe economically, that can’t make a goddamn decision. And if we do have fresh elections in April, as expected, we’re going to get another three party coalition because there’s no way that two parties have enough seats to generate a majority government. 

 

So you should expect the German situation to not really change. In terms of the real policy, security policy, the Ukraine war, relations with the United States, and just expect this, almost docility and inertia. This is a really bad time for Europe for this to all be happening. The Ukraine war is raging as hot as ever. 

 

And in the United States, Donald Trump is about to take over again. And if you don’t have France or Germany who are basically capable of raising their voices for really any reason, then it is up to someone else to decide what your policy is and that someone else is probably going to be Donald Trump, because the Brits are on the outside because of Brexit and there just isn’t another large country that is cohesive enough or powerful enough. 

 

I mean, the closest would be Italy, where Giorgia meloni is reasonably powerful and popular, but it has been a long, long time in Europe since anyone has followed the Italians lead. I mean, we basically have to go to what, Emperor Constantine in the fourth century? Yeah. No. Okay, so, 

 

whether this is good or bad, of course, depends upon your view of Europe and your view of the world and whatever Donald Trump is going to come up with. 

 

The downside is obvious. Donald Trump tends to enact policy based on whoever’s flattered him most recently that something that Vladimir Putin figured out in Donald Trump’s first term. But Zelensky of Ukraine is clearly figured out and was one of the first world leaders to call to congratulate Donald Trump on his crushing success. 

 

And it’s finally everyone can see what a wonderful leader is and blah, blah, blah, blah, blah, you know, really impressed Trump. And so for several days, we had a lot of very pro-Ukrainian things come out of Mar a Lago. We’ll see if that lasts. We also have minor countries around Europe, whether it’s in the Low Countries or the bolts falling over themselves to call Trump to make their case because everyone is realized. 

 

This time around that it’s all about who speaks to him most recently that he favors, and everyone wants to be that person. It’s not a great way to run a country or a foreign policy or continent, but that’s the reality of where we are. The other issue, of course, is Ukraine, and that Donald Trump is saying that he has a plan to end the war within days of taking over, which, you know, if you can dissolve 500 years of Russian animosity in a week, that would be wonderful. 

 

But I didn’t believe it when he said the same thing about ISIS the first time around, or health care the first time around. So I really don’t believe it now. But hey, you know, stranger things have happened in the United States, in Europe in the last 70 years, so why not give it a shot anyway? That’s kind of the bad side. 

 

The good side is just because the Europeans get a voice doesn’t mean they always get it right. I mean, I realize that’s a huge thing to say in Europe, but, if you think back to the last time we had a significant strategic falling out between the Americans and the Europeans, it was over the Iraq War during the administration of George W Bush. 

 

And at that time, the president of France, Jacques Chirac, and the Chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schroeder and the president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, formed what a lot of people called the axis of and suffer ability to oppose American policy. Now, there certainly were a number of good reasons to oppose America’s war in Iraq. However, Chirac and Schroeder basically allowed themselves to be propaganda props of the Russian government, something that even if those leaders never really regretted it, their people certainly did. 

 

Now, Chirac has since passed on, so I doubt we’re going to be a couple out of him. That’s particularly loud. But, Gerhard Schroeder is around still, and after he lost the chancellorship, he went to work for the Russian government, several state owned companies. And so his corruption came. Absolutely breathtaking. And we’re still cleaning up that mess. 

 

And by we, I mean German policymakers and French policymakers. And now we have to figure out how this all goes down with Trump being large in charge. So the future of Europe, the policies of Europe probably no longer are going to be flowing through Brussels or Paris or Berlin. They’re going to be flowing through more moral law grow. 

 

And I gotta admit, that’s going to be a hoot. 

Trump Tariffs Part 2 – Canada and Mexico

Photo of a bicycle in front of the Canadian flag

Unlike Trump’s proposed tariffs for China, the tariffs heading for Canada and Mexico can be viewed as leverage (or bargaining chips) to address issues amongst our North American trade partners.

Trump’s goal isn’t to disrupt North American manufacturing, he’s just looking to gain the upper hand for negotiations on things like migration and drug control. But that doesn’t mean these tariffs won’t sting. US citizens should expect to see a nice bump in costs to goods crossing these borders. Trump’s North American tariff strategy is a bit reminiscent of Cold War policies where trade access was tied to concessions.

How are our neighbors going to react? I would expect Mexico to cooperate, especially with their new (and hopefully more pragmatic) President Claudia Sheinbaum at the helm. Relations with Canada could sour as they are resistant to any action that could be perceived as ‘bending the knee’ to the US.

Tomorrow we’ll dive a bit deeper on one of the things Trump is looking to stop…fentanyl.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Alright. We’re trying the drone today. Today is part two of the Trump’s Tariffs series. Yesterday, we covered China and discussed how what Trump is achieving there is an industrial reorganization. Tariffs may actually, in the right policy combination, work for that.

That’s very different from what’s going on with Mexico and Canada. Mexico and Canada are the number two and number one trading partners collectively.

If the tariffs that Trump says he’s going to put on actually happen and there is no retaliation, we’re looking at something along the lines of roughly a $1,500 hit to every man, woman, and child in the United States. So, potentially big. That’ll hit some industries more than others. Automotive is definitely the one that will get hit the most because there are a lot of products, especially in U.S.-Mexico trade, where intermediate products go back and forth, and back and forth, and back and forth across the border.

The administrative cost of imposing a single 25% would be huge. It would be easier just to do it every time something crosses. So, all of a sudden, you’re adding $5,000 to $10,000 to the cost of a vehicle that is made in North America. It’s an inflationary issue, an employment issue, and an industry issue. There is no version of the future of the United States that is post-China that does not involve Mexico and Canada very, very strongly.

Keep in mind that Trump put his name on the most recent trade deal with both countries. That’s NAFTA Two. So, potentially very, very, very big.

However, what Trump is attempting to achieve with Mexico and Canada is not the same as what he’s trying to achieve in China. In China, he’s actually trying to move industry. He doesn’t seem to have a problem with the manufacturing supply chains we have here in North America.

His concern is he wants to use the lever or the hammer of trade and tariffs to get progress, in his view, on immigration, migration, and especially on fentanyl. So basically, it’s an “if this, then that.”

Now, that’s not a crazy idea. In fact, there are a couple of reasons to expect it to work. First off, that’s the whole concept of globalization and the Cold War: that the United States used its Navy to patrol the global oceans to force open international trade, including our own market.

We would do this for you if, in exchange, you would allow the United States to write your security policies. That was the policy right up until 1992.

Now, we got away from that in the post-Cold War era, where free trade became a goal in and of itself. Trump wants to dial the clock back 35 years and start renegotiating what security policies mean to include migration and fentanyl.

The idea that you can do that makes a lot of sense because the United States is the only large, rich, consumption-led economy in the world. That means that the U.S. president, whoever that happens to be, has a huge amount of negotiating room to get what he wants, whatever the issue happens to be. So, you want access to this market? That’s fine.

You have to do XYZ, A, B, and C, and you have to do that maybe first.

The question is time frame.

In the case of Mexico, it’s probably going to work because it’s worked before. In Trump’s first term, he tried something very similar on migration issues and forced a deal with the then-president, Lopez Obrador. We now have a new president, Claudia Sheinbaum, who is much better at math than her predecessor.

So, it’s just a question of how these two ultimately do or do not get along.

In the case of Canada, it’s probably going to be a little bit more sticky. The ruling government of Justin Trudeau is a minority government. It is in trouble, it’s not popular, and it faces an election next year. Capitulating to Donald Trump is generally not a great way to win accolades with leftist supporters.

So, we might actually see relations between the United States and Mexico pull forward in its own way, while relations between the United States and Canada suffer.

But a much bigger issue is whether or not what Trump is wanting to do with Mexico and Canada can actually work.

There are ways that Mexico, in particular, can cooperate with the United States on migration. That has happened in the past. I’m sure it will happen again in the future. But fentanyl is different.

Trump’s understanding of fentanyl is that the precursor materials come from China, whereas the turning to finish the drugs happens in Mexico, and then they cross the border into the U.S. That’s accurate, but it’s an incomplete understanding because fentanyl is different from cocaine.

Cocaine has very specific economics and geography of production and transport. Fentanyl does not.

To understand the pros and cons of what Trump is trying to achieve with trade policy, we need to look at the supply chain for fentanyl. Then, we might see how things could work a little bit differently.

That’s going to take a whole other video. We will tackle that tomorrow.

Trump Tariffs Part 1 – China

An AI generated image of connex boxes with American and Chinese flags on them

The Trump administration is planning to impose some hefty tariffs on China. This isn’t just to reform trade practices and show China “who’s the boss”, but rather to shift industrial production away from China permanently.

Trump’s goal is to wean the US off that $500 billion worth of annual imports. This is going to be a challenging time for everyone involved; China is having their feet swept out from under them, and the US will have to find someone who can replace the Chinese (because we surely can’t do it on our own). And not to mention an unwanted bump in living costs for the Americans.

It’s not all bad news bears though. The US has enough cheap energy to help build all the processing and manufacturing it might need, but it will require significant investments, policy changes, and TIME. Trump has the right idea, but his approach is lacking a bit of the strategic depth that this will require.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today’s the 26th of November, and today we’re going to talk about the incoming Trump administration’s initial plans for trade policy.

Last night, Donald Trump texted out that he plans to levy very sharp tariffs on Mexico, Canada, and China—our three largest trading partners. For this discussion, we’ll focus on the Chinese component.

We’re talking about China first because Mexico and Canada are different issues with different factors at play. First, with China: we don’t like China, and China doesn’t like us very much. The Trump tariffs, if implemented on the Chinese merchandise exports that come to the United States—roughly half a trillion dollars a year—would increase the average cost of living for the average American, every man, woman, and child, by about a thousand U.S. dollars a year.

The stuff that comes from China, like I said, is mostly manufactured goods, almost exclusively. The bulk of it falls into the electronics category, which includes computers, cell phones, cellular technology, white goods, consumer goods, and parts that can go into pretty much anything.

The Chinese have a very predatory trade system, so overall support from the U.S. citizenry is likely to be pretty high, despite the cost of this. This is a more traditional tariff goal here. The Trump administration has long wanted to reroute global trade flows, specifically where China is involved.

That means punishing the Chinese until alternatives can be generated. But therein lies the rub. No American trade policy going back to World War II has ever been very good at building that alternative system. We punish countries we think are engaging in unfair trade practices, but those punishments are usually designed to get them to dismantle those trade policies so we can return to something more fair or normal.

That is not the goal this time around. The goal here is to permanently relocate industrial plants. Simply throwing on a tariff and funneling the money to a general fund doesn’t achieve that. You also need to build a complementary industrial policy that takes some of the income and uses it to build a long-term alternative.

Here’s where the challenge and the opportunity lie. First, the challenge: the things China does, it doesn’t do by itself. It has relatively low-cost wages, especially for its mode of production. However, it’s not a very profitable industrial power. It has only managed to get to where it is now and maintain its position through a massive amount of subsidies.

If those subsidies were to go away, you would see mass de-industrialization of China, which would probably lead to the collapse of its political system. The Chinese aren’t even going to consider that, which is ultimately what a normal trade policy would aim for. To overpower that, you’d not only need a fairly steep tariff rate—much higher than the 10-25% that Trump’s team is suggesting—you’d also have to build an alternative.

When it comes to things like electronics assembly and components creation, the United States is not a very competitive player in that market. Our labor, to be perfectly blunt, is too highly skilled. The same goes for Canada and Mexico. You’d need to develop a different model, and doing that quickly is very difficult and expensive.

However, there is some low-hanging fruit. The Chinese dominate not just electronics manufacturing and assembly but also materials processing—turning bauxite into aluminum, cobalt into cobalt metal, and lithium into battery chassis, for example. This is something the U.S. and the rest of the world have largely stepped back from for two reasons:

  1. It takes up space and is environmentally damaging, leading to regulatory challenges.
  2. If the Chinese are willing to pollute their environment, exploit their workers, and subsidize the industry, why compete with them when they can do it cheaper and hand you the end product?

There are problems with that argument. The Chinese have discovered that this gives them leverage in trade talks. However, rebuilding this capacity elsewhere isn’t difficult or even particularly expensive. For example, the U.S., thanks to the shale revolution, produces a huge amount of excess natural gas and has the cheapest natural gas in the world. From that, we’ve developed the cheapest electricity in the world.

Over the last 15 years, the chemicals industry has shifted to run on natural gas rather than oil whenever possible. As of 2024, the United States is by far the largest, highest-quality, and lowest-cost producer of intermediate chemical inputs for modern manufacturing.

But it took the free market 15 years to make that happen. If we want to speed up the process for everything else, it means implementing an industrial policy that uses revenue from Chinese tariffs to help build the supporting infrastructure. This is low-hanging fruit that we need to address anyway. The Chinese won’t be around much longer, and even if they were, we wouldn’t want them to maintain the leverage they currently have.

Building up industrial plants isn’t necessarily expensive. For example, creating capacity for something like aluminum might only cost a few billion dollars. It’s not costly or time-consuming, but “cheap and quick” isn’t the same as “free and immediate.” It requires a policy to make it happen. Otherwise, the market will handle it over the next 15-20 years, but I’d argue we need to start the transition much sooner.

Once that foundation is established, we can begin tackling more difficult pieces like electronics. So far, the Trump administration has not demonstrated an awareness of this level of nuance in tariff policy. The general belief seems to be, “A tariff is good. Do it, and we win.” It’s going to take a lot more effort than that.

That’s the situation with China. The situations with Mexico and Canada are very different, and we’ll tackle those tomorrow.

Ukraine Can Now Strike Russia Direct

Photo of the ATACSM rocket being fired

The Biden administration just gave Ukraine the greenlight to use American weaponry inside of Russian territory. So, what does this mean for the future of the Ukraine War?

The biggest change will be Ukraine’s usage of long-range ballistic missiles (mainly the Army Tactical Missile Systems, or ATACMS) to target military infrastructure within the Russian border. While there will be some impacts to Russian logistics, this likely won’t lead to any significant breakthroughs. And it doesn’t look the Russians are too worried about this either…otherwise someone important would have been doing the press conference.

Without too much concern for immediate escalation, this greenlight allows Ukraine to soften Russian positions and supply lines along the frontlines. But perhaps the biggest thing to watch, is that Trump now has another card up his sleeve once he gets into office and begins his negotiations with Russia.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from chilly Colorado. It is Monday, November 18th, and yesterday, on the 17th, the Biden administration lifted restrictions on the use of American weapons by the Ukrainian government. They can now launch wherever they want in Russian space. The weapon system that is of the most importance are the outcomes, which are kind of a rocket ballistic missile that has a range of about 200 miles.

It’s broadly expected that within the next day or three, the Ukrainians will be using them to target things like ammo dumps, air assets, and especially rail bridges—basically anything to snarl the logistics on the Russian side of the equation.

The two areas you’re going to see the most activity are in the vicinity of Kursk, where the Ukrainians have a foothold in Russian territory, and an area in the Donbas near where the Russians have been focusing strongly on capturing the city of Picross, given that it’s a rail hub.

The whole idea is to disrupt the ability of the Russians to get military assets to those theaters. There’s probably not going to be too much of an impact on things like air power on the Russian side because already 90% of the jets that the Russians have been using to operate in Ukraine are beyond that 200-mile range.

You might push a few more back, so this is concentrating the fight on those two main salients. But it’s probably not going to generate any sort of meaningful breakthrough in either direction, though it will certainly help the Ukrainians hold out.

There are three big things that we do need to consider now that we’ve had this kind of upgraded military capacity.

First of all, I don’t see this as a meaningful escalation in the war. I don’t think it’s going to generate any sort of significant response by the Russians. That’s not just because the Russians have, by my count, had over 200 “red lines” that the West has eventually skipped across.

You can always tell if the Russians are serious or not by who does the speaking. In this case, the Russian that came out and condemned the American action, saying this was an escalation, was a guy by the name of Dmitry Peskov, who is basically their press attaché. It didn’t even come from a policymaker. So, you know, it’s not serious.

I don’t expect the Russians to do anything significantly more. Keep in mind, the Russians have been crossing a lot of what the West would consider red lines—with spies, sabotage, and even bringing in North Koreans to fight in the war. There have been a lot of steps here, and that was probably ultimately what drove the Biden administration to take this action. But I don’t think this is an escalation in the traditional sense.

Second, if the Russians want to rebuild their credibility when it comes to red lines, they have to talk. The way you establish red lines and mutual deterrence is through a direct face-to-face summit. Putin, however, has refused to pick up the phone and call any leaders who are decision-makers because he knows that if he does, everything is on the table.

He would then have to give something up. Since the Russians have been pushing broad-spectrum interference in Western affairs—whether politically, economically, or strategically—for three years now, he’d have to give up a lot of that to get anything he wants. So it’s simpler to just avoid communication altogether.

We’ve been here before. When the Soviet Union developed its first atomic weapon back in 1949, that was the height of the Cold War. Things were really sketchy, and we didn’t get our first real bilateral summit after that weapons test until 1955, after Stalin had died. I’m not saying we have to wait for Putin to die or anything like that, but we’re not in a position in Russia politically where it’s feasible to have that conversation.

As long as the Russians feel they’re making incremental gains in Ukraine, which they have for about a year now, there’s no need for a broader renegotiation of the relationship. Always keep in mind that Ukraine was never a one-off; it’s the ninth post-Soviet conflict the Russians have either instigated or been involved in, and it won’t be the last.

Regardless of how Ukraine gets settled, one way or another, there will be another series of wars further west that will involve NATO countries until we get to that point. Putin feels that negotiations are better carried out on the battlefield rather than by phone or in person.

Which brings us to the third thing: this is really interesting timing for this step by the Biden administration. Obviously, Biden’s not going to be president after January 20th, and there’s going to be no succession within the Democratic structures.

Donald Trump is coming back, and here we have a very clear step forward that puts a fascinating chip on the table for potential negotiations down the road. If there’s anything we understand about Donald Trump, it’s that he sees everything differently. Putting this card into his hand to play with Putin at a later time is kind of fascinating.

What Trump will do with this is entirely up to him, but Biden appears to be setting the stage for Trump to have whatever he needs to force the Russians to the table in whatever way he wants to. This is a really interesting approach to bipartisan foreign policy that we used to see all the time during transition periods but really haven’t seen in the last eight years.

All right, that’s it for me. Everyone take care.

Photo by Wikimedia Commons

Trump’s Cabinet Picks: Loyalty Over Experience

Photo of Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard at a podium

Donald Trump’s cabinet appointees are rolling in and let’s just say they’re not the A-team, but what did we expect?

Trump’s choices aren’t exactly the pick of the litter, but they all fall into one category: they’re yes-men. As long as these people will keep Trump’s echo chamber intact, he’ll keep handing out nominations like Oprah gives away cars. And if anyone does decide they know better than him, they’ll get a swift kick to the street.

Trump’s cabinet is another example of the erosion of the Republican party. As the business leaders, fiscal conservatives and national security experts get marginalized, the party shifts more and more under Trump’s cult of personality. The Senate remains the only real stronghold of the “old” Republican party, but if Trump’s push for recess appointments goes through, then that will be gone too.

There are some standouts to these appointees though. Lighthizer is one of the stronger ones and Gabbard is one of the scarier ones. There’s a lot to unpack here, so today’s video is a bit longer…

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from the home office in Colorado. I’ve received a small flood of requests for me to do a video on what I think of Trump’s, cabinet appointees and who some of these guys are doozies. I mean, we’ve got a guy who’s supposed to be the top health authority in the country who thinks that WiFi causes cancer. 

The person who’s supposed to manage the military is a culture warrior, and the guy who is supposed to lead up national law enforcement. While his only past experience with law enforcement is being the subject of an investigation into sex trafficking of minors. So, you know, we got some real winners here. But rather than go on a blow by blow, I think it’s better for use of everybody’s time to talk about the Trump relationship with the government, especially at the top people he picks and how that is kind of taken in an interesting direction. 

So first off, the nature of the cabinet secretaries that Trump is selecting here, the primary job of the people who lead the departments in the US government is not necessarily to implement policy. I mean, that’s obviously on their to do list, but it’s mostly to generate a degree of awareness for the president. The US is a big place. 

The world is a bigger place, and there’s a lot going on, and no one can be aware of any of everything. And no one can be an expert in everything. So it’s primarily the job of the cabinet secretaries to become experts on their topic and use their departments to generate a series of briefings on context and awareness, to present to the president so that the president always has the best information available and can always make decisions in an informed manner. 

A couple problems here. When it comes to Donald Trump, number one, he insists on believing that not only his is he always the smartest person in the room, but he’s always the smartest person in the room on any given topic. So from his point of view, the cabinet secretaries are not there to generate awareness because that’s not necessary. 

The cabinet secretaries are there to be servile, to basically rubberstamp and congratulate him on everything that he does. If you remember back to for his Trump term, most of the cabinet meetings opened with everyone talking about how wonderful Trump was. It was almost like a cult meeting. Now, when you insist that you live in an echo chamber and you get to choose your own people, an echo chamber tends to be what you get. 

So I urge you to not pontificate over what this person or that person’s appointments are, that this or that department happens to be, because that’s not really the point of what Trump is doing here. He’s building an inner circle that will not be entrusted with leadership, but are simply designed to tell him that his leadership is really what everybody needs. 

  

If you’re interested in policy, for whatever reason, you’re better bet. Rather than looking at tweets appointing is to look at his appointment schedule, because Trump tends to do whatever the last person to flatter him once. That was a much better guide in his first term, and I see no reason for that to be different in this. 

True. So it’s really hard for me to get excited over this or that Trump appointee, whether it’s somebody I like or someone I despise because they’re really not there to do the normal job, they’re there to be toadies. And if they were competent at doing their job and telling the president what he needs to hear. Well, as we saw in his first term, he just fires them. 

And so they don’t have to tell him. No, they just have to tell him. Yes, but could you can also consider and that’s enough. Remember that Trump went through more cabinet level appointees than any U.S. president in history, because anyone who tried to do their job got axed. So second, a far more illuminating thing to ruminate on is to find out just how far gone the Republican Party really is. 

And we’re going to get an answer to that question before the end of January. The Republican Party used to be known as the party of adults. There were three factions at the core of it the national security community, the fiscal conservatives who wanted to balance the budget and the business community. And if there’s one thing that these three factions agreed upon, it’s it’s successful leadership required a degree of organization or delegation, two words that are not ones that Trump uses a whole lot. 

So Trump purged those factions, all of them. He relied upon them heavily in his first term because he was new to the field. But when they didn’t match his personality, then fired him pretty quick. So he purged them from the entire system, starting with his administration, then moving on to the Republican Party as an institution, and then even going after their champions in Congress. 

Then he spent most of his time in the political wilderness ensuring that these three factions could never come back, leading us with an institution of the Republican Party that has basically been gutted, of what used to make it the Republican Party and reducing it to what it is today, which is a Trump echo chamber. Or if you want to use that technical term, a cult of personality. 

Now, what is wrong with Trump’s cabinet picks is not going to be a secret. Normally the process goes like this. The president elect selects his people. He submits them for security checks to groups like the CIA and the FBI and all that good stuff. And they come back to him with a report of what kind of skeletons are in their closets. 

And considering that one of these nominees, likes to drop off dead bears in Central Park or chop off whale heads on beaches, we can imagine. And, we cracked the skeletons. We’re going to fight anyway. Once he has his report in hand, he can change his mind about whether this is the person he really wants to be in his administration. 

But if he decides it’s all okay, the report isn’t squashed. It’s handed over to the Senate. Who has to do the ratification. And even if the Senate decides to confirm an appointment, that might be a little. Whoops. Some version of that report will ultimately be released to the public. So we’re going to find out everything there is to know about some of these people. 

And some of these people are seriously sketchy, but it’s the Senate that’s the key factor in all of this, because while Trump has basically co-opted the Republican Party, the Senate’s kind of like the last cluster of holdouts, if that’s the right term. You see, in, in the Republican Party itself, it’s a non-elected institution. So Trump and Trump’s people can basically go through there and bit by bit, use, advocates and party activists and his real core supporters to just basically flood through the whole system and kick out the people they don’t want. 

And that has been done in spades. And then the House of Representatives has elections every two years. So again, it’s very vulnerable to the political whims of the moment, especially if your party leader wants something done. But the Senate’s different. Only one third of those seats are up for election every two years. So it takes six years to get your first flush, if that’s the right term. 

And so while Donald Trump has now been at the top of the American conservative pile for the last eight years, and so he has just been through his fifth consecutive period of being able to shape the House to his own norms. She hasn’t even been through two full cycles for the Senate. So there’s a number of senators still ascribe to the old Republican ideals of the business community, national security issues and fiscal jurisprudence. 

And so if there are people who are going to oppose Trump, that is where they’re going to be clustered at the moment. And it’s the Senate that confirms presidential appointees. And so Trump is attempting to get the Senate to do something called a recess appointment. In the Constitution, there’s a clause that says that if the Senate is not sitting for an extended period of time, then the president can just appoint people he wants and they don’t have to go through the confirmation process at all. 

Well, the time limit established by the Supreme Court is ten days. So Trump is basically asking the Senate to not even do their job, not even short to work for the first two weeks so that all of his appointments could just flow right through. Now, normally, I wouldn’t give this any credence at all, because it would be an unprecedented surrender of congressional power and would basically gut the Senate as an institution. 

But there’s a lot about Trump that is unprecedented, and he has already made the request. And so the question is whether it will be acceded to agreement. And if the Senate does meekly accede to Trump’s demands, then the Republican Party, as we once knew it, is well and truly dead. We might as well just take down all the bunting and the labels and the bumper stickers and label it MAGA, because that’s that would be what it is that. 

Third, there are two Trump appointments that don’t kind of match this pattern. And they are worth of a deeper look. The first one is Robert Lighthizer. Now, Robert Lighthizer served as the US Trade Representative under the first Trump term. And he was one of the very, very few people that any policy autonomy and actually served the entirety of his four year term. 

Now, Trump has already approached him about taking his old job back, and apparently Lighthizer and Trump were in negotiations over the specifics of what this role would look like, whether or not it’s just the US, a TR position, or more of an oversight position, that would all be over the office of the Trade Representative as well as the Commerce Department, in order to have more overarching authority over trade policy. 

Now, Lighthizer is somebody who has earned repeatedly the respect of the business community. He’s been in and out of trade law and in the administration level ever since Reagan. And he’s very, very good at what he does and the trade deals that were negotiated under the Trump administration, NAFTA to Korea, Japan, all of these were done by Lighthizer personally and their deals that greatly increased, America’s authority over trade law on a global basis. 

He’s a solid choice, and he is definitely worthy of the position. If Trump will have him back, the only question at this point seems to be the details over the level of authority that he would have. We should have an answer to that within days. And if he was appointed, I have no doubt that he would sail through the Senate. 

The second person is on the other side of the equation. That’s Tulsi Gabbard. She used to be a, representative in the House of Representatives from Hawaii. She was a Democrat. She, switched teams to MAGA. Not too long ago. And, who, the job she’s been nominated for is the director of national intelligence. Now, there are over a dozen arms of the US government that have some sort of intelligence capability or central intelligence. 

Obviously, the FBI, the DEA, Homeland Security, the Defense Department, and the DNI, whose job is to basically ride herd over all of them and collaborate and manage all of the agency so that no one is working across purposes and that in a single person, you can have somebody that is so wired and so aware that the president has a one stop shop when they need information. 

Now, Tulsi Gabbard has never been in a managerial position ever. Not even a fast food restaurant. She’s never run an agency. She’s never managed people. She’s never managed multiple agencies. She has no background in intelligence, as an operative, as an analyst, as a manager. And that’s before I start saying the bad things about her. She’s an active cult member, not the mega cult. 

She has her own culture. You. Can you be a member of two cults? I’m really not sure. She’s a conspiracy theorist. She’s a friend of the Syrian government. And it’s the general opinion of most of the American intelligence community that she’s been an active Russian agent for years. All of this will come up in her vetting document. Gabbard is the singularly least qualified person who has ever been nominated for any cabinet position, and we have had some real bozos in years past, being pushed into big chairs. 

She couldn’t pass a security check to work in a daycare center, and DNI has to pass the most rigorous security check of any American ever, because they are literally the nerve center for all secret information that the United States captures and manages. Now, unfortunately for all of us, Trump’s cabinet picks really don’t matter much. Because he’s not picking people for competence or to help him govern. 

They just don’t have much authority over him day to day policy. And in doing so, it means that they just aren’t going to have much of an impact, for better or for worse. So whether you love him or hate him, whether you love or hate the picks, I. I’m afraid to say that it really doesn’t matter too much. 

The one exception, of course, is Gabbard. In that position, this person could do an immense amount of damage, and I know for certain that the Russians are sour, waiting at the possibility of having their girl at the heart of the US intelligence system. 

Election Postmortem…

Well, that didn’t go the way I expected. Here’s what happened…

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Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from a hotel room. I forgot my microphone today. I was planning on doing this from the beach, but there’s a hurricane out there anyway, so it wouldn’t have worked. So, the federal elections did not go the way I was anticipating, so I thought it was worth doing a postmortem. I’m going to remind you how I got to my conclusion, and then we can pick apart what changed.

In the last 30 years, most elections, especially at the presidential level, have been decided by a group of Americans who self-identify as independents. It’s a much smaller set than the people who self-identify, though roughly 30% of the American population self-identifies as Democrats, roughly 30% as Republicans, and the 40% in the middle call themselves independents.

But over three-quarters of that group will vote for one party or the other almost all the time, more than 90% of the time. So it’s really only a thin little sliver of 5 to 10% that has been the balance of power within the American political system for decades. They put in Obama twice, they put in Trump twice, they put in Biden, and they kicked Trump out.

When I looked at what was happening with the American political system, I thought, okay, this is the nut. This is what matters. Watch that group. Focus your predictions on that group.

When we got to the 2022 midterms, Donald Trump had spent the last two years telling independents that their votes didn’t matter and that everything should be decided at the primary level rather than the general election level. The collective response of America’s true independents was, “Hold my beer.” All but one of the races that Donald Trump put his finger on, the Democrats won. What was supposed to be a red wave in the midterms turned into, at best, a red fizzle.

My thinking was: independents are fickle. They tend to switch sides every two or three elections. They get buyer’s remorse, and it took Donald Trump really pissing them off to their core to show up twice and vote the same way twice in a row. Since he didn’t change his rhetoric, my anticipation was that the independents would do what they had done in 2020 and 2022 again in 2024.

Look at these two maps.

This first one shows what happens if the independents split 50/50. You can see how, while it is an advantage to the Democrats, there are plenty of possible ways that the Republicans can pull it out of the fire. But if you get something like what happened in 2022 when the independents break very, very strongly, the second map shows a very different scenario—one that is very, very difficult for the Republicans to have any chance of success.

Some version of the second map is what I anticipated happening in 2024.

Now, we are not going to have final, comprehensive exit polling or political identification polling data until the Pew Research Group finishes their assessment. They started the day the election ended, and I doubt we’re going to get the full results of that study until probably the end of the first quarter of 2025.

But we do have expert-polled data, and we now have the final results from pretty much all of the states. Arizona and Nevada just reported, so we have some pretty good data to work with. At the onset, it appears that my prediction for the independents basically proved true. For three elections in a row, they broke very strongly against Trump.

The problem was that everyone else voted differently.

It’s like we’ve been in this lockstep for, especially the last 12 years, where you’ve got a hard-core group that’s MAGA leading a hard-core group that’s more elite-led. There hasn’t been a lot of movement in those groups. But what we saw in this federal election is a lot of bleed-over as the elite-led group just lost support over to Trump.

To give you an idea of how extreme it was:

The Democratic Alliance, as we understand it today, is based on three pillars of support. You’ve got coastal, primarily white, primarily college-educated elites; you’ve got minorities of all flavors; and then you have organized labor. What happened this time is that a lot of those pillars broke.

Women, especially unmarried women, are a big part of that alliance, but they switched to Trump by five points. Eighteen- to twenty-nine-year-olds—the youth, which almost always work for the Democrats—broke toward Trump by 6%. Black men went to Trump by 7% more than before. Nonwhite college graduates shifted by 9%. Asians shifted by 11%.

People who are in the lower income bracket, ages 30 to 49—people who you’d like to think of as “welfare queens” or whatever—broke 12% for Trump. But Latinos? Latinos shifted by 17%, with Latino men shifting 22%.

So, we saw a lot of these groups that we’ve always associated with being fairly tightly linked to the Democratic grouping break. That changes a lot.

For those of you who are on the left and are going through a lot of kicking yourself and soul-searching, I’ve seen a lot of hot takes in the last week. Just keep in mind that the voters are always right, especially when they don’t show up.

We’ve got three things going on here now that we need to keep an eye on.

Number One

We are in a period of political realignment, and party loyalties are obviously shifting. It’s very much in play. How much in play, unfortunately, is still unclear. The biggest difference we had—aside from the demographic breakdowns between 2020 and 2024—is that voter participation dropped by over 10%. Trump just doesn’t have the pull, for or against, that he once did. That makes drawing any conclusion a little fuzzy.

Number Two

With political factions in motion, a new party is being born. I can’t say right now if the current alignment that brought Trump to power for his second term is a permanent feature of MAGA—it is MAGA. This is not the Republican Alliance; it’s something new. But what I can say is that it is the end of what we think of as the Democratic Party.

Remember the Democratic pillars: minorities, organized labor, and educated white coastal elites. Well, organized labor is now, at best, a swing vote. Over half of them voted for Trump. But minorities are really where it’s at.

The fastest-growing demographic in the country, largely due to immigration, is Hispanics. People always seem to forget this: Hispanics are the group in the United States most opposed to migration in really any form. When Donald Trump made a lot of his pitch about the southern border, that really resonated with the people who, at one point, crossed. Losing those two legs—Hispanics and organized labor—out of the Democratic Alliance means that any places where those two pieces matter for local politics are, at best, up for grabs.

Without some significant soul-searching—and, more importantly, some significant alignment shifts—white, coastal, educated elites? That’s not a party. That’s a book club. It can’t win federal elections.

Number Three

We’re going to have a constitutional crisis in the next couple of years.

If you can put your personal political preferences and passions to the side for a moment and go back and look at pretty much any interview or rally speech that Donald Trump gave in the last three months, I think if you’re honest with yourself, you will see that the guy is failing.

Even if you can’t be honest with yourself, you have to admit that he is older now than Joe Biden was when Joe Biden became president four years ago. The chance of Donald Trump serving an entire term without losing his mind is vanishingly small.

Unlike Joe Biden, who has a group of peers, friends, and confidants who can tell him the truth and nudge him to make decisions—Donald Trump has no one like that. Donald Trump’s MAGA party is a cult of personality. He has purged it completely of anyone who might be able to challenge him.

What we know so far about his new cabinet is that there are going to be no members of his old cabinet who ever told him “no” or “yes, but.” That includes people like Mike Pompeo or Nikki Haley.

So, how do you get rid of a president who has lost his mind? Do you have to wait for him to die?

This is a constitutional crisis for the country because we’ve never been in this situation before. It’s also a leadership crisis for MAGA because Trump is MAGA.

How we shake out of these general trends—a little degree of voter apathy, the demise of the Democratic coalition with no clear replacement, and the coming demise of Donald Trump with no clear replacement—it’s going to be a lively time.

I’m sure I’m going to have a lot to say in the next four years. So, stay tuned.

Remember When…

I’m sure this isn’t a shock, but a lot of folks have asked what I think of the incoming trump administrations cabinet nominations. Before I delve in Monday’s video into the simple and forgiving world of American domestic politics, I think it would be best to review where this all began. In this special weekend edition we reach into the way-back machine and go back to New Year’s 2021 when the world seemed so different, and so similar.

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For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

My Favorite US President of All Time Is…

Many of you have asked who my favorite US President is, so I figured I would do a video covering that. And we don’t have to go too far back, just to number 41 – George H.W. Bush.

He had the right skills for the job (thanks to experience as a congressman, ambassador, CIA director, and VP) and he navigated a changing (and globalizing) world in a way that sustained American dominance, improved the human condition, and helped manage the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Since “Poppy” lost his re-election, we’ve seen a series of narcissistic presidents, leading the US down a more isolationist and protectionist path. The window to reshape the global order is closing for now, and it will be a few decades before the US and the wider world is ready to try it again.

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Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from D.C. That’s obviously the Washington Monument behind me, one of the handful of things not covered in scaffolding at the moment. Considering that the election is almost upon us, I decided to take a question from the Ask Peter forum on the Patreon page and answer: who is my favorite president and why?

And that’s a no-brainer. That’s George Herbert Walker Bush. If you consider he was president at the end of the Cold War and helped manage the decline of the Soviet Union without a shot being fired in our direction, isn’t that enough to make him a great president? But think about what it was he tried to get us to do.

He wanted us to have a conversation with ourselves about how we take the Cold War alliance, the globalized system, and play it forward for another generation of American preeminence, while also aiming to improve the human condition. And if you think about what he inherited, that was pretty bold, because the whole idea of globalization was that we needed a world full of allies to be on our side against the Soviet Union. To do that, we created the global structure and used our Navy to patrol the global ocean so anyone could trade with anyone else without even a military escort.

Basically, it would be like every single country won World War II all by themselves and could dictate the terms. Free commerce, and the U.S. allowed everyone to do that. Having those assets in play when the Soviet Union finally fell presented the ability to create a new human condition on a global basis, and he was the right person to do it. Not only had he just come from the White House—not just for two years as president, but eight years as vice president—he had served in Congress as an elected representative.

He’d been an ambassador to China, run the CIA, and was on a first-name basis with everyone in the world who mattered. He was the right person in the right place at the right time with the right Rolodex, asking the right question. So, of course, we voted against him, threw him out of office, and started down a parade of relatively or increasingly narcissistic leaders.

The six we’ve had since then include definitely four of the worst presidents we’ve ever had in American history. I’ll let you guys debate among yourselves who the two exceptions are. But it was a missed opportunity. And now, today, that opportunity has probably expired. The United States has not just simply turned sharply isolationist and protectionist on both sides of the political aisle, but the nature of the world has now changed to the point that doing any sort of broad reboot is not possible.

Thirty years on, we’re all 30 years older. Most countries have terminal demographics, and the moment we had to reshape everything has passed. So we’re going to have to wait another 20 or 30 years for all of this to shake out. Hopefully, at the end of that period, we will have another president similar to Herbert Walker Bush who is willing to ask us that question again.

And maybe this next time, we’ll choose to answer. 

America After the Election: Foreign Policy & Does Turkey Have the Power to Control Israel’s Future?

A 2020 electoral college map

America After the Election: Foreign Policy

Listen, I debated even entertaining an election video for today, but since this question was so good, I just had to record one.

The question is: what aspects of American foreign policy are going to stick with us regardless of who wins the presidential election? The answer is not as eloquent.

I’m sure that not one of you will like what I had to say and that’s fineeeee, because as long as I pissed off everyone, I should be in the clear…and I coincidentally planned an international trip, so enjoy! Muahahahah!

 

Does Turkey Have the Power to Control Israel’s Future?

Israel has had a lot of eyes on it lately and many are starting to wonder what the future looks like for this small and arid country. Let’s break this down through the lens of deglobalization.

With US involvement and globalization set to decline, Israel could be losing a very valuable partner. Remember that the US has supported Israel with critical resources like food and energy, as well as on the security and military fronts. That leaves some pretty big shoes to fill.

I don’t want to discredit Israel entirely because they have established themselves as a technological power, but that can only take them so far. The main shortcomings being energy, food, and protection. Thankfully there are some viable options out there.

Saudi Arabia and Israel have already begun working together and I would expect that to continue. Turkey, who will take some convincing to enter into a partnership, would be a powerful addition to the team (Turkey is poised to be the regional leader moving forward, thanks to its military and economic power). And then we’ll throw in Egypt to round out the roster.

I don’t want to put too much stress on this, but if Israel can’t figure out its relationship with Turkey…the Israeli future could look bleak.

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Transcript #1

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado, well we are two-thirds of the way through our first ten inches of snow for the season. Ooh. Happy election day to everyone. I had considered just letting this pass and just dealing with the crap that’s going to inevitably happen after. But I got a really good question from one of the Patreon crowd members.

So I figured I would take a shot at it, before I leave the country for a couple days. So, the question is this: what aspects of American foreign policy are going to stick with us regardless of who wins the presidential election? Great question. I do not have a great answer. In the world until roughly…

Oh, let’s call it 2012. We had something in the United States, when it came to foreign policy and strategic policy, called the bipartisan consensus. And the idea was that the Soviet Union was bad. Global communism was not a great idea. And the way for the United States to secure its security, as well as its economic well-being, was to build an alliance network that would span the world and pursue a free-trade world,

a globalized world with everyone so that most countries of consequence would have a vested interest in benefiting from participating in the American security agreements rather than going and doing something else. And that gave us NATO and the Japanese and the Korean, the Taiwanese alliances, and all of that, and built the nonaligned world into an economic powerhouse that wasn’t necessarily aligned with the United States, but really wasn’t aligned with anyone else either.

Broadly worked. But then in 2012, we had eight years of a visceral disinterest in governing, by Barack Obama. And then we got Donald Trump and Joe Biden, who were two of the most economically populist presidents we’ve ever had. And over that 16-year period, the bipartisan consensus has withered away. And the party that was responsible for basically writing most of the real policies, the Republican Party, has now

found itself in a different place with the national security conservatives and the business conservatives not really even part of the party architecture any longer.

And there are some factions of the Republican Party that are finding themselves very strangely aligned on some issues with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. So, to say that security policy is no longer up for grabs in the United States is not paying attention to what’s really going on. What that means is the United States is in a period of flux, not just politically, internally, but internationally.

Now, this is the topic of a lot of my workings,

Starting with The Absent Superpower and The Accidental Superpower ten years ago. But what we’re seeing in the United States is also churning other things, which means that very few of the things that we consider to be normal national security and economic precepts are likely to survive because the institutions of the parties that formed them are themselves up for grabs.

And we’re seeing the leadership of both the Democratic and the Republican Party taking the institutions into a nonfunctional era. They will reform, and we will get to a situation where we can have a meaningful conversation about foreign policy again, but it’s probably not going to be for a few more years. So we’re stuck with what we have.

So let’s start with the Democrats and Kamala Harris. How can I say this without sounding like a complete prick? She’s an empty suit. Kamala Harris’s only job experience before she became vice president was being a prosecutor, which is, you know, better than the last three presidents, but it’s still not a lot. It’s a relatively minor view of anything.

And so when you look at anything she’s going to say about anything, she’s never actually implemented anything. And so you have to take everything with a big block of salt. In her first year as vice president, she was at Joe Biden’s side in every press conference, every summit, every meeting, and it got to the point that Biden’s staff decided that, no, we don’t want her around.

So they gave her a task that they knew she would fail at and gave her no power to carry it out. And that was going down to solve the border. And so, lo and behold, it was a failure. And then they were able to shovel her off to the side for the next two and a half years until it turns out she’s the presidential nominee.

So if you are voting for Kamala Harris, do not fool yourself. You are voting for an unknown, somebody with very limited experience, and who will come into the White House without a circle of people around her who are competent. They’re going to be people she’s picked up, people who are not loyal to her personally, most likely.

And so it really is a crapshoot. And then, of course, we’ve got the Republican side. And I’m going to put aside for the moment most of my feelings on Donald Trump on strategic issues. I would just ask you to look at really any of his interviews or rallies

in the last three weeks, especially the one that was in Michigan two days ago.

The degradation that I saw during the debate with Biden was in full swing, and this guy is just not all there anymore. So even if he does become president, he probably won’t be for very long. Keep in mind that he is older now than Joe Biden was when Joe Biden became president. And the mental fortitude required for the job is immense.

And Trump just doesn’t have it. So don’t kid yourself. If you’re voting for Trump, you’re actually voting for JD Vance. And JD Vance is even more of an empty suit than Kamala Harris. He’s also a bit of a chameleon, which I don’t know if it’s a plus or minus. He wrote a somewhat famous book,

Hillbilly Elegy, a few years ago, and since then, he’s partially repudiated what he said.

And then he said that Donald Trump was a horrible person, should never be president, and was a danger to democracy. And he’s obviously repudiated that. This is a guy who will say anything to get closer to power. And if Trump wins, he will be the next president. So we’ve got two candidates here who both seem to be fairly economically populist, both of which have no experience in the real world,

and no experience in government—very limited, anyway. And that’s what’s on the docket. So any sort of institutional loyalties are weak to none. Any sort of policy experience that might give us an idea of what they might prioritize is negligible. And so any sort of policies that might have consistency, from the last 20 years to the next four, it’s going to be a short list.

The issue with foreign policy in the United States is that most of it is a presidential prerogative, and it’s very rare that Congress has any say in any of it, at least in the formative stages. And so if we don’t know who, institutionally speaking, politically speaking, ethically speaking, the next president is going to be because there’s no track record,

we don’t know what they’re going to prioritize at all, and we don’t know how they would react to any hypothetical scenario because they’ve never had to do it before. The only policies that are an exception, then, are issues where the president has chosen to cede a degree of authority to Congress and lock something in with an act of Congress that limits the president’s room to maneuver. Those sorts of policies will probably stick because it would require an act of Congress to overthrow them.

In the case of the United States, that’s a very short list of things. And most are related to trade, of which by far the most important policy that falls into that bucket is NAFTA. Now

I’ve made no bones about my general dislike of Donald Trump on any number of issues, but what he did with NAFTA 2 renegotiation, I thought, was brilliant because it was the right thing at the right time with the right partner.

Mexico has become our number one trade partner. And if there is a future for the United States economically, outside of being locked into a very dangerous and unequal relationship with China, Mexico will be the core of whatever that happens to be. And so having the hard work done already, and having it be the isolationist right of the United States that did the negotiations, I thought was great.

So no matter who becomes president next, I think NAFTA is fine. And honestly, that is the single most important foreign policy priority the United States has. So at least when it comes to preparing for whatever is next in the world, as the Chinese become more belligerent and as they start to fall apart, as the Ukraine war crescendos and we face the Russian demographic dissolution as the European

fractures because the population there is making it very difficult for them to do anything else.

The most important single piece of our future was done by Donald Trump, and he deserves credit for that. And I don’t think that whoever his successor is—Harris or JD Vance—is going to have the political authority or interest in overturning that. So, you know, hurray. Now, with that said, I have now probably thoroughly pissed off everybody on both sides.

You should go vote. And you should know that by the time you’re seeing this video, I’m already out of the country, so have a good one.

Transcript #2

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the coast of South Carolina. Several of you have written in on our Patreon forum with questions about what the future of Israel will be, especially as the world de-globalizes. Well, a little background, and then we’ll go into it.

So, number one: Israel is not a big place. We’re talking about a country that’s roughly the size of New Jersey, in a large neighborhood that is pretty arid and not exactly full of friends. Yes, Israel has built a surprisingly dynamic society with an amazing level of technological acumen, but it didn’t do it alone. The question is whether it can sustain itself; it’s basically a de facto sponsorship of the United States from the beginning. And while, for example, its missile defenses are impressive, the real ones—the ones that intercept the ballistic missiles, the arrows—have never functioned without American participation in terms of targeting, tracking, and even, you know, firing.

So, by far the most capable state of the region, but the PA isn’t exactly high. Here’s a country that imports the vast majority—over 80%—of its energy. And despite all the talk, a kibbutz is something like three-quarters of its food as well. So it’s in kind of a pickle. It requires foreign sponsorship for security and it requires access to economies outside of the region for its energy and its food. You remove the United States as the security guarantor, or you remove globalization, and this should, in theory, be one of those countries that, without a radical change of affairs, is simply going to dry up and blow away.

Now, I don’t think that is Israel’s future because a few things are going to change, some of which already have. One of the things that so frustrates the United States about Israel is it acts on its own. It has agency. When you are so much more technically capable and have so much more reach than your neighbors, you have some options. And the Israelis often exercise that. They often engage in military and paramilitary operations that are directly opposed to U.S. interests. And because of that, the Israelis have this view that no ally is worth forever. If push comes to shove, you do what you feel you need to do. And if it happens to piss off the person who ensures you get fed and the lights come on and the missiles get shot down, well, that’s so be it.

They know that at some point down the road they’re going to have to do things differently. And while they probably can’t do it on their own, that doesn’t mean that they can’t find a new friend. So, the question is, who are the candidates?

Well, in terms of energy, I would argue that they’ve already found that one. Starting over 15 years ago, the Israelis basically built a de facto alliance with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia would provide them with some intel on Iran and some energy. And in exchange, the Israelis would provide the Saudis with backdoor access to American weapons systems that the Americans were willing to sell to Saudi Arabia, along with the training that was necessary so they could use them. In addition, anything that involves Iran, the two of them will operate pretty closely.

Now, this doesn’t mean they get along on everything. Obviously, when it comes to the Palestinians, there are still some fine details to work out. But the two of them get on pretty well behind the scenes and publicly spout a lot. But behind the scenes, they’re actually getting along great; they’re reasonable friends. Agriculture is easier. There are a lot more countries in the region that provide food surpluses, most notably in Europe. So it’s not like the Israelis need access to the globalized system to keep the food flowing.

But when it comes to security, that basically tells you where they’re going to get their food. Every country in the Middle East is in the process of wondering when the United States will pull back and, if so, who they should go to. And none of the options are particularly good if you’re an Arab. If you consider that the French and the Brits and the Turks have all had colonial empires in the region, no one really wants to go back to that day. But if you’re Israeli, you’ve got some options because the Israelis were never really a traditional colony; it was formed by the Zionist movement in the aftermath of World War II.

Partnering up with France, or Britain, or in my opinion, Turkey, is something that can be done with a minimum of cultural pain. Of the three, the most likely candidate will be Turkey—not because it’s the closest cultural cousin; it’s the opposite. But if Turkey is not a friend, then Turkey will most likely be an enemy. And having an alliance with someone against your local foe puts you really at the mercy of your ally. But if the Israelis can find a way to bury the hatchet with the Turks, then you take the largest economy and military in the area, with the most projection-based economy and military in the region, and you get a very powerful pairing.

That’s going to be pretty easy to justify joining. So I think the future of this region is likely to be Turkish-led, to a degree Israeli-managed, Saudi-fueled. And those three will have no problem bringing in Egypt as a big bulwark partner in North Africa. That quad is likely to be the power center for this region in a post-American system. And they have everything that all of them need—energy, security, naval access, food, and a really good network of intelligence systems.

I know a lot of you are going to say, “Wait a minute, doesn’t the Turkish government hate Israel right now?” Yes. I didn’t suggest any of this was going to be easy. The issue is that the Turkish government can protect Israel from, say, France or Britain, but France or Britain can’t really protect Israel from Turkey. So there’s really not a lot of strategic choice here. You know, if you’re Saudi Arabia, the idea of reaching out to a distant power like Japan or China makes a degree of sense. But for Israel, the potential foe is near and present. So if Israel cannot find a successful way to get along with Turkey, then Israel will vanish.

This is a region that is actually pretty easy for the Turks to get at. They’re not too far away. They only have to punch through Lebanon, and Lebanon is not really going to fight back. Not to mention you’re going to talk about a really meaningful blockade that would starve Israel of food and energy as well. Far better to find a way to get in bed with the Turks than the other way around.

So again, never said this would be easy. Never said there wasn’t a lot of work to do.

MedShare Donation + What Do Hurricanes and Political Factions Have in Common?

Satellite photo of hurricane helene over Florida

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I know everyone wants constant updates on the upcoming US election, and if you haven’t figured this out by now, that’s not really my shtick. However, I will offer a couple factors that could influence the outcome of this election.

First, we’ve got the severe damage to infrastructure in the swing states of Georgia and western North Carolina caused by Hurricane Helene. While this might not seem like something that would impact the election, these highly Republican areas are sensitive to voter turnout, to the point where a few thousand votes could change the result.

The bigger factor to watch is organized labor and the business community. Neither of these factions are fully aligned with a major party, so that puts a lot of votes up in the air. Expect these factions to act as swing voters and introduce a hefty amount of volatility to the political landscape.

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Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming from Washington, D.C. That is the Rose Garden behind me at the White House. And of course, there’s a new layer of security that wasn’t here last time I was here, so you can’t see anything. So instead, we’re going to put the Treasury Department or ours. At least, it’s a, you know, pretty building.

Anyway, a lot of you have been asking me to give you an update on my assessment for the election, and I’m just not going to do that. I gave my assessment two years ago. It was based on structural factors, and those structural factors haven’t changed. And if you want a blow-by-blow of what’s going on precinct by precinct, I am not the guy to do the hot takes.

But I will tell you two things: one on a micro fact that is likely to impact this election, and the second one is on the broader trend that will affect future elections. So first, the micro effect. When Hurricane Helene rushed in from the Gulf, it did something that most hurricanes didn’t do and maintained significant strength even when it was a couple hundred miles inland.

Normally, when you have a storm surge on the tornadoes and the wind and the rain, you devastate an area of the coast. Then, when it’s time to pick up the pieces and repair the damage, the first thing you do is get the interstate corridors back up and running and then move on to the secondary roads. Most coastal regions, particularly in the Gulf, are pretty flat, so that’s not too hard to do.

The devastation can be immense, but once you get the road arteries back up and running, things aren’t so bad. But when you move inland and start hitting the Appalachians, you’re in a different situation. It’s not flat, and you don’t have a grid network for roads where they’re all over. You have very specific roads following very specific corridors.

And if you dump two feet of rain in those zones, the rain washes off the mountains, gets into the streams, and river levels can rise by 20-30 feet or more and wash everything away. That is exactly what happened in northern Georgia and western North Carolina. Now, in both cases, we’re looking at years before the physical infrastructure is repaired and probably more than another month before we even get a reasonable damage assessment.

And why that matters to this election specifically is that northern Georgia and western North Carolina are among the reddest of the red areas in the country. Both North Carolina and Georgia are swing states this time around. So, the idea that you can have several million voters, and have a few hundred thousand, who, for whatever reason, can’t vote because of physical infrastructure conditions, in races where just 10,000 votes might separate the winner from the loser—you can see how that can tilt the election pretty easily.

The second thing that’s longer term is what’s going on with organized labor and the business community because right now, neither of those factions are part of either major party. Donald Trump pushed the business community out of his coalition for being, from his point of view, unnecessarily disloyal.

And the unions are kind of in flux between the Democrats and the Republicans. They’ve got kind of a foot in both camps but are not really committed one way or the other. If you remember, the Teamsters President—big union in the United States—actually endorsed Trump live on stage at the Republican National Convention. And in the most recent court strike, the Biden administration refused to take a trust-busting action against the unions.

In an attempt to draw the unions back into the Democratic coalition, both factions are very much in play. This has never happened before in human history because these two factions, their arguments, and their compromises, form American economic policy. And the idea that one wouldn’t be part of one coalition or the other is strange, but both at the same time? Not reasonable. Not sustainable.

If you look at either the Trump administration or the Biden administration and wonder why their economic policy seems batshit crazy, that’s why. The people who have traditionally done the math as part of economic policy formation are not in the room. Now, this is, like I said, not sustainable. Sooner or later, one or both of these factions are going to either rejoin one or both of these coalitions or form their own, and we will have a reorganization of American politics.

Now, there’s nothing about this that is odd. We’ve done this five times in American history already. This will be the sixth reorganization, and it will form what will be known as the seventh party structure. But until that happens, both of these factions, arguably historically the most powerful factions on both sides, are in play. The business community has always been the backbone of the Republican coalition, and organized labor has always been the backbone of the Democratic coalition, or at least since the last reorganization.

So this will not last. But until such time as these factions are back as part of the political process, they are functionally swing voters. And that makes this election a lot more volatile than it would have otherwise been.

Okay, that’s it for now.