Data Centers: A Necessary Evil…Kinda

Cooling fans at a data center

While data centers are a massive, loud, and expensive drain on critical resources, they are essential to modern life.

I’m not here to argue the downsides of data centers, because everyone knows all that; however, many people see them as just AI power stations, and that’s where I’m stepping in. Data centers touch nearly every part of modern life: research, cloud storage, social media, and so much more. Without them, life gets a whole lot slower, more expensive, and all the stuff you know and love gets much scarcer.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. And today we are going to talk about data centers. You may have noticed that there’s a bit of a political brouhaha about them, the idea that they absorb a lot of electricity and a lot of water and are generally making life loud in rural America. There’s something to all of that. I want to talk about the movement against data centers and what data centers actually do, because there’s a lot of misconceptions there. 

So first, the data centers themselves. Most of the brouhaha has to do with artificial intelligence. The core of any AI system is something called a graphics processing unit, which is a chip that is normally involved in personal computers to handle graphics processing. Ergo the name. When large language models, which are the current iteration of AI that everyone’s all gung ho about. When they got big a few years ago, the people who are doing AI were looking around for preexisting types of hardware that were good at doing multiple types of processing of data in parallel, and GPUs were the only thing out there. So most AI data centers are either going to use GPUs directly or something that’s descended from that lineage, that works very similarly, but at the core is a relatively small chip, in most cases about the size of a postage stamp, integrated and packaged in different ways. But the problem is, as anyone who has a gaming console will tell you, or anyone who runs a multiplayer computer system for games that has a lot of graphics, is that these things get hot. So normally they exist one at a time under a fan. They run for a few hours and then they turn off. But in a data center, they’re running 24/7 hot, and they typically have to be hooked up to a coolant system that for most systems is either air or water based. And those systems are running 24/7. And the return, the hot air or hot water that’s taken away is typically more than 180 degrees. So the cooling system is very power intensive, whether it’s air or water. And if it’s water based, it’s a question of whether it’s using an older system or newer system. The older systems have evaporation towers to cool off the heat. That’s where your water demand comes from. Your newer systems are more closed circuit, but you still have to fill it up with several millions of gallons of water on the front end. And then of course, there’s leakage. So there’s a constant demand, not as much as the older systems, but still very, very real. 

Anyway. Writ large, over 80% of the water use and over half of the electricity use for a data center does come from cooling, and there’s not a lot you can do in the short term to change that. I mean, you can move away from the evaporation towers, of course, but that requires different sorts of hardware and generally is incorporated into the system on the front end. They are working on new types of GPUs that incorporate the cooling into the actual chip architecture. But the first of those is not expected to come out this decade. The problem is that there’s a lag from the point that you design a chip, and then you build out the logistical system that is necessary to incorporate the chip into a data center. Years. Simply fine tuning the production cycle of a fabrication facility takes 6 to 12 months, based on the piece of hardware you’re trying to do, and then it is somewhere between 90 days and 180 days before your first production run actually generates your chip. Because once you have your silicon disk, you have to etch it and bake it and cool it dozens of times. That’s not a day process. That’s a multi-month process just for their first run. At that point, you then take your finished semiconductor wafer and you break it up into the various components. And those get incorporated into various intermediate products. That’s another 60 to 180 days. So from the point that you finally decide you have your perfect design to the point that you have enough of those finished products to put into a data center, you’re talking 5 to 7 years. That’s not going to happen before 2030 at the absolute soonest. 

So we’re stuck more or less with the environment that we have today, which means a lot of power, a fair amount of water, and the demand is very real. Some people say that the Chinese are trying to manipulate public opinion to go against data centers, and no they’re really not. The Chinese are not nearly as good at that as the Russians are. And the Russians don’t care about this topic because they can’t make any of the chips, and they’re not using any of the chips because they don’t have an AI sector, and their data centers are pretty piss poor, anyway. The Chinese do have a bot farm that has something like 200 million accounts, but only 200 of those accounts have been assigned to participate in the anti AI space. And almost all of the followers of those accounts are just one another. The Chinese just don’t understand how to manipulate a free society in the way that the Russians do, because the Russians have had a century of practice, and so it’s just really a non-factor. Most of the opposition is real. That doesn’t mean that it doesn’t cross over into other unrelated sectors. So, for example, there’s a lot of people in the green movement who see any sort of fossil fuel as a sin and data centers, because they have to run 24 hours a day, can’t just can’t use solar and wind for an appreciable percentage of their demand because it’s not reliable enough. And of course, the sun doesn’t show at night. Now you can put in batteries into a data center, and all of them have batteries, but it’s mostly for power smoothing, so there’s no interruption in current as opposed to store solar or wind power, because just the fields you would need would be immense. So most of them have to run on nuclear, which is not an energy sector in the United States. As expanding people talk about small modular reactors becoming a thing, but small modular reactors are somewhere between 5MW and 300MW, with most of them probably around 50. By the way, we haven’t built a prototype yet, so that is all very perspective. And let’s say you have 50 a 50 megawatt SMR and you have a one gigawatt data center. Okay. So you’re going to put you’re going to put 20 nuclear reactors into a single data center. The math just really isn’t there. If you don’t use nuclear, your only other options are coal or natural gas. And so you get these green factions that are opposed to data centers because of the type of power that they undoubtedly are going to have to use. There is not a single data center on the planet that runs on solar or wind at all, and there won’t be ever, unless our nature of what solar and wind can do changes are a bit, a lot, radically. That’s also a problem for a different decade. 

Okay, so that’s the front end. Now let’s talk about what the data centers actually do. Just because opposition is real doesn’t mean it’s not without consequence. So let’s break this into three big categories. First, the things that you might not have thought of but are probably not a reach for you. Big data processing and obviously artificial intelligence in that category. But so is graphics processing. So is any type of research. So is climate modeling. It used to be that you would have a mainframe or a series of servers in your company, and you would use them to do the big data heavy work, and it would take hours for them to crunch the numbers. That has all been offloaded to data centers now. When people talk about the cloud, the cloud is 100% data centers. So whether you’re saving your own files or you’re doing a climate model, or you’re in the energy sector and you’re trying to figure out how to frack a well more effectively, or are you doing biological research, every bit of that isn’t just stored in data centers. It’s processed in data centers. And it has been for years. The second category are things that you probably realize already. Your email. Anytime you use your computer to send or receive any information, whether that’s for an insurance claim or for personal use, all of that is going to be using a data center. So for whatever reason, we don’t have enough data centers. All of a sudden you have to do all your computing and storage local, and that’s an order of magnitude more cost for you. One of the reasons why laptop computers have kind of faded in terms of general use is a lot of the tasks that they used to do have now been offloaded to the data center sector and aren’t being done at all. So think of all the accounts that you have, for example, for your bank, for your fire insurance, for your home insurance, for your mortgage, for your checking account, for your savings account, for your debit account, for your credit cards. All of that is done almost 100% in data centers today, which means we get to a third category. The things you probably haven’t thought about. Anything that can be turned into zeros and ones now largely has been. So. For example, it used to be that you had a phone and you had a phone line. Well, once we switched over to cellular communications, your phone handset turns your voice into a series of zeros and ones and sends it off to a tower. That tower sends it to a data center. That data center routes it to a different tower. And that tower then beams those zeros and ones to whoever the receiver of the call is. Basically anything you do on your phone, no matter what it is, including voice. It’s now processed through a data center. So that’s your entire social media history and participation. That’s every app you have, regardless of what it does. Now it is something that has been digitized, and you have to apply that thought process to everything in the economy. If you go back to, say, the 50s and the 60s, well before data centers, everything that involved interaction among companies was done on paper. So just to pick one example, your grocery store, every day, they would go through and do inventory and figure out what they needed to order, and they would put it down on paper, and that paper would be physically handed off via the mail to the person who would then fill those orders and send it back and stock the shelves. By the time you got to the 70s and 80s, that paper had been partially digitized via the fax machine, but everything still had to be done manually, and something like 10% of the American workforce at its peak was involved in this sort of data processing, which was really just putting pen to paper and then sending it off in some way. So once we got to the digital age, we started transferring all of this as the zeros and ones. And once faxes started to give way to email, we started sending them as attachments or now eventually just an app process. And so anytime your at a grocery store and you buy something, it no longer has to be manually counted. The system itself says, okay, you just bought two things of yogurt and a thing of eggs that goes back to the back room where they tallied up moment by moment. Where they set thresholds. We’re like, okay, if we keep going at this pace, we’re going to write out of yogurt in three days, in eggs in four days. So let’s preemptively place an order that’s all automated. It’s all done through data centers. 

So if you want to go into a world without data centers, you have to consider what you’re giving up. Everything that you can now do at home. You will probably have to go in and communicate with a real person. Anything that is digitized. You’re gonna have to do with paper. And so for things like, say, grocery stores and anyone who has to deal with inventory, you’re talking about needing literally millions of workers to do very, very, very painfully low value added jobs where minimum wage wouldn’t begin to cover the cost of those people. So you’re talking about slower service, like by weeks, you’re talking about less product variety, you’re talking about longer lead times and basically condemning 10 million Americans to have jobs that have no value add. So do data centers have negative effects? I’d never try to argue against that point, but keep in mind that without them and without their ongoing expansion, you really are talking about dialing back the clock to where we had a far lower standard of living and far lower personal incomes.  

I will note a couple of things that are exceptions. Health insurance is still done the old fashioned way, which is one of the reasons why we all hate it so much. So keep that in mind. If you want your experience with your insurance company to become the norm for your entire economic life, then a world without data centers is exactly what you’re after.

Defending the Homefront from Cheap Drones

Camo clad man flying a drone outdoors | License by Envato Elements

It’s one thing for high-tech, expensive strike systems to break through defenses, but when cheap and simple drones can inflict widespread damage…that’s a whole other can of worms.

Having the ability to hit hard-to-defend civilian infrastructure with these low-tech drones means that countries like Saudi Arabia and Russia have to rethink everything. They’re not just changing how their military operates during wartime, but fundamentally shifting how their economy functions from the ground up.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. And today we’re going to talk about a new sort of targeting system that has been used in multiple theaters or new targeting criteria would probably be a better way to phrase that. Over the weekend in the late part of last week, we had the Houthis of Yemen starting to attack Saudi Arabia’s civilian airline system, specifically the Riyadh International Airport, where at a minimum, 12 people were killed, probably closer to 30 and several hundred people were injured. Looks like a plane was hit. One of the terminals with passengers was hit. And then in Russia, the Ukrainians have started targeting data centers. Data centers are very easy to disrupt. They’re very large targets. They’re hard to miss, and they require absolutely massive amounts of climate control or the chips melt down. So you put a hole in the roof, that kind of ruins the entire experience for everyone. In addition, the Russians cannot make any, any, any of the semiconductors that go into even a circa 1999 data center. So this is 100% imported hardware that they can’t replace without spending a great deal of money.

According to the Houthis, anything that’s in Saudi Arabia is a viable target because they’re in a general war with anyone who’s on the other side of the Palestinians or the Iranians. And they, over the last decade, have really been not particularly picky about what they attack in the first place. Ukraine is a lot more discerning from their point of view. Data centers are part of the infrastructure that allows Russia to be a modern state, and the data centers handle military logistics and weapon designs, which are true. So they see it as a viable military target in its own right, in addition to the fact that it’s an important civilian piece of infrastructure.

The bottom line for both of these is that normally when you’ve got drones going against military targets, there’s a degree of electronic warfare in play that scrambles the signals. So if you’ve got a long range drone coming in, you can scramble the signal. Then the pilot loses control of the drone and either Peter pans or crashes or hovers and does basically no damage. Or you can kinetically intercept it with, say, bullets or missiles or whatever it happens to be. That is not in play with these two target sets. Until now, the Saudis and the Russians have not put up electronic warfare around these sort of assets. For one, if you put electronic warfare around your entire economy, you won’t have an economy anymore. It’s simply too big to protect. And specifically for the airport, if you have E-W that’s meaningful, you’re going to have a hard time landing planes. The bottom line is here is that these weren’t fancy drones. Over the last eight months, I’ve done quite a few videos talking about how the advances in drone warfare allowed them to bypass E-W. That didn’t apply here. These are relatively unguarded, mostly civilian targets, which means that what the Houthis and the Ukrainians have done is eminently replicable across the entirety of Saudi Arabia and the vast majority of Russia. Both of their systems now have more than enough range. So the Iranians are providing the Houthis with the weapons to do this. They can hit anywhere in Saudi Arabia. The Ukrainians are, for the most part, producing their own drones. They have already demonstrated that most of them have a range of at least 300km, some upwards of 1600km. So everything that’s basically within 100km of Moscow and significantly more is all within range, which means it is time for us to start noodling, fast hopefully, about what a post drone economy can even be. Because if everything within 600 miles of an enemy is civilian infrastructure that you either have to protect or write off, then the entire industrial age needs to find a new way to operate. We are not ready for this. No one is ready for this.

Perhaps the biggest problem that I see here is that the drones that were used were not sophisticated at all. They don’t have that advanced technology that’s being developed this year in it. These are just plain Jane weapons platforms that are very, very cheap. Nothing, nothing in the input stream for them is under any degree of sanctions. And if you wanted to sanction it, you’d have to sanction basically every single phone maker, computer maker. In most electronics makers, you’re talking about chips that are not just legacy, but all the hardware in them could have been assembled with parts from RadioShack 15 years ago, was RadioShack still around 15 years ago. You get the point. That’s before you consider the more advanced stuff that is coming up, like the memory drones out of Ukraine that can even get through jamming now.

So we’re now in a situation where all of the crude out of Saudi Arabia is being threatened not just by advanced drones, but by basic ones. And the entire supporting economic structure has now, basically the genie’s out of the bottle, the seals been cracked. In the case of Russia, it’s not just about the shadow fleet in the market, it’s about the wheat markets, about the sunflower market. It’s about the iron ore market. It’s about the aluminum market. It’s about the timber market. All of these are now easily targeted systems with where we are with drone manufacturing on just a regional basis.

It doesn’t take a huge amount of imagination to come up with a military conflict in somebody else’s backyard, where drones become part of the problem, and all of a sudden the entire industrial infrastructure is in play. I’m looking at you, Northeast Asia. Anyway, that’s it from now. See you guys next time.

SpaceX Deploys 26 Satellites with New Starship

SpaceX rocket launching from a pad

SpaceX has completed its first (mostly) successful Starship test. The ship was able to reach orbit, deploy 26 Starlink satellites, and return home. And while there were some hiccups (engine failure on launch and reentry, as well as a crash landing) along the way, this was a step in the right direction.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. It’s crappy outside, so we’re doing this one inside. It is the 28th of September. You’re going to be seeing this on the 29th. And the news today is that we’ve had our first mostly successful test of SpaceX’s new ship, the Starship. The intent is for the Starship to be the most powerful rocket ever launched by man. That will be able to take upwards of 60 satellites for the Starlink constellation up with every individual flight. Elon Musk, who, of course, is the the guy behind this, eventually intends to do one launch a day with most of the components being assembled on site in Boca Chica at their Starbase. 

Anyway, what happened today is it went up and had engine failure on the way up, and it had engine failures on reentry. And because of the engine failures, they cut the trip short only did two orbits. So it came down less than three hours after takeoff instead of the 8 to 9 hours. That was the original plan. That doesn’t mean it’s an overall failure, because it’s still launched the satellites, and this is the first time that a Starship has actually achieved orbit. But this is a step in the direction that they need to go. This is not a proof of success because they had, I think it was three engines failing the way up and two on the way down with engine failures that they thought they had solved already. They have to, I don’t want to say go back to the drawing board, but they have to completely reiterate and modify all of the engines moving forward. So it’s probably going to be at least a couple of months before we get another meaningful test. In addition, because they didn’t get a lot of data, they don’t know about the reusability problem that they’re trying to solve. The intent is for these things to be launched from Boca Chica, to do their orbits, to drop off their satellites and then land in Boca Chica. Without having meaningful data for how long the Starship can be in orbit. They just don’t know how to proceed with that at the moment. And then finally, this was a partial test of cargo. They only launched, I think it was 28 satellites. Their intent ultimately is to do over 60 per individual launch, which is a lot. Anyway, so moderate step in the right direction. Still a lot of work to be done. 

One more thing. It blew up when they landed it in the ocean. It blew up, which is normal because they weren’t actually trying to recover it. So don’t take that as a negative. Too much of a negative.

The AI Race: U.S. vs. China

The letters "AI" on a blue cyber background

The AI race is in full swing. China is chasing digital sovereignty, but there’s a glaring hole in that plan…it doesn’t have the advanced manufacturing capabilities to achieve it. Here’s the real kicker: nobody does.

China might be a bit more flexible with its ethics and data manipulation, but that means nothing without the advanced chipmaking equipment. China can produce less efficient chips, but has incredibly low yields on leading-edge chips. To produce the highest-level chips, there are roughly 65 countries involved in a complex supply chain.

Which means that not even the U.S. could go out and do this on its own (unless it underwent a 20+ year tech ecosystem rebuild). America’s real advantage in the AI race comes from the broad coalition of allied countries all working together to produce high-end semiconductors.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the top of little Castella, taking advantage of a break in the wind to answer a question from the Patreon crowd. Oh, by the way, that’s an ash mountain over there. And all of that is the Turner Ranch. Ted Turner, I guess, is a state, is a single largest landowner in the country. 

And that’s where he used to party. Anyway, the question is, is how is China’s artificial intelligence program coming along? They clearly don’t have any of the ethical restrictions that the United States has. And is that given them an edge? Is this something we need to worry about? Number one, I would argue that if you’re comparing the tech bro culture of Silicon Valley to China and the idea that one of them is morally superior, you need to do a little research. 

Silicon Valley, and especially the folks that are involved in AI, really don’t give a rat’s ass about your personal privacy and are perfectly willing to pillage your data in any possible form. In fact. Hey, I got a little visitor here. Hey, buddy. Yep. Never mind. He’s gone. Anyway, point being that if you are on Facebook or what is it now? Meta, whatever, any sort of social media whatsoever, all of your data is being mined actively in a way that the Chinese honestly sometimes have trouble keeping up with. And while the Chinese certainly do it with a little bit more flair, the AI Kings in the United States, the data kings in the United States have no problem getting all of the information that they need from you already. 

So the info influx really is not much of an issue. There used to be a moment when things had to be manually entered in, and the Chinese had an advantage of that for the numbers, but now AI has reached the point that it can self process. So again, that’s gone away too. So the structural issues really are not relevant. 

It really comes down to hardware. Now the Chinese are under export restrictions, so they cannot import the hardware that is necessary to make high end semiconductors, specifically the extreme ultraviolet machines that come from the Dutch company ASML. And without those, there’s no way they can make anything that’s really under seven nanometers reliably. That means that the reliant on importing chips and their export restrictions on anything coming out of the United States or Taiwan or Japan or Ireland, or any of the countries that make high end semiconductors, that limits them to approximately a 4 to 5 nanometer ceiling. Now, it’s not that those are bad chips at six nanometers. 

I mean, they’re fine, but if you want to do AI, it’s all about the number of computations you can crunch per chip and the power that takes per computation. And right now, in the rest of the world, the high end chips are in the 2 to 4 nanometer range, and we are now starting to get ships that were designed with coolant topography in mind. let me spell that out. What that means for an operational if you have a one gigawatt hyperscale data center, you probably have about a half a million GPUs on top of that. Lots of CPUs, lots of Dram, lots of Nand, different sorts of processing capacity, lots and lots of hardware. 

But the 500 GPUs or the core of it because large models. And when we’re talking about AI today, that’s what most people are discussing. Use those chips almost exclusively. And the better they are, the more computations, the more energy efficient per computation. The Chinese don’t have access to those 2 to 4 nanometer chips. Sometimes they can import some five and especially six nanometer chips. 

But they have made the decision that for sovereign control reasons, they don’t want to depend upon anyone’s imported chips. If they can make anything that’s even partially functional themselves really cool in. But there’s a middle ground. There’s a gray area because while the Chinese can’t import those high end chips in that high end equipment, they can still import a lot of equipment and a lot of gear. And they do that. They imported deep ultraviolet, DUV machines that are still pretty good and that are the basis for a lot more mature nodes. 

And they have used these to successfully make nodes as small as seven nanometers. Now I have to emphasize this. These chips kind of suck. They you generate about one third the computations per chip compared to what comes out of Asme and Taiwan. They generate about twice as much power, probably closer to three times as much power. Once you consider that the rest of the engineering of Chinese data centers, is that just that much worse? 

So you’re looking at overall one ninth efficiency compared to the leading edge stuff. On top of that, the yields for these seven nanometer chips is awful. It’s typically less than 30%. And as a rule, anywhere else in the world, any yield rate below 95% is something that wouldn’t be considered because it’s just such a massive waste of resources. 

China does the math differently, and they’re concerned with digital sovereignty and keeping them with the United States. But what it means is they need to build nine data centers for everyone in the United States in order to get an equal number of compute, and that is assuming the hardware can run the software that is required to do things like large language models. 

Bottom line, the Chinese are doing everything they can. They are sparing no horses, and they’re not even remotely close. They have tried over and over and over and over again for the last four years, to try to push past that seven nanometer limit, and they have succeeded in making a few emphasis on the word few chips, the meter level using technology. But it’s highly inefficient. And you’re talking about yields that are below 5%, nowhere near enough to supply a single data center, much less a raft of them. But before I laugh in their face, I have to say that the technology of AI is changing day by day, week by week, one by month, and the hardware is always two years behind. 

So I don’t want to rule it out there. Certainly motivated, if that’s the right phrase. But when it comes to the domestic manufacturing of the hardware that is required to do this, no, they’re just not even in the same game. Now, before anyone goes and toots America’s horn, the United States can’t make these chips either. Neither can Japan or Korea or Taiwan takes a team effort with 65 countries and 100,000 manufacturing supply chain steps and almost 10,000 companies. 

It really does take everyone. And if anyone is actually trying for real digital sovereignty, they’re going to fail unless they rebuild the entire tech ecosystem. And that is not something you do in less than 20 years. So are the Chinese going to fail at this by the rules of the game, as I understand them? Yeah. Are the Americans going to fail at this by my understanding of the rules of the game? 

Yeah, but the United States is part of a coalition of like minded countries that implement these technologies together. That’s how we do AI. And if the US decides to go it alone, it’ll be at best in China’s position.

Can AI-Driven Robots Save Japan?

A face of a humanoid robot, side view on black background

Japan has long been a pioneer in methodologies and technologies to save society from a demographic crisis. Japan’s next endeavour is developing AI-powered robots for industrial, agricultural, healthcare, and logistics applications.

They plan to take Nvidia’s newest GPUs to train an AI model that combines vision, language, and physical action, allowing autonomous operation without constant connection to a data center. This won’t happen overnight, but given Japan’s aversion to immigration, this is an early test case of just how far AI-driven robotics can carry an aging population.

Transcript

Hey, all, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. And today we’re going to talk about Japan. The Japanese government just announced a program to develop its own model for industrial and agricultural and health care robots. In essence, they’re buying a new breed of GPU called a Reuben from Nvidia, which is the American company that is like $1 trillion company or 18 trillion. I don’t know, it’s big. In order to generate their own model. So they’re buying these chips, about 28,000 of them. They’re going to put them in a customized data center that they’re building right now, that’s on the small side, only 140MW. Nothing like the giant hyperscalers we have here in the United States. Anyway, the goal is to iterate a new model that connects vision and language with action so that you can have a robot in an industrial setting or healthcare setting, or an agricultural setting, or a logistics setting that can operate autonomously. So they develop the model, they condense it down, they pack it onto a robot with different hardware and simpler hardware, and then it operates without any sort of oversight from the data center. So starts its life a little bit like a large language model, but with something that is designed to generate a package that you can take and then put into something else, whereas a large language model just goes goes goes goes goes goes goes. Uses the same sort of hardware that the hyperscalers are using. And that’s part of the problem, because the hyperscalers like we want a million of these chips. And so Japan is in line behind all the hyperscalers which have the biggest orders and the deepest pockets. And so Nvidia designs their hardware for the hyperscalers and everybody else, like the Japanese, has to just see what’s on offer and adapt their own systems accordingly. 

Now, what is this probably going to look like? First of all, don’t get too excited about time. The Japanese aren’t going to these chips soon. The first chips only started to be produced in June. TSMC only kind of hit their stride in July, and its first real deliveries aren’t going to happen to this fall. And the Americans are in line first, so the Japanese probably won’t get their 27,500, I think, is the number, probably until the second quarter of next year. By then, most of the data centers should be built, and they can begin meaningful operations before the end of next year, but they probably won’t finish the model until right around New Year. So we’re already talking not just 2027, but 2028 before they might be able to start putting this thing into robot brains. And at that point, well, then we can reevaluate. Japan is the world’s oldest society. It’s no longer to the fastest aging, but it’s expecting a workforce shortage of more than 11 million workers as soon as 2030. Now they have a robot strategy in the country, and they’re pretty good at automation already. So they’re starting from a level in this project that is well ahead of everybody else in the world. But that’s because the need is so huge. If Japan is going to continue to be an industrialized, advanced country, they have to find a way to substitute for labor. Now, in the United States and in a lot of other countries, you could always tap the global talent pool and bring in high tech workers. 

Japan, however, is one of the world’s most racist societies. So they like robots, but they don’t necessarily like Filipinos or Indians or even Americans. So doing this AI approach is the only one. 

Once this is set up, if it works, the robots will probably still have a digital tether back to the data center, but not for operations, because they’re going to have to make decisions right there in front of them. And if they have to wait for the lag, like, you know, when you program something into Claude or ChatGPT, there’s that lag before you get the answer won’t work. All has to operate on site, but it will still be generating training data to go back to the data center to update the model. And then of course, you have software updates like you had with any other hardware. 

It’s a very promising project, merging what the Japanese have been doing for the last 40 years with the frontier tech that is being developed only just today. And if it works, we may, may, may, at least in one situation, have a partial, partial solution to what is turning into a global labor shortage, as the population of 100 plus countries is honestly just aging out to the point that we won’t have enough workers to do what we need to get done. 

But Japan, they’ve been working on this for a while. They’re using new toys. It looks pretty promising.

Why I Don’t Worry About Cyberattacks (for the most part)

A hacker a a computer terminal

Following the cyberattacks in Minnesota, many have reached out regarding cyber threats from a national security perspective.

Most successful cyberattacks don’t target critical national infrastructure; they go after individual organizations. Thanks to the decentralized cybersecurity model adopted by the U.S., there is no single system an attacker can compromise to cripple the entire country.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here come to you from the east, east, west, west side of Bison Peak. On my way down, I got buzzed while I was up here that there’s been a cyber attack in Minnesota effecting at least 30 different municipal districts. The information I have to work with is very limited. I have no bars up here. 

Got garments to me. Anyway, I thought this would be a good time to talk about cyber because we’ve got the the background and we’ve got the teaser. So short version. This is not something I worry about in the traditional sense, not from a nation state point of view. It’s serious issue. Cyber has been becoming more and more of an issue because the tools that are necessary to do cyber attacks have proliferated massively. 

And you can pick up basically a starter toolkit on the dark web for just a couple hundred dollars, and for a few thousand, you can get some really interesting tools. And people have been using those to hack whatever databases they can get into, whatever systems they can, and hold whatever hostage they can. Common attacks are ransomware, where basically you lock up somebody’s database and say, if you don’t pay me X by Y date, I’m just going to delete the whole thing. 

And a lot of folks don’t have sufficient backups, so they really don’t have much of a choice to pay. And you can always tell if you’ve got somebody who’s dedicated to cyber defenses by who pays. Of course, anyone who pays has a vested interest in not telling anyone that they’ve paid, because that’ll tank their stock value or confidence in their institution or whatever it happens to be. 

From what I understand, with Minnesota, that’s not in play. It doesn’t look like any services were interrupted. People are pointing their fingers at Iran because that’s the flavor of the month at the time. I have no way to say that it’s Iran or something else, but I do want to underline when it comes to national security issues, this is something that, while not minor, is not something that I kind of put in my top tier of concerns. 

The reason is the combination of disassociation and concentration when it comes to cyber defense versus cyber offense. Back when computers became a thing back in the 1980s, we had Ronald Reagan and nobody knew what was going to happen with all of this. So there was no institution that kind of take responsibility. So Reagan’s decision was to make the National Security Agency, the NSA, responsible for cyber offense, and their job was to hack everybody all the time, put in backdoors, put in worms, whatever. 

Working from the theory that if we ever get involved in a hot war, or if the other side does cyber against us in a way that kills people, we will have the option to go scorched earth. The idea being that the NSA’s would have access to as much as possible, and they could basically implode opposing systems from the inside so they would never carry data again. 

Not just a hack, but a physical destruction of the hardware down at the node. But defense wasn’t touched because if you wanted to throw a cyber defense umbrella over the entire country, you would need a massive institution. And how would you determine where the line is? Is it the fortune ten companies? 

The fortune 100, the fortune 500? The fortune 5000? Is it everything going down to the mom and pops? And remember mom and pop companies that have employees of 50 or less or half of the employment base? Do you deal with individuals in this way? Do you deal with universities? And rather than try to come up with a solution to that problem, Reagan just everyone else, you’re on your own. 

So every government institution at the local, the state and the federal level, and every company, regardless of size and every individual, regardless of wealth, is responsible for their own cyber defense. You fast forward that to the 2020s, and what it means is the same ease in which people can get hacking tools is also available for people to get defense, and especially encryption tools, and off the shelf encryption tools that just cost like 2030 bucks can’t be hacked by anything shy of a semiconductor taking a couple of years, it doesn’t mean that you’re perfectly safe. 

Human error is undoubtedly the way the most hackers get into systems, but it does mean at this moment, as long as you have a degree of awareness and put a little modicum of effort into it, the advantage really is for the defender. Will that always be the case? I have no idea that the semiconductor industry and software is evolving in very strange positions, and I can’t underline enough that most successful hacks get in because somebody has been sloppy or hasn’t changed their password, or lets them in because of a fishing attack. 

These are all very real concerns, but what it means is, from my point of view, it is impossible for cyber attacks to take down the country because there’s no single defense. There’s no node that an enemy can hack into and take down the whole country, or take down all the power grids. We’ve got thousands of power grids and thousands of water districts across the country. 

You have to hack each of them individually and then everyone around them. When they realize there’s a hack, they usually cut their connections. Part of the reason for that was because of, if you remember back to 2001, 2002, right after nine over 11, we had a power outage in the northeast and in eastern Canada because we had interconnections among our power grids. 

Well, after that event, everybody basically built firewalls, and that worked not just to prevent cascading power failures, but it also worked to prevent cascading hack access. So anyone who wants to take down the United States has to hack literally tens of thousands, if not tens of millions of things to in order to do it. And even the Chinese, at their height before their demographic bomb went off, never had enough people to do that. 

There’s an open question whether AI, as it evolves is going to be more effective as an offensive or a defensive capability. That is part of the handwringing around something called mythos, which is a new clod product that’s anthropic. It’s the company that generates clod because basically mythos is doesn’t have barriers and it hacks things, but it also figures out where the vulnerabilities are so that you can reverse patch everything to. 

Bottom line is this is all evolving, but the physical structure that the United States has set into place often operations concentrated, defensive operations dispersed makes it very easy for individuals or individual companies to get hacked, but functionally impossible to do meaningful damage to the US structures even in a time of war. For what it’s worth, in the world these days, that passes as good news.

Why Space and Data Centers Don’t Go Together

Nebulas and stars in space

We’ve all seen the headlines lately talking about the proposed data centers across the U.S. While nobody wants these things in their backyard, putting them in space isn’t going to solve our problems.

With just a quick look into some basic physics and logistics of putting a data center in space, the idea becomes comical. First, you have to put massive amounts of hardware, cooling systems, and power into space. Then you have to completely reengineer the data center for space. Then you have to think about maintenance. Oh, and cooling these things down in a vacuum is no easy task.

To put it simply: no, we won’t be putting any large AI data centers in orbit.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today we are taking a question from the Patreon crowd. So it’s a question that I have resisted answering because I don’t like it, but so many people have asked, I figure, what the hell? So it’s on space based data centers. Is that the future? Will this solve some problems? 

How much is it? It’s just a little bitty snake. Is this something we should take seriously? Let’s explain what a data center is. You have dozens, hundreds, thousands of racks that contain modules that are packed with things like graphics processing units, Dram and Rand memory, and then threading through it all, some sort of coolant. 

You see, most data centers are based on crunching data, the GPU part, and that generates a lot of heat. So you incorporate the cooling system into the modules and if you can, into the gypsum cells, although that’s really cutting edge and no one’s really doing that at scale just yet. Soon, hopefully. Anyway, those racks have weight, the GPUs have weight, the Nand has weight, the Dram has weight. You need a lot of electricity. You need a lot of coolant. 

You need a liquid system. You need a pumping system. And if you’re going to take a one gigawatt system and move it into space, the theory is that because space is cold, cooling is cheap, and because solar power in space generates at least five times what it does on the surface, power is cheap. No, no. Let’s start with getting this stuff up there. 

So just the computational stuff, the racks and the things in them, not counting the cooling system. That’s for something of this size, roughly 20 million pounds of weight. Then you need another 10 million pounds of weight for the liquid coolant. Then you need another 5 to 8 million pounds of weight for all of the assorted things that keep it alive the pumps, the power cables and such. 

Okay, that by itself is about 250. Starship launches. Starship is the vessel that Elon Musk and SpaceX hope is going to revolutionary space travel. It’s currently in the prototype stage. It has not been going particularly great, but let’s just hand wave that away and say that it works 250 of those to get the equipment up. You’re not done. 

Now you need a construction facility in orbit, which means you need a habitat in orbit. You also need a habitat at the data center, because a typical data center has 100 people working at any given time. Now, the ES International Space Station has never had more than 13 people in at a time. And really it’s only rated for seven. 

So you’re talking about the equivalent of 20 to 40 ES equivalents attached to this data center in order to carry out the work. And that assumes that the work is possible, which are probably isn’t GPU’s really. All the high end chips are not rated for vibration, for cold, for heat, for humidity, and certainly not for radiation. And you’re in space so you don’t have the planet’s magnetic field and atmosphere protecting you. 

So now you need to clad the whole thing in radiation proofing, which is at least another 20 million pounds. There’s another 200 Starship trips. Also, a data center is a living thing. Chips burn out, you have to remove them and replace them. So now you need a space based launch system just to maintain your one data center. Oh, and the biggest thing heat. 

Yes, space is cold. But what people forget is that space is a vacuum, and a vacuum is the most effective insulator we have ever discovered. So yes, you can use radiator fins, but their area of effect has to be an order of magnitude bigger than what they would be on Earth, and a very different configuration because they need to extend significant distance. 

You’re talking about literally tens if not hundreds of kilometers square kilometers of radiator surface in order to radiate the heat. Yeah, it’s cold out there, but it’s also insulating. So you’re now talking about a system that needs a pumping system to get the liquid out to the radiator fins, and you are in zero g. So you don’t only need more pumps to cover more territory. 

Pumps don’t work as well in space because you don’t have gravity doing some of the work. So now we’re basically conservatively up to 500 space a star. 500 star. What’s it called? Starship. Yeah, 500 Starship launches and a note on the radiators. This sort of design, we don’t build on Earth because, you know, we’ve got gravity. So not only are you talking about having to invent a fundamentally new system here for the cooling system, but just the cost of the radiators alone is probably about the same as the GDP of New Zealand, about $250 billion, and that is by itself 20 times the cost of a one gigawatt facility all in on Earth. 

There’s so many levels of dumb to this that I forgot. One that’s really kind of critical. The radiators. Not only are there big and expensive, but remember spaces and insulator. So if you’re radiator fins are flat on to sunlight, they’ll actually absorb heat rather than get rid of heat. So you have to make sure they’re always point in to the sun, which means that your space based data center has to do something that no Earth based data center has to do. 

It has to be able to move. So you got to put engines in maneuvering thrusters on this thing, complete with the fuel. So yeah, so much dumb. So anyone who tells you that data centers in space are coming because we don’t have room is lying to you. Anyone who is telling you it’s the only way that AI is going to work is lying to you. And anyone who’s trying to raise funds off of a story like this is just thinks you’re stupid and is going to get your money. 

Don’t fall for it. Does this mean there can’t be computing in space? Of course not. You can have small, small emphasis on small like a rack systems attached to some sort of orbital platform. But all of these rules apply. Massive radiator fins, atypical cooling system, huge cost to install. And unless you’re going to permanently station people up there when something fails, it’s broken for good. 

So no, this is not revolutionary. But if the rules of physics change, I reserve the right to change my mind.

The End of Nuclear Arms Control

nuclear bomb with a mushroom in the desert

The last remaining US-Russia nuclear arms control agreement has expired, which means for the first time in decades, we’re in a world with no active nuclear arms control.

To be fair, it’s not like the Russians were honoring those deals even when they were in place. And given Russia’s war in Ukraine, negotiations for a new deal were a moot point. So, that leaves the world’s largest nuclear powers without limitations on their nuclear arsenals. Which means any other nuclear-capable power will be looking to expand or acquire its very own nuclear arsenal ASAP.

There’s a long list of countries eager to bolster security through nuclear armament, so a long period of nuclear proliferation is right around the corner…

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming you from Colorado today is the 4th of February. You’re gonna be seeing this in the morning on the fifth. And it’s a big day because for the first time in several decades, for the bulk of my lifetime, there is no active nuclear disarmament or arms control deal. In effect, the last one to start deal with the revised start deal, expired today. 

And there is really no appetite within the administration of the United States or the Russian Federation to negotiate a new one. What this means is we’re now in a situation where both sides have between 1000 and 2000 warheads, and there are no longer any legal restrictions on them expanding those arsenals. Now, some people try to put the blame for this on the Donald Trump. 

And I will not say that the Trump administration is really a champion of arm control in any form, but this is really mostly a Russian thing. You see, the The Russians know that they’re the strategically inferior partner in these deals. And the only reason that they were originally negotiated back in 1979 and 1985 is that they faced just a crushing, overwhelming American superiority in technology, reach and alliance structure. And so they knew that if there was a conflict, the United States had a bomber fleet, they had a missile fleet, it had a sub fleet, and they really just only had the missiles. 

And they were not confident that they could survive a first strike in order to deliver a second strike. So arms control back then was largely designed as a way by the Soviets to deflate tensions and eventually set the stage for a lasting detente that eventually ended the Cold War. Things really picked up after 1986, when Mikhail Gorbachev, who was really the only economist to ever run the Soviet Union, and he realized that the system was breaking and there was a limited amount of time. 

And so talks accelerated. And then in the post-Soviet system, under Yeltsin, we were no longer enemies. So getting rid of the thousands of warheads made a lot of sense to everybody. But in the time since that, we’ve had 20 years of Vladimir Putin and the Russians, rightly or wrongly, feel that the West has betrayed them time and time and time again. 

And the only way that they’re treated seriously as is if they’re threatened, the destruction of the human race with nuclear weapons. To that end, we’ve had two big trends that have happened in the last decade. Number one, bit by bit, the Russians have abrogated or cheated on every single one of the treaties in order to prompt the Americans to be the ones to cancel them. 

And Trump one did cancel a couple and others have expired. And so, you know, you can blame Trump if you want to. But the real fact was, is that the Russians were testing and fielding new weapons that were explicitly barred by the treaties and did it anyway, saying that they were still abiding by the conditions. The second issue, of course, is more recent with the Ukraine war. 

They’re in a hot war. And the idea that the Russians are going to voluntarily abide by any sort of meaningful arms control when they’re actually in the process of shooting a lot of people, is a bit rich, just like back in the late 70s and into the 80s, the reasons that the Russians thought they needed to do this is because they didn’t think that they could win on a field of battle. 

And unless and until they feel that way again in Ukraine, the chances of them going into any negotiations with good faith are pretty, pretty weak. Also, again, keep in mind that the Russians have abrogated or cheated on every single arms control treaty, nuclear or conventional, that they have ever signed. So any meaningful deal has to involve invasive inspections by both parties onto the other side in order to confirm these weapons are actually being taken out of service, dismantled, and eventually spun down. 

So they can’t be used, for weapons again, that requires a degree of intervention in the American military complex that we’ve done before. It would require a degree of intervention in the Russian complex that they have done before. it also would require a degree of trust on both sides that at the moment just simply doesn’t exist. 

And again, again, again, they are in a hot war. The Russians are in a hot war right now. So the idea that you can have American military and civilian personnel poking around into the Russian nuclear complex, it’s not feasible. 

So next steps. As to arms control, there really aren’t any, because until there’s a substantial change in mindset in Moscow, the idea that they’re going to negotiate with anyone in good faith simply evaporates. That leaves the situation open for everybody else. Now, the Americans and the Russians combined have over 90% of the nuclear weapons that are available in the world today. 

But they’re not the only ones. Israel has some, France and Britain have some. And the Chinese, of course, have a significant arsenal. Although it’s not merely in the same class as either Russia or the United States, unless and until we have some sort of deal between the Russians and the Americans and what a ceiling might look like, other countries not only don’t have an incentive to limit their own production of weapons, they have a very strong incentive to build more and more and more, not just to get to bigger tables, but to secure their own existence. 

And that is as true for China as it is for Israel and Pakistan and India and unfortunately, now true for Korea and Japan and Poland and Germany and Sweden and Finland as well. So we are not simply at the end of the great era of arms control that literally took tens of thousands of weapons out of circulation. We are now at the dawn of a new era of massive proliferation, because we no longer have a structure to limit it. 

And the changes to the international strategic environment basically demanded. Because if you’re a country that has been on the sidelines for the last 50 years and relying on the bilateral system between the Russians and the Americans to kind of keep a lid on things, and all of a sudden that is gone. You no longer have the time that is necessary to build up conventional force. 

Building up a nuclear force is the fastest way to get to a degree of security, where you actually hold some cards. And we are now going to see that in country after country after country after country for at least the next 15 years.

Electronic Warfare Innovations and Exports

Laptop with green coding and a server

Let’s talk about the current state of electronic warfare in the Ukraine War and how Iran is fitting into all this.

Drones are all the rage. You’ve got fancy autonomous systems, short-range with remote pilots, and fiber-optic tethered. The next logical step to countering drones is to beef up jamming capabilities; Ukraine has done just that. However, the Russians have taken this logic one step further. They’ve created a tool called the Kalinka. The Kalinka is a mobile detection system that listens for signals. This gives them an early warning for drone strikes and other signal-based attacks.

Electronic warfare innovations are spreading quickly, and this tech is already appearing in other regions. For instance, Iran used the Russian Kalinka tech to locate Starlink users during the protests, allowing them to shut down comms and suppress dissent.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado, I hope everybody who is east of the Rockies is enjoying the cold front because, Canada worst. Anyway, today we’re talking about what’s going on in Ukraine and Russia and Iran from a technical point of view, specifically electronic warfare. Drones basically fall into three general categories. Number one, you got autonomous ones that can make decisions on their own. Those are incredibly rare and incredibly difficult to maintain because the chips themselves are unstable when there’s vibration or heat or cold or humidity or anything. So really, aside from a few here and there that are very expensive, not a lot of play. The second are those that you fly first person, and for that you have to have a connection to them somehow so that the telemetry can come back and forth and you can control them. 

Now, the United States does that with things like Reapers through satellite connections. The Ukrainians primarily do it on a shorter range, and the Russians also on a shorter range, typically no more than, 20km. And the problem with that is they can be jammed. And so both the Ukrainians and the Russians have gotten very, very good at here. 

I mean, I would argue that right now, today, Ukraine’s jammers are by far the best in the world, probably an order of magnitude better than America’s. Once you consider in cost. And then the third type is to do, fiber drones, which have a thin fiber optic cable that they drag behind. Now, these don’t have nearly as much range as a rule, but they can’t be jammed because there’s a hard line. 

And these, as a rule, are five kilometers or less. Although there are now some models where the fiber optic cable is light enough. You can go more than ten. Anyway, so those are kind of what’s going on there. But there’s another aspect to countering drones or any sort of electronic battle platform, that doesn’t involve jamming, but it’s still electronic warfare. 

And in this, the Russians have definitely, cracked the code on a new tech that is really interesting and has a lot of applications. So they call it the clinker. It’s basically a electronic warfare detection system that is mounted onto a truck or an armored vehicle. You basically drive around, find a place to park, and then you just listen and you pick up signals whether this is a cell phone or a drone connection or more importantly, in recent terms, as we’ve discovered, a, Starlink terminal. 

So one of the things that the Ukrainians have been doing is taking mobile Starlink terminals and putting them on things like drones, and then they go out into the Black Sea and blow up something that’s Russian. And the Russians don’t like that. But if you’re having a constant link in from a Starlink terminal and you can detect that, then the Russians finally have a way of knowing that it’s coming. 

I’m not saying it works perfectly. The range is only about 15km, and one of the CBP drones, they’re pretty quick. It’s not a lot of time to react, and it doesn’t jam the connection. It just detects it. So the Ukrainians have learned to turn things on and off every couple of minutes so that the Clinkers can’t, link up. 

But one of the things you have to keep in mind is that we’re in a fundamentally new type of warfare here, and when drones first appeared on the battlefield in a meaningful way that was not American. It wasn’t in Ukraine. It was in Armenia. We had a war back in 2020 between Armenia and Azerbaijan. And the as a region has had, Turkish drones that they basically used to completely obliterate the entire armed forces of Armenia in the disputed territories and would go on a crowbar. 

The Armenians weren’t ready for it. And so what we’re now starting to see is Ukrainian and Russian technology coming into other theaters and just completely wiping the board. So, for example, in the last couple of weeks, we have we’ve had those big protests in Iran, and people were wondering how the Iranians were able to shut down communication so effectively. 

Well, it now looks like the Russians gave the Iranians a few clinkers, and they basically just drove them around town, identified where all of Starlink’s were kicked in the door, shut the people involved, or brought them in for beating or imprisonment or whatever it happened to be. And lo and behold, the, situation from the Iranian point of view was diffused. 

So we now have a technology that has very, very strong implications for use in a civilian management system. We’re going to be seeing more and more things like this of technologies from a hot zone where they’re iterating every day and every week suddenly pop up in a theater that you wouldn’t expect, where it completely outwits maneuvers outclasses the preexisting systems. Iran is just a taste of what is to come on a global basis.

The Semiconductor Tariff Nightmare

A semiconductor chip

A poorly designed and destined to backfire tariff has just been announced; this time, the Trump administration has turned its focus to high-end semiconductors.

Putting tariffs on semiconductors is nearly impossible to do cleanly. There are thousands of types, production stages, and end uses. So, the Trump admin thought it would be a good idea to tariff them based on the end use, rather than where they’re made. The only problem is that most importers don’t even know the final use of the chips upon import, creating a legally and financially risky situation for everyone involved.

This tariff will likely freeze access to advanced semiconductors and choke the US tech and manufacturing sectors. There are a few ways around the tariffs, but those offer little relief to existing manufacturers. But hey, let’s just keep trying to jam this square peg into that round hole.rough strong alliances will struggle to survive. And the next generation of kids (however small that cohort might be) will be studying those countries in the history books.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Iowa. Today is the 15th of January, and the Trump administration has at long last announced the first wave of semiconductor tariffs, specifically targeting high end semiconductors. There was always going to be a question as to how this was done and whether it was going to be a disaster. 

It really matters because semiconductors are, for most intents and purposes, a commodity. They come in in thousands of forms and at thousands of different stages of production. There’s over 100,000 steps for high end semiconductor fabs creation. And they can come in as raw chips still attached to the disk. They can come in separated from those disk. 

They can be put into intermediate products like motherboards or charging stations. They can be included into intermediate products. They can be incorporated into final products. And so whatever type of tariff regime you’re going to put in there is obviously going to be full of flaws, even if it’s very, very, very well designed. And commerce was never set up to manage this sort of system, much less, Customs and Border Patrol. 

And that was before we had the personnel purges of last calendar year. So the questions were always, you know, how are you going to do this? Are you going to look like at a car? And the 1500 types of semiconductors that are installed within it have a different tariff rate for each one. Do you tariff the entire car tariff the chips independently? 

You do it based on the intermediate products. Based on where the value added happens. Basically, you could get more paperwork for one tariff on one vehicle than all of the rest of the 30,000 pieces in a car combined. What the Trump administration has done with this round is instead of going by sourcing, which would make a degree of national security sense, even, it would be, logistically almost impossible. 

They’ve decided to go on end use, which is, if anything, even more confusing, because now anyone who is importing these products has to decide what each individual chip is going to be used for. Declare that on the tariff form and the way that Customs and Border Protection enforces the tariff regime is to not check it on the front end, but to randomly check it on the back end and then really bring down a hammer in terms of fines and penalties. 

The problem is if if somebody is important to, say, 10,000 of a specific type of chip, they’re not the ones who are probably going to use the chip. The chip is going to go on and get put into computers or cell phones or pacemakers or whatever it happens to be. And so who is responsible for it? So the person who is doing the importing has to go and gets a customer affidavit and assign them to each individual box, each individual chip that Customs and Border Protection can then go into later a year from now, three years from now, and attempt enforcement. So what we’ve gotten is something that will freeze the use of semiconductors at the high end, because no one is going to know how to do the paperwork on the front end. It’s difficult to come up with something that is going to chill American manufacturing more, because now simply accessing the pieces in the first place is not going to happen cleanly. 

And you could open yourself up to legal liability simply from plugging a piece of typical technology into something that you’re working on, because you’re not the one who did the actual importing, but you’re probably legally liable. So we’re probably going to see a seizing up across not just the tech space, but the advanced manufacturing space in the United States, especially in places like heavy machinery, automotive and aviation, where these chips are used in the thousands in every single vehicle. 

It’s going to be very interesting to see how this goes. The Trump administration says it’s going to do a review after 90 days where if progress has not been made and expanding the supply chain within the United States, then, more tariffs will be coming. One of the many exceptions, because there are a bunch is that if you’re using these chips to expand the construction of a supply chain, you get a pass. 

But if you’re already have a supply chain, you do not. So this is a horribly designed tariff, absolutely the wrong tool for the job. And it’s going to become very obvious as this year rolls on, that it is actually going to poison most of what progress the US has made in its industrialization effort over the last decade.