Where Would I Put a US Semiconductor Fab?

Semiconductor being made

If I were tasked with finding a location for a US-based semiconductor fabrication facility, where would I put it?

Well, just putting in a fab facility wouldn’t do much for anyone, as it ignores the enormous global supply chain that follows the fabrication stage. So, a better question would be “where would a full semiconductor ecosystem realistically go in the US?”

Places like the Texas Triangle, some coastal cities (think LA or San Fran), or western mountain cities like Denver might scratch part of the itch…but they either lack the workforce, the land, or the economics to make it work. The Midwest is the only feasible option; it’s scalable, has plenty of land and infrastructure, and has a strong blue-collar workforce that it can draw on from surrounding areas.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re taking a question from the Patreon page. Specifically, if I were to dictate where a high end semiconductor fab facility should go in the United States for maximum outcomes, where would I put it? Well, let’s start by clarifying a couple things. Number one, semiconductor fab facilities, obviously an important part of the process, but they are one part of about 100,000 supply chain steps. 

From the point of imagining a semiconductor to actually getting a product, 30,000 moving pieces, over 9000 companies. Now, fabs are obviously importance where a lot of these pieces come together, but it’s not the high value part and it’s not the high employment part. It’s just a middle place where some things are done, important things, but all of the steps are important. 

So let’s talk about process on the front end. You want to design a semiconductor. Most of that work is already done in the United States. And once you figure out how to do it, you then go to the fab company and you basically have a conversation going back and forth where you figure out how X can become a product and you eventually build, an encyclopedia that’s basically instructions on how to turn this vision into reality. 

And then the supply company goes out and sources all of the materials that are necessary and makes sure that from a logistical point of view, they arrive at the right time in the right format, with the right purity. The next part of the process involves the fab. You basically take one of those purified products, silicon dioxide, melt it in a big that you put in a seed crystal, and over several weeks you draw it up and let the crystal form. 

Eventually you get a crystal that weighs more than a car. You then slice it laterally into thin discs. You dope it with chemicals to make sure that the pathways you want are represented in you then run it through the EUV system. Extreme ultraviolet. That’s a giant bus size structure that, can basically etch structures down to the atomic level, and then you bake it and then you treat it again, and then you zap it again, and then you bake it in. 

I make it that order, really. Is it treat, bake, etch or etch? Baked. Anyway, you do that several dozen times and eventually you get a disc that has several hundred semi-finished semiconductor circuits on it. 

That’s where the fab part stops, because then that just goes somewhere else and it is cut into the individual dyes. Those dyes are stacked and tested and packaged. 

Go into intermediate products that most people like, generically called chips. Then they go in to other things like wiring assemblies and motherboards, eventually built into things like system of a chip that goes into your phone, and then only then do they go into your computers and your phones and your cars and everything else. It is a very involved process, and it requires over an order of magnitude more labor and capital after the Fab than it does to actually build and operate the Fab facility. 

And one of the reasons why the United States has largely gotten out of the fab business is we have seen countries, most notably Korea and Taiwan, subsidize the crap out of doing it there. So we’ve taken the step that we’re not economically good at and let somebody else pay us to do it for us. So if you bring a fab back to the United States, not only do you have to overcome those subsidies, you actually haven’t solved your core problem of all the downstream manufacturing and processing. 

That’s not one company that is literally hundreds of companies. The labor force doesn’t just need to be large and well-trained. It also has to be very modular and adaptable, because what is demanded for the chips of today is not the same for the chips of six months from now or a year from now, much less three years from now. 

So everything that all of those downstream companies do has to be re fabricated over and over and over and over and over. And that requires a very different sort of approach to labor. And that’s not something that United States has historically done. Great. So where can you put this sort of footprint. Because it’s not necessarily about land and water and power. 

You do need this for the fact. I’m not saying that’s unimportant, but it’s really the more downstream stuff that requires a specific time of modular, adaptable workforce and large numbers. Most American cities don’t have that. When you look at places like Los Angeles or San Francisco or New York or Atlanta, there just isn’t really much of a footprint to put the fab in the first place. 

And more importantly, even if you could put it there, you don’t have a dense enough labor footprint with the right skill set in these places. Even where I live here in Denver might be able to put a fab very, very easily because there’s a lot of green space, but the entire Front Range has less than 5 million people in it, and that’s probably just not enough of a labor force. 

It’s necessary to do all the downstream testing, packaging, and incorporation into intermediate product TSMC has been setting up outside of Phoenix and Arizona, a place called Chandler, and has basically run into this problem over and over again. The state and the city can offer all kinds of tax benefits. The federal government can say, yes, put it there. 

But the greater Phoenix area has about the same population as the Front Range. And they’re really having problems establishing all of those downstream industries that are necessary to take these fab components and actually put them into anything we might use. So what we’re seeing is a lot of it just shipped back to Taiwan, where that ecosystem already exists. 

There was really only two places in the United States that you might be able to build that sort of ecosystem on anything less than a 20 year time frame. The first one is the Texas triangle, and that’s the zone of Houston, San Antonio, Austin and, Dallas. And there are a few semiconductor fab facilities there. The problem is that there’s probably no longer enough room in the labor force in Texas. 

Texas has been in relative terms, the fastest growing part of the country for the last 35 years, primarily because of the shale revolution and the NAFTA accords, which made Texas the primary interface between the United States and Mexico. But to make that work, the Texans have always needed people. And while yes, it’s a no income tax state and that matters a great deal, ultimately there’s a demographic story here that is starting to turn against them. 

They bring in people from the south, from Mexico, and further deeper into Latin America because of Houston. They bring people from abroad. But Donald Trump’s immigration crackdown has turned those net migrations inward into reverse. So we’re now net negative in Texas in terms of population growth when it comes to immigrants. Second, Americans used to flock to Texas for jobs, most notably Californians. 

But California has rebounded since Covid, and that flow is gone. And in addition, we now have had a series of presidents that have failed to deal with issues of rising living costs. And so we’ve seen significant drops in the birth rate across the country. That makes people a little bit less mobile, a little bit less willing to move for economic reasons. 

And more importantly, it just means we’re not generating enough babies sustain long term population growth. So calendar year 2025 is the first year in American history where the population has actually dropped, with the exception, of course, of the Spanish flu. And in the case of Texas, for the first time in 40 years, they’re no longer seeing the inflows of people. 

So their population has for the first time started to stagnate. That tells me that if you take all of the manufacturing that already exists in Texas, there might not be enough room for a fundamentally new sector that works very differently than everything they have in more traditional manufacturing, the only option that remains is probably where this is going to happen. 

And that’s the Midwest. The Midwest has a number of major cities, none of which are anywhere near as big as places like Houston, of course. But you have a lot of flat land. You have good infrastructure, road and rail link in the area together. You have a huge number of small towns that have still the highest birth rates in the country outside of the Mormon country, out in, Utah. 

And because of the legacy industries in this region that reach all the way back to the Steele era in the 1800s, you have a lot more blue collar workers than white collar workers. And most of these jobs in the post fab industry are some flavor of blue collar, mid-career training. 

There’s just kind of normal for these folks. So you could drop a semiconductor fab facility outside any of the major cities and be able to draw on the broader region, which has over 40 million people, fairly easily. This is one of the many reasons why Intel has chosen to put their new facility directly outside of Columbus, Ohio, to tap the broader Midwest worker community. 

You could probably do something very similar outside of Saint Louis or Minneapolis or even Chicago. And in doing so, tap a lot of these secondary cities that we think of somewhat accurately as time having passed by. And that’s true whether it’s green Bay or Milwaukee or De Moine or Indianapolis or any of the others. So if you’re looking for a full transplant, if you’re preparing for a world where the Chinese are gone and this is just a sector, we need to expand by an order of magnitude, the Midwest is probably where it’s at. 

But the obstacles are many. The investments will be huge. So whatever going to do front load it.

Kessler Syndrome and the Future of Space

An Artist Rendering of a Satellite in Space

Space debris recently struck China’s Tiangong space station. Given the congested nature of the ~350km altitude band, this collision is a warning of what might come to low Earth orbit (LEO).

We’ve got Cold War junk floating around, thousands of Starlink satellites, and plenty of debris zooming around at this altitude. Sure, there are ways to track incoming debris, but it’s imperfect (I mean, you try avoiding something going Mach 25). Kessler Syndrome is the main concern here; just ask Sandra Bullock how she feels about it following her role in Gravity.

Like everything else in the world right now, space is in flux. A hostile Russia, uncooperative China, and prickly US are all adding to the tension.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. And today we’re going to talk about space. Now, you may have noticed in the last couple of weeks there’s been a little bit of drama around the Chinese space station. It’s called the Tiangong. Short version. It got hit by a piece of space debris. Now, the Tiangong is in low Earth orbit at about 350km of elevation. 

And it’s a very, very, very busy shell around the world. Back during the Cold War, when we didn’t have particularly powerful rockets, this is where almost all the satellites were. So there’s a lot of old Cold War debris, especially Russian debris that hasn’t been maintained or even really kept track of on the Russian side for a few decades now. 

And it’s just obstacles. In addition, this is where Starlink does most of their operations, and there’s about 6000 Starlink, satellites there, more than everything else put together. Starlink plans to do another 3 or 4000 over the next few years. And other entities, whether they’re European or Chinese, that are talking about building their own satellite network for broadband, are talking about using the same band. 

So it’s a very, very, very busy area. And that’s before you consider the thing young, which was the satellite that the Chinese had, that they shut down their own about ten, ten, 15 years ago now. Yeah, 15 years ago now, without understanding orbital orbital mechanics. And so it generated 15,000 pieces of debris, of which 2000 are still up there, and they regularly intersect this elevation at 350, kilometers. 

Now, why would the Chinese put their station there? Short version is they didn’t have a choice. One of the things that people forget when they compare, American technology and Chinese technology is the Chinese are in almost all sectors, more than one generation behind. And when it comes to things like aerospace or space travel or ships that means all of their vessels are a lot heavier. 

And so the sheer throw weight that they need to get to get into orbit, requires a lot more powerful rockets, which they don’t have. And so they can’t go as high. They just don’t have as much of a massive budget as, say, the International Space Station. And it sponsors do. The Russians intelligently have chosen to not share rocket technology with the Chinese because they know they would be a target of it anyway. 

So the Chinese are a generation, maybe two generations behind, and that leaves them stuck down here. So what happened was this piece of space junk hit them? And it’s a couple things to keep in mind here. Number one, in addition to being very, very busy, there is a lot of tracking up there, but it’s clearly not perfect. 

And just because you see something coming doesn’t mean you can get out of the way of it. So, luckily, nobody was killed. Luckily, they had a replacement, vessel that they could send up. Luckily, they could bring everybody down safely. 

There’s no reason to expect that. That’s going to be the new norm, though. Oh, by the way, the ISS over about 400km. So we’ve got a little bit more wiggle room in the international system there. Okay. Why am I bringing this up? Couple things. Number one, my broadband out here in the mountains sucks. I have a Starlink, corporate account, which is supposed to give me 25 to 30 And PBS. 

Every second, and instead I get closer to ten. So this video I’m recording right now will probably take me over four hours to upload for you. The reason is very simple. Starlink has sold a lot of subscriptions to support the satellites that are up there. And what they’re discovering is that the profit curve is not what they had hoped it would be. 

Because the more people who sign up, the lower the bandwidth is for everybody else, which means the more satellites they need to send up. But to send up the satellites, they need more subscriptions. Whether or not this is a long term model that is viable remains to be seen. But it is certainly not the cure all that a lot of us thought it was going to be a couple of years ago. 

And the only solution is more and more and more and more and more and more, more satellites in that same band. Because if you put the satellites higher, number one, it takes a lot more energy to get them up there. And number two, if something does go wrong with a satellite in a higher altitude, it’s a lot harder to deorbit it. 

And instead of staying up there for 2 to 10 years, it stays up for 15 to 20. And the reason that gets really important for everyone real quick is something called the Kessler syndrome. If you’ve seen the movie gravity with Sandra Bullock, you have some idea what I’m talking about. Basically, a satellite blows up for whatever reason, sends all kinds of debris out, and then that debris hits other things and causes more debris and more and more and more. 

And eventually all of low-Earth orbit becomes nonfunctional for purposes of space exploration or satellites of really any type, because slow moving pieces, in low Earth orbit move it about mock 25, and a paperclip at that speed is more than enough to ruin the day of any satellite and generate a lot more paperclips. So we’re in this interesting catch 22, and that the only way to deepen and improve space technology is to put more stuff up there, which puts us at the risk of ending everything that is up there. 

And now we’ve got the Russians, who are one of the best space powers, suddenly being hostile to everybody else, the Chinese refusing to cooperate in international fora, and the United States to put it mildly, is becoming a little persnickety know about a great many things. it adds up for an incredibly dangerous and, crisis prone, environment and low Earth orbit. 

About the only bright side I can tell you is that if we do get a Kessler and low Earth orbit, everything will probably de-orbit in under a decade, and then we can try again. So perhaps, just like with everything else in the world right now, as the globalization kicks in, we’re going to be taking about ten years off from everything.

Can 3D Printing Save US Manufacturing?

A 3D printer

We’re entering an era where restructuring global manufacturing will be non-negotiable. As supply chains collapse and tariffs complicate this process, can technology like 3D printing take some of the pressure off?

Investments in US manufacturing have declined under Trump’s protectionist policies, since relocating abroad can help avoid the tariff rabbit hole. 3D printing offers a promising solution for reshoring some of that manufacturing, but it’s too inefficient for large-scale production as of now.

As 3D printing improves and finds niches that align, this could be a disruptive technology. However, we won’t be replacing mass manufacturing with these printers anytime soon.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here. Walking down Indian Creek on my way out. Dreaming of Mexican food. But you know that’s not going to get satiated. Because there’s no good Mexican food anywhere near Denver. Anywhere. Today we’re taking a question from the Patreon crowd. And specifically, it’s, building off of some of the concerns that I’ve had with manufacturing. 

The short version is that the more complex the manufacturing system is, the more countries are involved. So when you put tariffs on the import of manufactured goods, either the finished product or the parts, what you’re basically saying is I don’t want to participate in the supply chain because it’s cheaper for everyone to move their production base out of your country. 

And then just import the finished product at the end of the day. Otherwise they have to pay the tariffs two, three, four, ten times. It’s one of the reasons why, the Trump tariffs are actually reducing investment in physical plant in the United States and reducing the amount of manufacturing products that we’re actually producing anyway. The follow on question from that is, is there a technology out there that might help us to get around that? 

And there, there might there might be, something called 3D printing. Basically, you take a powdered substrate, whether it’s a plastic or a metal, and then you sinter it with a laser, and grow a product. It’s often called additive manufacturing as well, instead of subtractive manufacturing. So subtractive manufacturing was more like punch holes and things. And you start with a block of material and you whittle it down until you have what you need. 

Additive manufacturing or 3D manufacturing? 3D printing is the opposite as you build it up layer by layer. Now, there are plenty of things that this looks very promising for. But the key thing to remember is if it has moving parts, especially moving parts that are different materials. It’s not that this technology cannot be used, it’s just that there are some pretty sharp limits materials, printers that can handle more than one type of material are pretty new, really just in the last 510 years. 

And the speed at which you can do things like this is very slow. So it’s very popular in things like, prototyping where every prototype is unique and then it doesn’t matter if it takes you hours to days to print the product. It’s also very popular in things where, abnormal shapes rule. So especially if you need a lot of strength but not a lot of weight. 

So you’re going to leave holes or bubbles within the material. So for aerospace, there are actually examples of 3D printers already on production floors and to a lesser degree in automotive as well. But the big thing to keep in mind here, speed, in the time that it takes you to stamp 100 products, you’re probably only going to make one 3D printed product, and so while 3D printing is getting incrementally better day by day and that’s great. 

And while it will undoubtedly, as the cost of manufactured products go up, as the globalization kicks in, it will obviously find more and more niches, where it’s the applicable technology, but it will always be coming from behind when it comes to mass application because of that speed issue. So I like the technology. I like the way it’s going. 

We should hurry up and get there.

The AI Race to Regression

The Open AI chatGPT logo on a phone

The AI race has been all the rage, but what if we were racing ourselves straight into regression?

OpenAI’s ChatGPT-5 is extremely powerful; however, it’s less user-friendly than its predecessor and is optimized for institutional users. Industrial and research applications are where the real power of AI lies. So, what happens when those energy-intensive data centers begin to falter?

Well, as globalization breaks down, that faltering is going to become a very real concern. Without an ecosystem that produces and shares all of the necessary components to make these AI behemoths run…we could see a technological regression that threatens the future of AI as we know it.

Transcript

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here coming to you from McCurdy peak. Well, the actual peak is there. Anyway, Peter Zane Company from Colorado. Today we’re taking another question from the Patreon page. Specifically, can you please explain to me this new space age that we’re in the race for artificial intelligence, and what we should look for, what we should worry about? 

Well, let’s start by saying that most of the things that people are talking about with AI are generally, not quite on the mark, for example, a lot of folks think that, OpenAI, that’s the premier artificial intelligence company in United States, that their new program chat, GPT or 5.0, which is supposedly an upgrade, is actually a significant downgrade. 

They find it not as user friendly, not as personable, not as complete. That’s for personal users. AI affects potentially thousands of different applications, and how most people interact with artificial intelligence is in some sort of first person single seat. interface. Like what you get on your phone or your laptop. 

I mean, I’ve got that way too. And the jump from chat GPT four to GPT five was not designed for your single user. It was designed for people who do code for people who designed drugs. It’s designed to bring a huge amount of processing power to things on the back end to basically recreate something. So the institutional users, the design users, they’re actually finding ChatGPT all kinds of fun. 

And some Altmann, who is the CEO of open AI, is going back and kind of taking some characteristics from ChatGPT for to put it in the chat, GPT five, in order to make everybody happy. So that’s all going to work out. Here’s the problem. Software versus hardware. If I’m going to really sum it up, it’s that 

Chat GPT for the algorithm that we all found so groundbreaking really only took up about ten terabytes. And you could easily carry that on thumb drives in your hand. Chat GPT five, more advanced, is at least twice that, probably three times. But OpenAI is not saying. So we don’t know that number for sure. 

The point is, in terms of the raw memory required to make the AI function, it’s really not that impressive. And so if, the corporate espionage or an act of benevolence, OpenAI were to lose control of the algorithm and it got out there in the wild, so to speak, it really could be used by almost anyone. What makes a AI function in the way that we think of it today? 

Not this Skynet future thing, but how it is now requires massive amounts of processing power at data centers. The largest data centers that the world has ever seen are needed in order to deal with the inflow of requests that come in, run the algorithm and spit out the results. Which means that the limiting factor, for the moment, in artificial intelligence isn’t the software, it’s the hardware. 

And this is where we have a really big problem, and it’s not that far away. The ability to make the high end processing chips that Taiwan is famous for, requires, 100,000 steps, 30,000 pieces, 9000 companies, and they’re scattered around the world. The single biggest concentration is then the United States, which is something Americans conveniently forget when they’re talking about sovereignty. 

Number two, concentration is on the Taiwan centric zone. The single most important company is in the Netherlands, but it has facilities in Germany and in Austria and in California, in Japan. But you’re never going to be able to do the chips at all without all of these steps. And a lot of them are single point failures. 

So if you have any degree of globalization, it doesn’t matter really what the countries. It falls out of work. We can’t make them at all. And for the chips that we already have, life span when they’re in a data center is typically in the 3 to 6 year range. So when we get to the point where we realize that we can’t make the chips, we’re going to have a bit of a scramble to see who can control what’s left. 

And then the ability to use AI will shrink from something that you can all have on your phone to simply the handful of entities, whether governments or corporations, that are capable of having their own data center so they can run by themselves and that will be it. Until we reinvent the entire ecosystem and what we have been seeing with most government efforts around the world, including the United States, to reassure the sort of manufacturing it only focuses on the fabrication facilities, which is what is in Taiwan. 

It ignores the design, it ignores the material inputs, it ignores the photo mask, it ignores the wiring, ignores everything else that goes into a successful chip, much less the downstream stuff like testing and packaging that ultimately makes the stuff that ends up in a data center. No one, to my knowledge, is putting any effort into actually bringing the entire ecosystem under one roof, and I honestly don’t even think it would be possible anyway. 

There are too many pieces. There are too many players. And and if you’re looking at the United States, there are not enough technicians that are capable of doing it because we already have record low unemployment levels. So we are in a moment right now where AI is possible with ChatGPT 5.0 and all the rest that will not last. 

And in the not too distant future, we are going to see a technological regression as we lose the ability to make the hardware. And since it took us 60 years to figure out how to do that in the first place, it’s not something that we’re going to do in a season is going to take a mastery. Industrialization process of different parts of the world to do different things, coming together in different ways. 

And that is something that I am not looking forward to. But we’re going to see at the beginning of that within this next decade.

The Fourth Shale Revolution: Supermajor Tech

ExxonMobil neon sign at a gas station

ExxonMobil has introduced a new type of proppant that might just spark the next US shale revolution.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Los Angeles on the California coast. And today we’re to talk a little bit about oil. There have been a couple of technological breakthroughs that I think are worthy of mentioning in the shale era. So ExxonMobil, big company, one of the largest players in the world, produces just under 5 million barrels a day. 

Has basically started mucking around with something called prop. So dial back…Hydraulic fracturing or fracking was basically how the United States produces 80% or more of its crude oil these days, as well as the vast majority of its natural gas. It’s not a fringe technology. It’s the backbone. What you do is you drill down vertically, and then you make a horizontal split that goes two, three, four, maybe even five miles. 

And then you inject water that is laced with sand. The water hydraulics, does not compress under pressure. So it cracks the rock apart. And then the water goes in with the sand and accesses tiny, tiny, tiny, tiny little deposits of petroleum. Then you stop the pumping. And because those tiny pockets of petroleum have now been exposed, they produce a back pressure that pushes the water out, but the sand stays lodged in the cracks, keeping them open so the flow can continue. 

The sand is called it, and it’s one of the biggest expenses in a fracking operation. Well, what ExxonMobil has now done is change the prop and is triggering what is basically the fourth shale revolution back backstory for that first shale revolution is when we figured out how to do this and brought out natural gas. The second shale revolution is when we figured out how to do this to bring out liquid oil. 

The third is when we built the infrastructure. Things like LNG facilities or chemical facilities or refineries to metabolize all this raw product where we’re now producing all of that stuff, all of that’s in the past. Fourth Revolution is taking the capital and the technological skillsets of the majors, like Exxon, and applying them for a whole new generation of technology. 

So one of the weird things about the shale revolution is when it started most of the super majors and kind of written off the American oil patch, and we had seen oil output from the United States dropped to historical lows well over the last century and a half. 

What that meant is we had small mom and pops that were doing everything, and they were trying everything they could come up with in order to get incremental increases. 

And that’s what generated the first few million barrels a day. Well, as time went on, oil does what oil does. And it rises and it falls and it rises and falls. And so we got a series of busts, and ExxonMobil was able to come in with its better capital position and buy up a lot of the smaller companies, to the point that it and Chevron now dominate the space and collectively produce almost 9 million barrels a day. 

Now you apply what Exxon has across its entire value chain, and you get a very different proposition. So for profit, specifically what we’re talking about today, they went into their refineries and they found waste product, something called petroleum coke. And they were able to manufacture that into a kind of a synthetic sand, if you will. The profit is where a lot of experiment has been going on and a lot of subsectors for the last several years, and you got some pretty expensive stuff that’s called ceramics called ceramics. 

It is ceramics. Petroleum coke is cheaper than that, more expensive than sand. But the real advantages it has that it’s a lot less dense, maybe 40, 50% less dense than sand, which means you can suspend it in the water better, which means it pushes into the formation better, which means it holds open cracks deeper in the formation. 

And for a small increase in cost, using what used to be a waste product. Exxon has seen their numbers increase by 10 to 20 to maybe even 30% in some wells. And that alone changes the math of the shale revolution a ten to a 30% increase in output for only a slim investment in what was a waste product. 

That’s amazing. And so the shale revolution is nowhere near done. You’ll hear people saying that eventually the shale revolution going to run out. There’s only much oil, but that misses the point. In the pre shale era, we were able to access about 10%, 9 to 10% of global energy reserves. There’s a lot down there that we just don’t have the technology to get to. 

The shale revolution doubled the percentage of what was accessible within the US space. So we’re talking about 150 years of output. All of a sudden we have access to something like that again. And we keep making these incremental increases, like with profit, that pushes the horizon back even further. So the shale revolution continues to set new records for output, adding somewhere between a half a million and a million barrels a day per year, and has now been doing that since 2009. 

You get a lot of output when you do it for that long. So this year is not the last year the shale revolution. Neither is next year or the year after or the year after that. 

Because the numbers keep getting better, the technology keeps pushing further, and the break even cost for what it takes to get a chunk of oil out in an economically viable way keeps going down.

The Semiconductor Frontier

Semiconductor being made

We’ve discussed how essential semiconductors are in our increasingly technological world, so here’s an update on ASML’s new High-NA EUV lithography machines.

ASML already builds the most advanced chipmaking tools, but these new models could enable chip designs at 1 nanometer or even smaller. Intel is betting on this new technology and could have mass manufacturing by the end of the decade, which would change the competitive landscape with TSMC. SK Hynix is similarly prepping new tech for these memory chips, which could give it the leg up on Samsung.

If it works, that is.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado, today we are taking a question from the Patreon crowd. Specifically, if I could give an update on what’s going on with the new EUV machines that are coming out of the Dutch from ASML. Background, for those of you who don’t follow this, ASML is the company that makes the lithography machines that make high end semiconductors possible. 

Very, very, very short version. It’s basically a machine about the size of a bus that makes a tiny little laser that operates at an accuracy that is smaller than a DNA strand and allows you to etch semiconductors at the nanometer level. EUV in its current form can go down to about three nanometers below that. It basically loses coherence. And so there’s a new machine called a high numerical aperture that, in theory, can take you down to one nanometer and even below. 

And the idea is that the smaller you can edge your transistors, the more processing power you can cram onto a piece of silicon. And the more powerful the semiconductor on the other side can be. So EUV is a technology that’s been around since 2012, 2014 somewhere in there. And it was grabbed by what was then the industry underdog, which was TSMC in Taiwan. 

And over the course of the next several years, they leaped ahead of who the old industry leader had been. And that was America’s Intel. Now we’ve got the flip side. TSMC is reserving the right to maybe buy one of these new machines, the high end machines. But it is Intel that’s now betting their future on the new technology, hoping that they can repeat the feat that TSMC did and once again become the world leader. 

They have two of those machines are at their Hillsboro facility. They’re currently cranking out about. Well, their goal is to crank out about 10,000 chips a month, which is very, very, very small scale. They’re very much still in the testing phase. And it is just simply too soon to know if a this technology will work and be what its effects will be, and the be what its effects will be is really the question here. 

When we went from duv. Deep ultraviolet, which was the old technology, this is what the Chinese have still to EUV, which is now the standard for premium chips. 

The nature of semiconductor has changed because it wasn’t just about cramming more into less space, it was making them more energy efficient, was doing things with the architecture eventually leading to stacked chips. 

And so it wasn’t just a linear jump. And there’s possibility that with high end A, we will have another linear jump that will leave all the chips that that we make today behind, but we don’t know that until we have our first mass manufacturing run, that at the soonest will be at the end of calendar year 2026, and that will just be with a couple machines. 

Then we will have to have the industrial build out to build more of these machines. And these machines cost significantly more than a commercial aircraft. And then you’ll have to put them into the facilities and you have to start designing chips with the new hardware in mind. 

So we probably wouldn’t have enough chips to matter in a way that would really move the needle technologically before 2029 or 2030. That’d be more than enough to revive Intel’s fortune. But, you know, if, if, if, if then, there is one other company in the world that is trying out this new technology. 

It’s out of South Korea. It’s, SK Hynix, which is the company that makes the best, Dram chips. Those are memory chips. So what Intel does what TSMC does, those are GPUs. Those are processors. And those are important. But you have to pair it with a memory chip. And the Koreans excel at that. So as to the Dram side, SK Hynix is an industry leader, along with Samsung. They recently overtook Samsung in terms of total output, but in terms of quality, they’re pretty much neck and neck. And so now one of them has DNA and one of them doesn’t, if Na fails, I don’t think it’s going to be a disaster for this case. 

SK Hynix are already a fantastic company. But Samsung does have more capital coming up behind them. But really, what’s going on in Korea is nothing compared to the drama between Intel and TSMC. 

So let me give you a worst case. Best case for Intel. Worst case, this doesn’t work, in which case Intel is merely the second best chip manufacturer in the world. Americans get really pouty when they’re not number one, but this is still a solid company. And honestly, there are a lot more pieces of a supply chain under the hood of Intel than there are, in TSMC. The TSMC folks are great at what they do, but they basically follow the instructions that the designers gave them, and then they do the construction and everything in order to make the fabs function. 

But the real high value added work is done somewhere else. Intel does more of these steps, more like a traditional conglomerate, which means that they’re probably not as efficient at any individual one of them. But of the 100,000 supply chain steps that go into making a high and semiconductor, they have a higher proportion of them under their roof, probably as many as a quarter. 

So if this doesn’t work, Intel is fine. If it does work, TSMC doesn’t slip. They’re still making the chips that make today’s, silicon revolution possible. But then we also get a new frontier. The only caution I have is that currently, it takes a 100,000 supply chain steps to make a high end semiconductor with the high end American Aperture technology. 

We really don’t know what that supply chain is going to look like, but it would be very strange if it was simpler. So this is already the industry that is the most overextended and dependent on globalization and threatened by Trump’s tariffs threatened by the fall of globalization and threatened by the demographic crash. The idea it’s going to be with us from ten years from now is a stretch. 

But there is a little sliver of hope that, based on what the supply chains for high end are, maybe, maybe unlikely, but maybe it’ll be a little bit simpler. The first that we will have a good grip on, what that will look like will be in about a year.

Nvidia Purchases $5 Billion of Intel Stock

Photo of an INtel microchip

Nvidia announced a $5 billion purchase of Intel stock, but it’s not the game-changer that the headlines are making it out to be.

While Intel is America’s biggest chipmaker, it lags behind TSMC’s cutting-edge nodes. Nvidia is just a design firm, so they don’t possess the necessary manufacturing know-how to improve Intel’s capabilities. So, Intel’s need for the right ecosystem and advanced lithography to create the upper echelon of chips remains.

This is just another case of political appeasement. Nvidia has been in hot water with Washington and Beijing, so they’ll do just about anything to cool things down a bit. But hey, $5 billion is $5 billion.

Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here come from Colorado. And today we’re taking a look at the 18th of September, purchased by Nvidia of roughly $5 billion of stock in American semiconductor manufacturing firm Intel. Now, Intel is by far the largest of the American fab companies. But it gets a bad rap because it’s not TSMC. TSMC, of course, is a Taiwanese based company that is the world’s premier. That makes all the leading processing nodes, especially if it’s below four nanometers. 

Intel is trying to catch up with mixed results. And, in the market, it generally is discounted significantly because it’s not TSMC. And every time they fail to catch up, they get punished. That doesn’t mean it’s not a good company. That doesn’t mean it doesn’t produce a lot of product. 

But if your goal is to make the best of the best, Intel doesn’t do it. 

This is not going to change that. Now, a few weeks ago, the US government under Donald Trump took a 10% share. This will give Nvidia roughly a 4% share. But let’s talk about how semiconductors happen. And then you’ll see that this is not nearly as big of a deal as it might appear at first glance. 

What typically happens is a large consumer of microchips, a Google and Apple, something like that comes to a company like Intel or TSMC, and says that we want to make a new chip that does X, Y, and Z. Here are the parameters we want in terms of performance. And Intel slash TSMC says you’re at the wrong place. You need to go talk to a design firm. 

And so you find a design firm and you jointly put this thing together. All the strategic architecture and then you take that back to your TSMC or your Intel, and then you redesign it again, and you build an instruction booklet that is a few thousand pages of all the steps that are necessary to craft each and every tiny little bit of what goes into each and every aspect of a semiconductor that is then farmed out to an ecosystem that is around the semiconductor fabrication firm, all the companies that build all the individual pieces, all the companies that do all the testing in the incorporation of those pieces into larger chips, motherboards and products. Hundreds of companies involved. And you then get this very thick instruction book, probably several thousand pages. Now, which you hand to TSMC or you hand to Intel. And they use that to follow the instructions to the letter to make the chips. 

Which means a design company like Nvidia partnering with a fab company like Intel. It’s not that it’s a negative, but it kind of misses all the steps in between. Now, Nvidia has been beat around the heads and shoulders first by the American government and most recently by the Chinese government, primarily over its seeming inability and unwillingness to apply technological sanctions and limit their sales to China. 

Nvidia is willing to bend the rules. There’s no argument there, and it seems that in order to placate the Trump administration, they’re putting a what sounds like a big investment, $5 billion into Intel. But this really doesn’t move the needle for anyone. It doesn’t speed up the process. All it does is perhaps give Nvidia an inside track to communicating with Intel in the circumstances, when they decide to build chips that are not cutting edge. 

So it makes a lot of people smile. It makes a lot of people think that, ooh, Intel is going to get better. Nvidia doesn’t have what Intel needs to get better. That would be TSMC. That would be ASML, the company that makes the high end lithography systems. That would be this constellations of dozens, hundreds of mid-tier companies that contribute individual pieces, a lot of which don’t exist in Intel’s network because they’re in Taiwan. 

So it looks nice. And having a few extra billion dollars is never a bad idea if you’re trying to expand your output. But if you’re thinking that this partnership is what is necessary for Intel to turn the page and all of a sudden move up to, say, 2 or 1 nanometer. No, because Nvidia doesn’t have that technology. Nvidia does design, not manufacturing. 

Don’t get the two confused.

Should the UAE Invest in a Tech Sector?

Photo of interior of computer chip

The UAE is pouring money into building a tech sector, focusing on semiconductor fabrication plants and data centers.

While semiconductor fabs are central to chipmaking, they require immense technical expertise, specialized labor, and integration across thousands of precise steps; meaning this is a nothing sandwich.

Data centers are more achievable, but that doesn’t mean they’re a good idea either. The UAE would need to subsidize access to scarce high-end chips, figure out the high cooling costs (because desert climate, duh), and even then, the geographic limitations will prevent them from becoming a global hub.

Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today we are taking a question from the Patreon page and specifically about tech and some of the things that are going on in the Persian Gulf, specifically, a number of the Persian Gulf Arab states, most notably the United Arab Emirates, are splashing around a lot of cash and trying to build a tech industry. 

There are two forms of taking. The first is they’re trying to get kind of like what happened in Arizona, a high end semiconductor fabrication facility. And second, they’re getting a data center. Two very different pieces of technology that have very different requirements. So let’s start with the semiconductor fab facility. 

Semiconductor fabs like the kind that we now have outside of Phoenix, the one that’s being built outside of Columbus, Ohio. 

The ones that are in Taiwan, are incredibly sophisticated. And what people tend to forget is that these are not just like assembly locations. They bring some of the most advanced machining in one place. They bring some of the most advanced materials into one place. They bring some of the most sophisticated designs in one place. And basically, you’ve got something in excess of 10,000 pieces that come together on the floor of the fab. 

It’s not simply an issue of making a semiconductor. You have a high end machine that’s called a extreme ultraviolet machine that does etching, and you have to dope. Well, let me let me back up. Just show you the whole thing. The whole process. Step one. You buy some really, really expensive sand silicon dioxide. That’s just pure, pure, purified. 

Usually only comes from the United States. You melt it down and know that you put in a seed crystal. And over the course of several days, sometimes weeks, you grow it into a crystal that weighs more than a car. You then slice it laterally into wafers, and then you take those wafers into your semiconductor fab facility, because these are all done in different places. 

And then you hit it with lasers that come out of the EV system. You dope it, you bake it again, you dope it, you bake it again, you do that, you know, ten times, 20 times, 90 times, and eventually you get a bunch of semiconductors on your disk. You then break those into pieces and test them and eventually incorporate them into actual hardware, like, say, a motherboard or a flash drive. 

And then goes into the intermediate products trade. So fabs are essential. Absolutely. But they are one step in an entire process that has thousands of steps. They just happen to be where a lot of these steps come together. They are not the high value added part of the process. That’s going to be almost everything else. Does that mean that they’re not important? 

No. Does it mean you can do it with unskilled labor? No. 

the United Arab Emirates have skilled labor? No. So if the UAE were to pay the $2,025 billion it takes to build a top rated facility, then they would have to do exactly the same thing that the Chinese have had to do import the labor to make it run the most exacting work that is done in a high end fab facility is the quality checks at every step. 

And that is something that if the chips are above, say, 20 to 30 nanometers, the Chinese can’t do it at all. And the idea that the UAE could do it is absolutely laughable. So if they did built this, no one would want to probably work in the unless the pay was absolutely immense and you would have basically a white elephant project generating very error prone, high cost items. 

That’s probably going to happen. What is less unlikely would be, say, a data farmer or data center. This doesn’t require nearly. The maintenance work is not nearly as, worker intensive. Basically, you get a bunch of GPUs. You build into something called a module with a bunch of Dram and Nand chips. Now, Dram, our memory chips and Nand are long term memory chips. Flash memory, short term needs power. Nand is, long term memory, not as quick, doesn’t need the power, and the GPU is all the processing. So you basically build a module and then you put a bunch of them in a server, and you put a bunch of server blades in a rack, and you put hundreds of racks in a room with really good cooling, and then you just let it run. 

Data cables coming in, data cables going out. Traffic comes and goes, you can house AI algorithms on it. You can. How’s your AOL account on it? Whatever you want. Two problems. Number one, all of the hardware is really, really expensive. And demand for the high end chips is very, very high. So most server farms do not have the sub seven nanometer chips that are, for example, necessary for most AI applications. 

Second problem latency. As a rule, you want your data center to be as close to your demand as possible. So the United States of various quality sets of about 10,000 data centers. And we try to put them either right outside of a population center or somewhere roughly in the middle of the country for trans coast traffic. So the idea that the UAE, with a couple first world cities is going to need a couple of data centers makes perfect sense. 

The idea that it’s going to be a global information hub, no, because there are no countries near it that generate the volume and quality of data that would want to go all the way to Dubai and Abu Dhabi before then moving on. So if the Emiratis decide to go down this path. This won’t be nearly as much of a white elephant project as, say, building a fab facility, but they would have to subsidize it in order to get the high end chips. 

And it appears that’s exactly what they’re doing. There is one of what’s supposed to be one of the world’s most advanced data centers, under construction in the United Arab Emirates right now, if everything goes to plan really does with these things, if everything goes to plan, it’ll become operational before the end of 2026. But it will be in a very expensive place to operate because the single largest expense for data centers is cooling its electricity. 

And I don’t know if you knew this, but the UAE is in a near equatorial desert. So the operational costs will be massive. And while labor is not a huge component of a data center when it comes to costs, they still don’t have the labor force to do even that. So if they do this, they seem to be doing it. 

It will be very expensive and it’ll just kind of be a feather in their cap. It won’t be actually something that a lot of people want to use.

George Jetson Would Be Disappointed with Autonomous Vehicles

A Waymo autonomous driving vehicle

I hate to be the bearer of bad news, but it doesn’t look like we’re all going to have personal Waymos anytime soon. There are four major hurdles.

The subsidies that have made a lot of the progress on autonomous vehicles possible are being phased out, so all that infrastructure that is needed won’t be made. Lithium is the backbone of EV’s, but most of the processing is in China; the US would need to build local capacity for this to work. Tesla, the leader of US EV innovation, hasn’t released a new model in years. And of course, the chip shortages that are coming soon will restrict growth.

So, mass adoption for electric and self-driving cars isn’t happening. There are niches where this technology will likely do well…think convoy trucking.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Oregon. And today we’re taking a question from the Patreon crowd, specifically what I think the future of electric and automated vehicles are specifically self piloting sort of stuff. It doesn’t look great. A couple of problems here. First of all, there are very few electric models that make sense to your average consumer without a huge amount of subsidies. 

And under the Trump administration, those subsidies are basically going to zero. And if you don’t have the infrastructure in place to support charging, and if you don’t have the subsidy support, mass adoption, you’re never going to build the infrastructure that you need to support support charging. So outside of some very specific places where there just has the right concentration of infrastructure and support places like say, Oslo and Norway, this really doesn’t have much of a future in the rest of the world, most notably in the United States, where distances are large, about half the population doesn’t have a grudge to charge. 

That’s problem one. Problem two is manufacturing. Right now, the vast majority, something like 80% of global lithium is processed and turned into lithium metal in China. And that is an infrastructure we’re going to lose. So if these are technologies you really want, you have to build the processing locally. And the Trump administration is actually moving in the opposite direction and removing some of the grants and the subsidies that the Biden administration established to build up this sort of infrastructure. 

So that’s problem two, problem three is legacy infrastructure. It’s not just that the United States loves their cars, but in the United States, the sort of engineering that is necessary to do this thing is really held within one company. And that one company is Tesla. Tesla is arguably the most what, until recently, the most subsidized company in modern American history. 

And those subsidies are also going to zero. The bigger risk here is that Elon Musk’s entire corporate empire is going to dissolve over the next couple of years. And I just don’t see Tesla, which hasn’t issued a new model in three years, being really part of the American automotive future. As for other companies, you know, Ford, Chrysler and the rest, they’ve all tried to get into EVs, running them alongside their other vehicles. 

But they have proven to be not as popular because, again, that infrastructure doesn’t exist. And that means you have a huge upfront cost for people who want to do it. And so with the last data we have, which is about a year ago, over three quarters of the people who owned an electric vehicle in the United States, it wasn’t their first car, their second car, it was their third or their fourth car. 

It was a showpiece. It was a talking point. It was allowing them to beat their chest and say they were environmentalists. Although I would argue, that if you look at the full cycle for producing an EV, the amount of carbon and energy it takes to build it in the first place, it’s actually not a very smart environmental choice. 

And then fourth and finally, and the one that’s going to become just crushingly important in the not too distant future, are the chips. An electric vehicle that is capable of automated piloting requires about 2000 U.S. dollars of chips. About half of those are relatively cheap and easy to obtain. The other half are the high end ones. And in the world that we’re moving into, that is the globalizing the capacity of the world to make the high end chips is going to go to probably zero, which means anything that is more advanced than, say, the iPhone 12, roughly, is something that we’re simply not going to be able to produce in sufficient volume. 

If you’re going to do true auto pilot, you need a significant amount of processing power on your vehicle that is not dependent upon the weather, that is not dependent on an uplink. It has to be done locally, otherwise you’re driving yourself. So what that means is at the end of the day, your individ person vehicles are not probably going to be auto piloted, or even electric, for much longer. 

That doesn’t mean the technology is going to die. It just means it needs to find a niche where it’s more appropriate. And what we’re probably going to be seeing is convoy in for trucks. Basically, your first vehicle has a driver software engineer, mechanic kind of person, maybe 2 or 3 people in it, and then a line of two, three, 4 or 5, six, seven trucks follows that first vehicle nosed tail. 

The technology that is required for that does not require electric vehicles, and it requires a much lower quality of chip to make it happen. That is something we can do with today’s technology. The reason that hasn’t happened yet has to do with legal issues. Until Congress codifies where fault lies, when something goes wrong, it’s difficult for auto manufacturers to really get into the business of making automated vehicles function. 

So the question is, you know, who’s at fault when there’s an accident? The driver, the person who did the last software patch, the manufacturer, the person who designed the sensor until that is sorted out, it’s going to be very difficult for EVs, as opposed to EVs to get to deeper claws into the American transport system, because if we don’t know who we’re supposed to sue when something goes wrong, then the liability gets spread out everywhere and it becomes a real mess that nobody wants to touch. 

All right, that’s my $0.02.

The Revolution in Military Affairs: Artificial Intelligence

ChatGPT logo with a synthetic brain hovering above

AI is working its way into just about every aspect of modern life. I mean, who didn’t fall for that video of the bunnies jumping on the trampoline. But artificial intelligence might not be the game-changer in warfare that you think it is…at least not in the short term.

AI promises faster processing, targeting, and decision-making, which all sounds great, until you throw in the wrench of deglobalization. As the globalized world collapses, the semiconductor supply chain will fall apart. The most advanced chips will not be able to be created anymore. Between the bottlenecks of EUV lithography and the countless single points of failure, we’ll be stuck with what we currently have (or yesterday’s tech).

When you factor this into military applications, it means older systems like cruise missiles and smart bombs will be mainstays. Fully AI-enabled systems will be severely constrained and reserved for the really important stuff.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here come to you from Cassidy arch. And where am I? Capitol reef National park. Sorry, it’s been a busy week. Today we are going to close out the series on the revolution in military technology. As advances in automation and digitization in materials science and energy transfer come together to remake how we fight. 

And we’re going to close out with something that you probably don’t need to worry about. And that’s artificial intelligence in war. The whole idea of AI is it can process faster than we can’t make decisions faster than we can, and potentially target with lethality faster than we can. 

I don’t think it’s going to happen. The problem is that the semiconductor supply chain for the high end chips that are capable of doing AI, and as a rule here, the cutting edge is going to be three nanometers and smaller, simply isn’t going to be able to survive the globalization age. So any chips that are not made in the next relatively short period of time, no more than a single digit of years, are really all we’re going to have for a good long time. 

And that means that the machines that are going out and doing the fighting have to rely on something that is older, that is not capable of processing and has to be linked back to something back home, either via wire or telemetry or some sort of radio communication. And that makes for a very different sort of beast. 

There are roughly 30,000 manufacturing supply chain steps that go into semiconductors. The high end stuff. And there’s about 9000 companies involved, and about half of those companies only make one product for one end user. There’s literally thousands of single point failures, and it only takes a few of them to go offline for you to not be able to make the high end chips at all. 

But the place that I think it’s going to be most concentrated, the place where we’re all going to feel like the place where is going to be obvious is going to be with the lithography. Specifically, we are currently using something called extreme ultraviolet, which is done by a company called ASML out of the Netherlands. And they are the world leaders in all of this. 

There are other companies that do the fabs other than TSMC and Taiwan, but the lithography can really only be done by the Dutch. And it’s not like this is one company. This is a constellation of hundreds of companies, and every time one of them either has a generational change or goes public, ASML basically sweeps them under the rug, absorbs them completely, puts the staff in different areas and puts it all under referential lockdown so there is no way to duplicate what they have. 

And so if you take this gangly supply chain that wraps the whole world and any part of that breaks, we can’t do EUV at all. And that means functionally, no chips that are worse than or better than six or 7 or 8 nanometers based on where you draw the line, we can still do something called deep ultraviolet, but extreme ultraviolet. 

It just becomes impossible. And that means that the best chips that we will have ten years from now are going to be very similar to the best chips we had ten years ago. And that limits what we can do with any sort of technological innovation. For the purposes of the military, it becomes very, very truncated. Old weapons like smart bombs and cruise missiles actually don’t use very sophisticated chips. 

20 year old chips are just fine. It’s the high end, the thinking, the processing, anything that’s more than guidance and requires a degree of decision making, that is what’s going to be off the table. So while I applaud all of us for having these conversations about the implications of AI, what it means for the workforce, what it means for culture, what it means for morality and legality. 

These are great conversations. It’s very rare that we get ahead of the technology in discussing what it can and can’t do, and start thinking about the implications for us as people, but I think we have some extra time because once this breaks, it’s going to take us 15 to 20 years to rebuild it. And that was back before everything accelerated with the Chinese fall and the Trump administration. 

Now it’s probably going to take longer. So have these discussions. I think that’s great. But it’s really probably going to be a problem for the 2050s.