Copper Imports Slapped with 50% Tariff

Copper tubing

I know it feels like we’re all trapped in a Sisyphean nightmare with all the discussions of tariffs, but don’t shoot the messenger. Trump’s latest move is a 50% tariff on copper imports is going to do a lot of harm.

You all know that the US needs to build out its industrial capacity in the face of deglobalization, and copper happens to be an important part of that. Building domestic copper production would take over a decade and all these pesky tariffs are only extending that timeline.

Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here come from Colorado… hiking season. Unfortunately, I can still get the news, so I know that we now have a 50% tariff courtesy of Donald Trump. That is going to be coming to copper imports beginning on August 1st. Let’s say that you are someone who is really concerned about the US copper industry. 

I am not. I’m really not. But if you are, there are a few things that you do before you get larger volumes of copper from domestic production. Number one, you go out and explore to find the deposit you’re after. Number two, you build physical infrastructure, road and rail to get to that system that can handle heavy freight. 

Third, you build a processing facility to separate the copper ore from the rest of the rock and then an intermediate processing facility to turn it to something called blister copper, which is roughly 98% pure. It gets rid of a lot of the sulfur. You then take that blister copper, and you take it to another facility that you need to build. 

That’s a proper smelter that will turn it into that, you know, the reddish orange shiny stuff that you use in everything. And then copper then goes on to be in almost everything that involves electricity. So it is an important material. But putting a 50% tariff on it on the front end retards that entire process. And from start to finish, the entire process takes somewhere between 10 and 15 years. 

So if your goal was to facilitate copper production, step one, would it be offer, say, tax credits for exploration? Go ahead and build the physical infrastructure and get started on the smelters. All of that is very power intensive. So you all sort of need some more electricity. By putting the tariff on the front end, you’re basically retarding the whole process rather than speeding it. 

That’s a problem. One. Problem two is that the Chinese are literally dying out. And while they are big players in the copper sector, and that will have to be shut out at some point, that’s not my primary concern at this point. My primary concern is we have a limited amount of time in the United States to build out our industrial plant to prepare for the Chinese just not being there, and that means roughly doubling the size of the industrial plant. 

And for that first stage, doubling the size. There are four main inputs that you need. The first one is copper that now costs 50% more than it used to or will on August 1st. The second item is steel, primarily but not exclusively for structure and interior structure support. I think I-beams that, courtesy of an existing a Trump tariff, is now 50% more than it used to be. 

Third is aluminum, primarily, but not exclusively used in cladding and especially Hvac systems. That is now 60% more than it used to be because of Trump tariffs. And the fourth thing you need is a labor force that’s willing to do the construction work. Now in the United States, historically, for the last 40 years, most of that work has been done by immigrants from Mexico. 

And Central America. But as you may have noticed, the Trump administration has basically launched a poll grim against illegal migrants. Now, I don’t want to get into a broad debate of the pros and cons of immigration at this moment, but let’s just talk about where this policy in its current form leads. The Trump administration wants to deport about a million people a year, which carried out for a few years, would basically remove the illegal migrant community in its entirety construction is the industry that they are most involved in. 

Agriculture is number two. And what the Trump administration has discovered is that going after people who have committed crimes, it’s actually kind of hard because it’s a law enforcement issue and you have to do investigations and arrest them one at a time. That’s not going to get you to a million people. So instead, they’re going after people that they know about. 

They’re going to churches. They’re revoking legal status for people who say, I’ve been brought in from Venezuela or Haiti out of economic or political persecution. They’re going to people’s court hearings where they’re going to get ruled on for a, say, a green card and arresting them before they can before the judge, because, you know, these are people where they know where they are. 

So the four inputs that we need to prepare for a post China world are now more expensive. And every time the cost of something goes up, you can do less of it. So if these policies continue for any appreciable amount of time, we can test that economic boom that I’ve been talking about for years. Goodbye. Because we will not have the industrial plant that is necessary to produce the goods. 

We need to continue to lead the lives that we have been leading. It’s almost as if a Russian agent was whispering things in Trump’s ear and trying to convince them to do the things that would be most against our best interests. Oh, wait. 

Tariff Day Is Here, Again!

Scrabble pieces showing the words USA and Tarrifs

Tariff Day is almost here and it’s looking like it might be another series of recycled tariff rates layered with vague threats.

This ongoing series of tariffs has stalled the economy, putting business investment and construction in limbo. And since there is no one to negotiate with on the American side, I’m not sure when or if any real deals/negotiations will take place. The only movement we’ve seen on this front is with the UK, and calling that a trade deal is still a bit of a stretch. Allies like Japan are starting to feel a bit betrayed by this endless cycle of tariffs.

All there is to do now is wait and see if any meaningful strategy appears from this Tariff Day.

Transcript

Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today is the 8th of July. We’re going to send this out today and again tomorrow for people who missed it. We’re coming up on another tariff day where Trump says he’s going to reset tariffs for pretty much every country in the world. So far today, he has released about a dozen letters that are basically read exactly the same, except for the header and one number where he’s basically told people what their tariff rates are going to be moving forward. 

Several things from this. First, the spread of countries that are in this first list go from Tunisia and Bosnia on the low end to Korea and Japan on the high end. So countries that are just nothing to countries that are firm allies, all of them got the same letter. There’s no sign of meaningful negotiations with any of them. 

Trump just picked the same number he’d had before. Maybe round it a little bit, put it in there again. Nothing has really changed. And he’s now telling them that they have until August 1st to renegotiate, which means, number two, we are still in this hell limbo. We’ve had over 150 tariff policy since the 20th of January. We now have the threat of a couple hundred. 

And no one really knows what to do. New business, construction spending. The United States has basically gone flat. Nobody wants to start a new project because nobody knows what the rules of the game are, and based by many versions of the tariffs that are in place right now, it actually penalizes people to invest in the North American supply chain system. 

It’s actually cheaper to say, build your entire manufacturing base outside of the United States and just pay the tariff once on its way in. If you want to have an integrated supply chain where countries do what they’re better at. That actually you’re penalized. Okay. What’s number three? Japan. Japan is the country to watch most closely here it is one of the countries that has now gotten the letter. 

It is a country that entered into good faith negotiations and is now a country that it’s kind of talking shit about Trump a little bit. If you remember back to Trump one, there was, about a half a dozen major trade deals that were negotiated or renegotiated, which included NAFTA, which included a trade deal with the Koreans and included a trade deal with Japan. 

And the Japanese came to the conclusion that Trump represented the future of American economic nationalism. And so they needed to figure out a way to get in on Trump’s good side, on my good side, so they could be part of the American future moving forward. And so they made quite a few concessions that had never been made in trade deals before in order to get that agreement. 

And then we get to April 2nd and Trump tears it off, and we get to July 9th and he tears it up again. And so the Japanese are left wondering, like, you know, even if you go out of your way to seek a deal with Donald Trump, even if you offer him everything he has demanded, it still means nothing. 

And that has really colored the other trade negotiations, because if Japan, the country that has bent over backwards to try to make this work by Trump’s own terms can’t get a deal, why should anyone else try? And there’s the fourth thing no one can try. Trump still hasn’t staffed up the Commerce Department or his own office, or much less the U.S. Trade Representative, which is normally responsible for negotiating trade deals. 

So if you are a country out there trying to negotiate with Trump, there’s no one to speak to because the only two people who are handling the talks are Trump himself and the Commerce secretary. And those are both full time jobs that normally are not led by trade talks. We have only ever once gotten a trade deal with anything less than ten months of negotiating. 

And so far from the rhetoric that we saw back in April that people were lining up to talk, maybe they were, maybe they weren’t. There was no one to speak with. And so no meaningful negotiations have really happened. And the only trade deal we actually have right now is with the Brits, who basically just agreed to buy a bunch of planes in order to get a lower number. 

And that was the talks. I mean, there’s a lot of real irritants in the relationship with the UK, and none of them were addressed at all. So that just leaves what the rest of us think about this. Obviously business investment is down sharply. We’re actually seeing new builds drop down to levels we haven’t seen since Covid, which is really bad. 

But the final thing to keep in mind is that this is not the end. Trump has already made it very clear that his new August 1st deadline is very loosey goosey. So August 1st is the new, July 9th is the new April 2nd. And there’s a reason why Wall Street is just kind of ignoring this. I’m sure you’ve heard of the taco trade. 

Trump always chickens out. Well, they’re now calling it Taco Tuesday, which is actually kind of funny and clever. Anyway, but until this is resolved one way or another, until you know what the numbers are. No one knows what they need to do to prepare for what’s next. And so everybody’s stopped.

Can Retaliatory Tariffs on Brazil Save Bolsonaro? + Live Q&A

A photo of the Brazilian Flag

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We’re excited to announce our next Live Q&A for the Analyst members on Patreon on Wed, July 30! Peter Zeihan will be answering a mix of pre-submitted and live questions.

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Over the past 6 months, we’ve seen Trump use tariffs for everything under the sun. But the Brazilians just got hit with a 50% tariff for an unorthodox reason…because their former president is being prosecuted.

Jair Bolsonaro is facing legal charges for attempting a coup after losing an election. Trump happens to be fond of Bolsonaro, so he’s attempting to use tariffs to get him off scot-free. And no, there’s not a significant trade deficit or high-value imports that can used to justify this away with.

This is a flat out rule of law issue that will come back to haunt the United States for decades to come.

Transcript

Hey all Peter Zeihan here, coming from Colorado. Hiking season! The world won’t leave me alone. Of course. I need to go someplace with less coverage. Anyway. I want to talk about today is we have another, another, another, another 50% tariff going into place, this one against Brazil. Now, Brazil is one of those countries that kind of site and released back on April 2nd when those big game board sheets came out, when Trump announced what the tariff levels were going to be for everybody. 

We don’t have the goods deficit that’s we’re talking about with Brazil. So Brazil qualified for the low 10% on everybody tariff. And that’s where it was left. But, last week Donald Trump decided, nope. He is starting to expand his idea that tariffs are good to punish countries that are doing things he doesn’t want, even if they have nothing to do with economic issues. 

It is beyond questionable whether this is legal under American law. But until Congress steps up and acts which I don’t anticipate anytime soon, it is what it is. Trump’s reason for putting this 50% tariff on Brazil. We’re going to stop upheld that idea. Trump’s reason for doing a 50% tariff on Brazil, is that the Brazilians are in the process. 

Brazilian government is in the process of prosecuting a guy by the name of Bolsonaro, who’s a former president who attempted a coup after he lost an election. Sound familiar? Anyway, Trump is saying that unless the prosecution stops and Bolsonaro is allowed back into the political system, that this tariff will go into place. Now, we do buy a bunch of things from Brazil, but it’s mostly relatively low value added commodities, some really crappy beef, some agricultural products, things like iron ore. 

Brazil is a very low value added economy. And Trump, on ideological grounds for a mix of reasons, finds himself allied with Bolsonaro and opposed to, Lula, who is the current president who hails from the left side of the political spectrum, whereas Bolsonaro is from the right. It’s, it’s a messy comparison. Brazilian politics are significantly different from the United States, so don’t over, over under those two hoods. 

Anyway, I for a long time have not been a fan of Lula, but not because of rule of law issues. He’s anti-American to the point that’s borderline pathological and is willing to even sell his own country down the river in order to achieve a degree of independence from the United States. Which is just dumb, in my opinion. 

So, for example, when he was president the first time around, he basically invited the Chinese in to form joint ventures with everything that the Brazilians were doing. And throughout the 70s, 80s and 90s, the Brazilians actually made a lot of progress in moving up the value added scale. 

Their oil company, Petrobras, is one of the world’s best, especially a deepwater. They had a construction company that was world class, and they had a really dense concentration of midsized companies that were really pushing the technological envelope in all of their products, and they were globally competitive. Well, the Chinese formed joint ventures with all of these companies, stole all the technology, took it back home, subsidized the crap out of building an alternative industrial plant, and then drove all the Brazilian producers out of business. 

Strategically stupid, economically stupid. But what’s going on with Bolsonaro is something different. This is a rule of law issue. When Trump did his little attempted push back in 2020. Yeah. 2020, he eventually got away with it. And he eventually returned to power and pardoned everyone who was basically a coconspirator. Bolsonaro hasn’t had that kind of advance. 

He was both smarter and dumber, smarter. And that he learned from Trump’s failure back in 2020 and went for a much more direct assault on the Brazilian Congress, trying to basically take it out of the equation. And then when that didn’t work, he fled the country, came coming to Florida, ironically, which was like much better attempt and much better demonstration of actual guilt. 

So no one in Brazil really thinks that this case is going to go anywhere except for with Bolsonaro in jail, unless he’s pardoned in order to say he’ll the political spectrum. Anyway, for Trump, this gets a little bit too close to home. And so he’s now threatening Brazil, with economic retribution for their rule of law commitment. 

Now, for those of you who don’t follow Latin American politics all that much, Latin America overall is new to democracy and is new to rule of law. Most of the countries back in the 60s, 70s and 80s, were military dictatorships. And when those dictatorships fell and in many cases, like in Brazil, actually actively turned over power to the civilian system, it went fairly smooth. 

The problem has been maintaining the center of the state so that law enforcement can work, because when you go from a system that’s pretty corrupt with a bunch of colonels and generals basically calling all the shots and getting whatever they want to a system that’s much more free form, it takes a while for law enforcement to kind of step in the gap when the military steps back and to reassert a degree of security. 

And Brazil in particular, has had a problem with that. And so it has some of the highest crime rates in the world. So most American foreign policy since that transition, which happened in the late 80s and into the 90s, has been focusing on encouraging rule of law across Latin America. Whenever can happen. And you can find a lot of faults in American foreign policy in any region, specifically Latin America. 

But I would argue that it’s been broadly successful on at least this one point. And so to have the American president now trying to go ramshackle the opposite direction and ripping up rule of law, is a horrible idea. Because if your goals are to get Latin American countries to assist with enforcement of U.S. immigration preferences and to assist with limiting the amount of narcotics can can come from Latin America to the United States, you need a relatively strong state and knocking over the rule of law at the top is arguably the dumbest thing that you could do. 

And yet, here we are.

The Art of Trump’s Trade Deal

Official White House Portrait of Trump for 2025

Robert Lighthizer, the former US Trade Representative during Trump’s first term, declined to return for a second term? But why?

Well, Lighthizer had all the credentials and strategy, but he saw the s*** storm he was about to walk into. Between the federal bureaucracy breakdown, the hollowed-out trade office, and the pure chaos of navigating hundreds of Trump’s trade deals at once, it wouldn’t take a genius to know to sit this one out.

The current USTR, Jamison Greer, walked into this storm on his first day and, to no fault of his own, hasn’t made any meaningful trade progress. Frankly, I’m not holding my breath for any new deals.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here, taking a question from the Patreon page today. Specifically, it’s about Robert Lighthizer, who was the trade representative under the first Trump administration, but who declined to accept a trade role in the second. The question is, if Lighthizer had come in with his general strategy of isolating China been successful. For those of you who don’t remember, Lighthizer has been an old hand in American trade law going back 40 years, and has always approached it from a far more bare knuckle approach than some of the more, shall we say, genteel negotiators. 

He was really, really, brass tacks when it came to say, the Plaza Accords during the Reagan administration or trade deals with the Japanese. This time around, his general approach was to strike meaningful trade deals with all of America’s allies first, and then basically bring everybody together into a solid block to force concessions out of the Chinese. 

Now, do I think that would have been a better strategy than what the Trump administration is doing, which is basically picking a trade fight with everyone at the same time? Well, yeah, but there’s really no point in crying over spilled milk because Lighthizer did not take the job. Now the question is why not? And what does that mean for the trade authority? 

Now Robert Lighthizer is getting up there. He’s, I believe early, late 60s, early 70s. Now, I’m really not sure. Anyway. It’s not spring chicken. He’s been doing this since the Reagan administration. So it makes sense that he wouldn’t want to work Washington hours for another four years. But more importantly is the structure of what is happening at the federal government and how that limits what the trade representative can do. 

Two things here. Number one, when Trump came in, he cleared out the entire upper echelon of senior civil servants. Only about 5% of the men have been replaced. Normally when a president comes in, they just take out the top layer and leave all the people with the institutional knowledge. But Trump just fired everybody. And so all of the federal bureaucracy is basically having a problem functioning because the upper middle and upper management are simply empty. 

So there’s no one to carry out Trump’s orders. He’s got some people at the top with the secretaries and maybe a few undersecretaries. And that’s just it. And all of those people are political appointees that are basically new to the industries. So there’s no one to make sure that the president’s orders can be followed. Problem one. Problem two. 

It’s worse for the U.S. Trade Representative Office. Joe Biden was only the second president in recent American history to negotiate no new trade deals. And his trade representative, Katherine Tai, was good at her job. But she focused on enforcing the previously negotiated deals and having a bunch of memorandums of understanding. So during the four years of the Biden administration, the USTR office was slimmed down considerably. 

And now under Trump two, it has not been re expanded. So not only is the USTR missing its upper leadership, it’s missing a lot of the rank and file people who would normally negotiate trade deals. So that’s number two. Number three trade deals. They take a lot of time. There’s a lot of details. The fastest trade deal the United States has ever negotiated was with Singapore. 

That took ten months. And that’s because Singapore is a city state. It doesn’t have an agricultural sector. So there weren’t a lot of sensitive topics that really need to be ironed out. Most trade deals take in excess of three years. Some of them take significantly longer. And so if you were Robert Lighthizer and you’re looking at this and you realize you’re going to have no staff, no assistants, no deputies, and the Trump administration is going to want you to negotiate 200 trade deals at the same time. 

He was like, I’ll pass. Thanks. the person who is the USTR now is basically a former protege of Robert Lighthizer. His name is Jamison Greer. He was actually served in USTR during Trump one as Bob Lighthizer chief of staff. The guy is far from incompetent. 

He’s pretty good at what he does from my point of view. But he has those three problems. He has no deputies. He has no staff. And he’s expected to negotiate 200 trade deals at the same time. So the end result is we’re not getting anything. Of the two deals that have been agreed to so far, the two deals, the first one is with the Brits, where they basically they were planning on buying a number of Boeing jets over the next eight years. 

So they cut that order in half, said announced it. And Trump’s like it’s a deal. And that’s all that happened. And with the Chinese deal all it was was an agreement to talk. Of course there’s no one in Washington to speak with. Because there’s no staff. So, we’re kind of stalled. And I don’t blame Lighthizer for saying pass on this one.

Finally, Some Clarity on US-China Relations

Donald Trump and Xi Jinping at the G20 Summit

It’s a bird, it’s a plane, it’s…some long-awaited clarity on US-China relations. Here are the two major developments that we’re tracking and what they mean moving forward.

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth just made the strongest official statement on US support for Taiwan in case of a Chinese invasion. Of course, he made this declaration without consulting any military leadership, but hey, at least something happened.

The other development is that Trump and Xi finally set up a phone call. There are clearly some big personalities (and egos) at play here, so it’s a big win to even get this on the calendar. With all the issues going on between China and the US, as well as a slew of internal problems for each country, a chat is long overdue. Especially when that little chat could impact one of the world’s largest trade relationships…

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Foggy morning here in Colorado. Peter Zeihan here. Today we are going to talk about American Chinese relations because we’re finally about to get hopefully, hopefully, maybe, a little bit of clarity. Two big things are going on this week. Number one, and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has said that China is the threat if Taiwan is invaded, of course the United States will respond in kind. 

Military options are not just on the table. They would be our go to, It is the clearest repudiation of this concept of strategic ambiguity that we have been existing in East Asia for decades. That is the idea that Taiwan is not technically recognized. So the United States will not say, one way or another, whether or not we’re going to send them. 

The Biden administration, let me rephrase that. Joe Biden personally repeatedly repudiated that. But this is the clearest, most detailed, repudiation we’ve ever had from any American authority, ever. The question, of course, is whether or not that this is what the Defense Department is ready for. Hegseth apparently did not even discuss this issue with his own office, much less with the Joint Chiefs or the military chain of command at all. 

So I will never tell you that the military is not preparing for every eventuality. That’s why it exists. But it seems to be a disconnect between the political message that Hegseth is trying to send and what the U.S. military has actually been doing since January 20th. So that’s kind of piece. One piece to Donald Trump and Chairman G of China are having their first phone call this week. 

This is something that has been pushed off again and again and again and again. It’s been a very weird power play carried out by four year olds. She wanted Trump to make the call. Trump wanted to make the call, thinking that whoever came to the mountain would be the weaker party. I you know, if it makes sense to them, it makes sense to me. 

Whatever. This will be the first time that the two leaders have really had a conversation since the last time was Trump. President. And there are, of course, a number of big issues on the table. The most important one is the trade war. Trump put tariffs on China, which were 145% hundred and 85%, 510%. It’s hard to keep track. 

And then after a few weeks of basically seeing trade between the two countries go to zero, something that we’re going to start feeling soon because there are some holes in the inventory now that are starting to leak out. Trump abrogated his own tariff level, dropped it back down to low levels and said, you know, we have a deal. 

And all the deal was that this was that they agreed to talk. Well, now we’re talking. The problem we have on both sides of the Pacific is to be perfectly blunt. The leadership, Chairman Ji, spent the last 13 years purging the Chinese government of anyone who will tell him anything. Not just bad news, just anything. And that is in turn, gutted the bureaucracy of the Chinese system. 

So that is now the world’s least informed leader of the world in general of his own country. He has no idea what’s going on aside from the ideology. Trump is trying to catch up to him. Trump has executed his own purge of the government, is having his cabinet secretaries destroy the capacity of the United States to collect data long term. 

He’s sending back intelligence reports that don’t support his ideological views, no matter how far from reality they might be. And of the top 1600 positions in the US federal bureaucracy, a lot of them are still unfilled. When Trump came in, he didn’t just clear out the people at the top. He went as far down as he could, legally could go. 

And then even a little bit further. But those positions have not been filled. And even when he has nominated people and sent them to the US Senate for confirmation, a lot of those haven’t happened because he’s trying to achieve basically 17 bills worth of stuff in one with this giant super mega happy bill. And, you know, it’s taking every little piece of attention that Congress has. 

And so the Senate hasn’t been able to pick up the confirmation roster. So he is arguably today the second least informed world leader. The two of them manage what used to be the world’s largest economic trading relationship. Now it’s the third largest we are Mexico and Canada are now more important to us than China, but it’s obviously a massive strategic relationship that has to be handled carefully. 

So we’ve got two old guys driven by ideology who don’t think the rules apply to them, who have blinded themselves to information, and now they’re going to have a talk about what’s going to happen for the rest of us. It’s going to be consequential one way or another.

Coping Mechanisms 101: The “TACO” Trade

Newspaper photo of President Donald Trump

I won’t ramble on about Trump’s chaotic trade policy because you’re all aware of that. However, there are some interesting updates to share.

After most of America’s key trading partners have been subjected to the chaos, Wall Street has adopted a new strategy called the “TACO” trade – short for “Trump Always Chickens Out.” You know since most of his aggressive threats are walked back within weeks of announcing them.

We’ve also seen a court ruling state that Trump’s tariff actions may be unconstitutional. We’ll have to wait and see what the result is following the appeal, but convos regarding presidential trade authority have been sparked.

This all contributes to the stalling of industrial investment in the US, because if you don’t know the rules, how can you play? It would be nice to get some clarity here soon, but we may be in for four-year ride on this roller coaster.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado. I am recording this over the weekend. You’re going to see it on Monday, June 2nd, which means we will undoubtedly have a few updates that are not being folded in. And because that’s just the nature of the beast these days. We’re talking about trade today, specifically, what is up with the Trump administration and the current status of the many trade wars the Trump administration has launched. 

If you remember, this is the most aggressive president we have ever had when it comes to issues of trade. We have already had a 132 documented trade policy changes by this administration, and things are getting a little out of control. Let’s start by talking about two of the United States is four biggest trading partners. So number one and two are Mexico and Canada. 

We’ve dealt with those bear for I’m sure we’re gonna deal with them again. But in the last few days we’ve had a lot of movement on Europe and China who are number three and number four. 

Let’s start with Europe. Trump decided that the Europeans are not serious with their trade talks. The primary reason is that there’s no one on the US side to answer the phone when the Europeans call. 

The Trump administration still hasn’t staffed up for really anything. Most notably for trade talks, normally takes several dozen, if not several hundred people to handle the negotiations. For one major trade deal. And the United States is attempting to do 200 deals at the same time. So everything is just kind of slogged. Anyway, Trump laid the blame on the Europeans and said that come July 1st, tariffs will increase by a factor of 5 to 50%. 

He then had a call with the commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, and said that, no, that’s going to actually happen on July 9th. By the way, these are not trade policy adjustments. So they don’t go to that 132 number. These are just, things that he said on Truth Social. And with the Chinese, we had a recent deal in Geneva where the Trump administration agreed to peel back the tariffs from 145% to 10% while talks continue. 

So it was just an agreement to talk. Trump has now said again on Truth Social that the Chinese had violated the deal to talk. And so tariffs are probably going to be coming back in soon. I have no idea what’s going on behind the scenes in the Trump administration. There are so few people that you can tap to find out. 

But it appears, at least from the Chinese and the European point of view, as well as the Canadian, the Mexican and the Japanese and the Korean and blah, blah, blah. Is that the Trump administration is basically making policy off of a whim, the normal flows of information that would inform the white House of what’s going on in the world don’t exist anymore. 

The Trump administration has fired the top 1400 positions in the federal government. Very few of those have been replaced with anyone. And those that have been replaced have generally been replaced with party loyalists, rather than anyone who knows anything about in this instance, trade. So we’re just getting things going back and forth and back and forth, not based on data, not based on reality, not based on trade flows, not based on national security concerns, based on whatever it is that Trump feels the issue of the moment happens to be. 

And the result is just this erratic nature of policy. As a result, now that we’re a few months in, Wall Street has had to deal with this, and they’ve developed something called the taco trade. Taco stands for Trump Always Chickens out. And the logic behind the trade is that Trump says these big things implement these big policies. 

And then he immediately backs down immediately within a few weeks. I’m not sure that’s entirely fair. Trump obviously finds it a lot less amusing than a lot of other people do, but it gives you an idea of just how everyone feels. We don’t know, day to day what the policy is going to be. We don’t know, day to day what the goal is. 

And so we don’t know day to day how Trump is getting from A to B, assuming there is a B and what information I’ve been able to clean out of the white House is that there was never a goal in the first place. This is just how Trump likes to run the show, and this is what we can look forward to for four years. 

Which explains in vivid detail why industrial construction in the United States is basically seized up because nobody wants to invest in an industrial plant if they don’t know what the rules of the game are, especially if the person who’s making up the rules of the game keeps making up the rules of the game. On top of that, we have now had a court case by a trade court in the United States that says that the Trump administration does not have the legal authority to do most of these trade policies. 

Now, according to the Constitution, the Congress is the only body in the United States that has any trade authority on tariffs. But over the last several decades, most notably in the 70s, the Congress submitted some of that authority to the US executive for emergency circumstances. And almost every tariff that the Trump administration has put in place to this point has drawn upon that emergency authority. 

So Trump declares an emergency and then defines the tariff. The court disagrees with the logic of that, saying, not that Trump is interpreting the statute incorrectly, but that Congress cannot unilaterally cede, tariff authority to the president. Now, I’m not a legal scholar. I’m not going to parse out. I just found a case kind of interesting that they were going after Congress with the ruling rather than the presidency. 

It’s already been appealed, and there’s already been a stay on that tariff suspension. So those are two of the 132 tariff changes that we’ve had now. And the Trump administration, of course, is going to appeal this all the way up to the Supreme Court. And since we’re already at the upper federal district court level, it’s not going to probably take too long to get there to get some legal clarity. 

But the bottom line is clear. We’re in a bit of an institutional crisis over the ability of Trump to do what he is doing. And now Congress has been roped into that discussion as well. From my point of view, the fact that Congress actually is being called to the carpet on some of these issues is actually great, because it’s going to force a degree of clarification about what is possible, what is not without an act of Congress. 

But between now and then, you should expect nothing but more confusion as everyone is trying to figure out what’s going on while the floor keeps shifting under all of us.

The Fire Hose of Chaos: American Brands

Image of the iconic Nike swoosh logo

Many of America’s most beloved brands rely on Chinese manufacturing, but what happens when that goes away?

The impacts and shortages faced will vary based on how dependent each company is on China. There are three groups these businesses fall into: tech firms, consumer brands, and mid-tier companies. Tech firms like Apple, Dell, and Microsoft have complex and integrated supply chains that would be difficult to pick up and move; these companies will need years to rebuild, and they’ll face shortages in the meantime. Consumer brands like Nike, Mattel, and Keurig can be easily replicated. Middle-tier companies like Whirlpool and GoPro will face lots of competition and will need heavy investments to recover.

This disruption was inevitable, but Trump moved it up on the calendar and left companies no time to adapt. So, get ready for shortages, bankruptcies, and inflation. There might be one upside here though, we may not have to see Crocs around anymore…

Transcript

Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re talking about some of the impacts of the Trump tariffs on the American corporate space. There are a lot of companies that sell consumer goods in the American market, American companies primarily, that have outsourced most of their manufacturing to China. And with the tariff policy, we’re basically getting two things. 

Number one, people can’t afford these products anymore. And so most shipments from the United States to China already stopped. And you’ll see that hitting the shelves at some point in the next 3 to 6 weeks, based on where you live in the country. From the point that the Trump administration were to cave on all of these tariffs and just say, you know, bygones, and the Chinese just say, okay, it will then be another six weeks before product starts to return. 

So, let’s say that, June 1st is when that happens, you’re talking about three months without product. For most of these companies, that’s enough to kill them. And even if it wasn’t, the Chinese basically have the technical capacity to take over a lot of the supply chains themselves, because all of the equipment is already in China. 

Most of the intermediate products are already in China. So these are companies that in some form are just going to die in the not too distant future and vanish from American shelves forever. Now, not all of them are the same. They fall into three general categories. The first are products that are more advanced, where the Chinese do a lot of the assembly, but a lot of the product in the intermediate product comes from outside of China. 

These companies have at least a chance to rebuild their supply chain in other countries. But you’re talking about hundreds of billions of dollars of sunk cost for some of them. And you don’t do that in a year or two years or three years. This is five years or more minimum. And that just means that these products are going to disappear until that happens, or they’re just vanished from your lives for probably five years, maybe a little bit more. 

And most of those fall into the category. Apple, Dell, Microsoft and Hewlett-Packard. So if you haven’t gotten your backup computer, do it now, because the inventory that is in the country right now is all that is left. Yes. Electronics have been at least partially exempted, but it’s already too late. And the Chinese are moving to take this stuff over. 

Second, these are products that are on the other end of the spectrum. Things that the Chinese can take over now. There’s nothing that’s particularly sensitive about them. From a technological point of view, it’s just a the brand is what’s special, and it’s the brand that’s going to disappear, or they’ll misspell it and they’ll just make it a Chinese brand. 

And this this is a very long list that includes a lot of consumer products and a lot of clothing. So Nike, Levi’s, Hasbro, Mattel, Ralph Lauren, Skechers, Under Armor, Estée Lauder, Columbia Sportswear, Patagonia, Yeti, KitchenAid, Black and Decker, Stanley Tools, shark, Ninja of At-Home Appliance Fame, Keurig iRobot Ray-Ban Pvt. That’s Hilfiger and Calvin Klein. Newell, which is Rubbermaid and Sharpie and Crocs. 

So I guess there’s at least some bright spot here. Crocs will finally fucking go away anyway. They’re gone. There is absolutely nothing they can do at this point to salvage the production that they have in China. I do not feel all that guilty for any of these companies. Everyone who has been paying attention has been seeing some version of this coming for a long time. 

And I’ve been warning companies like this that the Chinese were going to vanish from the space anyway because of demographic collapse, and they should get out while they can. Anyone who is left has basically lost. And then we’ve got companies that are somewhere in the middle. These are companies where, you know, they’re halfway between Apple and Crocs. There are some parts of the supply chain for some products that are more advanced that the Chinese can’t just walk in and take over. 

So we could see these companies come back after some significant reinvestment. Not as much as will say for somebody like Apple, but they’re going to be dealing with a massive amount of competition in the international space from the Chinese, who can make their lower end products exactly as they used to. That’s fossil, the watch company whirlpool, other white goods companies, GoPro and Fitbit. 

It’s a long list and this is only partial. Now again, some version of this was always going to happen, but Chinese were always going to go away. But the way that the Trump administration has done, the tariff policy basically front loading the penalties and not giving people a chance to adapt means that all of these companies and more are going to break in the American space. 

Most of them will end up filing for bankruptcy, and someone will probably come and buy up the pieces and then do limited restarts of the production lines and other places. That does mean that in the interim, and we’re talking here for the lower tech stuff, a period of 1 to 3 years for the higher tech stuff, probably four or more. 

We just don’t get the product. So one of the big challenges that we’re going to be having in the United States is inflation driven not just by tariffs directed not just by higher capital costs directly, not just by higher labor costs directly, but high tariffs caused by extensive product shortages in the consumer space, whether that is electronics, home goods, apparel, you name it. 

We can recover from this. We can recover from this faster if we have Mexico and Canada and our other trading partners involved. But it’s not going to be quick and it’s not going to be free.

The Fire Hose of Chaos: Agriculture

A tractor working in crops

US agriculture is heading towards a major crisis, and yes, Trump’s trade policies are to blame for this as well. Many of the US ag export markets are closed off, and farmers are feeling the heat.

China has already cut purchases of US agricultural products to (nearly) zero, and this market is likely gone for good. Not long ago, China was the largest buyer of US products, meaning US farmers are losing a huge chunk of change and output will need to shrink accordingly.

The meat industry is reeling. Demand is falling, per-animal profitability is tanking since there’s no export market for byproducts, and overexposed beef producers are in for it. Row crops like soy are in trouble as well since China was the largest market for much of this. Specialty crops like pistachios and cherries will face devastating losses.

The only path to recovery is through an extensive, long-term government support. Think France’s permanent ag welfare. Without it, American farming will face a collapse worse than the 1980’s farm crisis.

Transcript

Hey, y’all. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. And today we’re going to continue our Firehose of Chaos series about how the Trump administration’s domestic and international policies are affecting the US economy. And today, it’s the agriculture edition. Agriculture in the short to mid-term is probably the sector that’s facing some of the sharpest challenges. And it’s entirely feasible for me that over the course of the next 3 or 4 years, we’re looking at somewhere between a quarter and a third of U.S. producers just going out of business because of the trade war. 

The issues pretty straightforward. Trump has basically picked fights with America is number one, number two, number three, number five, number nine, number 11, number 12, number 14, and number 17th largest trading partners when it comes to agricultural exports. And as a rule, agricultural importers fall into two categories. Number one, those who don’t have a choice, they just can’t grow the food themselves. 

And then those who do have a choice, who can always switch products or switch consumers. And when it comes to export destinations like, say, China or the European Union, they’re definitely in the latter camp. And so what usually happens is that whenever there’s a trade spat for any reason, anywhere, agriculture is usually the sector that is targeted first. 

A couple reasons for this number one, agricultural interests around the world tend to be very politically powerful, and they, can make their desires known to the local political system. And second, people have this wildly inaccurate view of how farmers work that they might be a little bumbling, that they’re a little backwards. But of all the audience that I ever speak to, they are always the most sophisticated and always the ones that look for the most because they have to. 

Everything that they do is dependent upon supply lines and manufacturing and finance Trends go out a year, five years, a decade because of the decisions that they make now are going to reverberate throughout their operations for years to come. And this is true everywhere. So when there’s a trade fight, the other side knows that if they can damage agriculture, they can take producers off for the long term. 

And that’s exactly what is happening now. Specifically, the United States, number one export partner for agricultural produce and meats is China. And because we now have in excess of 100% tariff going both ways on products, U.S. sales to China have functionally gone to zero. And they will not be coming back this year or next year or the year after. 

And considering China’s export dependency and its demographic decline, it is highly unlikely that American farmers will ever have access to unified China again. China will break before that is fixed. And so you’re looking at an industry that is basically tapped out. Pretty much all the growth that has happened in American agriculture since the year 1995 has been from export markets. 

They’ve been a direct beneficiary of hyper globalization, arguably the sector after tech and finance in the United States that has benefited the most. And now that some of their major consumers are simply beyond them, either because of economic stress or the trade war, they’re looking at basically needing to reduce overall output by something around 20 to 25% on a nation wide basis. 

Now that’ll change specifically based on region based on crop based on season. But that is a horrific headline number that the industry now has to deal with. Let me break this down into three general categories. So first, meats, as the world has become richer, they want more protein, whether that is chicken or pork or beef or, fish. 

And the sector that sells the most into the Chinese market is not pork. I’d like to take a little bit of credit for this one. I have been warning the pork guys for years that if they bet the farm on China, they will lose the farm. And in the aftermath of the last trade war with the Chinese during Covid, when, Trump was president, we had our phase one trade deal. 

The Chinese decided that they were going to try to slim down their exposure to the US system. And the pork guys suffered, and they learned their lesson, and they’ve diversified into other markets. Well, the beef guys were like, oh, there’s a protein shortage in China. We can help with that. And they just surged into China and they made themselves exposed in a way they had never had been before. Well, now they’re kind of screwed, particularly those who are operating in the industry. 

That is more export geared. And that’s where the slaughterhouses in Nebraska, South Dakota and Missouri kind of fall in, Texas. There’s a little bit more insulation because most of their market is either domestic U.S. or Mexico. 

And hopefully, hopefully, hopefully, the Trump administration will ultimately salvage NAFTA in some form, in which case their primary export market will be okay. But if NAFTA goes away, then Mexican industrialization goes away and then the Texas agricultural sector goes away. That is still much a TBD, but the kind of stuff that’s locked in at this point. Also keep in mind that not everybody eats the same things. 

So the United States does the select cuts the rump, roasts the tenderloins, or we grind it into ground for burgers, things like that. We we do that for all of our meats. But there are other parts of the animal that Americans like that other people are like, oh, that’s delicious. So chicken feet, for example. Entrails. Oh, Menudo. Or the Koreans are big fan of ass sphincters. Yes, yes. They cut out that little bit, they flip it in and they prepackaged it and microwave it. And they’re just like, know. And I’m just like, love me some Korean food. But no. Anyway, based on the animal and the region, somewhere between 10 and 30% of the proceeds from the sale of an animal comes from those. 

What we would consider undesirable parts that are sent to foreign markets where they just yak it up. Well, that’s gone. So we’re now looking not just at a headline reduction in the number of head of cattle or swine or number of chickens that we need. Also, the profitability per animal just dropped by about 25%. If your business had a drop in income of 25%, what would that do to you? 

And that’s a secondary effect to what’s happening to the agricultural folks in the meat production sector, a second row crop. Primarily, we’re going to talk here about corn and soy. In the short term, soy is the really big hit here. The Brazilians had a great production year last year, so there’s plenty of soy in the global markets. 

And the Chinese will never buy soy from the United States again unless they have no choice. So we’re basically looking at that sale drop very close to zero. The decisions for planting for this year have already been made. So if you are a soy farmer, you are. You’re kind of fucked. There’s really nothing you can do at this point. 

It’s too late in the season. Longer term, soy will do fine because it’s a cheap protein. And as the world, globalized as people are going to do, the switch the other direction for meat back to plant protein. So soy long term looks great. It’s there that corn’s a problem because if you’re exporting corn, it’s really only being used for animal fodder. 

About the only, good thing I can put there is that if you grow corn, you can also grow soy. You actually need fewer inputs for it. You have to worry about a different sort of crop rotation, but you’ll ultimately be okay. But for this year. Ouch. For the soy folks. And then finally, specialty crops. This is mostly an issue for the West Coast, especially for the California Central Valley, but really, there are pockets of specialty crops all throughout the United States. 

Michigan is known for its cherries, for example, apples out of New York. Any time you’re sending a specialty crop anywhere, you’re going to be sensitive to things like currency changes, which the United States isn’t doing so hot. So the prices have gone up, so sales have gone down, or climate, or especially politics. And in the case of China, they have basically underwritten the development of the US specialty crop industry for the last several years. 

The Chinese follow a hyper financialization model where they basically print currency like mad, expand their money supply like mad in order to underwrite their industrialization. They treat money as a political good because that is what is necessary to keep the population employed and therefore not rebelling. Well, that also means that they’re relatively cost in sensitive, because for them, money doesn’t have an economic value like it has in a Western system. 

And so they will pay anything for anything. Well, that means that they have paid for the development of specialty crops throughout the United States, especially on the West Coast, and doubly so in California’s Central Valley. And if you look at what the Central Valley produces, for example, things like pistachios, which I am doing my personal best to establish an American baseline for that. 

Most of it goes to China. And now that is going to zero. So if you’re looking for a zone that is particularly screwed, there is very, very little in California’s Central Valley that is going to survive the next two years because their primary source of demand, the majority of the demand has just gone away completely. Now, can we save all this? 

Well, like I said, agriculture is politically powerful. Trump considers rural communities to be part of his core constituents. But you have to keep in mind a couple things. Number one, Trump has not so far in his term treated his allies particularly well. He’s demanded a lot, but he hasn’t offered a lot in return. So if the farmers are going to get bailed out in a way that they were the last time around, Trump has to go back to Congress and get more money. 

That hasn’t happened yet. I’m not saying it can’t happen. I’m not saying it won’t happen. I’m saying it hasn’t happened. And if you’re going to keep all of American agriculture above water, it’s going to take a lot more money than last time. And more importantly, it’s going to take it for a lot longer. China is not coming back. 

Globalization is not coming back. The ability of the global system to absorb American agricultural production is not coming back. And until such time as we are on the other side of globalization and other agricultural producers, most notably Brazil, have shattered. We’re looking at a really hard transition time for anyone in American AG, especially if you’re producing protein or specialty crops. 

The only solution. Is to become France. France gets a lot of crap for good reason for supporting its agricultural sector, even when it is wildly disconnected from demand trends. They see it as a cultural issue. And if we’re going to keep our current slate of ranchers and farmers alive, it’s going to take tens of billions of dollars a year from now on, 

Or we get something about twice as bad as the 1980s farm crisis, which drove ultimately about 20% of agricultural producers out of business in a five year period. Those are our choices.

The Fire Hose of Chaos: The Fed

Seal of the federal reserve on a 0 bill

Jerome Powell has been on the receiving end of Trump’s threats and the markets have reacted negatively to the undermining of the Fed’s credibility. Here’s the full picture.

The Fed is raising rates to combat inflation driven by Trump’s tariffs. Higher rates = more expensive borrowing = slower economic activity. A necessary evil to prevent an inflation spiral. Trump wants rates lowered to encourage economic growth, counter to the Fed’s mandate. There’s no legal ground for Trump to fire Powell unless he wants to alter the Fed’s charter through Congress. Which, to be frank, is a feasible route given a weakened Republican party unlikely to resist.

Stagflation is just the tip of this iceberg. A deep recession is lying just beneath the surface, and Trump’s undermining of the Fed’s independence would only surface more problems.

Transcript

Peter Zeihan here. Coming from Canada….Coming to you from Colorado. Sorry. It’s been a long week. One of the big things that happened in the week ending April 25th. On a number of occasions, Donald Trump indicated that he planned to fire the Federal Reserve chairman, Jerome Powell. Eventually he backed out and said it was just a joke. 

And he never really considered it. But the damage has been done in the markets are kind of on fire in a bad way. So why does this matter? Well, the Federal Reserve is responsible for determining the monetary policy of the economy. And the tool that is generally gets the most publicity and is most directly relevant to most of us is interest rates. 

When the fed raises interest rates, everyone else in the economy that is involved on the credit side of things raises the cost of everything. Whether it’s your mortgage rate, your car rate, or your credit card rate. And so higher rates means that it costs you more to do whatever it is you want to do, and your mortgage will go up. 

Well, if you get a new mortgage, you’ll be more expensive. You get a new car, it’ll be more expensive if you do a purchase on layaway, it’ll get more expensive. And when you do that, you slow down economic activity. And that is the intent to slow down economic activity, because what they’re trying to do is suppress demand. 

Because if you suppress demand, enough inflation goes down. And courtesy of the Trump tariffs, we have a significant inflation problem that is only going to get more intense in the weeks to come, as the product that used to come in from China is no longer arriving. So we have product shortages. And the fed is anticipating that the Trump tariffs on China, in addition to all the other Trump tariffs, are simply going to generate shortages in supply, and they want to reduce demand to match it. 

So we don’t have an inflation spiral. Trump doesn’t like this. He wants economic activity to be robust. And so he’s pressuring Powell and the fed to drop interest rates in order to reduce those credit costs. 

So the consumption remains stable or even better, goes higher and generates faster economic growth. But if you do that, you get higher inflation. So three things come from this. 

First of all, the Federal Reserve is not going to bend the knee to Donald Trump because it legally cannot. The Federal Reserve Charter as established by Congress is very clear. The Federal Reserve is supposed to achieve a balance between inflation concerns and growth and employment concerns. 

But when the two sides clash, it always should go with inflation, because getting inflation under control can be very difficult and in some cases can take years and trigger massive recessions. But boosting growth is easy. You just make the credit easier and it can come back roaring in weeks to months. So Donald Trump is not going to get his wish here. 

So the threats against the Federal Reserve chair probably going to continue. Which brings us to the second thing the president can fire the Federal Reserve chair for cause. And for cause does not include doing your damn job. So if Donald Trump were to fire Jerome Powell, two things. I mean, number one, it would go through the courts over and over and over again. 

And the federal charter is pretty clear or so. It’s pretty obvious to me that the Trump administration would lose that fight and would be very public and would be very humiliated. And I think Donald Trump knows that. In addition, power would still be on the Federal Reserve Board for another two years. So it’s not like it’s going to generate some sort of activity that is all of a sudden going to be in Donald Trump’s favor. 

And I think he realizes that now. That’s one of the reasons why the threats have stopped a little bit. Which brings us to the third issue. If this is what Trump wants to do, if he really wants lower interest rates, if he really wants a looser monetary policy, he can get that without replacing the fed chair. 

He just has to change the Federal Reserve Charter. And that just requires an act of Congress. In that, considering that he’s basically ripped the backbone out of the Republican Party that is normally in favor of fed independence, it would be a much easier route. So as the economy starts to slow, as inflation starts to tick up to levels that are incredibly uncomfortable, expect a Trump to slam his head in the fed a few more times, and then just go to Congress, and we will find out at that point whether or not there’s anything left in the Republican Party that can stand up to Trump when he makes a very, very, very bad economic decision, because we’re already in an environment where stagflation is our best case scenario. And if the tariffs continue in their current form, much less get expanded as Trump says they’re going to be. We are looking at a very deep, dark recession, just a few weeks from now. 

And gutting the independence of the Federal Reserve will only make it deeper and darker. 

The Fire Hose of Chaos: Recession Time

Photo of 0 bill being cut

What do you get when you mix overly aggressive trade measures and a poor economic plan? Trump’s idea of a great start. Or, as I like to call it, a policy-induced recession. Here’s what’s happening.

Cargo shipments from China have collapsed and shortages will begin in a month or so. Trump’s eager to dump $1 trillion into new deficit spending, raising capital costs. Those DOGE cuts failed to offset spending and have backfired. Customer confidence is at its lowest since the ’08 crisis. We’ve already chatted about the construction issues. New tariffs are killing growth across numerous sectors. Policy confusion has stalled investment. And the global demographic picture isn’t getting any prettier.

The recession that the US is facing is no longer avoidable. Political choices have led us here, not economic fundamentals. Even if we flipped the switch today, recovery would be months away.

Transcript

Hey, all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from New York. There’s the World Trade Center, and I couldn’t think of a better place to discuss the recession that’s about to hit us. This is the latest in our series on the fire hose of chaos. How the Trump administration’s domestic and international policies are affecting the US economy. 

If you were looking to avoid a recession, I’m afraid that that ship has sailed like it literally sailed out of China about three weeks ago. I’m recording this on the 29th of April and back on the first week, we had tariffs kicked into China that rapidly ratcheted up to 145%, and that basically turned into a trade embargo and ships just stopped sailing. 

And at first it was just a few. And by now more ships have been canceled by a factor of two than what happened in the darkest days of Covid. The last of the three tariff vessels will dock in Los Angeles on or about May 5th. About two weeks later, the last will hit Houston about a week after that here in New York. 

And at that point, the inventory that’s in the country is always got to work with, and we will see good shortages of almost every kind within a month. There’s also not much of a chance of changing policy to avoid this at this point, because even if the Trump administration were to climb down completely, and even if everyone in China were able to go back to work the next second, you still wouldn’t see loadings within a month, and then it’s another month for it to cross the ocean. 

We’d already be talking about sometime in September or October. And that’s just one piece of the equation. We also have weakness everywhere else. The Trump administration says it wants to increase deficit spending by $1 trillion. That’s going to raise capital costs that won’t be compensated by the DOJ’s cuts. Doge has steadily revised down how much they think they’re going to cut out of the federal government, from 2 trillion to 1 trillion to 150 billion. 

And the most recent data suggests that cutting that 150 billion actually cost 130 billion, because a lot of the jobs that were let go were people that were actually essential workers that Congress mandates. And so they’re being had to be rehired on a contract basis, which costs more. That’s before you consider what’s going on in the housing sector, where we’re seeing consumer confidence at its lowest since the financial crisis back in 2007. 

That’s before you consider that industrial construction spending has dropped to zero, something that never even happened during Covid and that kind of blip doesn’t exist is going back as far as the data is. The issue is we’ve had roughly 100 different tariff policies in two months, and no one knows what the rules of the game are. 

And we have had no effort by the Trump administration put in place an industrial policy. We actually encourage manufacturing construction. And so it’s just withered on the vine from lack of confidence. Also, we have significantly slower economic growth in places like Michigan and Indiana already from the car tariffs that are already in place. And if the Trump administration does what it says it’s planning on doing on May 2nd, those car tariffs expand to cover car parts, which will trigger a manufacturing recession in roughly 25 states. And that’s before you consider the consumer spending is going to hit by agricultural tariffs that are just around the corner. And that’s before you consider drug tariffs or semiconductor tariffs, which are being promised. Basically we’re looking at a secular slowdown in economic growth in almost every sector. At the same time, almost none of it has to do with economic fundamentals. 

It all has to do with policy. And even if we got a complete policy change today, we’re going to have several months before we recover from this, just by unwinding things. And perhaps the darkest point of this is that some version of this was probably going to happen anyway. Birth rates have been dropping for decades, and it was always going to be the period between 2025 and 2035 when a number of countries including but not limited to Germany, Italy, Japan and China, basically aged out of being productive systems. 

And when that happened, globalization was going to crash. But the tariffs are making it crash now harder. And in a way that is causing a lot of heartbreak for Americans. That wasn’t necessary. What is the other side of this look like? I don’t know, that has become a policy question.