Oil Archives - Zeihan on Geopolitics

Oil Markets Aren’t Worried About Iran

With everything going on between Israel and Iran right now, I know what you’re thinking – it’s time to run to Costco and fill up the gas tank. Hear me out though, we don’t live in the same world we did a few decades ago.

Oil markets aren’t reacting to this conflict for a few reasons, but it boils down to where the crude is coming from. Between the US shale revolution and a diminishing importance of the Persian Gulf in oil markets, this conflict just doesn’t move the needle like it used to.

Sure, there could be a situation where I might start to worry. But that would require Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz (very unlikely) OR marching troops all the way to Saudi Arabia’s oil fields (also very unlikely). So, unless some dramatic military step is taken by Iran, we can all just fill up whenever it’s convenient.

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from a somewhat breezy and drizzly Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about the attack that happened over the weekend in Iran. Israel’s basically bombing the crap out of Iran, going after the nuclear facilities. And, contrary to popular concern, oil prices really haven’t done all that much. They’ve moved less than 10%.

Why do they not care? Why do I not care? Now, if you back up 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 years ago, any sort of spat involving Israel in any way immediately sent oil prices through the roof. And if it involved Iran, oh boy howdy. Because the Persian Gulf remains, even today, the world’s largest producer of crude and by far the world’s largest exporter of the stuff.

And with in the modern day, the Europeans no longer taking crude from, Russia because of the Ukraine war, it’s become more important to global petroleum than it’s ever been before. However, however, however, there is another factor and that is the US shale revolution. The United States, in the last 20 years has gone from the world’s largest importer crude to, in gross terms, the second largest exporter, second only to Saudi Arabia. Does that mean we’re completely immune to what’s going on? But it does mean that we’re dumping more than 10 million barrels a day of crude into this market than what we did before, closer to 15, actually, now that I think about it.

And that changes the math for everything, because if we did have a sharp cut off of the very thing in the Persian Gulf, the United States would face some teething pains as we use some of the crude grades that we produce in refineries that weren’t designed for it. But overall, we’d be okay. And having that extra 10 or 15 million barrels a day of global production just means that in percentage terms, the Middle East doesn’t matter nearly as much as it used to.

Now, where does that take us? More specifically, what would make us worry? I am of the opinion now that even if Iran decided it wanted to shut down the shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf, it probably couldn’t. They’ve got a lot of small boats. A lot of them are really nothing more than, speedboats. It could do some damage.

But about the only thing that is going to get Iran any assistance, any sympathy in the international system is if it doesn’t shut down the energy line that allows countries like China to function. If it does, that really is all on its own, except for the Russians, who would be happy to see global energy go up in smoke, which means, it’s down to how good their military is.

And, you know, Iran has never, ever, ever in its history been a naval power. Probably the last battle that Iran was really noteworthy. It was like against Sparta. And if you’ve seen, you know, those movies, you know exactly what I’m talking about. It didn’t end well. What would make me care? Well, if Iran were to take its military and surge it into Iraq and south through Kuwait and go for the Saudi oil fields with the intention of taking them offline.

That would get my attention. Iraq plus Kuwait. You’re talking 5 to 6 million barrels a day. Once you talk about the Saudi oil fields, you’re talking about another ten. All of these Saudi oil fields are in the far east of the country, really close to gutter. In a Shia majority area, and in theory with the Iranians, who are also Shia religiously, would get along with these people.

So you could see some sort of rebellion happening at the same time. But for that to happen, that would be a big risk for Iran these days. One of the things we’ve seen with the Israeli attack is Iran no longer has any meaningful air defense whatsoever, and it’s generally easier to have static air defense in it. It has mobile air defense.

So if they take their army and throw it at Saudi Arabia, they would have no air cover at all. In addition, Iran does not have what we would consider to be a mechanized military. It’s an infantry heavy force. So you’d basically be sending, don’t know, 50,000 hundred thousand, 200,000 men marching through the desert, 500 miles. Leaving aside the logistical terrain, that would be easy pickings.

They would be completely open to the sky the entire way. And so even a successful operation would be hugely costly for them. And a failed operation would mean the end of the Iranian government, because the Iranian military wasn’t designed to fight other countries. It was designed to occupy all of the non Iranian non Persians in the country of Iran.

Only about half the population are ethnically Persian. So if if they were to do that, it would be incredibly risky. And unless they pull it off successfully, I still don’t care and neither should you.

What’s Up with the Middle East: Saudi Oil Slips

Oil has been the secret sauce for the Middle East for ages, but that’s beginning to change.

The Chinese are now the top importer and consumer of oil, driven by all that energy-intensive industrialization. US oil consumption is dropping, although exports of refined products have masked this a bit. The US shale boom has also made American energy independent and competitive, which isn’t great for Saudi manipulation and control of oil markets.

Which means Saudi Arabia is losing some of its influence; the US doesn’t need the crude, Saudi Arabia’s costs are rising, and more competitors continue to pump oil regardless of market signals. But the Saudis aren’t completely out of options…they could always just use a little terrorism to destabilize their rivals.

Hey, all, Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Zion National Park. This is Zion Canyon. That is the infamous Angel’s Landing, which I will not be doing a video from. But we continue our coverage in the Middle East today talking about what makes the whole region matter. And of course, that is oil. We’ve got a lot of crosscurrents going on, and international oil markets right now.

We’ll start with demand. Then we’ll go to supply. Demand is weird. The United States has largely completed its transition to a services economy. And so we’re becoming more and more efficient for every dollar of GDP that we make. And so in terms of actual oil demand, we’ve actually seen demand drop in the United States. I’d argue for the last 15 years.

Now, you’re not going to see that in the data, because the United States has massively increased its production and export of refined products. So technically, we’re still absorbing crude turned into things like jet film gasoline and then sending it out for a profit. But in terms of our normal consumption, it’s actually gone down by quite a bit.

The second big factor, of course, is China, which is pricing sensitive and factor insensitive. They basically expand their money supply in order to give everybody a job. Most of those jobs end up being in the industrial space, which is relatively energy intensive. And so they need every drop of the stuff they can get from everywhere. So China has overtaken the United States as the world’s largest oil importer by far.

And if you look at the numbers the way I do, they’re clearly the world’s largest oil consumer as well. But unlike, the Chinese, the United States has an ace in the hole, and that’s the shale revolution. So now we talk about supply. The United States has gone from producing less than 5 million barrels a day as recently as 20 years ago to, now, something closer to 15 million barrels a day.

Most of that increase has been in the shale fields, where it’s relatively light, relatively sweet, fairly easy to refine, but not necessarily geared towards the American preferences when it comes to refinery infrastructure. So we end up exporting a lot of that stuff as well, and then bringing in some heavier, more sour stuff from Canada in particular. From the Saudi point of view.

All of the math is out of whack. The Saudis are completely incapable of defending themselves in a real war. And their plan has always been to lean on the United States for security support. And they do that by making sure that the United States always has as much oil as it possibly wants. But now the U.S. really doesn’t care on a systemic basis about oil markets at all, because everything that we need to either get at home or within our continent, or worst case scenario, within our hemisphere, and the Saudis are kind of left dragging, they would love to have a new security guarantor, but it’s not clear who that

could be. The Chinese don’t have the reach or the longevity. The French and the Brits don’t have the punch. And the Turks may be closer, but they are on the wrong side of Mesopotamia to make it work. It leaves Saudis in quite a lurch. And the Saudis, from an economic point of view, are struggling with new problems.

It used to be 20 years ago that OPEC could dominate oil markets by increasing or decreasing. The Saudis always had problems getting countries to follow their quotas. But because Saudi Arabia and their relatively close ally, the United Arab Emirates, always basically agreed on oil policy. You had this huge chunk of spare capacity that could be turned on or off relatively quickly.

They’re facing two challenges to that now. First, the spare capacity is largely gone. Everyone’s been pumping full out for quite some time. And then second, with shale, you can bring on a new shale. Well, in a matter of weeks, as opposed to having pre invested billions of dollars into spare capacity in Saudi Arabia, which still takes months to turn on.

So any time that the Saudis would try to flood the market. The shale folks just proved to be a little bit more competitive than the Saudis would have liked. And whenever the Saudis tried to push up prices by gutting the market, the shale folks would just take the market share. And that happened over and over and over and over and over again.

Second problem the Saudis are facing are is the former Soviet Union, because while Saudi from time to time can bully some of the other producers, into changing their oil policy to meet with the Saudis, one and two, they’ve never been able to do that with the Russians. A lot of the Russian production is in Siberia. It’s very high cost to get out of the ground.

The Russians have no intention of ever turning it off. A big problem these days is Kazakhstan, where a couple major projects called Tengiz and Kasha gone have really come into their own and made Saudi Arabia more important to oil markets than Kuwait. And they’re never turning that stuff off either. And then Azerbaijan has finally hit its stride with its offshore production.

So you got three significant players that are just dumping more and more crude on the market. And there’s really not a lot that Saudi can do, which means it’s time for a different sort of strategy. Some people in Saudi thought they could build a giant linear city that everyone would come invest in. Well, that was a stupid idea.

And so now the Saudis are probably going to rediscover some of their militant roots that they put down in the 1980s with al-Qaida. We have a lot of moving parts in the Middle East. Syria’s one. Iran is one. But what the Saudis really need is for some major oil producers to go off line. And the only tool the Saudis have that is even remotely reliable outside of Europe, opening the spigots is terror attacks.

This is something the Saudis are very good at. Their own population is basically former horse raiders that decided to settle down and substitute mass rapes and killings for, domestic violence. And now they’re in a position where the only way in the midterm that they can drive oil prices up is to drive someone else out of the market.

They haven’t decided what the target is yet. But we should expect significant policy change out of Saudi Arabia over the course of the next year, especially now that it’s become apparent to the Saudis that the American relationship really is over.

When Donald Trump came to Riyadh, recently, he didn’t ask for crude. First time, an American president hasn’t had some conversation with the Saudi royal family about crude oil. He simply said, you need to invest money in the United States if you want us to be involved at all. $600 billion is my number. So I don’t have $600 billion. The idea of them being a cash cow for whatever project in the world is long gone.

Their population is much larger, their subsidy system for their population is much larger, and their cost for just holding the line are much larger. So the U.S. will be lucky if it gets 150 billion. And the Saudis simply need to change the rules of the game if they’re going to continue with their system in its current form.

Can Venezuela Help Out with a Middle East Oil Shortage?

With the increasing possibility of disruptions to the Middle East oil supply, I was asked an ~interesting~ question on how to solve it. Could foreign intervention in Venezuela open its oil supply as an alternative to Middle Eastern oil.

Before we look at Venezuela, we need to know who might be interested first. The US has its oil needs figured out, so it’s really only the Europeans that would consider this. There’s plenty of crude in Venezuela, but years of mismanagement have left infrastructure and fields in poor condition. Couple that with a host of security issues, political instability, and a heavily armed civilian population…and it’s definitely not a cakewalk.

Even if the Europeans were willing to make the massive investment to revamp the oil industry in Venezuela and put forth a substantial military presence to establish the order needed to make this possible, they would still need the sign off from the US…and that’s probably not going to happen without some major incentives.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here coming to you from the Golden Horn above Denver and it’s probably my last snow free day of the season. Anyway, We are. Oh.

Oh, deer.

Today we’re taking a question from the Patreon crowd. Specifically with everything in the Middle East starting to look very Middle Eastern again, would it be worth considering some sort of operation in operation?

To remove the government of Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela so that the world has another source of crude available for when the Persian Gulf becomes a place you really don’t want to be? Might sound a little neo imperialist, but that’s a pretty good question. You got 20 million barrels a day of crude that comes out of the, the Persian Gulf states.

And any meaningful conflict that involves Iran or Saudi Arabia, clearly is going to take a substantial percentage of that off line. And even if the oil fields in the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia take no damage, and even if those two countries stand, and even if the bypass pipelines that get around Hormuz or go to the Red sea, operate at full capacity, you’re still talking about roughly how 12, 12 to 13 million barrels per day that’s under severe threat.

So the idea of being able to get some more crude out of Venezuela is a solid idea from a supply point of view. In addition, if you look back at history, the original oil embargoes that OPEC did, were Arab. They were not they didn’t involve all oil producers. And back in the day, Venezuela was not a participant in them.

So we saw more production out of Venezuela, which didn’t simply, cushion the blow.

But I would argue that over the period of several weeks to months, it actually broke the back of the embargo. So having Venezuela in play is obviously great. That said, the country that would do something like that is 100% not the United States.

While the United States does prefer heavy crude, Venezuela has been such an a sneaky producer for so many years, more than a decade now that, with the exception of a few incidental cargoes, U.S. refiners just don’t even want to take delivery of the stuff because they can’t plan on it. You tool your refineries step by day, week by week, by month, by month, year by year, based on what you anticipate, the blend of crudes coming in going to be.

And so if you can’t rely on a particular supplier, it’s better for you simply not to use it at all. And ever since the early days of Hugo Chavez, maybe going back to 2007, there have been very, very few refineries in the United States who have chosen to use Venezuelan crude. I know that doesn’t match the rhetoric.

It’s always about, oh, we’re not going to ship to the Americans anymore. Well, the Americans weren’t buying anymore. So if Venezuela were somehow magically to come back into the mix, its specific grade, a very heavy, very sour crude would have a hard time finding a local buyer. That’s problem one. Problem two. The middle row government is well, it’s like Zimbabwe levels of incompetent, Zimbabwe being a country that was one of the world’s great breadbasket until the government of Mugabe and his successor just drove it into the ground and made it a food importer, under first Hugo Chavez.

No, Nicolas Maduro, we’ve basically seen the, cronies of the government literally rip up everything, even if it was nailed down, and sell it oftentimes for scrap. So the country now imports 80% of its food. It used to be a food exporter. And, its total oil output is kind of bouncing back and forth between 500,000 million barrels per day based on what happens with, Chevron, the American company, which is really the only one that’s still operating there.

Most of the reservoirs have suffered extreme damage. The infrastructure hasn’t been maintained. And don’t get me started on the refineries. Oh, there’s like chunks in their gasoline now. But just for the record, chunks of gasoline is a bad thing. So, if you could wave a magic wand and change the government and change the investment strategy and, make them not klepto those.

Oh, yeah. Important detail. The Venezuelan government is not socialist. It is not communist. It’s a kleptocracy. And of course, we should be scared of that anyway,

If everything was perfect, it would still take probably an investment of 40 to $50 billion upfront just to get back to where they were five years ago when they were exporting, like, a million barrels a day, maybe producing something close to a million and a half.

Keep in mind that the fields that Venezuela has are old, they’re technically challenging, and they produce a very sludgy type of crude. So you really to know what you’re doing. And today, there’s only a handful of companies that have any experience working with that. One of the Chevron, the other ones, Conoco. And then there are some companies that say in Canada that work with the oil sands, which is probably the closest analog, but it’s even not a very good one.

And as a rule, the Canadian oil sands operators don’t operate anywhere except for the oil sands. So simply building up the skill set that would be necessary to attempt this would be huge. Third, most of the oil is in one of two places in the western part of the country. You’ve got a region called Maracaibo, which is about as anti Maduro and anti-trade as you can get, but the government’s efforts to basically destroy their own state have had a big impact there.

And Maracaibo itself is lawless, complete with pirates operating offshore. And in Maracaibo a lot of the crude is produced from offshore wells, most of which are in the process of going down to zero. So you have a split politically in the country that you’d have to deal with. The second part of the crude comes from the southern belt, the Orinoco Belt, which is super heavy, far more technically challenging, and a lot of that is just vanished from the market completely.

So if you want to bring either of these in, you don’t simply need to change the government. You need to restore basic security to the country. And then you’re talking minimum, bare minimum. Something like 50,000 troops. Remember, one of the things that Hugo Chavez did is he paid people to be on his side. And he didn’t just pay them with food and with fuel and with cash.

He paid them with AK 47. So arguably, of the countries in the world that are not actual war zones, the densest footprint of assault rifles in the population is in Venezuela now. So anyone who’s going to come in for any reason, even if the locals in general are welcoming the stability and they be able to get food, they’re going to be dealing with the significant population that is armed to the teeth and not with little pop guns.

Okay, you put all that together and the US is like, no, sir. The United States is now not just a net exporter of crude oil, but by the end of this calendar year, probably is going to be exporting 5 million barrels of refined product. That’s a greater volume of refined product exports than all but three countries in human history have ever produced as raw, crude.

So the idea that the United States is going to launch a war for oil is just silly. It’s going to happen. It’s going to be because countries in Europe realize that the Russians aren’t coming back to the table, not in the way that matters in the Middle East is as unstable as ever. Ergo, this conversation that means that we are left with the Europeans basically thinking, well, where else can we go?

And one of the very few options that is not West Africa or North Africa is going to be Venezuela. So they’re going to have a choice. Do they go into Libya, which is basically a stateless zone now on its own. Can’t even call it a civil war. Civil war requires a state. You can go into Nigeria where with over 100 million people, the chances of imposing a security environment on Nigeria that the Nigerians don’t want is silly.

So we’d have to be even done with partnership with them. So even with a lot of cash, you’re going to be dealing with a very corrupt system and slow growth of output, or you’re talking about a military occupation and enforceable reconstruction of Venezuela. Leaving aside the little issue that the Europeans are a little bit out of practice at that, they would have to get American permission as well.

Monroe Doctrine and all that. And for the United States to give the Italians, the Brits and the French and the Germans approval to invade, basically a country in the Western Hemisphere, let’s just say that whatever was being offered in exchange would have to be really nice. And I’m not sure there’s anything in Europe that we want that badly at the moment.

So interesting idea. The crude is there, but the country that would have the capacity to do something but the United States really doesn’t care. And the countries that do really care would have to build up a whole fresh set of tools and then bribe Washington in order to make it happen. So it’s an interesting exercise, but nothing that I think is going to go down this decade, next decade though, everything’s game.

Why Is Gas So Expensive in California?

Picture this: you’re driving down the PCH in a sports car with the top down, hair is blowing in the wind, and then the gas light comes on. You pull into the first gas station you see and a gallon of gas costs $14.99. Okay, maybe I’m exaggerating a little, but California is heading towards a massive energy crisis.

California has been living in its own energy world for quite a while. As if its distinct gas formulation designed to reduce air pollution, high gas taxes, and dependency on foreign oil weren’t enough, the state now requires refiners to keep reserve supplies (raising costs further and creating more logistical issues).

Since California isn’t a beneficiary of the shale revolution, they still import crude from the Persian Gulf and use outdated methods of collection. This makes them vulnerable to global energy shocks and could lead to extreme gas prices throughout CA. So, if you were planning to head to the west coast, let your hair down, and take a cruise along CA State Route 1, you may want to grab a few extra gas cans before you cross the state line.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Huntington Beach, California. Behind me is the old Huntington Beach refinery. This used to be a major oil producing zone. In fact, there’s still a handful of producing wells across the L.A. area, with one of the most prolific ones being inside of a mall in Wilshire Boulevard. Never say that the Californians aren’t capable of a bit of, double dealing.

Anyway, the reason I wanted to talk about this, and this is what, you know, made me think of it, is we’ve got a bit of a crisis going on in California. I’m going to rotate around a little, not only is the view better, but you can even see some of the old, oil platforms out in the ocean.

Hey. They’re okay. Anyway, short version is that California has a very high tax regime for, a lot of things, but none more so than gasoline, where it has the highest gasoline taxes in the country. And as a result, gasoline in California is ridiculously expensive, often goes over $5 a gallon. I think it’s where it is right now, actually.

Anyway, there’s some other reasons for this, but, we’ll get to those in time. Bottom line is the Californians have become a nerd, but angered by very, very high gasoline prices and very, very volatile gasoline prices and more so than everyone else, you know, everyone else is, you know, used to the up and down of crude prices of how that affects things.

There’s more going on in California for you that was worth exploring. The governor of California, Gavin Newsom, has recently signed into law a project that will force refiners to maintain storage of gasoline grades for the California market as a cost of doing business in the state. The intent is so that when maintenance happens, especially unscheduled maintenance, that there’s always a reserve that the state can fall back on to keep energy prices out of control.

Unfortunately, it’s going to do the absolute opposite. And the cost of, complying with this new regulation combined with all the other regulations in California and at the energy sector, which are already, the stiffest in the country, means that a lot of refineries are evaluating whether they even want to stay. And, shortly after the new law was signed, Phillips 66, which maintains a refinery near here in Los Angeles, announced that, next year will be the final year that there are refineries operating and they plan to shut down and redirect their efforts to other places, most notably other states.

A couple things here. Let’s talk about the technical of why what Newsom and the Democrats here are doing is just purple idea. First and foremost, California, in order to control air pollution, has a different formulation from the rest of the country. So any refinery that is producing, gasoline or unleaded or whatever else for the California market has to produce a very specific type of fuel that doesn’t have a demand anywhere else in the world.

And so no refineries outside of the state produce for the state because there’s no margin added for them. So it’s just the locals. Second, not every urban center in California has the same regulations. And in the summer, a lot of them had different regulations. So not only do you have to produce a strain that is different for the state as a whole, but when you get to the summer months, you have to produce several different ones.

And all of this drives up costs because it reduces scale. The idea of the regulation that you have to have storage makes sense. But gasoline, once it’s refined into a fuel, if it’s stored for any appreciable amount of time, you know, more than days to a few weeks starts to degrade. So the cost of keeping this up is really high, and the waste that comes out of it is not minor.

And so from a carbon point of view, this isn’t a great idea anyway. There’s any number of reasons why this isn’t a great plan, but the Californians are doing it anyway. And that means that California is setting itself up for a bit of a problem down the road, more than just high prices. You see, California is the only one of the lower 48 that is not participating in the shale revolution in some way.

They have a significant oil field here in the Monterey Shale that’s out in Kern County in in the valley. But the techniques that are used for fracking have specifically been banned. But oil production has not. So, the locals are using technologies that are older and arguably dirtier than shale tech in order to produce crude for this local market.

This new regulation further separates California from the rest of the country. Also, keep in mind that the United States is now far and away the world’s largest exporter of refined oil products. By the end of this calendar year, we’re looking about 5 million barrels a day of exports of things like gasoline and jet fuel. Obviously, none of that’s coming from California.

But for the rest of the country, we’re awash in an embarrassment of energy production and fuel production, whereas California is in huge deficit. And now California is the state that is most dependent, not just on energy imports, but energy imports from another hemisphere. Yes, all the refineries in Louisiana and Texas like to use imported crude. They mostly use, Venezuelan, Mexican and Canadian and to a lesser degree, crude grades from the Eastern Hemisphere.

But everything, almost everything that California gets comes from the Eastern Hemisphere. And almost all of that comes from the Persian Gulf. So the next time we have an energy shock, for example, because I don’t know, Israel bombs Iranian oil production and export facilities and that Iran returns the favor by hitting Saudi Arabia. We get to know what are you prices?

Most of the United States is like, whatever. But here in California, they have made themselves uniquely exposed to international shocks while also being uniquely exposed to their own. So one way or the other, we are looking at a significantly darker chapter in California economic history. Just around the corner. And that’s before you consider things going on in Silicon Valley or the capital market or the general aging of the millennials, all of which are already hitting California pretty hard.

So stay tuned. When it gets bad, I’ll be back because it’ll be cheap.

Trump’s New Grand Strategy

President Trump suggested that Europe should buy US oil and gas to address trade deficits and strengthen alliances. I have a few qualms with this.

Trump talks a big game, but backing it up is a whole different story (meaning I wouldn’t recommend holding your breath while we wait and see if this comes to fruition). That’s not my only concern here though. Europe is facing a whole lot of issues, and prioritizing energy exports to a struggling region isn’t in the best interest of the US.

Instead, America’s energy resources should be allocated to emerging economies in regions that the US could use as strategic footholds and partners down the road. I’m talking Southeast Asia rather than Europe. Carefully selecting allies as the world deglobalizes is going to be very important…so, let’s hope Trump can do more than Tweet about all this.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from. Okay. Who are okay. Who are. Yeah, I think that’s it. On the Cape Brett track in Northland, New Zealand. Today we’re going to do a, something I’m not going to get in the habit of and commenting. And one of Trump’s threats, specifically says that the Europeans should purchase American oil and gas, in order to address their trade deficit, in order to cement the alliance.

Normally, I’m not going to do this because Trump says a lot of stuff, that usually just doesn’t survive the room. And he is packing his cabinet with functional incompetence. So the chances of any of his policies actually making it into, reality, whether it’s domestic, foreign, are pretty low. And this is no exception to that.

But, it’s an interesting hypothetical exercise to, think about because we are in a period where the world is reshaping and seemingly incoherent. Things like this actually could have an impact. So, the volume first, Europe. And I’m using Europe in the broadest sense. It includes the Balkans, includes Switzerland, includes the United Kingdom, as well as all of the European Union.

They use about 13 million barrels of crude a day. If you include refined product, as well as about 45,000,000,000 cubic feet of natural gas a day. And that’s roughly 50 to 60% of what the United States uses. They have more people than the United States has, significantly more. But their economy is smaller and it’s less energy intensive because they don’t have a lot of manufacturing.

And while the United States has been gone, going through this big Three industrialization boom, much of Europe is actually industrializing because they’re running out of energy because they’re under net of workers, because they’re running out of finance. It’s a demographic story as much as anything else. Anyway. If if, if the United States did decide that it wanted to fuel Europe, it would need to expand its oil production by like 2 or 3, 4 barrels a day, which is probably going to happen in the next five years anyway.

And for natural gas, we need to build out significant, LNG, liquefied natural gas export capacity. We have to double, almost triple what we have right now. And there are enough projects in the pipeline for that to happen over the next decade. So from a numbers point of view, it’s not a ridiculous idea. It would mean not sending product anywhere else.

And so problem number one with this plan is right now our number one energy destination for energy exports is Mexico. And without those exports, the lights go off. In Mexico, roughly half of Mexican electricity, for example, is generated by the use of American natural gas. And we send them over a million barrels a day of crude and refined product as well.

And that’s built into our manufacturing system. So if we were to send that somewhere else for, our number two destination is, Japan, which is a much tighter ally than many of the European countries. And in general, if you’re doing this to address a trade deficit, taking something we already sell and have no problem selling from one place and send it to another just generates a different numbers problem.

That’s part of the problem with Trump’s things is that, he assumes that every individual thing stands alone when it’s all usually interconnected anyway, let’s assume for the moment that Trump is serious that Trump’s team can make it happen, that the Europeans are amenable. The trade deficit isn’t the issue here. Never is. The issue is a strategic block.

We’re moving into a world where globalization is ending. And it’s not that I think the United States is going to have a problem finding takers for its commodity exports. Now, the issue is that not everyone will be able to afford or have the security situation. Well, that will allow them to access those materials. And if the United States were to make a strategic decision not based on the trade deficit, based on who we want to be our ally, who do we want to encourage to continue to exist in a globalizing world?

Europe is one of the places that should be considered, it keeps the Russians in a box. It gives you a foot in the Middle East without being in the Middle East. And there’s a lot of cultural history or baggage, if you prefer, with the European family, which is where the vast majority of Americans eventually trace the roots back to, there’s a very strong argument to be made that Europe is it. And that’s where we should play. And if the United States were to pour all of its energy exports because it would take all of it, then that is a viable bloc. And then you can talk about what comes from that agricultural fusion, manufacturing fusion, military fusion, and the idea that you have an American dominated system that includes the entire cultural West.

There’s an argument to be made that in a world that breaks into factions and regions, merging North America and Europe is arguably the most powerful option. Just keep in mind that if we do that, we no longer have the resources that are necessary to say, do the same thing with Korea and Japan, which are two advanced countries we currently have excellent relations with or with Southeast Asia, which is likely to be the most rapidly growing part of the world

Moving forward, the United States is going to have to do many of the things that other countries are going to have to do in a globalizing world. We’re going to have to make some choices. They’re going to be a little difficult. And choosing to pour all of our energy resources into Europe, which is a region that’s experience.

A demographic bomb might not be the biggest bang for the buck. Germany, for example. The industrial base is probably going to collapse within a decade because they won’t have a workforce in addition to their energy problems. A much better bet is probably Vietnam or Thailand or Myanmar or Indonesia. Malaysia, and I would expect that as the eurozone faces problems, because if you don’t have a consumption led economy, it’s really hard to have a currency as a eurozone prices problems.

The United States is going to be able to choose to work with individual European countries. France looks much more viable. The U.K. is much more viable. Spain is much more interesting. Central Europe will probably last longer than Germany, Italy in a worse demographic situation than Germany. But its geography is much more friendly for power projection. It’s easy to kind of break Italy off from the rest of Europe’s strategically.

So there’s a lot of ways you can cut this pie. And I applaud Trump for starting the conversation on what might be possible. But the specific idea that Europe buys American energy, the end. It doesn’t take us very far, but it does get us looking in the right direction.

Quick addendum from further down the trail. Because I know I’m gonna get some hate mail for that one. So let’s make sure that the hate mail is well informed. Hate mail. The reason I say that Polish is under Donald Trump just don’t tend to happen is, he tweets something out or whatever social media he’s using, and then he leaves the room, and usually that’s the end of it.

And that’s before you consider that he is appointing people to his cabinet who are functionally incompetent in their areas. It’s a little less true in foreign affairs. Some of the people look interesting. But the primary purpose of being on Donald Trump’s cabinet is to stroke his ego, to tell him he’s wonderful and to make him look good in public.

And the heartbeat that you step away from that, you lose your job. So in Trump’s first term, he went through more cabinet level secretaries, than any other three American presidents in history combined. There’s just not enough time for a meaningful policy to be discussed, formed, and put in practice before the person is kicked out. But even if that was not true, Trump is a horrible personnel manager.

One of the worst we’ve ever had. And the only other person in modern memory, who comes even close is Barack Obama, who was arguably the worst of the second worst. It’s just a difference of styles. Obama insisted on micromanaging every little thing, but then hated people and hated having conversations with them. So he never was available for anything to be managed.

So nothing happened. And so for eight years, we really only got one law consequence passed and we had no foreign policy whatsoever. Trump is of that caliber when it comes to outcomes. So you look at our last three presidents Trump, Biden, Obama. We’ve had 16 years where the world is falling apart, where globalization is ending. And decisions like this on regionalization really are important and do need to be made.

But we’ve had no one to lead the conversation or to carry it forward, or to turn it into policy. So kudos. Seriously, kudos to Trump for starting the conversation. And I will be pleasantly thrilled. Should the process proceed from here?

No Shale for Europe

The US oil industry has seen a massive boost thanks to the shale revolution, but can the Europeans replicate the success the US has seen?

Unfortunately for Europe, there are a lot of things working against them. Problem one is that Europe just doesn’t have the right geology to make this work. They are also missing the decentralized network of small companies that helped build out the shale network in the US, they lack innovation, and they don’t have a rapid regulatory approval system. Aaand there is no financial incentives for landowners due to the legal barriers in place.

In the short term, this doesn’t look very plausible for the Europeans. They would need to buildout all the infrastructure, under perfect conditions, and even then it would take a decade to MAYBE get one million barrels per day. So, oil imports from the Middle East and US will continue.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from a brisk Colorado. Today we’re going to take a entry from the Ask Peter forum. Specifically, what would it take for Europe to experience an American style shale revolution? The continent is a massive importer of oil and natural gas, and they don’t exactly have a lot of territory that is good for sun or wind either.

So their choices really are nuclear, which let’s just call that problematic in some places, or imported. And if you’re importing, then you’re at the mercy of whoever you’re buying the stuff from, as they discovered with the Ukraine war, when that is Russia, that’s a problem. And as I discovered in the 70s and 80s, when that’s the Middle East, that’s a problem.

And then, of course, most European countries don’t have a production base navy, so they can’t even patrol their own supply lines should someone in between decide to cut them off. So, you know, reasonable question. Well, there’s a couple things that they really can’t do much about. And then there’s a couple things that they can, but I doubt they will.

So let’s start with what they can’t fix. Geology. Yes yes, yes, 90% of known oil and natural gas is in unconventional rock formations like shale. But that doesn’t mean that all shale deposits are created equally. So if you consider the United States, we’ve got the Permian, which in some places has 20 different stacked layers, each with their own petroleum layer, little jumbled together, but for the most part, pretty easy to get to.

So you can drill down through one, do laterals go down to the next one, do laterals go down the next one? Do laterals and the whole thinking funnel up through a single point of extraction. It’s by far the best in the world of that geology, and it’s, as far as we know, the only one in the world, there are tiers.

The Marcellus, in the Pennsylvania area is still pretty good, but it’s mostly gas, whereas the Permian is mostly oil. You’ve got the Bakken in North Dakota. That’s somewhere between, and the Europeans just don’t have the type of deep sedimentary geology that the United States or that North America specifically has. So it’s not that there isn’t oil and gas to be had.

It’s just it’s probably not going to have the same bang for the buck, even if all else was equal. And of course, all else is not equal. The way the United States started its shale revolution was with hundreds, if not thousands of mom and pop companies. And so we developed the expertise as we went. But it started from kind of a baseline understanding, especially national lands in the United States.

Small mom, the pops are the wildcatters that basically drill or have rights to small chunks of acreage and drill whatever’s best in that acreage. And they’re constantly trying new things. And in doing so, eventually they crack the code on shale. In the last few years, that has evolved quite a bit. And now the super majors have taken everybody’s best practices and are now doing some really aggressive iterations using things like artificial intelligence.

And overall, since 2012, we’ve probably seen worker productivity in the area increased by 350 to 400%, which is by far the record for any subsector in any industry anywhere in the world. And that’s before you consider that, we’ve gotten much more efficient with the equipment. So we’re actually getting about two and a half times as much crude as we did ten years ago.

But with one third the number of drilling operators, if you’re going to do this in Europe, you basically have to create it from scratch. With the notable exception of the United Kingdom, there is no constellation, no environment of small and medium sized players. Get your big national players that are de facto monopolies, and that’s about it. And with the possible exception of France’s too Tall and to a lesser degree, BP and EA and I, you know, none of these guys or what I would consider at the technological edge.

So simply getting into shale in the first place would be a big leap. But at least that’s something you can do something about. The other issues are far more problematic, but luckily there is a little bit of hope here. The first one is proximity. One of the reasons why the U.S show revolution has been so successful is when the technologies were first pioneered, they were pioneered on the edges of projects that had already been in production places like the Marcellus in Pennsylvania or the Permian in Texas.

And so there was already significant takeaway capacity was just waiting to be used. All the legacy pipes from previous oil booms, we weren’t exactly dormant, but they were certainly had a lot of spare, space in the pipelines. And shale was able to flow right in there. And most of the expansion we’ve seen in the last eight years has been about expanding that takeaway capacity, because it’s all the old stuff been maxed out in Europe.

Their mature fields have been abandoned for decades. And so on the off chance that there is any infrastructure left, it’s probably going to have to be completely rehabilitated. In addition, a lot of the best geology we are aware of in Europe is directly under where people live. So, for example, we know there’s a good shale geology under the some of the lowest sections, lowest in elevation in the Netherlands.

But you know, if you get any land subsidence, you all of a sudden have lost part of your country. So the chances of drilling there are not very high. And the richest shale deposit we’re aware of is under Paris, specifically under the roof. So the idea that the jewel in the crown of French historical preservation is suddenly going to be an operating oil extraction site.

I don’t think so. This isn’t the United States where there’s still oil production on Wilshire Boulevard. They have a very different attitude towards things in Europe.

The final issue, which is arguably the single largest, obstacle is legal rights in the United States, unless something has been negotiated otherwise, under the land you live on or own our mineral rights that you also control.

So if somebody decides they want to come into your neighborhood and drill and they get your permission, you get a cut. Whereas there is no country in Europe where that is the case. So if somebody were to come in, they’d get permission of the National government, and then the national government would get not just the oil and gas, but all the money that would come from it.

And you get nothing. So you’ve set up a situation where you can guarantee very strong opposition from regional governments, local governments, landowners, renters, everybody, because they don’t see any of the immediate benefit, unlike how we have it here. Now, technically, that is a legal change that is up to the individual countries to shift, but doing so would be would be a bit of a heavy lift.

So even if in a perfect scenario, the Europeans could just wave a wand and change the legal structure without public opposition and all local landowners and adjacent interests were immediately on board. And if they started building out the infrastructure for takeaway capacity today, and if they retooled their entire educational system to generate the scads of workers, that they would need to do this at scale the soonest, that you would probably see a million barrels a day fresh output, from Europe as a whole, would probably be 8 to 10 years from now.

And to be perfectly blunt, I don’t have that kind of time. The only way that the Europeans are kind of holding things together right now is with imported oil from the Middle East, an imported natural gas from the United States, and liquefied form that is more stable than their previous import menu, which was Russia heavy. But to think that that has ten years to run, in an environment where so much geopolitically is so unstable and changing so quickly, they’re gonna have to figure out another way.

One more thing. Regulation. This is something that Europeans obviously can do something about. And I’m not talking about here about a relatively anti-business, pro-environment regulation. Obviously, if you’re going to have a robust energy sector. You have to make some compromises there. That’s not what I’m talking about. I’m talking about turnaround time. So the Texas Railroad Commission, which regulates the shale space in Texas, is famous for fast turnaround times.

They accept applications for drilling permits 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. And in Texas, people drill and Christmas and Thanksgiving and Easter and all the rest. And most of the operations at most of the wells are operating at least 16 hours a day. They just rotate crews. The two examples I can give you of countries in Europe that have attempted, to try shale are the United Kingdom, Poland, the United Kingdom basically drowned everybody in paperwork.

Very British. And as a result, getting things approved wasn’t measured in days or weeks, but months. Because there was always one more form. It was like working for the U.S. Defense Department. And when they discovered that the geology in the United Kingdom, is, the oil bearing stuff is less dense, it’s in smaller deposits and it’s more spread out, and it’s a lot deeper.

Everyone pretty much walked away. The other country that tried Poland, had a little bit better geology, but you still had a problem with just permitting. You could file for your permit between 9 and 5 Monday through Thursday. And, God forbid, it was a holiday because, you know, the Europeans have a bunch of those. And this is an a country that actually has a strong national security interest in independent energy production.

But foreign companies just couldn’t get it to work. And Exxon, you know, that dainty, demure company that never gets its way ultimately just threw up its hands and walked home? So unless you have that change in government culture, it’s really difficult to imagine this moving

While U.S. shale operations now are getting more and more oil out of each individual, well, now measured in the tens of thousands of barrels a day, often, if you’re going to start new, with a new sector, with little expertise and especially without, say, the Permian geology, you’re probably only going to be getting a few hundred barrels per day. So the barriers between you and your operation that the government puts up needs to be very low for it to be worth that effort. And right now, the incentives in the United States versus Europe are just completely flipped. Okay. Now I’m done.

Will Saudi Arabia Start an Oil Price War?

Image of the Nabawi Mosque, Madina, Saudi Arabia

My crystal ball is working overtime trying to figure out what the future of oil prices will look like. You’ve already heard one of the scenarios, but here’s another POTENTIAL way this could play out.

The Saudis could get frustrated with other oil producers not cutting production, and flood the market with oil. We’re talking 3 million barrels per day, which would drive prices down below $50 per barrel. This would have an outsized impact on higher cost producers like Angola, Venezuela, and Nigeria.

These countries could face economic instability because of this, but they’re not getting the worst of it. The Russian oil fields are hard and expensive to operate, should production drop during a price war, it may never recover. Oh, and the US will be fine thanks to low-cost shale production.

Okay, I’ll go get the popcorn and you grab the sodas.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

If you sign up for our Patreon page in the month of October, the proceeds from your subscription for the remainder of 2024 will be donated directly to MedShare. So, you can get our all of the perks of joining the Patreon AND support a good cause while you’re doing it.

We encourage you to sign up for the Patreon page at the link below.

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Fort Worth, Texas. And, I spoke with you recently about what I consider to be the highest risk we’ve had in a long time to the Middle East for crude oil supplies. But remember that I pointed out the possibility of Iran striking at Saudi Arabia’s energy complex and Israel taking out Iran’s, for that matter.

I said 1 in 4 to 1 in 3 chance. It’s not that I think it’s a majority chance. In fact, you know, there’s obviously other scenarios. I’m going to share another one with you today, which takes us the absolute opposite direction and probably has about the same chance of happening just to confuse anyone who wants to play some money in the market.

So you know, you have fun with this. So the idea is that Saudi Arabia is getting a little cheesed off that it has been restricting its own production in an attempt to boost oil prices. Specific. While my hair is out of control here, in order to get prices up, above $100 a barrel. And with the exception of the United Arab Emirates, no one else in OPEC, much less this broader OPEC+ group, has been cutting production at all.

In fact, everyone else has been putting as many barrels in the market as they possibly can. And of course, the U.S. shale producers continue to produce. That’s something that by any other standards would be record levels. But by their standards, like, oh no, only went up a million barrels a day this year, which, you know, is bonkers that it is now and done that for eight of the last 15.

Anyway, the Saudis have very clearly gotten annoyed, and they’re indicating that they’re willing to put a lot more oil on the market, maybe as many as 3 million barrels a day, and that they’re going to try to drive prices down quite a bit in order to grab market share. And that the number of $50 a barrel or lower has been floated. Doing something like that is well within the Saudis’ capability, assuming that global politics are favorable, which is always a little touch and go anyway. Whenever the Saudis have done this, it causes a lot of ruckus around the world among all of the other oil producers, specifically those that

have higher breakeven costs. So places like Angola or Venezuela or Ecuador or Nigeria and especially in places that are really, really dependent on oil flows, like places like, say, Libya and Nigeria in that category, because if they’re getting a lot less income, you know, obviously they face social malcontent. And if their crude isn’t profitable at that point, then they have to shut those production levels in.

And sometimes it can take years, if not decades, for that to be rebuilt. One country I’m not worried about is the United States. We’re now in a situation where the vast, vast, vast—over 80%—majority of the oil that the U.S. produces comes out of a shale well, and pretty much everybody is profitable below 50.

In fact, you’d have to go down to below, probably 35, before you’d see a meaningful impact on existing production. Keep in mind that once you’ve drilled your shale well, its production costs for operating purposes drop below about $10-15 a barrel in most places. So you might not drill new wells, but you’re going to maintain what you’ve got.

In fact, it costs money to shut it in anyhow. The last three times that the Saudis have done something like this, we’ve seen a little blip, oftentimes, in American shale output. But then you see it surge back very quickly, because from the time that a shale operator starts working on a well to the time that it actually starts producing is usually only about two months or less. With some of the new technologies, that might be a little longer, but it’s still less than three months anyway.

So whenever you’ve got market share up for grabs, the Saudis, of course, try to take it, but the U.S. shale guys do as well. So the Saudis have to do all the work, and they don’t have to split the benefits with the U.S. shale players. Now, this time, there is one other thing in the mix that is going to make this particular potential price war a little bit more exciting.

And that is Russia. Russia’s fields are deep. They are thousands of miles from international markets. They require over a thousand miles of pipes. Even the ones that are close to international markets, most of them are in the permafrost. And the Russian educational system for generating petroleum engineers collapsed back in the 1980s. So the only people in Russia who are capable of doing the work are a small cadre of Russian citizens who, in the 2000s, were basically trained abroad.

There’s just a few dozen people, because of the Ukraine war, because of the sanctions regime. The people who would normally do this work, typically Americans, Brits, Dutch, and Germans, are all out, and the Chinese don’t have the capability to work in this sort of technically demanding environment. They just haven’t learned those skills yet. So if you have high-price producers like Russia who lose production, this time around, they’re actually out of the market for good.

A lot of the fields aren’t simply old and complicated and far away and deep; they’re also very, very mature. So it would take a huge amount of investment and technology the Russians simply don’t have in order to get it back up and running on the backside of any sort of trade war. And they can’t do that themselves.

So, how is that for two bookends for what can possibly happen? A conflict in the Persian Gulf that sends oil prices skyrocketing, or a price war that removes a major player from the market permanently? Both of these could happen. In fact, it’s entirely possible that we’re getting some mix of the two, where the Saudis start with the price war, and then the Iranians have an economic reason to take out Saudi energy prices.

And if this is just too wishy-washy for you, well, welcome to my world. This is what geopolitics often is.

Impacts of an Israeli Strike on Iran’s Oil Sector

You’re receiving this video a week after its initial posting on Patreon. If you’d like to get access to this content as soon as it’s released, along with a number of other exclusive perks, click the link below.

Following my video on Iran’s attacks from the other day, I feel it necessary to explore the possibility of an Israeli strike on Iran’s oil sector and the affect it would have on global markets.

Iran’s oil exports hover around 1 million barrels per day. Thanks to sanctions, mismanagement, and maturing fields, production has taken a hit over the years. Regardless, that’s a million barrels per day that could vanish from the markets, which means a $10-15 increase per barrel on top of the “war premium”. Not a global catastrophe, but it will still hurt.

The US is fairly insulated from shocks to the global oil markets (like this one), so I’m not worried about the US. Should this get really bad, the US president can authorize a suspension of crude exports which would create a glut of oil in North America…similar to what we’ve seen with natural gas prices.

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are free and we will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the beautiful chaos that is Dallas Love Airport, headquarters of Southwest Airlines. In the aftermath of a video I recently did on the Israelis and their potential strike on Iran — specifically targeting the oil sector — I thought it would be worth noting how that could affect a few things, most notably here in the United States.

So, Iran’s oil production has been suffering for years. Part of it is due to sanctions, but mostly it’s because their regulatory regime is really punishing for would-be foreign investors. They basically require that the state take a leading role in everything, and the state company is not very good. Most of the oil fields in Khuzestan are mature and require a lot of technology that the Iranians don’t have and don’t understand in order to make them produce meaningfully.

Everything else worth having is offshore, but the Iranians have absolutely no ability to operate offshore by themselves. So while the numbers that officially hit the market ebb and flow because of the sanctions regime — and whether or not the Iranians are attempting to sneak around sanctions — the actual flow is about a million barrels per day of exports. Sometimes it’s as low as 400,000, sometimes it feels a little bit higher, but about a million. Now, if you remove a million barrels a day from the market, we’re going to feel it. But that’s only 1%, so you would expect, in a purely market-driven environment, for that to kick up prices by ten, maybe fifteen dollars a barrel. Of course, since it would be due to someone dropping a bomb on something, there would be a war premium on top of that.

The impact globally is going to be felt, it’s going to be real, but it’s not going to be huge. As for the United States, I’m really not concerned. The U.S. is no longer an energy importer. We’ve come a long way since 2007, when we were importing something like 14–15 million barrels a day, thanks to the shale revolution.

The United States is now arguably one of the lowest-cost producers in the world, and our production is well over 20 million barrels a day. Moreover, the U.S. has diversified its economic strength and is now absorbing far fewer barrels. Now, if you look at the headline numbers, you’re not going to see that, but that’s because the U.S. Energy Department calculates things differently from everyone else.

We look at the amount of crude we actually consume in total, including what goes into our refineries for products that are then exported. That’s not how most countries do it. The argument here is that nobody consumes raw crude; it has to be turned into something. So, it’s not a stupid way to look at the data, but it does make it seem like we are more dependent on international trade than we actually are.

In fact, if you consider all the types of crude that the U.S. produces — raw crude, natural gas liquids, condensates — we now have such a huge surplus that by the end of this year, the U.S. will be exporting 5 million barrels a day of roughly defined product. In the history of the petroleum era, there are only three countries that have ever produced more than 5 million barrels per day of raw crude, and we’re exporting that much in refined product.

So, the degree to which the United States is insulated from this is robust. Now, do keep in mind that oil is an internationally traded product, and so there is more or less a single global oil price point because it is an easily exchanged commodity. But if we ever get to the point that there is an oil shock — I don’t think that will happen with Iran — but if we do, and prices get to a point that the American president finds untenable, the U.S. president, courtesy of powers granted back in 2015, has the authority to summarily suspend all exports of raw crude. And we do a lot of that too. If that happens, the crude gets trapped within North America.

We get a supersaturated energy market, and then North American energy prices separate from global energy prices in a manner very similar to what has already happened with natural gas prices. U.S. natural gas prices, because of a similar glut in natural gas, are as a rule one-fourth to one-eighth what they are in Europe or Asia. So if we ever do get into a situation where crude prices get sketchy, you can count on the American president — whoever it happens to be — to enact that power.

Then, all of a sudden, we’ve got energy prices here that rarely go above $60, because every shale oil field we have is cost-competitive at that price, while everyone else screams past $100 on their way to $200 and more.

Okay, that’s it for me. Of course, the biggest downside of being here is that, because Southwest is a hub and it’s open seating, you have to check in 24 hours online in order to get a decent seat. And because I was launching this new thing called Patreon 24 hours ago, I forgot. So I am C-51. I will be the sad person up against the bathroom, trying to squeeze this lengthy, 6-foot-5 frame into a middle seat that does not recline. Pray for me.

The Future of Saudi Arabia

A photo of Saudi Arabian traffic against a desert skyline

The US has become largely self-sufficient when it comes to oil, and it was never really reliant upon Saudi oil in the first place. Back in the day, the US formed a relationship with Saudi Arabia not for itself, but instead to provide US allies with oil during globalization. Times are changing and so is this relationship, so what does the future of Saudi Arabia look like?

The US is largely pulling out of the Middle East and turning its focus back towards home and East Asia. That means American strategic interests in the Middle East have nowhere to go but down.

Without a real need to maintain an active relationship, US-Saudi relations will likely fade, exposing Saudi Arabia to a…colorful neighborhood. It doesn’t take much to imagine a strategic mishap in which the Saudis lose control of their oil fields.

The current external security guarantees aren’t working for the Saudis and they don’t have many great prospects. China’s navy lacks the range to help out Riyadh, Japan remains (mostly) pacifist, and European powers just don’t make a ton of sense. Turkey is the only real option, and not even a great one at that due to Turkey’s strength and “history” of ruling the region.

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are not only free, they will always be free. We also will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Morning, everyone. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Waterfall Camp just above the Merced Canyon. That’s the one that stretches pretty much the entire length of the North Country and ends up down in Yellowstone Valley. Today, we’re going to take an entry from the Ask Peter forum about the Middle East—specifically, the Persian Gulf. What’s the future of relations between the United States and the countries in the region, specifically the Arab states, most notably Saudi Arabia?

Well, if you’re an Arab in the Persian Gulf, the news isn’t great. During globalization, the United States needed oil from the Persian Gulf—not for itself, but for its allies. Everyone from Japan to China, to Korea, to Taiwan, to France, Germany, Italy, and Britain. These were countries that did not have sufficient oil capacity for themselves. To induce them to join the global order and the Cold War against the Soviet Union, part of the deal was that the U.S. would keep them fueled. They wouldn’t need a navy to get the oil themselves—the U.S. would take care of that. So, the oil was for the U.S., but not directly. The United States has always gotten most of its oil from within North America, and to a lesser degree, from countries like Venezuela, with a little bit from Africa. We never got more than maybe 20% of our crude from the Middle East at all.

Well, as the shale revolution kicked in, the volumes of crude that the United States got from the Middle East basically dropped to zero. The Saudis got into the habit of parking supertankers off the coast of Louisiana, waiting for them to be needed. And after a while, when it turned out that they weren’t needed anymore, those stopped altogether. In addition, the stuff from Africa went away, Venezuela committed national suicide, and now the United States, plus Canada, is pretty much self-sufficient. There are some rounding errors and caveats in that statement, but that’s kind of the core position.

In the shift through Barack Obama and Donald Trump, the United States became far more disengaged from the world. We went from having a carrier, maybe two carriers at a time, in the Persian Gulf, to now really never having one there unless something is flaring up. This reflects the shift of strategic priorities. The U.S. is far more concerned with things at home, and then, to a lesser degree, what’s going on in East Asia.

For example, when the Kuwaitis discovered a big oil field offshore last month, the Americans were like, “Whatever.” Kuwait can’t develop that itself—Kuwait has no offshore capability. Maybe some of our firms will be involved, but with the security guarantees gone, it’s a different game.

Then there’s Saudi Arabia, which is, of course, the big one. The Saudis are a little cocky because they control the holy sites and claim to control the religion of Islam, or at least speak for it. That is, of course, a hotly contested topic in the region. But the United States has bent over backwards for the last 75 years to keep the Saudis happy because that was the single biggest play in the region for crude. If you could get the Saudis on board, you could pretty much guarantee that the Kuwaitis, Emiratis, and Qataris would join as well. And then you’d have everything you needed.

That doesn’t necessarily play in a post-globalized world. In a world where the U.S. is self-sufficient in energy and has sufficient exports to supply a handful of choice allies, the U.S. actually enters into the role of a disruptor. Reliable energy supplies on a global scale are no longer perceived as a strategic necessity. Once that happens, the U.S. goes from being the greatest guarantor of security the world has ever known to something closer to the opposite. When that happens, the relationship with Saudi Arabia will absolutely tank.

The Saudis can barely operate some of their easier fields. They need a huge army of expats to keep everything going. Simply denying them the staff would be enough to cripple production. More likely, however, all of the oil is exported through just a few terminals, and the Saudis don’t have a navy worth mentioning. So, if you take the world’s greatest naval power against a desert power without much military…you do the math.

I’m not saying the U.S. is going to conquer Saudi Arabia—there’s no point in that. But embargo, destroy some offshore loading facilities, or grab tankers as they leave—these are all options for the future. At that point, if we don’t want the oil and we don’t want someone else to have the oil, Saudi Arabia becomes just a country living in the desert.

Have you seen Syriana? It kind of sums it up. How did Matt Damon put it? The view of the business community is that people in your country were living in tents in the desert a century ago, beheading one another, and you’re going to be doing that again this century? That’s pretty much where we are when it comes to American views of this region. Take away the oil, and all that’s left is a penchant for domestic violence that we don’t particularly like either. So, that relationship is going to break in time. But “in time” is the key word. We’re not there yet.

As the Biden administration has shown over the last two or three years, there’s still a need for an alliance structure to achieve certain things, most notably in the Ukraine war. Also, in terms of boxing China in and semiconductors. As long as the U.S. perceives value in its alliance structure, there’s value in keeping crude flowing unimpeded from the Persian Gulf. But we should be preparing for a middle ground between completely cutting them loose and tolerating them.

In the middle, we would force this region, by hook or crook, to be a little more selective in where they sell their crude. Should things with China ever escalate to the point of shooting, which I don’t anticipate but can’t rule out, one of the first things the U.S. would do is put a few ships in the Strait of Hormuz and make sure crude can’t get to China at all. That would shut down the entire place within three months. That’s a very different relationship from what we have now, but it’s something to think about.

One more thing. Oh, yeah—Lewis Canyon. We have to look at this from the Saudi point of view. The Saudi position has always been that, since they sit on the world’s largest exploitable deposit of oil, they should just be able to pay people to defend them and their beliefs. Right up until the Iraq War in 2003, the United States was basically a bunch of mercenaries. The Saudis thought, “We’ll buy a bunch of their equipment, shrink-wrap it, put it in air-conditioned warehouses, and when we want them to fight our wars, we’ll call up the American press and they’ll do it.”

They didn’t think the Iraq War was a good idea, but it happened anyway. They were violently disabused of their position in the world. As the U.S. steps back, the Saudis are going to need a different security guarantor, and there aren’t many candidates. It’s got to be someone with a blue-water navy who can deploy over long distances—or march to Saudi Arabia.

The problem is, there are really only four options. China doesn’t have the range. Japan does, but they haven’t moved far enough past their pacifist position to invest in an army. It looks like the U.S. and Japan are settling for cooperation over the Pacific, which includes energy security for Japan. So, that probably doesn’t work. Next up are the Brits and the French. The UAE has already gotten into bed with the French, and there’s already military cooperation from their base in the UAE. But the Saudis would really rather not go with Europeans.

The only other option is Turkey. Turkey wouldn’t need a naval force to sail around the Arabian Peninsula to get to the Persian Gulf—they’d just have to march through Iraq directly to Riyadh. But that would generate the one thing Saudi Arabia doesn’t want: a superior military power with easy access to everything Saudi. Because if you’re Turkey in that scenario, why in the world would you defend Saudi Arabia and not just take it over?

Hurricanes in the Gulf, Offshore Oil and the Energy Sector

The most recent hurricane that tore through the Gulf of Mexico has sent ripples through the insurance industry thanks to all the property damage, but what will its impact on the energy sector look like?

The US has become a net exporter of refined products, moving over 4 million barrels per day. The shale revolution made this achievement possible, and in the process, helped to move most energy production onshore. So, when Hurricane Francine ripped through the Gulf, its impact on the energy sector was minimal.

Offshore production in the Gulf of Mexico only accounts for about 5% of US production. To minimize the impact even further, shale producers can easily compensate for any temporary loss in offshore ouput. Shale is king, and offshore production just isn’t really needed…but at least future generations can tap into the Gulf reserves should they need it.

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are not only free, they will always be free. We also will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Cove Bay in Barbados. It occurred to me that, the Gulf of Mexico just got hit by a hurricane. And I wanted to tell you why it doesn’t really matter. Well, I mean, it does matter. You do property damage, especially in an era of rising sea levels and bigger hurricanes. Obviously, that has an insurance application that hits us all because insurance companies then have to make up for it either by higher premiums or by charging everybody else more for insurance.

So it does ripple through the system. But from an energy point of view, it doesn’t really matter. The United States is no longer simply energy independent. We are now a net exporter of over 4 million barrels per day, not of crude, of refined product. And that puts the United States into a category that no other country has ever been in terms of being an energy power.

Now, the Gulf of Mexico used to be one of our major energy things. And back when I was working at Stratfor in the Arts, part of my job was to basically chronicle how much stuff went off, like how long I would stay offline, and that gave us price increases that would last not for days or weeks, but months or even a couple of years.

Sometimes because it took a long time to repair the damage, to go out and untangle, what happened on the seabed with the pipelines? It was it was expensive, was laborious, and we would feel it for a long time. Not anymore. One of the many weird things about the shale revolution is that all of the production sites are onshore, and unless you get so much rain that everything floods in your field, you’re talking about a time to bring them back on that if it goes off it at all is measured in days and you can bring on a completely fresh well in the weeks.

So we have seen the price argument and the national security argument for energy production in the offshore Gulf of Mexico dwindle and dwindle and dwindle. And so even though the most recent hurricane just plowed through some of the best production real estate the Gulf of Mexico has, it only took off somewhere between 650 and 750,000 barrels per day, which not that is an insignificant amount, but United States, if you include things like, associate production from natural gas liquids and condensate, we now produce close to 20 million barrels a day.

So you’re talking about less than a 5% reduction. And the shale guys are already spinning up their drills to bring more production on line to displace it. And it’ll be weeks to months before the offshore producers can even pretend to catch up. The price structure just has changed so dramatically. For natural gas, it’s actually even a little bit better.

We’re talking about 750,000,000 cubic feet per day. That is right around one 1.5% of U.S natural gas production. So we’ll barely feel that outside of the local markets at all. And same thing. The shale guys are going up to gas wells to supplant it. So think of it this way. If you’re in the Gulf, you are now the piggy bank.

Should anything go drastically wrong with U.S shale production, the reserves in the Gulf will be there for another generation, but it’s probably going to be another generation or two before that’s all relevant. All right, that’s it for me. Take care.

Photo credit: NASA Goddard Space Flight Center from Greenbelt, MD, USA, CC BY 2.0 via Wikimedia Commons

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited NAtions

The Absent Superpower

The accidental superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited Nations

The Absent Superpower

The Absent Superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited NAtions

The Absent Superpower

The accidental superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited Nations

The Absent Superpower

The Absent Superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited NAtions

The Absent Superpower

The accidental superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited Nations

The Absent Superpower

The Absent Superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited NAtions

The Absent Superpower

The accidental superpower

The End of the World is Just The Beginning

Disunited Nations

The Absent Superpower

The Absent Superpower

Transcript

Transcript

Transcript

Transcript

Transcript

Transcript

Transcript

Transcript

Transcript

Transcript

Join 200,000+ other subscribers

Stay Social

GEOPOLITICAL INSIGHT STRAIGHT TO YOUR INBOX