Going Nuclear + Live Q&A Announcement

Photo of a nuclear mushroom cloud

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As the Trump administration shifts US foreign policy, several countries are taking notice of the rising global instability. It looks like the nuclear question is getting thrown around by quite a few of those countries.

The US cancelled defense talks with South Korea following the (Korean) president’s impeachment. As a result, the South Koreans are now revisiting policies that would allow them to develop nuclear weapons, quickly. However, Seoul isn’t the only place these discussions are happening.

Feeling the US can no longer be relied upon for protection, places like Ukraine, Poland, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Romania, Japan, and Taiwan are all considering nuclear armament in varying degrees. This strays from the long-standing policy where the US would provide security in exchange for control over global defense policies.

With large scale nuclear proliferation now on the table, the risk of conflict (and use of these weapons) will grow. And more shiny, red buttons isn’t quite what the world needs right now.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Learn about medshare here

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from the Home Office. Apologize for being inside, but there’s 70 mile an hour winds outside, and recording is just not possible. Today is the 17th of March, and the news is that American Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth just canceled defense talks with the South Koreans. He had a really good reason for doing it. 

The South Koreans functionally don’t have a government right now. The former president was impeached, currently out on bail, which just feels weird linking those words together. And they haven’t had new elections yet, so there really is no one of authority to speak to about really deep strategic issues. And there is a very deep strategic issue that needs to be discussed. 

The South Koreans have been looking at what the Trump administration has been doing with Ukraine and the European allies and even badmouthing, the Japanese of late. And they are coming to the unfortunate conclusion that they are going to have to go it alone on their defense policy. Now, South Korean military forces have basically been under this American umbrella, not just in terms of actual security protection, but actually leadership since the Cold War. 

If a War were to break out, and the North Koreans were to invade South Korea, technically the entire South Korean military is under American command, even though there’s only about 30, 35,000 American troops on the peninsula, compared to, you know, ten times that for South Koreans. In addition, the South Koreans are one of the few countries that by Donald Trump standards have actually met their defense procurement goals over the course of this last several decades, typically spending more than 3 to 3.5% on defense the entire time, which is kind of the range that Donald Trump until recently said we were supposed to be in. 

And at the moment, the Trump administration hasn’t really bad mouth the South Koreans in any way, like they have the Germans or the Italians or the Brits or the French or the Ukrainians or the, you know, it’s a long list give you the point. Anyway, the South Koreans see the reading, writing on the wall because they realize they are not what you would call a major ally. 

The South Koreans are not capable of deploying forces really outside of their theater. And so they are definitely in the category of defense consumer. Regardless of how much of the week they try to shoulder themselves. And their concern is if the Trump administration just turns his eyes to them. But it’s just a matter of time before the United States moves on. 

And so they are dusting off the policies from the 60s, 70s and 80s that would allow them to do a sprint to a nuclear weapon. In a matter of weeks, if not decades. And this has earned them the labor by the United States of sensitive energy country, meaning that they are no longer a complete non concern when it comes to nuclear proliferation. 

But now something where it’s on the radar and that’s exactly where they should be, and having a discussion at the very top level between the Americans and the South Koreans on what can and would and should happen under all these scenarios is exactly what needs to happen. 

But there’s no one to have that conversation takes up at the moment. So delay, South Korea is hardly the only country that is going to be in this bucket. We have a number of other countries who are concerned about what the United States is doing, and realize that they need to, or coming to the conclusion that they need to come up with their own defense plans. 

And one of the things you have to consider if you haven’t had a sufficiently strong conventional force for a while, you know, like South Korea has, building up this conventional forces takes years, if not decades. So can they be American general staff situation is 50 years in the making. Aircraft carriers, from the point that you decide that you want to do it, you go through the design, you go to the current, you go through manufacturing, and then finally field testing. 

You know, you have the 20 to 25 year process. Considering the speed at which things are unraveling in Europe, most countries just don’t have that sort of time. And so countries who want to actually look out for themselves, they can’t really rely on conventional forces in the short or medium term, which raises the question of nuclear weapons. The country that is, of course, under the greatest pressure is Ukraine. 

And we’re supposed to have a conversation very soon between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin of Russia, which will give some indication just how much Ukrainian territory, the Americans are willing to sacrifice in order to achieve a peace deal. But keep in mind that there are multiple nuclear power reactors in Ukraine. And Ukraine used to be where all the brains of the Soviet military industrial complex used to be on nuke issues, on aircraft issues, and on missile issues. 

So the idea that the Ukrainians, when under pressure can’t go nuclear is silly. Next slide of countries in that are already publicly discussing who, where and how to get the nukes. Poland’s at the top of that list. They’ve actively asked the United States to deploy nuclear weapons to their soil, and that has gotten broadly rebuffed. And so now they’re discussing what they need to do to get their own, the road for Poland will be a little bit longer. 

They don’t have a native nuclear industry, but their manufacturing capacity is robust. All they have to do is get the nuclear material and they’d be off to the races. It would probably take them 3 to 9 months in order to get a functional weapon, not an explosive device. They could probably do that in the weeks, but the actual deliverable weapon, probably within 3 to 9 months, the next country up is the one that I am, of course, most worried about. 

That’s Germany. They’re having the discussion. Not should we get nukes? But how should we get nukes? Option one is to partner up with the French and pay money to the French, so that the French nuclear deterrent, which has existed since the 50s, also covers Germany. But at the end of the day, the French are the ones who would control that arsenal and whether or not it should be used or not. 

And so the other option is for the Germans to get as close to the threshold as they possibly can get experience in doing the milling in order to make the warheads enriching uranium with the plutonium. And again, they have a nuclear industry so they can do this themselves, and the idea that the Germans could not put into the device into a deliverable weapon system. 

The Germans have been arms manufacturers for a very long time. That would not be a challenge. In between, look to Sweden and Finland. Here are two countries that, like Ukraine, already have an indigenous nuclear civilian fleet. And the Swedes, like the Germans, already have an indigenous, robust military system, for contracting and manufacture. Both of them are openly discussing these options. 

And if they do decide to pull the trigger, both of them would have a deliverable weapon in under a month. Rounding out the list in Europe, look to Romania. Like the Ukrainians, they have a nuclear industry. However, the weapon systems are subpar and pretty much all important. So they could get a device, use it as a failsafe. 

But getting the deliverable system would be, probably a bridge too far. And anything less than a 12 month timeframe. But it’s a lot faster than doubling the size of your army. Over in East Asia, in addition to the Koreans, the two countries to watch, obviously, are Japan and Taiwan. Both have a arms industry. Both have the materials. 

Both have plenty of scientists and engineers who have experience with both. You just have to marry the two together. It’s just a question of how many funds they decide to put behind it. And in the case of Taiwan, if they really did feel that the Americans were leaving, well, they really don’t have any option but to get nukes. 

And while the Japanese Navy may be much more powerful in terms of reach in the Chinese Navy, the home islands are within range of a lot of Chinese weapons systems. And so if there was a war, I don’t doubt who would win in the end because the Japanese could choke off the Chinese mainland. But the damage could be extreme. 

About the only way to mitigate the risk there is deterrence. And that means nukes. So they’re we’re talking about eight countries that are likely to pick up nukes in the not too distant future, based on how American policy unfolds in the next several weeks to months. Something the Trump administration is learning is something that every administration before it has learned it, including the first Trump administration, is that if you want to write everyone’s security policies, you have to give them something. 

And during the Cold War, and until very recently, it was a guns for butter trade, the US would protect global sea lanes so that anyone could trade with anyone at any time. And in exchange, the allies allowed Washington to write their security policies. What the Trump administration is doing is not just breaking that deal, but saying that we’re not going to protect your trade. 

You are on your own, but you’re also on your own for defense. And that forces all of these countries to take matters into their own hands. And if they do that, the United States loses the ability to say what can and cannot happen with weapons systems. And that leads to a world with a lot more nukes. And it a much, much, much higher likelihood of actually having a weapons exchange.

The Russian Reach: US Cuts Ukraine Intel & Dominos Fall

A Ukrainian soldier in the trenches

The US has halted all intelligence sharing with Ukraine. If you thought the weapons cutoff was a big deal, buckle up. Since Ukraine relies on US intelligence for battlefield maneuvers, we might as well start air-dropping blindfolds to Ukraine.

You can bet your ass that Russia will happily exploit this weakening of Ukraine. However, the fallout of this move by the US is not contained to the battlefield, or even the region. Key US allies are now raising alarms over fear of intelligence leaks and potential Russian access to sensitive information. The Five Eyes alliance is on red alert over the lax handling of classified data and leadership purges under Trump.

This is an unprecedented intelligence breakdown and puts a fat ole ‘X’ on US credibility.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Learn about medshare here

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming from Colorado, this one is going to seem a little out of order in the series, but, events are happening very, very quickly. We’re getting overtaken by them. It’s the 5th of March while I’m recording this. 

And the United States has just ceased all intelligence sharing in cooperation with Ukraine. There’s any number of reasons why this is not in America’s interests. Not to mention, you know, all the Intel that the U.S was gathering from Ukraine. But for the Ukrainians, this is actually far more important than the weapons cutoff that is now about 96 hours old. The United States contrary to what you might have heard, has supplied Ukraine with less than one third of its, equipment in any given day of the stuff that is important from somewhere else. 

And probably 40% of the total that Ukraine uses now is produced within Ukraine itself. So while losing access to the weapons flows is bad, it’s not nearly as deadly to Ukraine as losing access to the information that allows the Ukrainians to target it. The Russians outnumber the Ukrainians in every field, and can draw upon the old Soviet era stockpiles, in addition to the Chinese and North Korean troops and equipment. 

That gives them a huge numerical advantage. So the way the Ukrainians have been staying, one step ahead is to do two things. Number one, try to turn the war into a war of movement at any given point so that numbers in any particular place can be moved and concentrated to attack Russian weak points, as opposed to staying still and letting the Russians to come to them and grind and grind and grind. 

And then, number two, know where the Russians are coming from, not just so you can maneuver, but so you can target logistics in that direction and know which rail lines, in which trucks, in which intersections and all that good stuff without American signals intelligence, satellite intelligence, a lot of that goes away. The other NATO countries do have some capacity, but, the agreements that are made with NATO were specifically designed so that the United States maintains preeminence in all of that. 

And by turning it off, the Ukrainians basically lose every advantage that they had in the fight, with the exception of the drones. And the drones require long range targeting information that came from the Intel. So they can really only be used relatively close to the front. In contrast, every advantage that the Russians have can now be pushed to its ultimate maximum because they will be encountering Ukrainians in pockets that can’t maneuver intelligently, and just overwhelming them with sheer numbers of weapons and people. 

So far from being an honest broker, far from trying negotiate peace, this is a flat out effort by the Trump administration to crush the Ukrainians on the battlefield as quickly as possible, and about the only thing that they could do that would be more horrific than this would be to actually provide information to the Russians directly. And we are now in a World war. 

I can no longer rule that out. 

Well, shit, we may already be there in the time that it took us to process the previous section of this video. We’ve had a number of America’s close security partners. Israel, Saudi Arabia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand all publicly float through back channels that, they are considering suspending, at least selectively, intelligence, cooperation with the United States. 

The two reasons given, again, backchannels very, very spy worthy are they’re concerned that the United States is just hemorrhaging classified information, not necessarily the information per se. And the findings, the raw Intel, all of that, too, but methods of collection and integration that would basically endanger their entire Intel networks and their own national security. And of course, the second piece is whether or not the Russians are actually reading any of this as well. 

Quick backstory. So intelligence cooperation with Saudi and Israel has always been a little, tongue in cheek because, like, we’re worried that the Americans are going to leak and then something bad will happen. And the Americans, like, we’re worried that you’re going to leak and something bad is going to happen. So it’s always been a little bit of back and forth, and we only cooperate with one another on the things that are of direct interest to Israel and Saudi Arabia. 

It’s not like they’re getting the motherlode here. But their primary concern, of course, is if you’re Israel and if you are Saudi Arabia, or 3 biggest threats are Russia, Iran and Iran’s various proxy organizations throughout the region, groups like Hezbollah. And if we now have the United States compromised, there is a question as to how much American Intel and global Intel is getting into those hands, which would, of course, be a real problem for Israel and Saudi Arabia. 

The second issue, deals with the Anglo states, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada. Those four combined with United States are called the Five Eyes. And it is the tightest alliance in human history, the tightest alliance in American history. And it is the only system in the world that is basically an open book for Intel sharing. 

So the United States collects the lion’s share of the Intel. But there are other things that the other allies are better at, and they all have their own regional networks. So the US collects its bevy, we go and we have a powwow with the rest of the Five Eyes. We compare notes with what they’ve collected, and then we all go back home and take the information that we’ve learned and use that to inform additional investigations using our other partners. 

And we just go back and forth and back and forth. It’s a very robust, very productive system. But the five eyes are have two concerns. Number one, the way that the Trump administration is completely gutted, the top level of our intelligence directorates, has them terrified because they are seeing things leaked out into the public sphere. That should be kept secret. 

In addition, they’re also very worried about Elon Musk’s Doge, because you’ve got people who are in their 20s with no security clearance or getting access to databases, and then just posted it on social media because it’s fun. Whether this is just rank or gross incompetence on the part of the Trump administration or the Russians are directly manifesting these things from behind the scenes, really doesn’t matter at this point, because anything that gets out, the Russians are going to pick up anyway. 

So the five eyes are seen, Russian eyes and fingers in the heart of their own national intelligence system. 

Right now, which means that the United States just isn’t a competent or a trustworthy partner to them. And so the question isn’t how will cooperation be scaled back, but how much and where? This isn’t the end of the relationship. This can probably hopefully be fixed, but we haven’t had this sort of sustained breakdown in intelligence collection and processing in the United States ever, not even with the most robust, Soviet moles, Russian moles that we’ve seen. 

Folks like Walter James. I can’t believe I have to say this, but if you are one of my followers in the intelligence community, and you are concerned that your senior leadership is either completely incompetent or has already been compromised, your options are limited for what you can do. And I’m assuming you want to do it by the book, in which case the authority that has oversight over your entire world is the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 

That’s where you need to go. Anyone who says giving information to the oversight committee is traitorous is themselves a traitor. Because this is how the system works. This is how you do it by the book. This is the part of the legislative branch that has actual tactical oversight over everything in the world of Intel. So don’t let people bullshit you on things like that. 

And if you are one of my non intelligence industry followers and you do not have a senator who is on the select committee, leave them alone. They’re dealing with enough right now as it is.

The Russian Reach: Geography and Intelligence

Photo of a surveillance camera

Putin, like the Soviets before him, is clouded by fear of invasion due to Russia’s vulnerable geography. Understanding that makes Russia’s strategy of expansion and occupation towards defensible borders clearer.

That’s the backbone of today’s conflict in Ukraine – Russia seeking a secure and manageable perimeter. While this war was inevitable, it is no way the end of the line. Should Russia win in Ukraine, it will push into NATO countries like Poland and the Baltics to “reclaim” the natural geographic barriers once held by the Soviets.

Capturing, occupying, and controlling non-Russian populations is no easy feat, but an extensive intelligence system allows the Russians to rule through fear and disinformation. This system not only keeps these captured people suppressed, but also shapes global politics through covert influence. Tomorrow we’ll discuss how they do this on a global scale.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Learn about medshare here

Transcript

Okay, let’s look at the world through the Russian eyes. The Russians are from an area that was Moscow. Used to be known as Must Troy, which is in kind of the northwestern part of the Eurasian steppe. Very cold winters, short summers, generally shitty weather. Overall. Very prone to floods and droughts. They are not particularly secure ethnicity. And what they’ve discovered is there’s really nowhere to hide. The force of northern Russia, which could serve as barriers, do work. That’s how they hit out from the Mongols for a while. But, it’s all pine forest in the upper latitudes. And so basic agriculture is almost impossible. Everywhere else is flat. 

It’s open. The rain is erratic. It’s very difficult to build the pillars of civilization. And most importantly, there’s no geographic barrier you can hunker behind. So at least one side is free. So you’re completely insecure from all sides in land that is decidedly subpar. The only way that the Russians have discovered that they can achieve any degree of security here is by conquering everyone around them, basically expanding. 

They do that. They now have their inner core, which is protected, but they have an outer core that is now occupied hostile minorities. And around that outer core, there’s again no defensible barrier. So they do it again and again and again and again and again and again and again, until they reach an area that they can block. And so they expand from tiny Muscovy away to something more akin to the territory of the Russian Federation today, or ideally, the Soviet Union. 

I say ideally, because the really good barriers that actually do limit external attack are the Baltic Sea, the Arctic Sea, the Carpathian Mountains, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the deserts of Central Asia, and the tension mountains of Central Asia. If if the Russians can reach those zones, they shrink their outer perimeter. Give me an idea of just how extreme the differences. 

Modern day Russia, which lost a fair amount of territory and half of its population compared to the Soviet Union, actually saw its external boundaries get longer. And the right now about 5000 miles in total. If they were able to re expand to where they were during Soviet times and actually plug the access points between those various barriers, that 5000 miles would shrink to about 500 miles. 

That is ultimately what the Russians are fighting for because of the Eastern Hemisphere’s four big regions. The Russians are by far the weakest of the four. You’ve got Europe, which is densely populated. Much better climate can support much denser population patterns. You’ve got the East Asian rim, a very similar to Europe in that regard. 

And so you get the Colossus that is China in whatever form it happens to be in. And then you’ve got the areas of the Middle East which combine kind of the best parts of the Russian space with something new. You got a lot of oasis cities. You get a little pockets like Mesopotamia that can support, like European style density populations and then surrounded by Arabs. 

So what happens with political entities in the Middle East is they dominate a handful of these oasis communities or these bread baskets, and then they boil out across the deserts because they have mastered long range military, fighting. And so if they can get into the Russian space, they already have the transport technology built in. 

So the Europeans can dominate on technology and capital and military force. The Asians can beat the Russians on numbers alone. And the Middle East senators can outmaneuver the Russians. And so the Russians have been invaded 50 odd times in their history. And the only way that they know to protect themselves is to conquer everyone in their neighborhood, and then set up a really dense shell around the outer perimeter. 

The Ukraine war was always going to happen because Ukraine has two things going against it. Number one, it’s on the wrong side of that outer shell. And so the Russians see them as one of those internal ethnic groups that has to be oppressed and turned into cannon fodder. Second, the Ukrainians are up against parts of that outer shell, most notably the Arabian Gap, that is, goes into Romania and of course, the Polish gap of Poland. 

So this war was always going to happen. The Russians were always going to try to take Ukraine, and Ukraine was never going to be the end of it, because once Ukraine is subjugated, if Ukraine is subjugated, the Russians then need to push to the next line of countries, which includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Moldova and Romania, five of which are NATO countries. 

So this was always going to go down. 

But there’s another piece of this that is much more relevant to this overall series that we’re doing right now. And that’s how the Russians manage all of these restive occupied populations. It’s basically everyone who’s living in the Russian Federation who isn’t an ethnic Russian, is someone who’s been conquered because they were in the way or because they were perceived as a threat. 

And so the Russians basically have this mélange of occupied populations that, based on whose numbers you’re using, are somewhere between 20 and 40% of Russian citizenry. And that’s before you consider the countries that are on the outside of today’s Russian Federation boundaries, like, you know, say, the Latvians, who used to be the someone of those internal oppressed minorities but have managed to slip away. 

Ukraine, until recently was fully in that category. Now it’s a toss up. Well, the Russians can’t occupy them with their military because the military has to be at the frontier. The Russians do not have a good land. They do not have a lot of spare capital to throw around. They can’t go for the sort of fast and loose military forces that countries of the Middle East have done in the past. 

They can’t do the technocratic stuff that the Europeans have done in the past. And they no longer have the numbers to do. The human waves, endless human waves that say, the Chinese can do. So their military is spoken for. It’s there to plug the gaps. And if the gaps fail, all that’s left is partizan warfare. So in order to keep their populations from doing the partizans in the wrong direction, the Russians maintain what is arguably the world’s most advanced and penetrating internal intelligence system. 

Basically, they shoot through occupied populations with as many agents as they can possibly afford, to monitor the population, to spread disinformation, to keep the population turned against itself. And never, never, never allow them to agitate against Russian occupation in the first place. It makes Russia basically a state that is ruled by terror. And if the Russians happen to not like you for whatever reason, it means that they have this great tool, this Intel system that is great at passing unnoticed among populations, but finding the societal weak points about turning populations against one another. 

And at the end of the day, sowing information that can shape policy. And it’s very much in use today. So tomorrow we’ll talk about how the Russians see their Intel system.

The End of Bipartisan Foreign Policy

After four consecutive presidents adopting a neo-isolationist mentality, the era of bipartisan globalization is coming to an end. So, what will the future of US foreign policy look like?

US foreign policy once sought to prevent any Eastern Hemisphere power from becoming too strong, but all semblance of strategic coherence has gone out the window. This is reminiscent of the pre-WWII era, where each administration adopted a new foreign policy. This is likely leading us down a path where a dollar diplomacy-esque system will return.

Along with all these changes, the US military’s global influence is declining, and foreign policy is in a state of flux. I suspect we’ll see more erratic and reactive policies in the coming years, as the US military is used to play checkers instead of chess. Hopefully all those alliances and infrastructure that have been developed will stick around for future iterations of US foreign policy.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Learn about medshare here

Transcript

Peter Zeihan here coming to you from the urns. Lord Glacier. Today we are taking a question from the Patreon page. Specifically, what do I think is going to happen with U.S. foreign policy as this age of bipartisan policy comes to an end? The bipartisan policy is loosely referred to as globalization. The alliance structure, the Bretton Woods system. 

However you want to put the specifics on it. The idea is the United States has some very core national interests that are involved in the wider world, specifically, if unsaid, making sure that no single power in the Eastern Hemisphere ever becomes powerful enough and united enough across the territory to then float a navy that can challenge the United States. 

In the Western Hemisphere, it’s seen as an interventionist system in order to prevent an attack in the long term. And to that end, the U.S. tries to dominate security arrangements in the Eastern Hemisphere and prevent singular large countries from ever forming. This was the basis of the entire Cold War structure, and in bits and pieces. We’ve been moving away from it ever since the Berlin Wall fell. 

Now, with the election of four neo isolationist presidents in a row Obama, Trump, Biden, Trump. Again, we’ve largely moved away from that system. And the argument now is what pieces of this should we bring with us into the future and why? And since the Democratic Party basically imploded in the last election, and since Trump kicked the entire national security conservative group out of the Republican Party, the discussions are happening that what I would call a preschool level on both sides. 

So have we been here before? Oh my God, yes. If you look at the entirety of American foreign policy from the end of the War of 1812, right up until the Second World War, every time we got a new president, we had a new foreign policy. And because of that, the interests of the coalition that surrounded each incoming president basically made up stuff on the fly. 

There was very little institutional knowledge, and what was there tended to be denigrated by the other side. Sound familiar? And so we moved into a system where we had roving military and interventions that matched the political and economic ideologies of the ruling clique at that time, and then four years later, or eight years later, it would change more or less completely. 

It generated a foreign policy that was far more interventionist than anything that we had during the Cold War, because there was no agreement across the country as to what the overall broad, reaching strategic goals for the country happened to be. I think the most aggressive period that I can point to, and the one that I think is going to be most accurately reflected in this next phase of the United States is something called dollar diplomacy. 

In the aftermath of reconstruction, the United States had finally pulled itself together, but it was an ongoing process to achieve full economic and political integration. During that time, the U.S. largely decommissioned its military, and its foreign policy became a subset of powerful individuals, whether they were driven by ideology, religion, economics, corporate greed, you name it, they would go out and interface with the world. 

And when they saw an opportunity or when they got into trouble, they would call their friends in Washington who would then deploy troops or maybe naval forces. And we saw any number of interventions throughout the world, most aggressively in Latin America, but also throughout the entire East Asian rim, participating, for example, in some of the civil wars before the formation of modern China. 

That version of events is likely to be where we go now. I wrote about this in The Absolute Superpower to give you a lot of specifics. If you want to dive into it. What has changed in the ten years since I wrote Absent is that the view in the United States of the military has evolved. During the war on terror, the military was generally portrayed as the most positively received arm of government by the citizenry. 

But with the rise of Donald Trump, we have seen the new conservative coalition that is the Republican Party pushed that entire wing out of power. And so now, as a rule, the further to the right you are on the American political spectrum, the more hostile you are to the US military, which is one of the reasons that the Donald Trump administration is in the process of nominating a guy to run the Defense Department who has minimal defense experience, and he’s just designed to go in there and rip up woke policies, which is not a great national security strategy. 

But it doesn’t mean that the Democrats are much better. Yes, Joe Biden used the military as an arm of the US government. He’s much more trusting of government power than Donald Trump is. But there was no recalibration of strategy from the Biden administration, aside from supporting Ukraine in the broader conflict with the Russians, which I happen to think is a great idea, because it’s definitely the cheap way to fight someone who points nuclear weapons at you. 

But that’s not a normal alliance structure. That’s not a grand strategy. And it is difficult for me to see, with the evolution on both sides of the American political aisle, us coming up with anyone anytime soon, because the people who have the skills and the knowledge in this, the folks who are in the military, the national security community, the intelligence community, they are now completely on the outside. 

And we’re probably going to have to start this over from scratch. I just hope that unlike the last eight times we did this, we don’t decommission the military before we then start the work. Hopefully some of the work we’ve done in the past 80 years will still be relevant, along with the personnel, the equipment, the alliances and the bases that are necessary to implement whatever we come up with next. 

But between now and then, expect a lot more erratic and kinetic American foreign policy as the military becomes the tool of the moment rather than the tool of strategy.