Chinese Marriage Data Confirms Demographic Crisis

A chinese woman in a bridal dress walking down the aisle with her father and onlookers taking photos

Most of the data coming out of China isn’t worth the paper it’s printed on, but there are a handful of metrics that aren’t based on estimates. Today, we’ll be looking at marriage registrations and what the 6% decline from last year means.

This echoes a decades-long decline in marriage registrations and reflects the broader demographic decline facing China. Since an overwhelming number of Chinese births occur within marriage, the population decline may be even worse than previously forecasted.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here coming to you from…where am I? Termoli In Italy? And today we’re going to talk about some Chinese statistics that just popped out in the last couple of weeks that look really bad even by Chinese standards. So backdrop that you need to know this way is that Chinese data is awful. Part of that is just the nature of the beast. 

China really only started its industrialization process in 1978, and so the techniques that a lot of Western countries have been using for the better part of a century are new. And computerization really is only the last 20 years. And it’s a huge place. So getting the locals and the center to agree on what is normal statistics is a little hit and miss at times, and part of it is unfortunately by a degree of design, the central government sense quotas for everything and so lo and behold, the locals meet the quotas or maybe expand upon them. 

And then on top of that, you’ve got punishment issues. And where if a data point comes out, the Chairman Jinping doesn’t like the person who presents it to them, may have their job and or life forfeit. And so the people who do the data collection just stop collecting that data point, whatever it happens to be. So we have really poor data on Chinese demographics and financial issues and bonds and all these other things these days, especially health anyway. 

But there are some that are seen as not politicized. And so data for those is good. And the one we’re going to talk about today is marriage registrations. According to the new data that’s come out in the first half of the year. Those are down by roughly 6% in just the last 12 months. And that is on top of year and year declines that go back the better part of 30 years. 

This is data that has been collected since 1978. And it’s not an estimate like a lot of data. It’s actual registrations. People have actually gone to the equivalent of city hall and registered the marriages. So it’s something we relate to or it’s something that we can relatively rely upon. Now, the reason why this matters is if family formation is down, the birth rate is down, and if the birth rate is down, China’s hollowing out. 

Now, this is something we’ve been looking at at any number of angles for quite some time. What is interesting here, from my point of view, is that the marriage rate drop has been dropping much, much, much faster, two and three times faster than the. Suppose it had declined in the number of 20 and 30 somethings, where usually the people get married. 

So it gives us a little bit more accurate view of just how bad the demographic crisis is. And it was already really, really bad. Basically, we no longer have enough people under age 50 in China to even theoretically repopulate a country of 400 million people, much less supposedly the 1.2 billion that China says it has. And in internal conversations, the Shanghai Academy of Sciences is now debating how many hundred million people under age 40 they’ve over counted. 

They know it’s at least 100 million. And this year, the number 500 million popped up for the first time as a possibility. They just don’t know. And they don’t believe they have the capacity to go out and do get the information, because too many people are concerned with getting the wrong ancer anyway. It’s a tiny little window into the crisis that the Chinese are facing these days, and to be perfectly blunt, there’s no coming back from this without marriages. 

There are no children or very few. But more importantly, there are now no longer enough people to even theoretically get married in order to attempt repopulation. So it’s just a question of timing, whether it’s in single or double digits of years, of course, matters to all of us because we’re all living in the now. 

But it looks pretty rough and this isn’t going to last much longer. All right. That’s it for me for today. Till next time.

Civita di Bagnoregio: A Microcosm of Italy

Photo of the city of Civita di Bagnoregio, Italy with mountains in the background

Civita is living proof that places facing decline can adapt and overcome by drawing on their unique identity. This hilltop town-turned-tourist destination is a microcosm of Italy itself.

Faced with demographic challenges, Civita was forced to get creative to save its way of life. By charging a visitor tax, Civita was able to fund restoration projects and preserve this beautiful place.

Italy’s demographic crisis is only worsening, but success stories like Civita are a glimmer of hope.

Maurizio says ciao!

Transcript

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Civita, Italy. And today we’re going to talk about Vita. And Italy is kind of Italy in microcosm. It was founded by the Etruscans, 2500 years as a hilltop town for defense. And because they could watch trade routes in the time since, it’s of course, changed hands, it does bene times as Italy has changed systems, and in the modern day it’s kind of actually facing a rough patch. 

As you’ll see in some of these pictures, it’s perched on the side of cliffs that are slowly eroding, and the country’s moniker these days is come see it before it’s gone. 

So many people have now visited that them simply tracking dirt out of the city has dropped the level of the main square by about a foot in the last six years. 

In addition, demographically, the city looks a lot like Italy. Italy has the lowest reproduction rate in Europe, with less than 1.15 children per woman. And here in Cheviot, there’s really only about a dozen permanent residents left, and some years up to a million tourists come through again. Italy is number two destination for tourism Europe after France itself. 

that’s really what’s been keeping the system alive. In fact, if you go through Italy as a whole, whether it’s Rome and Vatican City or Venice, these are countries that have been tourist destinations now for the better part of eight centuries. And it looks on the surface like there’s really not much hope there. The buildings date back, in some cases 2000 years. 

There was an earthquake in the 1600s that the city really had never recovered from, But that doesn’t mean they’re gone. And it doesn’t mean they’re going to be gone soon. In the case of Covid, they instituted a €5 ahead tax a few years ago, and that has made this the only tax free municipality in the entirety of Italy. 

And they’ve used that income to do things like do Geological survey’s and reforest the hillsides around them to slow the rate of decline to almost nothing. 

Yes, they’re thronged by tourists. But as you can see behind me, on the one street there really is, everybody lives on the up and the out. So in the day to day operations at home, they don’t really suffer at all. 

It’s an interesting study about how resilience is really just an exercise and reimagining what it is to be stubborn. And in the case of both Italy and Vita, we have an area that realizes by the norms of the age things don’t look very good. And so 

They’re finding ways to turn their challenges into things that allow them to survive in the way of life that they want. Which, of course brings us to the bridge. The bridge was simply an issue of stubbornness, where they decided to make the investment that was necessary to protect themselves. When geography that self tried to cut them off the bridge brought revenue, revenue bought time, time brought a strategy, and the whole place is now holding together, and everyone is fighting to maintain the way of life that they’ve all wanted all along. 

It’s a nice story, and if you ever happen to be in the area, come visit Vita. And best of all, you should really look up my buddy Marisa. He maintains a restaurant with one table, and every second you’re in there, it’s glorious.

Buying Time With Drugs

Ozempic semiglutide injection

I hate to say it, but we still haven’t located the fountain of youth. Unfortunately, that means there’s no current medical breakthrough that will meaningfully reverse the global demographic problem.

It’s probably too late for all the boomers in our lives, but there is one class of drugs that could potentially improve long-term health: GLP-1s (aka Ozempic). These reduce obesity and inflammation by mimicking the hormone that slows stomach emptying and makes you feel full for longer. However, these drugs are too new and expensive to count as a solution.

Some countries are going to be worse off than others, especially those that lack a large enough young generation to replace retirees. At the end of the day, the only proven way to extend healthy, productive lives is a lifelong investment in health.

Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from a slightly chilly Colorado. Today we’re taking a question from the Patreon page. And specifically, are there any medications out there in anti-aging or anti Alzheimer’s that I think are going to change the math when it comes to global aging, specifically in the American and the Chinese context? Short version is no longer version. 

There is something called monoclonal antibodies. The idea is it destroys or inhibits the growth of the, the bad cells in the brain, basically, that contribute to dementia and Alzheimer’s specifically. But they are fabulously expensive and they really are do a job of what they say they do. According to the literature, which is all glow, it only reduces cognitive decline by like 30% over an 18 month period, which is not enough, really, to move the needle in any meaningful way. 

The problem is, is starting about age 59 or 60, we all start going through a cognitive and physical decline, and it really accelerates at age 62 to 63. And then that’s one of the reasons why we retire at age 65, and why a lot of people take early retirement before that. So if you really want to solve this problem from a demographic issue, a labor force issue, a tax receipt issue, you have to extend the age of retirement well past 65, at least to 70. 

And you need a medical treatment that allows people to be productive for all of that extended period. Remember, people are already starting to slip before age 65. There’s also an issue of timing. Remember that the baby boomers, the largest generation in American history, are mostly retired already, and the youngest ones are already 60. So you’re talking about less than one quarter of the cohort. 

If the drugs were ready today, could have their working lives extended for a few years. For most of them, it’s already too late. And the next generation down Gen X, it’s my generation. There just aren’t enough of us to really move the needle, even if we all could work an extra five years. And I assure you, we do not plan to. 

As for the rest of the world, the situation is actually far worse because in the United States at least, our baby boomers had kids. We know those as the millennials. And maybe these technological leaps, these drugs that don’t yet exist, will exist by the time it’s time for the millennials to retire. That’s another 20 years from now. But for the rest of the world, there really isn’t a millennial cohort. 

So the people who are retiring right now in Japan and China and Korea and Taiwan and Germany and Italy and all the rest, you know, this is it. And so if the drugs aren’t ready today, it’s already too late. Now, there is one, one medication out there that may, may make a difference. And that’s this class of drugs that is represented broadly by Ozempic. 

The idea that you can have people lose a lot of weight real quickly. Well, you know, being overweight, having cardiovascular disease, having heart congestions, that’s not good for your health. And if these drugs do end up working in the long run, as advertised, they can reduce inflammation throughout your body and keep your body weight down. Well, there might be a conversation to be had there, but these medications are new. 

They’ve only been around 2 or 3 years for any practical data, and we just don’t know what the long term impacts, good or bad, will be. So even if they were immediately one tenth the cost that they are right now because they’re very expensive. And even if we could apply them at mass, and even if they were 100% positive with no side effects, very doubtful for all of those things, it’s still only a maybe because we just don’t know yet. 

But for the Americans and the Chinese, where their equivalent of the baby boomers already one foot into retirement, no, it’s too late. We don’t even have a drug that’s on the horizon at the moment. That looks like it can solve the problems that we need to. About the only approach you can take is what they’ve been doing in Korea into a lesser degree in, say, Scandinavia, where they focus on human health from birth. 

The reason why the Koreans and the Swedes and the rest in that class live so long is they get a lot of exercise, they have a very good diet, and they have a high standard of emotional living writ large. It’s not very sexy, requires a fair amount of elbow grease and you have to start young. But that is still the only and best way to extend life that we’ve figured out so far.

France Hits the Demographic Point of No Return

A French flag ribbon with an axe on a chopping block

The Americans and Kiwis are the last of the developed countries still holding onto growing populations. France is the most recent victim to have fallen into demographic decline, so let’s see what the future has in store.

France has a sizeable working-age population to help ward off any serious economic strain for two to four decades. Germany, on the other hand, has been in decline for 50 years and is running out of workers, meaning the Germans must reinvent their economic model.

The US isn’t far behind France, though. And China is a whole other topic. The broader issue is that as more and more countries reach the demographic point of no return, the world still hasn’t found a sustainable economic path forward.

Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here coming to you from a snowy Colorado. Got a fresh inch overnight. Today we’re talking about, demographics, specifically in France. French statistics were released in the last couple of days, indicating that France is the latest country in the world to now have more deaths than births. France has long been the country Europe with the highest birth rate, with the most prone policies. 

And now they have slipped into, population decline as well. This means that every country in the first world, with the exception of the United States and New Zealand, are now in this position where they are in demographic decline. The Germans are among those that are furthest along. They actually hit this point back in 1972 or 1973. 

So short version. This isn’t the end for France, but it is the beginning of the end. Germany’s great example. They’ve been in this situation for about 50 years now, but from the point that you have more deaths than births, you then have to wait for everybody to kind of leak through the system. That literally takes an entire human lifetime. 

In the case of Germany, what this means is for the last 30 years, they really haven’t had many people under age 20. And so most of the economic growth comes from high productivity, workforce and exports. You can only have a consumption led economy if you have a lot of people aged 20 to 50. Those are the people who do most of the spending. 

France still has a lot of those. It’ll be another 20 years before those numbers start to decline. So France, in whatever the world evolves into next, still has at least two, three, four decades. But in the case of the Germans, this next ten year period is when they simply run out of working aged adults they have to invent a new, economic model, for the United States. We’re going to hit that point, where France is today in about five years, is the estimate. We’ve seen smaller and smaller generations for the last, 30 years. And now with the Trump administration turning so gung ho against migration, which is the one thing that can buy you time, we’re looking at probably the United States being a net zero growth population last calendar year. Full statistics aren’t in yet, but, we will hit that more deaths than births, by natural causes, by 2030. And then we will start that decline till now, as again with the German example. That doesn’t mean it the end is nigh. But something to keep in mind is. Whereas the Germans aged out during a time that there was a lot of young people on a global basis, and there was someone to export to the United States, and France will be aging out in a period where that is no longer true, because we already have a large number of developing countries, ranging from Chile to Colombia to oh, Thailand, that have already crossed this Rubicon. And so you can’t export to the world if the world is not young enough and rich enough to buy from you. So while we still do literally have decades left, it’s going to be a more compressed experience. And what happened in, say, Italy or Germany or Korea or Japan? One other note. 

China officially, according to their own statistics, hit this point about five years ago, the statistics aren’t very good. They probably hit it more like 15 years ago. Also, the, Chinese birthrate, just this last calendar year dropped by 17% in one year in a time where there wasn’t an economic crisis. So just because you have more deaths than births doesn’t mean that you’re gone already. 

But it also means that countries age at different paces and the Chinese don’t have nearly as much time. So we really are looking at an economic dissolution in the German situation within a decade, because they’ve been moving this way for a half century, and also with from the Chinese system in this decade, because they are aging so much more quickly. 

All right. That’s it for this one. Talk to you guys later.

Lessons From Japan’s Demographic Collapse

A Japanese elderly couple at a crosswalk

Japan has been dealing with long-term population decline for decades, and the latest report on births per woman dropping to 1.15 confirms that. However, there are some lessons we could all learn from Japan.

Japan is no longer the fastest aging society, but it remains the world’s oldest. So, they’re putting in the legwork to buy themselves some time. They’ve shifted production toward allied countries with stronger demographics and built themselves a strong navy, enabling them to project power should the need arise.

But the Japanese aren’t the only people getting older. This is a global issue, and the timing couldn’t be worse. As the world deglobalizes, societies that are unable to adapt and secure trade access through strong alliances will struggle to survive. And the next generation of kids (however small that cohort might be) will be studying those countries in the history books.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from the basement I grew up in. That sounds odd. It makes. It sounds like I was chained to a radiator for 15 years. No, that is not what happened. I just happened to be visiting my parents in Iowa. And I’m coming from the basement because the wind chill outside is zero right now, and that is not going to happen. 

Okay. Today is the 14th of January. And the big news is that Japan has recently released its newest demographic assessment of its country. They do this every year, after the United States. Japan is generally considered to have some of the best statistical capacity for their government in the world. And so I tend to trust their data quite deeply. 

They’re now saying that births per woman is 1.15, and anything under 2.1 suggests that your population is actually falling. And Japan’s is it is the, oldest demographic in humanity right now. But it is no longer, the world’s fastest aging. They’ve made some advances in health care. They’ve extended the ability, of the working age, in order to keep the workforce kind of stable, although it’s only had a mixed results. 

Made a little bit easier for people to have children. But still terminal. Terminal, terminal. But, they have slowed the decline to the point that they are no longer the world’s fastest aging society, and they haven’t been for well over a decade. Countries that are aging significantly faster than Japan include and are not limited to Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, China, China, according to official statistics, has a birth rate that is now lower than Japan’s but unofficial statistics. 

It’s maybe half that, but that’s a different topic for another day. Also some developing countries, Chile and Colombia and Latin America, even though they’ve have a very large young population, the birth rate has fallen off a cliff in the last ten years. In Southeast Asia, places like Thailand are aging faster. And in Europe, Italy, also probably Poland’s pretty close, although it might be neck and neck. 

And Ukraine is near the bottom, mostly because of the war. Anyway, the bottom line is that you can buy a little bit of time, but it’s really hard to turn the ship around once you drop below 2.1 and really no country yet that is slipped below has ever gone back up. So what does this mean? Well, number one, Japan, because it is an archipelago island nation. 

They don’t need to spend the same style, in defense. Not in terms of cost, but in terms of manpower. So if you’re a land power, you need an army. And Japan probably couldn’t field an army right now if it needed to. But it can easily field a navy. So even that might cost a little bit more and certainly more power per soldier or sailor. 

It could they can still have a projection based military system. And in this case, Japan has the second most powerful navy in the world in projection terms, which is about right size to what they need. They might need to do a little bit more as trade breaks down, but they’ve already changed their economic structure to relocate industrial plant into allied countries that have better demographics, like, say, Mexico in the United States or Indonesia and Myanmar. 

That’s issue one. So even though that they’re aging, they’re not aging as fast as a lot of countries around them, and they’ve got some military options that no one else can consider. Second big issue is that the demographic bomb is not limited to the rich world at all. China, by most definitions, remains some version of a developing country. 

And they arguably have by far the lowest birth rate in the world. And that fact that we’re seeing some countries in Southeast Asia and even in Latin America now dropping below half of replacement level, gives you an idea of just how deep this is. In fact, the country in the world that has seen the largest drop in the birth rate in the last 35 years is none other than Yemen. 

They’re still above replacement, but barely. But they’ve gone from eight children to a woman to two children per woman, like 35 years. So this is something that is coming for everyone. The question now, from my point of view, is how this integrates with globalization in general. Because if you start breaking down international supply chains, then some of the things that allowed industrialization to kick in and large portions of the world suddenly become up for grabs. 

In the case of manufacturing, that means if you are participating in a multi-state manufacturing system, all of a sudden that is useless. And so you have an older population that doesn’t consume as much and maybe can’t adapt as quickly, suddenly have to change their industrial base in order to function. Second problem is, of course, agriculture. 

Pesticides come from one place, herbicides from another, farm equipment from another part for farm equipment, typically from yet another. And then there’s three types of fertilizer potassium, nitrogen and phosphorus. Oh, Anyway, oftentimes those come from different places as well. You break down supply chains, and all of a sudden the food supply is a problem. One of the things, one of the hallmarks of globalization is anything can be traded. 

And so you can take countries that pre 1945 couldn’t grow a lot of food and had a limited population or couldn’t access iron ore and so couldn’t industrialize it. Suddenly everyone could get everything. You break down those links, not all goes away. You do that on top of a demographic decay and you get combination of deindustrialization events, the population events, and maybe even civilizational events. 

So, shit’s getting real. We are getting very close to the edge. And not just because of the Trump administration, although the Trump policies are certainly moving things forward, but a country like Japan that has managed to slow the decline right size their military for the options they’re going to need, and that has wide access to the Pacific and can convoy their own trade if they need to. 

They’re going to be fine. So if you get along with Japan and the United States, you have the basis for starting whatever is next. I’m not saying everything is going to be hunky dory. But you’ll live in a security environment that is more favorable and you’ll have an economic access. That means that you’re not going to suffer the worst. And of course, if you don’t get along with those two countries and you happen to be in the Pacific Basin, then, well, students will study you 50 to 100 years from now as a great example of what to never do.

Saving China: Three-Child Policy

Young Chinese children

If China was able to curb population growth with the One-Child Policy, can a Three-Child Policy help solve the current Chinese demographic crisis?

The short answer is no. Large families in urban settings don’t make sense. People in their mid-40s aren’t cranking out three kids. And if everyone moved out of the cities to have some space for larger families, China’s entire economic and political control model would collapse.

China would need to pull off a Star Wars-esque rapid cloning situation to have a shot at reversing the demographic decline they’re facing…

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re taking a question from the Patreon page. Specifically, how about solutions to China’s demographic problems? What if they started to institute a mandatory three child policy? Short version is clever, but no. Number one, roughly half of the Chinese population now lives in high rise condos. There isn’t room for one kid, much less three. 

So you got a mechanical problem there. And if you wanted to force everyone to have three kids, you’d have to first change the residency style of the country and basically force people out of the major cities where the economic activity is and where the services are, and where the government has control of things and push them back to the outskirts or into, the areas beyond. 

So you might, might, might, might, might, might, might, if you’re really brutal about it, get the birth rate up. But it would come at the cost of the entirety of the Chinese economic model, complete with the way that the Chinese Communist Party controls the population. So, no, second, I don’t even think it’s physically possible anymore, to move the numbers to the degree that are necessary according to official Chinese statistics, which are definitely not correct. 

The average age in China is now 44, 45, and getting people over age 45 to kick out three kids. I’m sorry. That’s just not biologically possible any longer. And that assumes the Chinese data is right, which it of course, is not. The debate within Chinese statistical circles, that is a thing, is how much they have over counted their population by whether it’s just 100 million or something closer to 300 million. 

But there’s a broad agreement that most of the over count are in people under age 40. And if you look at what has happened with the official data, they’re now saying they have roughly 60% as many people age 6 to 0 as they have age 11 to 6. So we’ve got a sharp collapse coming down the pipe, even according to the official numbers. 

If that thins out in the teenagers, in the 20 somethings, then you’re actually looking at the average age in China being a lot higher than 44, probably closer to 54 or even higher. And in that sort of environment, having three kids for the small number of people that they have of childbearing age just isn’t going to move the needle at all. 

Right now, The only theory I’ve even heard that might work, that would allow the CCP to maintain their political and economic system is Star Wars style cloning. 

And for those of you who are not Star Wars nuts, that’s basically taking an embryo, maturing it into a 20 year old in under three years. And the 20 year old that you’ve created actually has the full skill set and become a fully functional adult. Obviously our technology is not there at this point. Certainly isn’t in China. 

But growing an entire new generation of 20 somethings is the only way to make this work. And if you want to do it the old fashioned way, that takes at least 20 years, and the Chinese no longer have enough people to even attempt, regardless of what the government tries to force upon its population.

Help Wanted – The US Needs More Workers

Sign reading "Help Wanted" in a window

US labor data shows a slowdown in job growth, but given the recent changes to the Department of Labor, who knows if we can trust it. Regardless, labor patterns are definitely looking off…

Demographics are reshaping the labor market. Swaths of Boomers are leaving the workforce, and Gen Z doesn’t have enough people to keep up. Fewer workers means higher inflation. AI might help offset some of the labor shortages, but that will be expensive and time-consuming. Throw in an anti-immigration administration, and you’ve got years of inflationary pressure baked into the US economy.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming from Colorado. And today we’re talking about the U.S. economy specifically looking at the situation of the American labor market. Now, we’ve recently had new data coming out of the Department of Labor. And normally we generate the United States generates about 300,000 new jobs, per month. According to the last chunks of data, in October, we actually lost 100,000. 

And in November, we only generated about 60, 65,000, reasons why we should take that data with a grain of salt. First of all, we had to shut down during this period, and so a lot of the surveys that were done, weren’t done or the ones that were done were done in an incomplete manner. So I don’t know if we can trust that data. 

Second. The Trump administration has gutted the Department of Labor, so it’s incapable of doing its job in the way that used to, because it said that the, data was being fudged to make Trump look bad. Well, with the new staff in place, the Trump administration looks bad. So you take that for what it is. 

Third, we’ve got I think, going on here where employers are trying to see if they can use early stage AI to replace workers. And while that is very much up for debate, and it’s very much in its early years, something I found really interesting is that the surge hiring that normally happens in October, in November to prepare for the holidays hasn’t happened this year. And normally when you think of AI, in the way that large language models do it, you’re talking about things that substitute for white collar labor. And usually the people who are being hired for Christmas are doing inventory in his blue collar labor. So we’re having some weird, weird crosscurrents that we just don’t know about yet. So that’s number three. 

Number four. More importantly, we might have to adjust our expectations, for demographic reasons. So the baby boomers, the largest generation we’ve ever had, at one point, there were over 75 million of them. And now three quarters of them have already retired. So the largest chunk of the labor force has left. And then the new generation coming in. The Zoomers are the smallest generation we’ve ever had. Well, if you exit the largest group and enter the smallest group, you’re going to have a quantitatively smaller labor force. In fact, we’re probably losing about a half a million to three quarters of a million of a people out of the labor force this year. And that number will keep going up in the next ten years as the Zoomers continue to enter the workforce, because they just get smaller and smaller. 

So that 300,000 kind of stake in the ground that we’ve become used to these last 60 years is probably not correct anymore. And it all adds up to an economy where we just have less labor to work with overall. And so if AI is able to increase productivity, this is actually great, because we’re certainly not going to have enough bodies to put in those positions. 

This is probably going to be a strongly inflationary environment for the next several years, regardless of what happens with policy. And at the moment, what is happening in policy is also strongly inflationary because of the anti-immigration sentiment that we have in the United States and most strongly in the white House itself. So if we have a shrinking labor pool and the Trump administration is also shrinking the labor pool further because of immigration, then our only option is to increase productivity. 

And the only way you can increase productivity is by adding new technology. But that takes capital, which is also in short supply because of what’s going on with the baby boomers taking their savings and moving into retirement. Bottom line inflation, inflation, inflation that’s cooked into the system regardless of whatever else goes right or goes wrong. First, and most notably in the labor market. 

The Death of the US Tech Sector: Part 2

processor and computer parts

Continuing our discussion on the US tech sector, let’s break down how demographics and rising capital costs are stifling innovation.

The tech boom relied upon a few things: a young, highly-skilled workforce concentrated in hubs like Silicon Valley and cheap and abundant capital. I don’t know if you’ve noticed, but the US doesn’t have the young workers or the capital environment to fund long-term tech development.

Combine that with what we discussed yesterday, and you get a tech sector that is going to struggle in the years and decades to come.

Transcript

All right, Peter Zeihan here. Still in the hoover. Still talking about tech. We’re talking about the second problem now, and that’s on the front end. The tech sector isn’t just about manufacturing. It’s about imagining new products, imagining the future that is primarily done not exclusively, but primarily done in the United States and California. This is a Silicon Valley gig. 

Keep in mind that Silicon Valley does not do it alone. There are other places in the United States that are big on it. Austin, of course, is a big one. The Silicon Hills, Washington, D.C. is another. There’s three others. I can’t remember them off hand. I want to say Boston, but I can’t fact check myself right now. Anyway, what you do when you’re developing the tech sector is two things. 

Number one, you’re designing future products or you’re designing and implementing building software. Both of them basically follow the same process. You get together a bunch of relatively social techno nerds, put them together, network them together wherever they happen to be, preferably in the same room, and tell them to make shit up. And they hypothesize, and then they operationalize, and then they send it off somewhere else to be turned into a manufactured product or coded software. 

As a rule. The US tech age has boomed at the same time that this cadre of people, social tech minded individuals, the millennials, as we like to call them, have been, in their pre childbearing years, if that’s the right way to phrase this. And because the millennials started having kids on average 6 to 7 years after every generation before them, it gave a nice good run from roughly the year, 2005 until very recently. 

The second piece that you need in order to make this all work is just, gods and gods and drops of money. From the point that you rub two millennials together to see if you can get a spark, that doesn’t generate any money. And then they come up with the idea and that doesn’t generate any money, and then they build an operational plan and that doesn’t generate any money. 

Then they design the product, and that too doesn’t generate any money. Then you’re talking about either doing the coding still doesn’t generate money, or designing the products and figuring out how to build it. Still no money. All of those steps cost money. However, millennials don’t come cheap, especially with the skill sets that required for tech development. So you need the cost of capital to be relatively low, and the supply of capital to be as high as you can possibly imagine. 

And again, from roughly the year 2005 until very recently, that describes the United States to a T, the baby boomers were approaching retirement, but had not yet retired, and so they were shoving all the money that they could into the retirement accounts. And that money was being mobilized by whoever wanted to borrow. This is one of the reasons why we had 0% car loans for so long. 

It’s one of the reasons why subprime got so bad. The capital is so cheap, and it’s one of the reasons why the tech sector enjoyed its explosive boom. Everything from meta to AI. Well, folks, those days are over. At this point, over two thirds of the boomers retired. They’ve turned the bulk of their savings from relatively high velocity and applicable products, like stocks and bonds that could be used to lubricate the tech sector into things that are a lot less exciting, like T-bills, because if there is a market crash, they lose and they’re no longer earning income. 

So they don’t have much of a choice. Those that have decided to stay active in the market, well, they’re just stupid because the next time there’s a market crash and there will always be another market crash, they’re going to be broken. They don’t have to move in with their kids. The millennials imagine how that’s going to go anyhow. 

What this means for every industry is that the availability of capital has gone down. The cost of that capital has gone up. We’ve seen it in every industry. We’re roughly 4 to 5 times the cost of capital today that we were five years ago. You should expect that number to rise because remember, a third of the boomers largest generation ever, still haven’t retired. 

And the next generation down my generation, Gen X simply isn’t big enough to fill the coffers. So we’re facing a government fiduciary crisis as the volume of capital goes down, the cost of it goes up. That means debt servicing, for example. But it also means more expensive mortgages, as we’ve already seen, and less ability of the tech sector to tap capital markets on whatever terms they want. 

They’ll still be able to issue stock, raise money that way, general capitalization. But there are fewer players in the market now, so the demand for those stocks overall has to go down So the two big things that have made the tech boom happen are over. The millennials have to, abuse the term grown up a little bit and are more likely to have families now. 

And that means different sorts of jobs, different sorts of interactions. Also, they’re no longer in their 20s. The oldest millennials are now well into their 40s. Different sort of mindset. You want the Young bucks to be the one that are doing the software work, not some old codger. Yes, millennials, I just called some of you old codgers. We’re not going to think about what that means for me anyway. 

Combine that with more expensive money, and it’s difficult to imagine simply being able to build the workforce, much less pay for it over the time horizon that is required to develop these sorts of products. So in summation, the future of tech don’t look great. We’re not going to have nearly as many breakthroughs. They’re not going to come as fast. 

They’re not going to become as gigantic and on the back end. Even if we do get some. 

It’s going to be hard to manufacture them. We are losing the manufacturing capacity here in the United States. That would be part of that process. More of it is now going to Asia because of government policy. 

And when China cracks and it will, we basically lose access to a lot of the East Asian system. And if you think I’m putting this on China, it’s not just China. 

There’s a demographic bomb going off all over East Asia, most notably in North East Asia. The Koreans. 

Are not all that far behind. Neither the Japanese, but the Chinese are the core of it for this decade.

Demographic Lessons from the Mongols

cutouts of children and families

Massive population shocks are nothing new; just look at the Mongol invasions or the Black Death. But is the demographic collapse of today comparable to those historic cases? Or are we staring down the barrel of something entirely new?

Well, we’re not going to get a step-by-step guide by looking back at the Mongol invasions and Black Death, but there is a lesson in there. The collapse happens fast (relatively speaking). The building back and transitional times…that happens over generations.

So, demographic collapse isn’t the end; it’s the start of a long and painful process of finding a new system that works. Japan, China, Germany, and Russia will do a bit of guinea pigging for the rest of the world, but everyone’s heading there eventually.

Transcript

Hey, all, happy autumn from Colorado. Peter Zeihan here. Today we are taking a question from the Patreon crowd specifically. Could I take a look at the demographic decline that’s going on today and compare it to past periods where there’s been population collapses, specifically, the Mongol invasion of the 1200s and the Black Death of the 1300s. Okay. 

Great idea. I’m not sure we’re gonna be able to draw too many comparisons here, but I’ll give you my thinking. Which shapes why I’m very circumspect when it comes to specific forecasts based on demographics. The situation we’re in today is because of industrialization. We all started to urbanize, which means we all started to have fewer kids because on the farm, kids are free labor in the city. 

They’re just an expense. And people can do math, which means that over the course of the next ten year period before 2035, about half of the developed world, plus China is basically going to age into an environment where our economics models don’t work anymore, and they’re all looking at some sort of national, civic or economic collapse going to be pretty ugly beyond that. 

So let’s start with the Mongols. Among us were some scary dudes. And when they started rampaging across Asia and getting to the eastern rim of Europe, they had such a reputation that people ran before them literally until they could get to what is today Poland, because in Poland there were forests. And when the Mongols would charge into the forest, they couldn’t really operate as horsemen. 

They had to dismount. And then all of a sudden they were numbered 100 to 1. So Poland was kind of where the line was. And then, we had a government change among the Mongols. It was a clan based structure. And when Big Papa died, all the little boys went back to Mongolia and basically had an argument over who was going to be the next big papa. And that triggered, civil unrest and basically led to the end of the Mongol Empire. 

Later, a few decades, a new government rose on the scene called the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Basically, Poland and Lithuania, had some neighbors, the Latvians, the Germans, whatever. And when they went into those lands, they discovered that there was resistance. 

But if they went east, the lands were almost completely empty. So they started going east, and then they found one another and they had a little spat as expanding empires do. They cut a deal. They formed the Commonwealth, and over the next century they became the largest, most sophisticated political and economic structure that Europe had known to that point. 

So clearing the decks demographically can generate something new and maybe even something wonderful if you can get through the transition. The second example is, if anything, even more poignant. That’s the Black Death. When rats carried by traitors spread bubonic plague. Went throughout all of Europe. 

And based on where you were, either one third of your population died, if you were lucky or maybe even over half, that generated a different sort of transformation. largely because of population dynamics. Even after the Black Plague swept through western and southern Europe, these areas had higher population densities than the lands east of Poland did before the Mongols arrived. So these places suffered hugely. But they weren’t emptied out and what they discovered is to maintain the bones of civilization, much less build something new. 

Nobody had enough skilled labor to handle the metal of the wood or whatever it happened to be. So from the Colonel, survivors of skilled labor, we saw an explosion in training, as everyone had to figure out how to do more with less. That’s another word for technology. And so we triggered the Renaissance, which led in time to the Age of Discovery and ultimately the industrial age. 

So both of these examples are great for showing how demographic collapse isn’t the end. But you have to keep a few things in mind. Number one, it takes some time in the case of, the Mongol invasion, for example, it was roughly 1240, 1242, I think, when the Mongols went home and never came back. Poland, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth wasn’t finalized until like 150 years later. 

So, you know, you’re talking 3 to 5 generations of time where you basically had a lot of empty, the area would have been called something like marches. In the case of the Renaissance and the Black Plague, it was faster because the population wasn’t wiped out, but still, Black Plague hit about 1350. It wasn’t until 1400 that the Renaissance got going, and the Age of Discovery started 50 to 100 years after that. 

But for that to shape the general political environment took a lot longer. During this time, during the dark Ages, which was, you know, at this point, almost 800 years in, it was a horrible system, but it was stable. The most powerful country in the world was Ottoman Turkey, because they had a defensible core in the Sea of Marmara region, and they had access to multiple maritime routes of expansion, the Levant, the Aegean Sea into the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and especially the Danube. 

And they would basically expand down those maritime routes. When the Age of Discovery clashed with the Ottomans, the first time it happenedwas in 1529. You know, it’s a couple centuries after the Black Plague and it was indeterminate. 

In the meantime, you had the Age of Discovery continuing with the Portuguese and eventually the Spanish, discovering the new world, stitching together new routes, the old world technology generally progressing, and it would in time overpower the Ottomans. 

But the high water point for the Ottomans didn’t happen until the late 1600s. And it was another century after that, until you got the revolutions of 1787 that actually broke Ottoman power. And even then, the Ottoman Empire lasted for another 40 years before ultimately dying in World War one takes a lot of time for stable systems to unspool. 

So when you’re using these lessons and looking at our near future, yes, the demographic transition from our point of view is going to be very fast the next ten years, or it’s going to be lightning fast and the collapse of individual systems, we’re going to feel in our bones, but waiting for something that is stable to replace it on the other side. 

That requires inventing new models. Ever since the Age of Discovery, we’ve become inured to this idea that the patterns are permanent for every year except for 1 or 2 of the last 500, the human population has gotten bigger. And because of that, economic models that favor expansion do really well. That’s socialism, capitalism, fascism and communism. But if the population starts to shrink, those models aren’t going to make sense anymore. 

And we’re gonna have to invent something new. And the places that have to deal with that first are the ones where the demographic decline is going to come first and be fastest, and the countries on my list for that, that really matter are Japan, China, Germany and Russia, in no particular order. And if you know anything about the histories of those four countries, when they get insecure, things get a little exciting. 

So I can guarantee you that things are going to change. I can guarantee you that the models which we run our economic systems by are going to be different. What I can’t tell you is when this is going to settle out, because I’m probably not going to be around anymore at that point.

The Last Generation to Protest

A large protest made up of thousands of people

Staging a meaningful protest requires several things, and a large young population is one of the key components. So, what happens when there aren’t enough young people left?

Youth movements have been a driver for massive change across the globe, from politics to war and everything in between. Demographic trends show us that populations are growing older and taking the wind out of the sails of the youth. Countries like the US, Mexico, India, and much of Europe have already eclipsed the “youth protest” phase. We can still listen to For What It’s Worth by Buffalo Springfield…but those days are over.

Sure, there are countries with the youth to protest, but we’re talking about places like Nepal, Madagascar, and Nigeria, which simply don’t move the needle on a global scale.

Transcript

Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re gonna talk about these Gen Z protests that are bringing down governments, most notably in Nepal and in, Madagascar. And if these are two places that you don’t know much about. You’re not alone. What to keep in mind. Young people protest. Young people bring down governments. 

That’s just part of the math. They have less of a stake in the system. They have less experience, and they don’t see the cost to them as a society, and certainly not personally. Now, once you have kids, once you have a mortgage, once you have something to lose, then you have more of a vested interest in, say, reforming the system rather than overthrowing it. 

And so when you look at youth protests, you have to make sure that there is a youth to protest. So if you dial back to, say, the 1970s, in the 1980s, the most active student protest movements in the world were in, say, South Korea, where there was a large chunk of the population that was under age 30. If you look around the world today, there aren’t a lot of those places left. 

As you industrialize, as you would urbanize, birth rates drop. And so here in the United States, we’re now below replacement levels, while in Europe they’ve been 

below replacement levels for 50 years. Places like India and Mexico and Indonesia, Turkey, they all fell below replacement levels even before the United States did. So when you think of a place that matters because they’re economically large or strategically viable, all of these places have kind of aged out of the protest stage. 

And what’s left are much younger countries where the birthrate is still falling, but there’s still a substantial percentage of the population that’s below age 25. So we see Nepal and Madagascar. We’re seeing Yemen. We will see places like, Nigeria and maybe even Pakistan fall into that category. But for the most of the world, this youth bulge is long gone. 

And so the places where you can or might see youth protests actually change in government structure. They’re becoming fewer and fewer and fewer and places that are less and less important to the wider world.