Defending the Homefront from Cheap Drones

Camo clad man flying a drone outdoors | License by Envato Elements

It’s one thing for high-tech, expensive strike systems to break through defenses, but when cheap and simple drones can inflict widespread damage…that’s a whole other can of worms.

Having the ability to hit hard-to-defend civilian infrastructure with these low-tech drones means that countries like Saudi Arabia and Russia have to rethink everything. They’re not just changing how their military operates during wartime, but fundamentally shifting how their economy functions from the ground up.

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Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. And today we’re going to talk about a new sort of targeting system that has been used in multiple theaters or new targeting criteria would probably be a better way to phrase that. Over the weekend in the late part of last week, we had the Houthis of Yemen starting to attack Saudi Arabia’s civilian airline system, specifically the Riyadh International Airport, where at a minimum, 12 people were killed, probably closer to 30 and several hundred people were injured. Looks like a plane was hit. One of the terminals with passengers was hit. And then in Russia, the Ukrainians have started targeting data centers. Data centers are very easy to disrupt. They’re very large targets. They’re hard to miss, and they require absolutely massive amounts of climate control or the chips melt down. So you put a hole in the roof, that kind of ruins the entire experience for everyone. In addition, the Russians cannot make any, any, any of the semiconductors that go into even a circa 1999 data center. So this is 100% imported hardware that they can’t replace without spending a great deal of money.

According to the Houthis, anything that’s in Saudi Arabia is a viable target because they’re in a general war with anyone who’s on the other side of the Palestinians or the Iranians. And they, over the last decade, have really been not particularly picky about what they attack in the first place. Ukraine is a lot more discerning from their point of view. Data centers are part of the infrastructure that allows Russia to be a modern state, and the data centers handle military logistics and weapon designs, which are true. So they see it as a viable military target in its own right, in addition to the fact that it’s an important civilian piece of infrastructure.

The bottom line for both of these is that normally when you’ve got drones going against military targets, there’s a degree of electronic warfare in play that scrambles the signals. So if you’ve got a long range drone coming in, you can scramble the signal. Then the pilot loses control of the drone and either Peter pans or crashes or hovers and does basically no damage. Or you can kinetically intercept it with, say, bullets or missiles or whatever it happens to be. That is not in play with these two target sets. Until now, the Saudis and the Russians have not put up electronic warfare around these sort of assets. For one, if you put electronic warfare around your entire economy, you won’t have an economy anymore. It’s simply too big to protect. And specifically for the airport, if you have E-W that’s meaningful, you’re going to have a hard time landing planes. The bottom line is here is that these weren’t fancy drones. Over the last eight months, I’ve done quite a few videos talking about how the advances in drone warfare allowed them to bypass E-W. That didn’t apply here. These are relatively unguarded, mostly civilian targets, which means that what the Houthis and the Ukrainians have done is eminently replicable across the entirety of Saudi Arabia and the vast majority of Russia. Both of their systems now have more than enough range. So the Iranians are providing the Houthis with the weapons to do this. They can hit anywhere in Saudi Arabia. The Ukrainians are, for the most part, producing their own drones. They have already demonstrated that most of them have a range of at least 300km, some upwards of 1600km. So everything that’s basically within 100km of Moscow and significantly more is all within range, which means it is time for us to start noodling, fast hopefully, about what a post drone economy can even be. Because if everything within 600 miles of an enemy is civilian infrastructure that you either have to protect or write off, then the entire industrial age needs to find a new way to operate. We are not ready for this. No one is ready for this.

Perhaps the biggest problem that I see here is that the drones that were used were not sophisticated at all. They don’t have that advanced technology that’s being developed this year in it. These are just plain Jane weapons platforms that are very, very cheap. Nothing, nothing in the input stream for them is under any degree of sanctions. And if you wanted to sanction it, you’d have to sanction basically every single phone maker, computer maker. In most electronics makers, you’re talking about chips that are not just legacy, but all the hardware in them could have been assembled with parts from RadioShack 15 years ago, was RadioShack still around 15 years ago. You get the point. That’s before you consider the more advanced stuff that is coming up, like the memory drones out of Ukraine that can even get through jamming now.

So we’re now in a situation where all of the crude out of Saudi Arabia is being threatened not just by advanced drones, but by basic ones. And the entire supporting economic structure has now, basically the genie’s out of the bottle, the seals been cracked. In the case of Russia, it’s not just about the shadow fleet in the market, it’s about the wheat markets, about the sunflower market. It’s about the iron ore market. It’s about the aluminum market. It’s about the timber market. All of these are now easily targeted systems with where we are with drone manufacturing on just a regional basis.

It doesn’t take a huge amount of imagination to come up with a military conflict in somebody else’s backyard, where drones become part of the problem, and all of a sudden the entire industrial infrastructure is in play. I’m looking at you, Northeast Asia. Anyway, that’s it from now. See you guys next time.

How Diesel Could Shape the Ukraine War

Photo of diesel nozzles at a gas station | Licensed by Envato Elements

A U.S. diesel ban could have reverberating consequences for the Russian energy sector, following the sustained attacks by Ukraine. Russia is now relying on places like Kazakhstan, Belarus, and India to supplement its fuel supplies.

The Russians rely on diesel to transport damn near everything, so shortages will directly impact their military capabilities. Should the U.S. move forward with removing its diesel from the global market, the Russians won’t have long to come up with a solution.

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Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Toronto, specifically Queen’s Harbor. Anyhow, I wanted to put my $0.02 on a discussion that’s been happening for the last few days, and that’s a diesel export ban here in the United States. Now, we’ve already done a core video. We’ll link to it here about the economics of that and why it would work or not. But there’s another consideration, because the country that used to be the world’s largest exporter of diesel fuel, Russia, is now an importer because of all the damage the Ukrainians have been inflicting upon the Russian refining complex. It’s part of the reason why Donald Trump at the moment doesn’t like Ukraine. He goes back and forth. Anyway, they have been forced to import diesel from Kazakhstan, Belarus and India, which, while they are exporters, are not huge exporters. Right now, the shortage in Russia is probably in excess of about 1.5 million barrels a day of oil equivalent, and that number has probably gone up in the last two weeks, because the Ukrainians really have been doubling down on the attacks. Diesel is a big deal in the United States because we transport everything by truck, but the Russians aren’t too far behind. Primary transport in Russia is really two ways rail or truck. And the further away you get from Moscow and Saint Petersburg, the more likely you are to move from an electric train to a diesel train, and the more like you are to move to truck, because the road network is basically local, clustered around population centers. In addition, most jets, whether they’re civilian or military, use a similar cut from the refining stack. So while we might not have an official shortage of jet fuel, something to consider in the Russian context. But more importantly, most of the military hardware that the Russians are using in the Ukraine war, especially tanks and the supply trucks are going to be using diesel as well. 

Remember that since March, we have a new type of drone category that the Ukrainians are using memory drones, where basically the drone gets over an area, looks around it, looks into a decision tree that you’ve loaded into it, maybe some silhouettes, maybe a map and picks its own targets, which means that anything within about two, maybe even 300km of the front is getting hit by these drones all the time. And as you take out the fuel trucks, you basically snarl every aspect of the Russian attack. So anything that the Russians have been doing now has been done with low amounts of fuel, and with the United States possibly about to remove the last remaining large supply and the global standards, that leaves the Russians completely high and dry. 

I’m not suggesting that this is the point where the war turns. There’s just too many moving parts. But if we actually go a six month period or more where the Russians don’t have enough fuel to keep their system operational from a military point of view, then we really have entered a new phase in this conflict.

What’s Next for Iraq?

Flag of Iraq, torn and tattered against a desert sun

U.S. troops have withdrawn from Iraq, putting an end to American military presence that began following 9/11. So, what’s next for Iraq?

It’s not all sunshine and rainbows. Iraq is a deeply divided country, made up of three primary groups: the Shia Arab in the south, the Kurds in the north, and the Sunni Arab in the middle. The U.S. presence helped maintain some sort of civility between the factions, but with that gone…I suspect we won’t be looking at a flourishing era of peace.

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Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the CN Tower in Toronto. Today is the 30th of September. You’ll probably see this tomorrow or the next day. Anyway, the United States just withdrew its final troops from Iraq. Finally, finally, finally, finally, officially ending the US war on terror that started in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks back in 2001. So 25 years ago. Last troops are finally gone. We’ve only had a few hundred there this year, mostly in the north. 

Now let’s dial back to yesteryear and remind us of what an Iraq is, and then we’ll talk about the future. So first things first. Iraq is one of those heavily artificial countries that emerged out of the detritus of colonialism in the aftermath of World War II really didn’t start to gel into the 50s. Anyway, you’ve got three regions down in the South in what is classically Mesopotamia, between the Tigris and Euphrates. You have the majority Shia population that happens to sit on top of some of the world’s largest and easiest to exploit oil fields, and those fields at peak can generate 4 to 5 million barrels per day. In the north, in the mountains, you’ve got an area called Kurdistan, Iraqi Kurdistan, which has generally been split among multiple rival families, usually two big ones and several small ones. And they sit on top of a much more difficult oil complex, but still not hard by global standards and at maximum capacity can maybe do 2, 2.5 million barrels per day. Neither of these regions have ever really performed to snuff, but at the start of the Iran war earlier this year, collectively they were doing somewhere between four and a half and five, which, after 25 years of war and before that 25 years of sanctions, is not bad. And then in the middle, you have the smallest group making up at most 20% of the population around Baghdad, and that is the religious Sunni. So Shia Arabs in the south majority, Kurds in the north a minority, but the second largest group, and then in the middle the Sunni Arabs. 

The complication they have always had is having these three different groups in three different geographies that really have very little in common is in the South. They think because they’re the most numerous group, they should be in charge, which kind of like the American Democratic Party means they split into multiple factions that are constantly at one another’s throats. The Kurds are always the persecuted group, but because they’re split by family lineages, the only way that they’ve been able to hold things together is when an external power is leveraging them, like the United States did for most of the last 25 years, and really the 25 years before that. And in the middle, you’ve got the smallest group with the least economic wherewithal, the Sunnis. And because they’re the smallest group and because they don’t have much economic wherewithal, they’ve always been the most united. Now under the Saddam Hussein regime, which ended with the Iraq war back in 2003, this region had been controlling everything. Saddam himself was a Sunni Arab, and the other two regions were either enslaved, prosecuted, genocided from time to time. It was really, really ugly set up. During the American occupation, we tended to partner with the Kurds and induce the Kurds to vote for whatever Shia prime minister we thought would do a decent job and do what we wanted. We have a new prime minister whose name I’m not even going to bother learning, because I doubt he’ll last the year. He’s 41. He has no backing from anyone except for the United States. And now the United States is gone. 

So what’s next for Iraq? Well, it’s not going to be pretty. Iran has proven that it can destabilize any of these regions. And many of the militias that are operating in the south of the country, Shia, remember, Iran itself is Shia, have proven that they can overthrow the government from time to time and serve as a launch pad for attacks into other parts of the region or the country. So, for example, you may remember a few weeks ago we had drone attacks on Saudi Arabia’s West east pipeline, the largest oil transport pipeline in the world. Those originated in the Shia portions of Iraq and without US forces now, that’s pretty much going to be the future of southern Iraq, either a bastion of Iranian power or a launch pad for whatever they want to do in the region. Further north in Kurdistan, you’ve got basically the Americans that withdrawn and taking their gear with them. So things that the Kurds haven’t had to worry about in 25 years, almost 50 years, when it comes to being attacked by outside forces, is now back on. And as much as the Arabs of Iraq don’t like the Kurds, it’s nothing compared to how the Turks think of the Kurds. See, Turkey has its own Kurdish minority and has done some fairly nasty things and even invaded neighboring countries to take care of other Kurdish minorities before, even in Iraq. But the problem I would be most concerned about is now that the region is kind of game on from a geopolitical point of view, is the Sunnis again, because last time something like this went down, where the system became kind of unmoored and the foreigners left, you eventually had a three way fight that the Sunni Arabs emerged on top, with Saddam being the guy at the top of that heap. 

I’m not saying that the next guy is going to be genocidal like Saddam was, but to think that we are now at peace in our time, well, that that would be a stretch.

Will Putin Join the Miami G20 Summit?

Putin and Trump shaking hands on the red carpet. Photo by Wikimedia Commons: http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/77790/photos/82627

The Trump administration has extended an invitation to Putin to attend the G20 summit in Miami. There are several things to watch for, so let’s break it down.

First, Putin has to decide if attending the summit will result in his arrest based on outstanding warrants. Should he attend, we should keep a close eye on how the G20 members and U.S. allies respond. Last, Putin could use this opportunity to create a foreign-policy crisis to test NATO and Trump. Should make for an exciting time down in Miami.

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Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the home office because it’s crappy outside today. Anyway, today we’re talking about something that went down last week. On September 23rd, Secretary of State Rubio confirmed that Donald Trump had invited Vladimir Putin, the president of Russia, to Miami for the G-20 summit this fall. Oh my God. Right now, there are multiple international arrest warrants out for Vladimir Putin for his role in initiating and maintaining the war in Ukraine over these last several years. The Trump family has publicly disclosed that they own lots of property in Russia. And Trump’s son specifically have said one of the reasons why Donald Trump is so pro Russia when it comes to the Ukraine war, isn’t so much that he doesn’t like Zelensky, who is the president of Ukraine, although that is true, but because of that property. So this is a flat up, corruption play by the Trump administration 

Anyway, there’s three things to watch for here. Number one, Putin would have to accept the offer. There’s no guarantee he’s going to do that because he wants to make sure that he doesn’t get arrested. Putin has been agitating against the United States online, in person, using the tools of Russian power for the last 25 years. And that’s one of the reasons why he has never gotten along with, really, any of the presidents that we’ve had in the modern era until Trump and his personal interests get involved. And Putin has been working to try to ingratiate himself with Trump deeper and deeper. So, for example, one of Putin’s allies recently paid for one of Trump’s sons weddings because, you know, that’s apparently what you do when you’re corrupt to that level. And it’s worked. But that’s not the same as knowing that Trump, who has a reputation for being a little erratic and mercurial, isn’t going to flip the table on him based on something that happens in the moment. Now, arresting a foreign leader who is in country for a summit would be wild. We’ve never had anything like that happen, but we’ve had a lot of things that have never happened before this administration. So who knows. 

So number one, Putin has to be 100% convinced that he’s not going to be arrested at some point during a Florida trip. That’s piece one. Piece two is the effect that this would have on the Alliance. As I mentioned, there are multiple arrest warrants out for Putin. Those include, but are not limited to several of the countries who are going to be at the G20 summit, including the leaders of the United Kingdom and Germany and France and the EU structures as a whole. 

So if Putin comes, there’s the open question of whether or not these other leaders will come. Now, from a international structure point of view, I’m not really concerned about this as much. The G20 has its uses from time to time because it brings together the richest countries of the world and the largest countries in the world. So while you do have Canada and the U.K. and Japan and Germany, you also have Brazil and India and China. Anyway, point being is that these countries really don’t have a lot of common, and the last time they did anything that really mattered was during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis. And since then, when they meet, it’s really just a talk shop. And the question is whether anything can happen beside meetings. Which brings us to the third person, one of those Senate meetings. 

If Putin does attend, it is going to be really interesting. Putin is really good at making really bold announcements quietly to a world leader, especially the American president, while Russian forces are doing something else elsewhere. So if you go back to, say, the 2004 Winter Olympics. George W Bush was in town. Putin hosted him in Sochi. And while the Olympics were going on during the opening ceremonies, Russian forces invaded the former Soviet Republic of Georgia. And there’s some wonderful footage of one of W Bush’s aides whispering the news to him. As W is sitting next to Putin in the box. If Putin does come to Florida, he would absolutely engineer a moment like that and wouldn’t be about Ukraine because Trump doesn’t care about Ukraine. It would probably be about Estonia or Latvia who are NATO members. 

There’s been plenty of evidence over the course of the last several months that the Russians are putting in some forces together that would have the option of crossing the border into these two places. And seizing control of territories that might be ethnically majority Russian but are still in the Western camp. Keep in mind that the Russian population in these two states don’t want anything to do with Russia. They haven’t for a long time. Anyway, announcing the invasion of a NATO country, while he’s sitting next to Trump and then forcing Trump to decide right then what to do about Russia, what about to do about NATO? What about to do about the allies. When Trump very clearly doesn’t have any meaningful advisors in any of those capacities? That would be a coup, but it would come with risk because you never know what Trump is going to decide anyway. 

Those are the three things to watch, whether Putin actually comes, whether the allies then basically walk away. Because at that point, the United States has basically said that we really don’t care about your defense at all. And then, number three, whether or not the Putin government would use that as an opportunity to just completely shatter the alliance completely. That’s what I’m watching for. And we will know over the next couple of months.

The Attack on Saudi’s Petroline Came From Iraq

Miniature Industrial Oil Tanks on Saudi Arabian Flag | Licensed by Envato Elements

The attack that shut down Saudi Arabia’s East-West oil pipeline (aka the Petroline) has been traced to Iranian-backed militias in Iraq.

So, the prospect of defending Saudi energy infrastructure is nothing more than a pipe dream at this point. And given the very limited interaction between Iran and the U.S., I wouldn’t expect things to improve for the Saudis anytime soon.

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Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from the Denver airport. Just a quick update on something that’s been going on for the last couple of weeks. If you remember last month. No. Earlier this month…busy month. The Iranian forces launched drones and struck the east west pipeline. That’s the bypass pipeline that the Saudis use, so they don’t have to use the Persian Gulf in the Strait of Hormuz. And that maximum capacity can handle 7.5 million barrels per day. Anyway, shut it down. Hit a pumping station, and it took almost three weeks to get it back online. We’ve now confirmed that the attack didn’t originate from Iran or even from Yemen, but instead from Iraq. So Iranian backed militias in Iraq are the ones who launched it from the Maysan province. Baghdad authorities confirmed that overnight, last night. And what this basically means is that there’s absolutely no way that the Saudis can protect any of their energy infrastructure, because if you’ve got attacks that can come from the South or the north or the east, that means you have to defend everything from every direction. And no one could do that. There’s also no way that you can really prevent Iraq from being used as a launch pad, as long as the political system in Iraq doesn’t settle. Remember that the United States tried to make this settle with 100,000 troops over 15 years and failed more or less completely. And all you need to do is to have a garage that can store these things with a little launcher that you can put together in a couple of hours with some basic welding skills. And that assumes that the Iranians don’t smuggle in more advanced drones. 

So if you were hoping for some return to pre-war normal when it comes to Saudi exports, you can pretty much kiss that goodbye now. It’s just a matter of time until that’s all gone. And that’s not limited to Saudi Arabia. The only other possible option is a political deal that re-regulates how oil moves and transport moves in this region that, at a minimum, requires a deal between the United States and Iran. And with the exception of a little side meeting that Secretary of State Rubio had with the Iranians when they were in town in New York for the UN General Assembly meeting last week. There have been no talks at all directly between the Americans and the Iranians and nearly three months. 

So we are yet to reach step one of ending the conflict. And if you’re in Saudi Arabia, or depending on Saudi crude, that’s probably the worst of all outcomes.

SpaceX Deploys 26 Satellites with New Starship

SpaceX rocket launching from a pad

SpaceX has completed its first (mostly) successful Starship test. The ship was able to reach orbit, deploy 26 Starlink satellites, and return home. And while there were some hiccups (engine failure on launch and reentry, as well as a crash landing) along the way, this was a step in the right direction.

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Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. It’s crappy outside, so we’re doing this one inside. It is the 28th of September. You’re going to be seeing this on the 29th. And the news today is that we’ve had our first mostly successful test of SpaceX’s new ship, the Starship. The intent is for the Starship to be the most powerful rocket ever launched by man. That will be able to take upwards of 60 satellites for the Starlink constellation up with every individual flight. Elon Musk, who, of course, is the the guy behind this, eventually intends to do one launch a day with most of the components being assembled on site in Boca Chica at their Starbase. 

Anyway, what happened today is it went up and had engine failure on the way up, and it had engine failures on reentry. And because of the engine failures, they cut the trip short only did two orbits. So it came down less than three hours after takeoff instead of the 8 to 9 hours. That was the original plan. That doesn’t mean it’s an overall failure, because it’s still launched the satellites, and this is the first time that a Starship has actually achieved orbit. But this is a step in the direction that they need to go. This is not a proof of success because they had, I think it was three engines failing the way up and two on the way down with engine failures that they thought they had solved already. They have to, I don’t want to say go back to the drawing board, but they have to completely reiterate and modify all of the engines moving forward. So it’s probably going to be at least a couple of months before we get another meaningful test. In addition, because they didn’t get a lot of data, they don’t know about the reusability problem that they’re trying to solve. The intent is for these things to be launched from Boca Chica, to do their orbits, to drop off their satellites and then land in Boca Chica. Without having meaningful data for how long the Starship can be in orbit. They just don’t know how to proceed with that at the moment. And then finally, this was a partial test of cargo. They only launched, I think it was 28 satellites. Their intent ultimately is to do over 60 per individual launch, which is a lot. Anyway, so moderate step in the right direction. Still a lot of work to be done. 

One more thing. It blew up when they landed it in the ocean. It blew up, which is normal because they weren’t actually trying to recover it. So don’t take that as a negative. Too much of a negative.

What Happens When Fossil Water Runs Out?

Coastal shoreline with shale looking rocks in water | Photo by Envato Elements

Fossil water is ancient water trapped in deep aquifers that take millennia to recharge, rather than the standard seasonal rainfall recharge. So, once you use it…it’s gone.

For regions that have become dependent upon fossil water for agriculture, this is a big problem. The Ogallala Aquifer currently feeds western Kansas and the Texas Panhandle, but that won’t last much longer. Some areas have already run dry, and regardless of less water-intensive crops and more efficient irrigation, the aquifer’s days are numbered.

This is the least consequential aquifer we’re discussing, but even this one plays a massive role in U.S. wheat and food production.

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Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from, I guess, middle Slide Canyon. I’m approaching upper slide and behind me we’ve got Bath Mountain and the glory that is Slide Canyon. We are in northeast Yosemite, and hopefully we’re gonna get some sun today. Anywho, as long as I’m up here, I decided to do a video on some coming agricultural crises. 

This is going to be a short series because there’s multiple angles to this. But the first piece I want to talk about is something called fossil water. Water that is, fossil water is pulled from an aquifer that does not recharge with the normal seasonal cycles. So normally it rains, you get runoff, it seeps into the ground, goes into an underground aquifer and springs, and it recharges every season. So you can tap it, I don’t think as much as you want, but pretty heavily. Fossil water is deeper, and it’s typically in a more arid zone, and it doesn’t recharge from the surface at the same rate. So instead of recharging in weeks to months, it’s millennia. So we’re going to talk about three regions here that are affected, because all of them are going to cease to be agriculturally producing zones within the next 20 to 30 years. And based on what happens, it could really happen next year, because a lot of this is driven by stuff at the surface. 

The problem is honestly drilling for water in these zones. I mean, yes, there’s water down there. Yes, you can use it for agriculture, but you can only use it once. And so what we’ve seen in multiple parts of the world is the tapping of the zone in increasing volume. And the problem is honestly kind of legal, because if there’s a surface water dispute, there are negotiations, there are laws, there are regulations. It goes to court, there are sequestration of rights in order. And that’s primarily what’s going on in say the Colorado River basin. Not that it’s going great, but that’s probably what’s going on. But if you can just drill, then it’s just a race to the bottom of the tank. And that’s not something that can be easily regulated. So the first zone to consider is the Ogallala Aquifer in the United States, specifically in western Kansas, going down into the Texas Panhandle. Also goes up into, say, Nebraska and the Dakotas, although it’s really the southern section that’s in trouble. For the most part, we’re talking about zones that have been depleted to the degree of something like 200m. And most of these zones, if they’re not already going dry, are going to go dry within the next decade. We’ve already seen some efforts by places specifically in Kansas to shift to lower use irrigation. So instead of those big circular irrigation things that are huge water users and wasters to go to, say, drip irrigation and switching crops. 

The problem is, remember, the aquifer recharges in millennia, so switching from a high water crop to a low water crop doesn’t buy you much time and might buy them 30 to 60 years if they’re really, really lucky. And then, as we’ve already seen in a number of places in Texas, the land will just go follow because you won’t be able to grow anything there. 

This will have a big impact, because this is a zone that produces a lot of wheat that directly or indirectly feeds literally tens of millions of people, but it’s nothing compared to the other two. We’ll do that part of the video from further up the canyon.

Building Out the Power Grid: Large Power Transformers

An electrical station with transformers

There are three major obstacles to expanding the U.S. electrical grid: generation capacity, permitting, and large power transformers (LPTs). Let’s focus on LPTs today.

Reindustrialization will require a massive expansion of electricity generation (and that’s without further data-center growth). Large power transformers are essential for transmitting and distributing electricity, and most of the existing LPTs have already hit their expected lifespan. So, if the U.S. has any kind of shot at reindustrialization, it needs to replace all the aging equipment and add more LPTs, despite years of backlogs.

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Transcript

Hey, everybody. Coming to you from my tent in Yosemite. It’s raining outside. So I decided that discretion being the better part of valor, I’d take a nap. But first, I want to talk to you about the American grid. As you all know, we need to build out the grid as quickly as possible, as large as possible. And as I’m sure most of you have heard, a lot of people are unsure of how we’re going to do that. 

We’ve got three primary obstacles. The first is generation capacity. Assuming for the moment that the data center boom ends today. The United States needs to expand its grid by approximately 50%. And that’s obviously a lot. It took a half century for us to do the last 50% expansion. So to do that in a short period of time is going to be very, very difficult. 

With the data center expansion. You’re talking about a doubling or tripling or a quadrupling. And so anyone who tells you that data centers are the wave of the future clearly hasn’t done the math. There is no version of physics or the United States where that is possible. So this idea that this data center boom is not near its peak and is not a bubble. 

You know, regardless of what you think about the financing for data centers and the profit centers for data centers and the applicability of data centers, there just is nowhere near enough power, and there won’t be without a significant change in their design. Okay. All of that’s one. The number two problem permitting, it’s difficult to build large industrial infrastructure in a first world country because lots of people already have interests and they sue to protect them. 

But one of the real problems we have in the United States is permitting is that the local, state and federal level for power generation and any asset is typically managed at the local level within a specific electric district. Unless you’re in a place like say, oh, I don’t know, North Carolina, where I believe it’s Duke energy is really big. 

Most of these districts are like at the county level, maybe even smaller. And getting everything through, getting the capital lined up and getting all the permits, just taxes, staff that in many cases doesn’t exist in number. Keep in mind that U.S. electricity generation in the last couple of years had been stagnant since the late 80s. So a lot of the institutional knowledge has been lost, or very, very few people alive today that were proving data centers that last go around. 

But the third problem is probably the most significant, because if you decide that you really need something, you know, money can solve a lot of problems. And if you decide you need something, you can always speed the permitting by various means. But the third problem is something really can’t be rushed, and that is the presence of large Transformers large power Transformers LPTs, if you want to use the acronym. An LPT is basically something that is on the grid rather than in the power plant, and it steps up and steps down the electricity for transmission and distribution. 

They weigh 100 to 400 tons. And it’s a perfect example of one of those mid tech but high skill industries and products that the United States is basically outsourced. Very, very few of them are made in the United States at all. We import about 80% of what we use and get this. The average transformer, the average LPT in the United States right now that’s operational is about 40 years old. 

And these things typically last about 40 years. So not only do we need at least 50% more, probably more than that. We also have to overhaul and replace the entire grid supply of LPTs. The volume required here is immense. And the problem is that not a lot of places make these things at scale. 

And right now, there’s a backlog of 3 to 5 years based on which model you’re looking for. Even distribution transformers now have a backlog of over a year. So the real decision here to expand the grid should have been made five years ago. But, you know, here we are. Anyway. Most of the Transformers the United States imports comes from four places Mexico, Germany, Japan and China. 

And the Trump administration has picked trade fights with all of them. Although at the moment relations with the Mexicans are probably the best among the four. And that’s great. So if anyone is looking for a just brilliant lever to use against the United States and trade talks, LPTs are an excellent choice because we’re entering a stage where not just the United States is going to be unable to expand its grid unless it really gets some things moving. 

It’s not going to be able to maintain the grid it has. And that has horrible implications for absolutely everything. Remember, 50% increase is what we need. If we’re going to reindustrialize in a way that prepares us for deglobalization. So this is banded right together with all of those other issues that I follow that suggest that without some significant change in federal policy, we are simply not going to have the products we’re used to. 

The United States is a services economy. It’s a brain economy, and it relies on imports for a lot of its manufactured products. Now, you can argue whether that was smart or stupid to do in the first place. That’s where we are now. And now that deglobalization is here, we absolutely need to reindustrialize and you can’t do any of that work without power.

How To Ban Diesel Exports

Large Red Tanker Ship Docks at an Oil Terminal

A ban on American crude or diesel exports isn’t going to improve energy security; if anything, it will reduce domestic production. The problem lies in geography.

Most U.S. production and refining is concentrated in places like Texas and Louisiana, which are quite far from the demand centers in California and the Northeast. So for crude, export bans would oversaturate producing regions and discourage drilling. For diesel, the bans are futile without expanding infrastructure and changing the transport systems.

Export bans only make sense if paired with major changes to accompany them.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. And today I wanted to talk about something that has been in the news a lot of late, and that is bans on exports of energy products from the United States. There’s two topics here, one that’s old and one that’s new. The old one is about exporting crude in general, and the newer one is about diesel specifically. So let’s start with the older topic, then move to the newer. 

So here’s the problem. The United States is a physically large country, while places like Canada and China and Russia are larger, most of those countries are completely uninhabitable. Whereas the United States has a relatively broad population distribution across its entire territory. So a lot of internal American economic issues, especially when it comes to energy, are based on distribution. The mechanics of how we move things from A to B determines what our economic policy should be. And then whenever we deviate from that, we generate problems for ourselves. So start with oil. Obviously the bigger players are Texas, Louisiana, New Mexico, a little bit of Alabama, a bunch out of North Dakota, some out of Colorado, little bit out of California, and then places like Ohio and the Appalachians, Pennsylvania. And that’s great because we’ve got people in all of those places. But our densest population footprints in places like the American Northeast or Florida or the bulk of California, are not proximate to where the energy is produced. So you need to pipe it, the crude, from wherever it’s produced to a refinery. In places like the American Gulf Coast, you get these natural concentrations because Texas is all one political unit. So they can build pipelines without too much of a problem. They don’t have to go to federal authorities for permits or anything like that for the most part. And so you get these huge concentrations of crude in places that may have people, but aren’t necessarily enough people to consume the crude. So Texas, for example, produces more than enough crude for not just Texas, but the entire American West Coast, which doesn’t have a lot. 

So when you start talking about a crude export ban, what you’re saying is we’re going to create these massive pools of oversaturation in certain markets. And when you do that, without the infrastructure in place to ship the crude easily to where the people live, then all you’ve done is really disincentivize the crude producers from producing. So if you were to do a crude oil export ban tomorrow and have no mitigating policies, you would see crude production in places like North Dakota and Texas fall off a cliff very, very quickly because they produce far more crude than they can use locally. We also don’t have enough refining capacity in the country as a whole to process everything that we produce. So the only way to then square the market is to reduce supply. And that means the United States goes from exporting somewhere between 20 and 25 million barrels a day, to probably something closer to 10 to 15 million barrels a day over a couple of years. 

And it would happen that fast, because the vast majority of American oil production these days comes from the shale fields, and most shale wells generate somewhere around 70% of their total output over the 25 year lifespan in the first 12 months. So it would happen very, very quick, and the result would be less energy security rather than more. 

Something similar happens with refining and diesel fuel. Again, there are some dense concentrations of refineries where we turn crude oil into fuels that we use with, again, the Texas-Louisiana section being the densest. We’ve got secondary centers that are roughly matched to demand in places like the Midwest. But when you look at California and especially the American Northeast and certainly Florida, there’s just nothing. And the United States decided a century ago, more than a century ago, to favor truck transport over train and especially ship. Even though they’re much more efficient, especially for the American geography, which means we have a large built in demand for diesel fuel. Even though our geography argues that we should be doing other things. Anyway, this all combines. So if we were to have a diesel ban tomorrow, again, you would have a catastrophic change in prices in Texas and Louisiana, where diesel prices would go through the floor because of oversaturation. And the only way to fix that is to reduce diesel runs. And all of a sudden, the United States has less diesel than it had before. 

Now, of course, the Trump administration, being the Trump administration, is now openly discussing how to make this happen, the diesel ban, specifically. The energy secretary, Chris Wright, is against it because he knows energy economics. And the Interior secretary, Doug Burger, is against it because it used to be the governor of North Dakota, one of the states that would be oversaturated. So he understands what’s going on. But every time that those two have tried to inject a little bit of economic rationality and reasonable forecasting into the white House, they’ve been slapped down and they will be on this situation to. Now does that mean that an oil export ban or a diesel ban are just uniformly bad ideas? No, no, no, that’s not what I’m saying. I’m saying if you think you can do a once and done policy and then move on, that is stupid because that will guarantee that the problem gets worse. And we reduce not just global supplies, but American supplies of these things. 

What you have to do is pair a ban, if that’s what you want to call it, with other things. So, for example, on the crude oil front, most of the crude that is produced by the US shale fields is super light and super sweet. It’s not viscous at all. It has very few contaminants. And that is not what the American Refining complex is designed for, because going back to the 1970s, we became convinced that the world had run out of this sort of light, sweet, crude. And so we started retooling our refineries to work on ever dirtier, ever thicker crude. Shale revolution came along in the mid 2000s, changed the math for the United States. But the refineries have been slow to shift because they’re the most advanced refineries in the world. And they spent 100s of billions of dollars getting ready for the world that then ultimately for the United States didn’t happen. So what happens is the United States exports the light, sweet stuff and imports heavy, dirty stuff. So if you want an oil export ban to mean something without damaging American energy security, you have to force the refineries to change what they do to use local crude. And if you do that, then all of a sudden we have the flow through that we need for fuels, and then it’s a distribution problem. 

If you want to look at the diesel situation, it’s somewhat similar. If we get these dense concentrations of supersaturation, the only way to fix that is to improve distribution. And that means product pipelines. Right now, we really only have one, the Colonial Pipeline that takes refined fuels from the Gulf Coast up to the American Northeast. And that’s it. Everything else is shipped by rail or more likely, truck. So what you have to do is build a nationwide distribution system, or maybe even mandate the creation of refineries in places where there aren’t concentrations of them. Or here’s a crazy idea maybe ship it by water and amend the interstate commerce act or the Jones Act so it’s easier to move stuff around the continental United States. 

Bans by themselves sound good. Because it means that the stuff will be trapped here, but it’s trapped in the wrong places. It’s still a distribution problem, and a distribution problem means you have to address the distribution system. And unless and until you do that, the conversation is just in the wrong place.

U.S. Sanctions on Iran Take a New Approach

Flags of the United States and Iran blending. Licensed by Envato Elements

The U.S. has just announced that it will remove any company or country caught servicing Iranian-owned aircraft from the U.S. dollar system. But these sanctions don’t target the IRGC or regime; instead, they impact everyday Iranians in the hope of stirring up a rebellion against the regime.

While regime change is unlikely, the effectiveness of these sanctions will largely depend upon Chinese adoption. Without Chinese goods, Iran would be in quite the pickle. And we might even find out China’s stance in the coming days, as Trump and Xi Jinping meet in Washington.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today is the 22nd of September. You’ll be seeing this on the 23rd. The news today is the U.S. Treasury Secretary Bessent, has just announced new sanctions on not specifically Iranian aircraft and airlines, but anyone who might do business with them. Basically, if an Iranian owned aircraft lands anywhere in the world, anyone who provides assistance with ticketing, with boarding, with air traffic control, with fuel, with maintenance, anything is immediately purged from the US dollar system. 

The intent is basically to deny all access. Now, this is not a sanction that is designed to pressure the regime because the regime can always, you know, jump on somebody else’s aircraft Chinese, Russian, whatever. And most of them don’t leave the country anyway because….they’re not nice people. This is about targeting the population. We’ve seen a lot of measures like this over the last couple of months, as the Trump administration has come to the conclusion that pretty much everything that can be sanctioned on Iran has been sanctioned for the better part of the last 40 years. And they’re coming up dry with efforts to find other ways to put pressure on Iran overall. So the theory now is let’s try to make life as difficult for the Iranian population as possible so that they will rebel and overthrow the government. That’s a very tall order. Not only has it failed so far this year, with several attempts, complete with the Iranian government killing several tens of thousands of their own people as a result. But the stack is really high. The Iranian military combined with the IRGC, which is the paramilitary arm of the government, has well over a million people under arms, and it’s not designed to invade their neighbors. It is designed to occupy their own country to prevent the various groups of Iran from rising up. Keep in mind that even after thousands of years of ethnic consolidation, only about 50% of the Iranian population is actually Persian. The rest is Kurds and Balochis and other things. So internal security has always been first and foremost the concern of the Iranian government and Persia before it going back to antiquity. We’ve only had a half a dozen regime changes in human history in this part of the world. And to trigger another one is going to be really, really difficult. 

We’ve seen lots of other measures that the US government has done in the last couple of months. My favorite one is graduate standardized testing. You can’t take the GRE in Iran anymore, but it gives you an idea of how few levers there are if you actually want to change the government. 

Anyway, the real open question here is whether or not every country in the world is going to agree to do this. So far, most companies and most countries have already signed on, maybe grudgingly. But the real outside question is, of course, China, which is the primary source for most of the manufactured goods that flow into Iran. Up to and including the parts that they need for their drones. 

Now let’s see, I’m recording this on the 22nd. You’re going to see it on the 23rd. On the 24th. Chairman Xi Jinping of China is going to actually be in Washington for bilateral talks with Trump. And the technical term for what’s going to happen here is a shit show. On the American side, the Trump administration has systematically gutted all of the institutions that helped the president make decisions. So whether it’s the CIA or the State Department or the NSC, their staff was gutted last year. They were never rebuilt. And so all of the normal things that the American president would get on economics and culture and the political maneuvering within China, he’s not getting. Keep in mind that this is not just a China thing. Over half of the world’s country don’t have an American ambassador right now. China does. But the point is that Trump is coming into this as the least informed president for any summit in American history, and that will obviously color what comes out of it. But don’t get overly excited because Xi is not in much of a better position. Because Xi purged all of these systems a decade ago and has been operating in the dark in most international affairs, basically just working off of propaganda. So we’re going to get two of the most powerful people in human history who are also among the least informed leaders in human history, trying to hash out the details when they don’t have any of the details in Washington in 48 hours. It’s going to be a delightful negotiation, which means that the Americans are roughly unaware of what’s going on in China. The Chinese are roughly unaware of what’s going on in the United States. And if you happen to be someone in the middle like Iran, you might just manage to slip through unnoticed because it’s not up to the teams, because there aren’t teams. It’s just these two really arrogant and increasingly isolated men, pretending that they know what’s going on. 

Wow. There’s going to be a show.