Demographic Lessons from the Mongols

cutouts of children and families

Massive population shocks are nothing new; just look at the Mongol invasions or the Black Death. But is the demographic collapse of today comparable to those historic cases? Or are we staring down the barrel of something entirely new?

Well, we’re not going to get a step-by-step guide by looking back at the Mongol invasions and Black Death, but there is a lesson in there. The collapse happens fast (relatively speaking). The building back and transitional times…that happens over generations.

So, demographic collapse isn’t the end; it’s the start of a long and painful process of finding a new system that works. Japan, China, Germany, and Russia will do a bit of guinea pigging for the rest of the world, but everyone’s heading there eventually.

Transcript

Hey, all, happy autumn from Colorado. Peter Zeihan here. Today we are taking a question from the Patreon crowd specifically. Could I take a look at the demographic decline that’s going on today and compare it to past periods where there’s been population collapses, specifically, the Mongol invasion of the 1200s and the Black Death of the 1300s. Okay. 

Great idea. I’m not sure we’re gonna be able to draw too many comparisons here, but I’ll give you my thinking. Which shapes why I’m very circumspect when it comes to specific forecasts based on demographics. The situation we’re in today is because of industrialization. We all started to urbanize, which means we all started to have fewer kids because on the farm, kids are free labor in the city. 

They’re just an expense. And people can do math, which means that over the course of the next ten year period before 2035, about half of the developed world, plus China is basically going to age into an environment where our economics models don’t work anymore, and they’re all looking at some sort of national, civic or economic collapse going to be pretty ugly beyond that. 

So let’s start with the Mongols. Among us were some scary dudes. And when they started rampaging across Asia and getting to the eastern rim of Europe, they had such a reputation that people ran before them literally until they could get to what is today Poland, because in Poland there were forests. And when the Mongols would charge into the forest, they couldn’t really operate as horsemen. 

They had to dismount. And then all of a sudden they were numbered 100 to 1. So Poland was kind of where the line was. And then, we had a government change among the Mongols. It was a clan based structure. And when Big Papa died, all the little boys went back to Mongolia and basically had an argument over who was going to be the next big papa. And that triggered, civil unrest and basically led to the end of the Mongol Empire. 

Later, a few decades, a new government rose on the scene called the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Basically, Poland and Lithuania, had some neighbors, the Latvians, the Germans, whatever. And when they went into those lands, they discovered that there was resistance. 

But if they went east, the lands were almost completely empty. So they started going east, and then they found one another and they had a little spat as expanding empires do. They cut a deal. They formed the Commonwealth, and over the next century they became the largest, most sophisticated political and economic structure that Europe had known to that point. 

So clearing the decks demographically can generate something new and maybe even something wonderful if you can get through the transition. The second example is, if anything, even more poignant. That’s the Black Death. When rats carried by traitors spread bubonic plague. Went throughout all of Europe. 

And based on where you were, either one third of your population died, if you were lucky or maybe even over half, that generated a different sort of transformation. largely because of population dynamics. Even after the Black Plague swept through western and southern Europe, these areas had higher population densities than the lands east of Poland did before the Mongols arrived. So these places suffered hugely. But they weren’t emptied out and what they discovered is to maintain the bones of civilization, much less build something new. 

Nobody had enough skilled labor to handle the metal of the wood or whatever it happened to be. So from the Colonel, survivors of skilled labor, we saw an explosion in training, as everyone had to figure out how to do more with less. That’s another word for technology. And so we triggered the Renaissance, which led in time to the Age of Discovery and ultimately the industrial age. 

So both of these examples are great for showing how demographic collapse isn’t the end. But you have to keep a few things in mind. Number one, it takes some time in the case of, the Mongol invasion, for example, it was roughly 1240, 1242, I think, when the Mongols went home and never came back. Poland, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth wasn’t finalized until like 150 years later. 

So, you know, you’re talking 3 to 5 generations of time where you basically had a lot of empty, the area would have been called something like marches. In the case of the Renaissance and the Black Plague, it was faster because the population wasn’t wiped out, but still, Black Plague hit about 1350. It wasn’t until 1400 that the Renaissance got going, and the Age of Discovery started 50 to 100 years after that. 

But for that to shape the general political environment took a lot longer. During this time, during the dark Ages, which was, you know, at this point, almost 800 years in, it was a horrible system, but it was stable. The most powerful country in the world was Ottoman Turkey, because they had a defensible core in the Sea of Marmara region, and they had access to multiple maritime routes of expansion, the Levant, the Aegean Sea into the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and especially the Danube. 

And they would basically expand down those maritime routes. When the Age of Discovery clashed with the Ottomans, the first time it happenedwas in 1529. You know, it’s a couple centuries after the Black Plague and it was indeterminate. 

In the meantime, you had the Age of Discovery continuing with the Portuguese and eventually the Spanish, discovering the new world, stitching together new routes, the old world technology generally progressing, and it would in time overpower the Ottomans. 

But the high water point for the Ottomans didn’t happen until the late 1600s. And it was another century after that, until you got the revolutions of 1787 that actually broke Ottoman power. And even then, the Ottoman Empire lasted for another 40 years before ultimately dying in World War one takes a lot of time for stable systems to unspool. 

So when you’re using these lessons and looking at our near future, yes, the demographic transition from our point of view is going to be very fast the next ten years, or it’s going to be lightning fast and the collapse of individual systems, we’re going to feel in our bones, but waiting for something that is stable to replace it on the other side. 

That requires inventing new models. Ever since the Age of Discovery, we’ve become inured to this idea that the patterns are permanent for every year except for 1 or 2 of the last 500, the human population has gotten bigger. And because of that, economic models that favor expansion do really well. That’s socialism, capitalism, fascism and communism. But if the population starts to shrink, those models aren’t going to make sense anymore. 

And we’re gonna have to invent something new. And the places that have to deal with that first are the ones where the demographic decline is going to come first and be fastest, and the countries on my list for that, that really matter are Japan, China, Germany and Russia, in no particular order. And if you know anything about the histories of those four countries, when they get insecure, things get a little exciting. 

So I can guarantee you that things are going to change. I can guarantee you that the models which we run our economic systems by are going to be different. What I can’t tell you is when this is going to settle out, because I’m probably not going to be around anymore at that point.

Can 3D Printing Save US Manufacturing?

A 3D printer

We’re entering an era where restructuring global manufacturing will be non-negotiable. As supply chains collapse and tariffs complicate this process, can technology like 3D printing take some of the pressure off?

Investments in US manufacturing have declined under Trump’s protectionist policies, since relocating abroad can help avoid the tariff rabbit hole. 3D printing offers a promising solution for reshoring some of that manufacturing, but it’s too inefficient for large-scale production as of now.

As 3D printing improves and finds niches that align, this could be a disruptive technology. However, we won’t be replacing mass manufacturing with these printers anytime soon.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here. Walking down Indian Creek on my way out. Dreaming of Mexican food. But you know that’s not going to get satiated. Because there’s no good Mexican food anywhere near Denver. Anywhere. Today we’re taking a question from the Patreon crowd. And specifically, it’s, building off of some of the concerns that I’ve had with manufacturing. 

The short version is that the more complex the manufacturing system is, the more countries are involved. So when you put tariffs on the import of manufactured goods, either the finished product or the parts, what you’re basically saying is I don’t want to participate in the supply chain because it’s cheaper for everyone to move their production base out of your country. 

And then just import the finished product at the end of the day. Otherwise they have to pay the tariffs two, three, four, ten times. It’s one of the reasons why, the Trump tariffs are actually reducing investment in physical plant in the United States and reducing the amount of manufacturing products that we’re actually producing anyway. The follow on question from that is, is there a technology out there that might help us to get around that? 

And there, there might there might be, something called 3D printing. Basically, you take a powdered substrate, whether it’s a plastic or a metal, and then you sinter it with a laser, and grow a product. It’s often called additive manufacturing as well, instead of subtractive manufacturing. So subtractive manufacturing was more like punch holes and things. And you start with a block of material and you whittle it down until you have what you need. 

Additive manufacturing or 3D manufacturing? 3D printing is the opposite as you build it up layer by layer. Now, there are plenty of things that this looks very promising for. But the key thing to remember is if it has moving parts, especially moving parts that are different materials. It’s not that this technology cannot be used, it’s just that there are some pretty sharp limits materials, printers that can handle more than one type of material are pretty new, really just in the last 510 years. 

And the speed at which you can do things like this is very slow. So it’s very popular in things like, prototyping where every prototype is unique and then it doesn’t matter if it takes you hours to days to print the product. It’s also very popular in things where, abnormal shapes rule. So especially if you need a lot of strength but not a lot of weight. 

So you’re going to leave holes or bubbles within the material. So for aerospace, there are actually examples of 3D printers already on production floors and to a lesser degree in automotive as well. But the big thing to keep in mind here, speed, in the time that it takes you to stamp 100 products, you’re probably only going to make one 3D printed product, and so while 3D printing is getting incrementally better day by day and that’s great. 

And while it will undoubtedly, as the cost of manufactured products go up, as the globalization kicks in, it will obviously find more and more niches, where it’s the applicable technology, but it will always be coming from behind when it comes to mass application because of that speed issue. So I like the technology. I like the way it’s going. 

We should hurry up and get there.

The AI Race to Regression

The Open AI chatGPT logo on a phone

The AI race has been all the rage, but what if we were racing ourselves straight into regression?

OpenAI’s ChatGPT-5 is extremely powerful; however, it’s less user-friendly than its predecessor and is optimized for institutional users. Industrial and research applications are where the real power of AI lies. So, what happens when those energy-intensive data centers begin to falter?

Well, as globalization breaks down, that faltering is going to become a very real concern. Without an ecosystem that produces and shares all of the necessary components to make these AI behemoths run…we could see a technological regression that threatens the future of AI as we know it.

Transcript

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here coming to you from McCurdy peak. Well, the actual peak is there. Anyway, Peter Zane Company from Colorado. Today we’re taking another question from the Patreon page. Specifically, can you please explain to me this new space age that we’re in the race for artificial intelligence, and what we should look for, what we should worry about? 

Well, let’s start by saying that most of the things that people are talking about with AI are generally, not quite on the mark, for example, a lot of folks think that, OpenAI, that’s the premier artificial intelligence company in United States, that their new program chat, GPT or 5.0, which is supposedly an upgrade, is actually a significant downgrade. 

They find it not as user friendly, not as personable, not as complete. That’s for personal users. AI affects potentially thousands of different applications, and how most people interact with artificial intelligence is in some sort of first person single seat. interface. Like what you get on your phone or your laptop. 

I mean, I’ve got that way too. And the jump from chat GPT four to GPT five was not designed for your single user. It was designed for people who do code for people who designed drugs. It’s designed to bring a huge amount of processing power to things on the back end to basically recreate something. So the institutional users, the design users, they’re actually finding ChatGPT all kinds of fun. 

And some Altmann, who is the CEO of open AI, is going back and kind of taking some characteristics from ChatGPT for to put it in the chat, GPT five, in order to make everybody happy. So that’s all going to work out. Here’s the problem. Software versus hardware. If I’m going to really sum it up, it’s that 

Chat GPT for the algorithm that we all found so groundbreaking really only took up about ten terabytes. And you could easily carry that on thumb drives in your hand. Chat GPT five, more advanced, is at least twice that, probably three times. But OpenAI is not saying. So we don’t know that number for sure. 

The point is, in terms of the raw memory required to make the AI function, it’s really not that impressive. And so if, the corporate espionage or an act of benevolence, OpenAI were to lose control of the algorithm and it got out there in the wild, so to speak, it really could be used by almost anyone. What makes a AI function in the way that we think of it today? 

Not this Skynet future thing, but how it is now requires massive amounts of processing power at data centers. The largest data centers that the world has ever seen are needed in order to deal with the inflow of requests that come in, run the algorithm and spit out the results. Which means that the limiting factor, for the moment, in artificial intelligence isn’t the software, it’s the hardware. 

And this is where we have a really big problem, and it’s not that far away. The ability to make the high end processing chips that Taiwan is famous for, requires, 100,000 steps, 30,000 pieces, 9000 companies, and they’re scattered around the world. The single biggest concentration is then the United States, which is something Americans conveniently forget when they’re talking about sovereignty. 

Number two, concentration is on the Taiwan centric zone. The single most important company is in the Netherlands, but it has facilities in Germany and in Austria and in California, in Japan. But you’re never going to be able to do the chips at all without all of these steps. And a lot of them are single point failures. 

So if you have any degree of globalization, it doesn’t matter really what the countries. It falls out of work. We can’t make them at all. And for the chips that we already have, life span when they’re in a data center is typically in the 3 to 6 year range. So when we get to the point where we realize that we can’t make the chips, we’re going to have a bit of a scramble to see who can control what’s left. 

And then the ability to use AI will shrink from something that you can all have on your phone to simply the handful of entities, whether governments or corporations, that are capable of having their own data center so they can run by themselves and that will be it. Until we reinvent the entire ecosystem and what we have been seeing with most government efforts around the world, including the United States, to reassure the sort of manufacturing it only focuses on the fabrication facilities, which is what is in Taiwan. 

It ignores the design, it ignores the material inputs, it ignores the photo mask, it ignores the wiring, ignores everything else that goes into a successful chip, much less the downstream stuff like testing and packaging that ultimately makes the stuff that ends up in a data center. No one, to my knowledge, is putting any effort into actually bringing the entire ecosystem under one roof, and I honestly don’t even think it would be possible anyway. 

There are too many pieces. There are too many players. And and if you’re looking at the United States, there are not enough technicians that are capable of doing it because we already have record low unemployment levels. So we are in a moment right now where AI is possible with ChatGPT 5.0 and all the rest that will not last. 

And in the not too distant future, we are going to see a technological regression as we lose the ability to make the hardware. And since it took us 60 years to figure out how to do that in the first place, it’s not something that we’re going to do in a season is going to take a mastery. Industrialization process of different parts of the world to do different things, coming together in different ways. 

And that is something that I am not looking forward to. But we’re going to see at the beginning of that within this next decade.

The Fourth Shale Revolution: Supermajor Tech

ExxonMobil neon sign at a gas station

ExxonMobil has introduced a new type of proppant that might just spark the next US shale revolution.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Los Angeles on the California coast. And today we’re to talk a little bit about oil. There have been a couple of technological breakthroughs that I think are worthy of mentioning in the shale era. So ExxonMobil, big company, one of the largest players in the world, produces just under 5 million barrels a day. 

Has basically started mucking around with something called prop. So dial back…Hydraulic fracturing or fracking was basically how the United States produces 80% or more of its crude oil these days, as well as the vast majority of its natural gas. It’s not a fringe technology. It’s the backbone. What you do is you drill down vertically, and then you make a horizontal split that goes two, three, four, maybe even five miles. 

And then you inject water that is laced with sand. The water hydraulics, does not compress under pressure. So it cracks the rock apart. And then the water goes in with the sand and accesses tiny, tiny, tiny, tiny little deposits of petroleum. Then you stop the pumping. And because those tiny pockets of petroleum have now been exposed, they produce a back pressure that pushes the water out, but the sand stays lodged in the cracks, keeping them open so the flow can continue. 

The sand is called it, and it’s one of the biggest expenses in a fracking operation. Well, what ExxonMobil has now done is change the prop and is triggering what is basically the fourth shale revolution back backstory for that first shale revolution is when we figured out how to do this and brought out natural gas. The second shale revolution is when we figured out how to do this to bring out liquid oil. 

The third is when we built the infrastructure. Things like LNG facilities or chemical facilities or refineries to metabolize all this raw product where we’re now producing all of that stuff, all of that’s in the past. Fourth Revolution is taking the capital and the technological skillsets of the majors, like Exxon, and applying them for a whole new generation of technology. 

So one of the weird things about the shale revolution is when it started most of the super majors and kind of written off the American oil patch, and we had seen oil output from the United States dropped to historical lows well over the last century and a half. 

What that meant is we had small mom and pops that were doing everything, and they were trying everything they could come up with in order to get incremental increases. 

And that’s what generated the first few million barrels a day. Well, as time went on, oil does what oil does. And it rises and it falls and it rises and falls. And so we got a series of busts, and ExxonMobil was able to come in with its better capital position and buy up a lot of the smaller companies, to the point that it and Chevron now dominate the space and collectively produce almost 9 million barrels a day. 

Now you apply what Exxon has across its entire value chain, and you get a very different proposition. So for profit, specifically what we’re talking about today, they went into their refineries and they found waste product, something called petroleum coke. And they were able to manufacture that into a kind of a synthetic sand, if you will. The profit is where a lot of experiment has been going on and a lot of subsectors for the last several years, and you got some pretty expensive stuff that’s called ceramics called ceramics. 

It is ceramics. Petroleum coke is cheaper than that, more expensive than sand. But the real advantages it has that it’s a lot less dense, maybe 40, 50% less dense than sand, which means you can suspend it in the water better, which means it pushes into the formation better, which means it holds open cracks deeper in the formation. 

And for a small increase in cost, using what used to be a waste product. Exxon has seen their numbers increase by 10 to 20 to maybe even 30% in some wells. And that alone changes the math of the shale revolution a ten to a 30% increase in output for only a slim investment in what was a waste product. 

That’s amazing. And so the shale revolution is nowhere near done. You’ll hear people saying that eventually the shale revolution going to run out. There’s only much oil, but that misses the point. In the pre shale era, we were able to access about 10%, 9 to 10% of global energy reserves. There’s a lot down there that we just don’t have the technology to get to. 

The shale revolution doubled the percentage of what was accessible within the US space. So we’re talking about 150 years of output. All of a sudden we have access to something like that again. And we keep making these incremental increases, like with profit, that pushes the horizon back even further. So the shale revolution continues to set new records for output, adding somewhere between a half a million and a million barrels a day per year, and has now been doing that since 2009. 

You get a lot of output when you do it for that long. So this year is not the last year the shale revolution. Neither is next year or the year after or the year after that. 

Because the numbers keep getting better, the technology keeps pushing further, and the break even cost for what it takes to get a chunk of oil out in an economically viable way keeps going down.

Crippling the Kremlin with Russian Sanctions

landscape of the kremlin in Moscow, Russia

The Trump administration’s sanctions on Russia’s energy sector are proving to be more substantive than the other policies we’ve seen.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re talking about the sanctions that the Trump administration has put on the Russian energy sector, most notably on Rosneft, which is a state oil monopoly near monopoly, and Lukoil, which is the largest technically private company, but is really indirectly run by the state as well. A couple weeks back, the Trump administration put punitive tariffs on the two companies, saying that, no one can deal with them at all. 

And, if they do, they can’t deal with the United States or access the US dollar. And since all, crude traded internationally, well, well over 99.9% of it is exchanged in the US dollar. That basically means being shut off from global finance, among other things. We’ve had a few developments. First, a minor one with Hungary, Hungary’s president, Viktor Orban, who is, well, it’s kind of a weird cat anyway. 

He is an anti European anti-American pro Russian stooge, is the very short and to be perfectly honest, not particularly biased view. He’s been, working to sabotage sanctions on all things Russia and embargoes on all things Russian ever since the Ukraine war started, and has actually said that, if the Russian troops were in Kiev, they’d probably be better for Hungary because Hungary wants a piece of Ukraine as well. 

Anyway, he was in the white House and managed to, Sweet talk his way into getting an exemption from the sanctions. Hungary has been basically using and gorging upon Russian crude for the entirety of the Ukraine war and has been trading, exemptions to European sanctions and tariffs and such, in order to maintain access in exchange for letting the Europeans do what they want more broadly with the Ukraine question. 

And he was able to repeat that feat with Donald Trump this past week. I wouldn’t count on that lasting because no country that borders Hungary has a similar exception. So now that the sanctions are in place, there won’t be Russian oil or natural gas flowing through Ukraine to Hungary and even things like nuclear fuel are gonna have to be flown direct, but they’re going to have to be flown around the war zone that is Ukraine. 

And if you have radioactive material in your plane that trigger some other issues anyway. So, the Ukrainians are saying it’s a permanent exemption, that the Trump administration is saying it’s a 12 month exemption. The, the disconnect between the two is pretty typical for Trump’s deals on anything, and how the Hungarians are going to be squeezed out of this. 

It’s not a real problem. There is no alternate infrastructures that comes in through Slovakia or especially through Croatia. So they’re going to be fine. So it’s temporary issue. The broader issue is that Lukoil is actually an international company, whereas Rosneft’s holdings are all domestic. And for Lukoil, who holds assets in the United States, a lot of fuel stations. Or oil fields in Iraq. You’re actually talking about a substantial amount of production and financially viable assets that they’re going to have to now dump. Now, they were planning on selling them to a trading company based in Switzerland called governor. Now, governor was this is kind of funny. It’s a shell game. 

Back in 2014, the first time the Russians invaded Ukraine, governor was set up by a Russian who was affiliated with Lukoil. And then he immediately sold all of his shares to his Swedish partner because he knew he was going to be sanctioned. And it’s been operating as an independent, independent trading, platform ever since. The whole time it’s basically been a front for the Kremlin. 

And so the feeling was that governor was just going to buy all the assets. The Trump administration still hasn’t staffed up. Almost a year into its administration. And if you want to actually have a sanctions regime that is meaningful, you have to have a staff on it full time to deal with all the loopholes that will pop up. 

That’s been a big one. Well, the Treasury Department under Treasury Secretary percent, figure that all do all by themselves or with some help. I don’t really care how. And have already said that they oppose the sale to governor. So the assets are going to have to be split up on a national basis and sold more viably to get away from Russian influence, which is, you know, great. 

This is the first time in any sort of economic policy out of this administration that there seems to have been any awareness of some of the political and economic realities at the ground level. Normally we get a big broad tariff policy and then countries figure out how to get around it. The Chinese certainly have done that over and over and over again. 

But at least on this one point, the Russians have not. And that is absolutely worth noting. And giving credit where credit is due. Let’s see. There was one more. Oh, yeah. Rosneft has is a state monopoly. It’s technically incompetent. It really has very few petroleum engineers, and it’s gotten to where it is as being the biggest company in Russia by absorbing the assets of other people who have, from time to time fallen a foul of the Kremlin. 

Maybe that’s Yukos, which was run by a one time Russian oligarch. Maybe that’s T and CPP, which was a partnership that was part owned by British Petroleum. They just call themselves BP now. Anyway, it’s expansion through government thuggery rather than the traditional methods. Well, that that’s now reached its peak because there are a number of projects that Rosneft is involved in and is technically the operator that it can’t operate. 

It can only run the projects with foreign partners who are doing most of the technical lifting. And the biggest and most important of those is something called Sakhalin. Now that’s an island off in the Russian Far East, just north of Japan, that produces some of the world’s most difficult to produce crude oil in league with a company called Exxon, and which produces liquefied natural gas with a couple of Japanese companies, Mitsu and Mitsubishi. 

Well, now that the sanctions are in place, the Russians are going to have to run Sakhalin themselves, and they don’t know how to do offshore, and they don’t know how to do liquefied natural gas. And they certainly can’t operate in the Sakhalin environment. So here we’ve got a project that is the single largest dollar item of foreign investment into Russia ever. 

That’s probably going to shut down over the next few months because the Russians can’t operate it themselves. Unless, of course, there’s something that weird goes on where Exxon, for example, gets an exemption to the sanctions, which I don’t find likely. Anyway, that’s the money. Russia, most of which is pretty good for Ukraine and honestly, broadly positive for the United States as well. 

So, you know, mazel tov.

Myanmar Is More Important Than You Think

Flag of Myanmar waving in the wind

For a country that doesn’t get much attention, Myanmar matters much more than most realize.

While caught in a civil war for decades, Myanmar has a whole lot going for it. It sits between India and Thailand, it’s a low-cost labor center, and it has a navigable river. Add all that up, and you’ve got the perfect replacement for low-end global supply chains when China goes belly up. And if the election goes well in December, things might get even better.

Myanmar is also punching above its weight class in geopolitical importance. In the eyes of Beijing, they are an attractive land outlet to the Indian Ocean and access to Middle Eastern energy. With the military juntas in Myanmar favoring China and elected governments favoring the West, the coming election could tip the scales and shake up logistics for Beijing.

Transcript

Hey all. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Wren chair, a creek in Yosemite where I have my own personal beach and pool resort. Quite refreshing and a little chilly. Anyway, today we’re going to talk about Myanmar, which, of course, makes some of you say, what the hell is a Myanmar? And why would I care? Well, let me tell you, Myanmar is a country in Southeast Asia, sandwiched between the part of India that India doesn’t like to talk about. 

And Thailand. It is well, it’s having a really nasty civil war again. Has been for decades, honestly. And we now have news that on the 28th of December, the ruling junta, a military group, has decided that they’re going to hold elections again. And this is important for the three reasons that you should care. Number one, if we are going to move into a world beyond China, the Chinese are dying. 

So we need to. But if we still want stuff, we need to build out as robust of manufacturing supply chains outside of mainland China as we possibly can. Myanmar can be a huge part of that. It’s already part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. But 

Unlike Malaysia or Thailand or Singapore, it’s not particularly advanced in Vietnam, long since left it in the dust. However, all types of manufacturing that are going to be economically viable require a multi-step manufacturing supply chain step, something that some policymakers sometimes forget. And that means you need someone on the low end to do things like assembly in Myanmar is perfectly set up for that. 

So if we’re going to have a reasonable chance of still having manufactured goods in a post China world, Myanmar, it would really help if they were part of the solution. That’s one. Number two. Like I said, there’s a civil war going on. And because of that, you’ve got lots of secondary groups, minorities that are basically massively funding their operations through the heroin trade. 

Well, in the past, when the military’s giving up power to central control, the war has died down and some of the heroin production and smuggling has died down with it. So yes, yes, yes, Americans love their meth. They love their fentanyl. The cocaine. But we like heroin too. And anything that constrains the supply, I would say, is a good thing. 

And then the third reason why it matters is China directly. If China is ever going to escape parts of its geography, it really needs another outlet to the world. Right now, its entire population is basically on the eastern coast. And just off the coast is something called the first island chain. Japan. Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia. 

Countries that are, for all practical purposes, Informal if not formal U.S. allies. And so China has never, ever been able to punch through the chain in any meaningful way. They would take a Navy as powerful as the US Navy, which they are nowhere close to even try. So what about an alternative on land? 

Now, going through Russia sucks because it’s you know, Russia and they can’t be trusted by anyone. But Myanmar provides an opportunity to not only bypass the Strait of Malacca, but get closer to, say, the oil fields of the Middle East. So in the past, when the military has been in control, relations with the Chinese have been pretty good, even though the civil war boils right up to China’s border. 

But when the military gives up power and the civilian authorities take over, then it’s a little bit different. And generally China gets shafted, loses all its investments, and Myanmar opens to the west. That’s what happened about 12, 13 years ago when I was writing The Accidental Superpower. So there’s a section on Myanmar in that book. If, if, if, if in December, real elections actually happen. 

I see no reason why that shouldn’t happen again. So having a military dictatorship in Myanmar is something that the Chinese actually like, because they know who to talk to you. They know that, you know, you don’t have to change policy every election. Now, I don’t want you to get overexcited here. Democracy in Myanmar looks different than it does anywhere else. 

This is a country where the Burman people are largely in the center of the country, along the Irrawaddy River. To be perfectly blunt, the military is all Burman and they’re wildly racist. And that’s one of the reasons why the Civil War is going. And the last time we had elections and this woman by the name of Onion Suu Kyi, one who had been a dissident for quite some time, policy towards the minorities didn’t change at all. 

The Burman are pretty nasty with all of the minorities in the country. So I don’t want to suggest this is a once and done and not part of a process, but it would definitely be a step in the right direction. One more thing to keep in mind. Almost unique in Asia. Certainly in Southeast Asia.  

There is a river, that goes right through the Burma territory, called the Irrawaddy. And it is one of only a handful of navigable waterways in the, in the Asian landmass. So not only would the skill set for manufacturing be kind of like a 1980s Mexico, you know, relatively low skilled, relatively low education, but really, really cheap. You also have the possibility, because of the navigable waterway, of moving cargo back and forth really, really cheaply. 

So from an infrastructure point of view, would be really easy to build out Myanmar if the politics align. We’ll find out in December.

The Semiconductor Frontier

Semiconductor being made

We’ve discussed how essential semiconductors are in our increasingly technological world, so here’s an update on ASML’s new High-NA EUV lithography machines.

ASML already builds the most advanced chipmaking tools, but these new models could enable chip designs at 1 nanometer or even smaller. Intel is betting on this new technology and could have mass manufacturing by the end of the decade, which would change the competitive landscape with TSMC. SK Hynix is similarly prepping new tech for these memory chips, which could give it the leg up on Samsung.

If it works, that is.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado, today we are taking a question from the Patreon crowd. Specifically, if I could give an update on what’s going on with the new EUV machines that are coming out of the Dutch from ASML. Background, for those of you who don’t follow this, ASML is the company that makes the lithography machines that make high end semiconductors possible. 

Very, very, very short version. It’s basically a machine about the size of a bus that makes a tiny little laser that operates at an accuracy that is smaller than a DNA strand and allows you to etch semiconductors at the nanometer level. EUV in its current form can go down to about three nanometers below that. It basically loses coherence. And so there’s a new machine called a high numerical aperture that, in theory, can take you down to one nanometer and even below. 

And the idea is that the smaller you can edge your transistors, the more processing power you can cram onto a piece of silicon. And the more powerful the semiconductor on the other side can be. So EUV is a technology that’s been around since 2012, 2014 somewhere in there. And it was grabbed by what was then the industry underdog, which was TSMC in Taiwan. 

And over the course of the next several years, they leaped ahead of who the old industry leader had been. And that was America’s Intel. Now we’ve got the flip side. TSMC is reserving the right to maybe buy one of these new machines, the high end machines. But it is Intel that’s now betting their future on the new technology, hoping that they can repeat the feat that TSMC did and once again become the world leader. 

They have two of those machines are at their Hillsboro facility. They’re currently cranking out about. Well, their goal is to crank out about 10,000 chips a month, which is very, very, very small scale. They’re very much still in the testing phase. And it is just simply too soon to know if a this technology will work and be what its effects will be, and the be what its effects will be is really the question here. 

When we went from duv. Deep ultraviolet, which was the old technology, this is what the Chinese have still to EUV, which is now the standard for premium chips. 

The nature of semiconductor has changed because it wasn’t just about cramming more into less space, it was making them more energy efficient, was doing things with the architecture eventually leading to stacked chips. 

And so it wasn’t just a linear jump. And there’s possibility that with high end A, we will have another linear jump that will leave all the chips that that we make today behind, but we don’t know that until we have our first mass manufacturing run, that at the soonest will be at the end of calendar year 2026, and that will just be with a couple machines. 

Then we will have to have the industrial build out to build more of these machines. And these machines cost significantly more than a commercial aircraft. And then you’ll have to put them into the facilities and you have to start designing chips with the new hardware in mind. 

So we probably wouldn’t have enough chips to matter in a way that would really move the needle technologically before 2029 or 2030. That’d be more than enough to revive Intel’s fortune. But, you know, if, if, if, if then, there is one other company in the world that is trying out this new technology. 

It’s out of South Korea. It’s, SK Hynix, which is the company that makes the best, Dram chips. Those are memory chips. So what Intel does what TSMC does, those are GPUs. Those are processors. And those are important. But you have to pair it with a memory chip. And the Koreans excel at that. So as to the Dram side, SK Hynix is an industry leader, along with Samsung. They recently overtook Samsung in terms of total output, but in terms of quality, they’re pretty much neck and neck. And so now one of them has DNA and one of them doesn’t, if Na fails, I don’t think it’s going to be a disaster for this case. 

SK Hynix are already a fantastic company. But Samsung does have more capital coming up behind them. But really, what’s going on in Korea is nothing compared to the drama between Intel and TSMC. 

So let me give you a worst case. Best case for Intel. Worst case, this doesn’t work, in which case Intel is merely the second best chip manufacturer in the world. Americans get really pouty when they’re not number one, but this is still a solid company. And honestly, there are a lot more pieces of a supply chain under the hood of Intel than there are, in TSMC. The TSMC folks are great at what they do, but they basically follow the instructions that the designers gave them, and then they do the construction and everything in order to make the fabs function. 

But the real high value added work is done somewhere else. Intel does more of these steps, more like a traditional conglomerate, which means that they’re probably not as efficient at any individual one of them. But of the 100,000 supply chain steps that go into making a high and semiconductor, they have a higher proportion of them under their roof, probably as many as a quarter. 

So if this doesn’t work, Intel is fine. If it does work, TSMC doesn’t slip. They’re still making the chips that make today’s, silicon revolution possible. But then we also get a new frontier. The only caution I have is that currently, it takes a 100,000 supply chain steps to make a high end semiconductor with the high end American Aperture technology. 

We really don’t know what that supply chain is going to look like, but it would be very strange if it was simpler. So this is already the industry that is the most overextended and dependent on globalization and threatened by Trump’s tariffs threatened by the fall of globalization and threatened by the demographic crash. The idea it’s going to be with us from ten years from now is a stretch. 

But there is a little sliver of hope that, based on what the supply chains for high end are, maybe, maybe unlikely, but maybe it’ll be a little bit simpler. The first that we will have a good grip on, what that will look like will be in about a year.

New Strategies in the Ukraine War

Photos of military vehicles in Ukraine at night

The strategies implemented by Russia and Ukraine are shifting once again.

Russia has shifted away from targeting Ukraine’s power grid and is now striking rail infrastructure instead. These mobile targets are harder to defend, and the fallout is much worse for Ukraine’s energy and logistics networks. The Russians are also closing in on Pokrovsk; this city has been a key transport hub for Ukraine, and losing it will be a major setback.

The Ukrainians are strategizing as well. Strikes are penetrating deeper into Russian territory, hitting oil infrastructure and ports. The shadow fleet tankers are included in the target list, which could open a new can of worms for the Russians and countries backing their oil trade.

These shifts have the potential to reshape not only the war in Ukraine but also global energy markets.

Transcript

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado, today we’re taking a look at some of the new things that are happening on the Ukraine front. Three big. Number one. The Russians have changed their strategy when it comes to bombing civilian targets across Ukraine. For the last three years, they’ve been going after power plants, capacitors, transformers, that sort of thing. 

Natural gas transport infrastructure, substations, all all that. What they’ve discovered is that when you’re willing to do things that are not OSHA approved, there’s only so much you can do. So yes, they can knock off the power over and over and over and over again. But the Ukrainians get a little cheap equipment. It’s been imported. 

They, tie some wires together, and the power comes back on. So I don’t mean to suggest for a second that the Russians have. It inflicted a great deal of pain on the Ukrainian population, but it hasn’t had nearly the impact. I thought that it was going to have. And while, the Ukrainians have power that’s off every day, it hasn’t been able to shut the country down in the way that the Russians thought they were going to be able to. 

Also, whenever you go after a power plant, it’s a known location. And while that means it can’t dodge, it also means you can in place, anti-missile and anti-drone defenses and the Ukrainians have gotten incrementally better at that. Bit by bit by bit over the last four years as well. So they’re changing strategy. The Russians are now going after the rail network and specifically the rolling stock, because you can’t have a fixed offense on a train that’s moving. 

So the Russians basically figure out what the train schedules are and then send a fleet of drones and specifically go after, the engines. These are a lot harder to replace. They’re a lot more expensive. And a lot of Ukraine’s power grid now, because of damage to the natural gas transport system, has been coming from coal, the coal shipped by rail. 

And so it’s having actually probably a bigger impact in a shorter time period of time, than anything that the Russians have done in the last 3 or 4 years. So having a much bigger impacts, much harder to defend against. Once you have enough drones that you can expend them on moving targets, that’s one. Number two, we seem to be nearing the end for the city of Procrustes. 

Procrustes is a rail and road hub in southeastern Ukraine that the Russians have had under assault for over a year, and now they’re actually Russian forces in the city. They’re nowhere near to have clearing it and securing it, but it is no longer able to be used by the Ukrainians for transport at all. So they’re having to fall back through eight major transport arteries that combined and Procrustes, where the Russians have been after it for so long because as long as the crossing was in Ukrainian hands, the Ukrainians have been able to shuttle troops to wherever the hotspots happen to be. 

You move across, even if it’s just destroyed, it doesn’t become a Russian rail hub. The Ukrainians have to fall back quite a bit and then deal with much longer routes, in order to get at things wherever they need to go. The Russians have surged more and more troops into the area, and they are on the offensive pretty much across the entire front. 

They’re only making incremental gains. Like I said, they’ve been after Procrustes for over a year. But this is going to slow the Ukrainians reaction time significantly. Whether that will spell more advances for the Russians in the future remains to be seen of course, because the rules of this war change every six months. Which brings us to the third point. 

The Ukrainians are targeting differently as well. They’ve been using their rocket drones and the longer range drones to go deeper and deeper into Russian territory, going after more and more sensitive energy infrastructure. And we’re now in a situation where roughly 60% of the Russian transport system for oil that matters is under the gun in some way. 

The Russians, are taking hits not just in the refineries anymore, but also their ports. And on the first and 2nd of November, overnight, we had a number of Ukrainian drone strike out at a place called Tusa, which is one of the two major ports on the Black Sea. To ops is important because it serves as an outlet not just for Russian, but Kazakh crude. 

And the Ukrainians didn’t simply hit the pipe control system, didn’t simply hit the loading burst. They also hit at least two, perhaps as many as four of the tankers that were there. Now, we don’t have damage reports because the Russians don’t talk. And the tankers that carry Black Sea crude at this point are pretty much all shadow vessels. 

So they’re not registered with normal, law enforcement internationally. So they’re not talking either. But a couple things to keep in mind. Number one, to observe one of the four largest offloading facilities in the Russian system, even partially offline. That’s kind of a big economic hit. And it’s a lot closer than some of the targets in, say bus Korea Center. 

Tatar said that the Ukrainians have already proven that they can hit. So they actually have the possibility of taking this one off line if they hit it hard enough and repeatedly enough. And the Ukrainians are showing a penchant for hitting the same target over and over and over until it’s just not in the equation anymore. This would be the first major port that the Russians would have lost to, and more importantly, is the shadow fleet vessels. 

Now, part of what makes them a shadow fleet is that they are under insured or not insured at all. And in that sort of scenario, the financial risk is not borne by the international community. So if you dial back to the beginning of this war, one of the things I was really concerned about was that if a single ship went down, because it was targeted by a sovereign state like Ukraine, that we would see an unraveling of global maritime law. 

The way it works is companies purchase insurance for their vessels. And if something happens to that vessel, the payout is massive. Well, part of the way the sanctions work, especially as designed by the Europeans, is that they’re no longer providing maritime insurance for the vessels that dock at Russian ports. So they have to be off the ledger. They get insurance from, say, the Russian government, the Chinese government, the Indian government, instead of normal things like, say, Lloyd’s or Swiss wheat or whatever else. 

And that means that the financial risk is not assumed by the international community, but instead by these specific governments. Now, we have not had a shadow tanker sunk yet. We’ve had some confiscated. That was exciting. That happened in the Baltic Sea a few weeks ago. But we not actually had one sunk. But now we have the Ukrainians deliberately targeting multiple shadow tankers. 

And sooner or later, one of them is going to go down. And when that happens, it’s going to be really interesting to see how the payout happens, because if, the Russians or the Indians or the Chinese don’t pay up and all this insurance is null and void, and then the shadow tankers are basically a free for all. 

If you happen to be anyone else who doesn’t like the Russians and will probably see mass confiscations if the Ukrainians, the Indians or the Russians do payout, then the Ukrainians have every interest in hitting as many tankers as possible, because as large as a financial loss to the supporters of the Russian system, as possible. So one way or another, we have just kind of passed an interesting Rubicon, and we’re going to know in the next month or two how this is going to play out, because for the Ukrainians, there’s absolutely no downside to hitting the tanker. 

There may have been a year or two ago because back then the concern of the white House was that high oil prices were going to impact the Democrats chances of elections. I thought that was really bad math. From an economic point of view, you draw your own conclusions politically. But now two things have changed. Number one, Trump really doesn’t care about economic damage with any of his policies. 

So why would this one be any different? Second, and arguably a lot more importantly, we’re now in a massive oversupply situation for crude on a global basis. We’re probably somewhere in the realms of 2 to 4 million barrels a day. Too much crude. Which means that if it wasn’t for all the risk premiums out there, political, geopolitical, military or otherwise, we’d probably already have an oil price crash, which means that the world can get by with substantially less Russian crude than it thinks that it needs. It’s all adding up for a lot more direct action from the Ukrainians on all Russian energy targets. And I think the shadow fleet is where we need to watch the most closely.

The Last Generation to Protest

A large protest made up of thousands of people

Staging a meaningful protest requires several things, and a large young population is one of the key components. So, what happens when there aren’t enough young people left?

Youth movements have been a driver for massive change across the globe, from politics to war and everything in between. Demographic trends show us that populations are growing older and taking the wind out of the sails of the youth. Countries like the US, Mexico, India, and much of Europe have already eclipsed the “youth protest” phase. We can still listen to For What It’s Worth by Buffalo Springfield…but those days are over.

Sure, there are countries with the youth to protest, but we’re talking about places like Nepal, Madagascar, and Nigeria, which simply don’t move the needle on a global scale.

Transcript

Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re gonna talk about these Gen Z protests that are bringing down governments, most notably in Nepal and in, Madagascar. And if these are two places that you don’t know much about. You’re not alone. What to keep in mind. Young people protest. Young people bring down governments. 

That’s just part of the math. They have less of a stake in the system. They have less experience, and they don’t see the cost to them as a society, and certainly not personally. Now, once you have kids, once you have a mortgage, once you have something to lose, then you have more of a vested interest in, say, reforming the system rather than overthrowing it. 

And so when you look at youth protests, you have to make sure that there is a youth to protest. So if you dial back to, say, the 1970s, in the 1980s, the most active student protest movements in the world were in, say, South Korea, where there was a large chunk of the population that was under age 30. If you look around the world today, there aren’t a lot of those places left. 

As you industrialize, as you would urbanize, birth rates drop. And so here in the United States, we’re now below replacement levels, while in Europe they’ve been 

below replacement levels for 50 years. Places like India and Mexico and Indonesia, Turkey, they all fell below replacement levels even before the United States did. So when you think of a place that matters because they’re economically large or strategically viable, all of these places have kind of aged out of the protest stage. 

And what’s left are much younger countries where the birthrate is still falling, but there’s still a substantial percentage of the population that’s below age 25. So we see Nepal and Madagascar. We’re seeing Yemen. We will see places like, Nigeria and maybe even Pakistan fall into that category. But for the most of the world, this youth bulge is long gone. 

And so the places where you can or might see youth protests actually change in government structure. They’re becoming fewer and fewer and fewer and places that are less and less important to the wider world.

How Was Trump’s Trip to Asia?

Donald Trump and Xi Jinping at the G20 Summit

President Trump has wrapped up a whirlwind trip to Asia; he met with several key regional leaders—including Japan’s new prime minister Sanae Takaichi and Chinese president Xi Jinping, participated in summits, and crafted some new deals (at least he said he did).

The United States is pivoting away from China and focusing on younger, faster-growing countries in Southeast Asia. This transition has been anything but smooth; wild tariff policies and inconsistent messaging are keeping things…interesting. The Trump administration has made a temporary truce with China, but let’s not expect that to hold very long. Deals with other countries will be nice if they happen, but until I see someone other than President Trump confirm them, I won’t get my hopes up. South Korea is the only tangible progress I’ve seen so far, with $150 billion in US investment in exchange for lower tariffs.

Transcript

Hey all. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado. Today, I gonna give you a quick breakdown of what happened in Asia last week. Donald Trump had multiple summits in Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, up to and including a one on one with, the chairman of the Chinese system, Jinping. So. We’re in the midst of a major transition in the United States in terms of trading partners. 

And whether you think it’s for strategic reasons like the, the micro group and Trump seems to think or you think it’s for demographics reasons, which is kind of my general feel, there’s not a lot of disagreement, as to what’s happening as opposed to why it’s happening. So what’s happening from my point of view, is that the northeastern Asian countries, most notably China, are aging into not just obsolescence but national dissolution. 

And so the trade relationships with countries like China, have to go to zero more or less. Anyway. Now, if you want to do that earlier for political reasons, there’s some complications there. But, we’re going to get to the same places. It’s a question of time frame. On the opposite side of the ledger is Southeast Asia, where the demographics are broadly healthy and the relations with the United States are broadly positive. 

So it makes sense. You want these relationships to grow over time because they can. And if you choose to, denigrate those relationships, you’re making a political choice to punish yourself economically. So the relationships from a tariff point of view under Trump have been, in a word, erratic, with multiple times threats on the Chinese going up to 100% tariffs, and sometimes actually being there, but at the same time, in Southeast Asia, some of the codified tariffs that the Trump administration has put in place, not negotiation tactics, actually codified tariffs are some of the highest in the world, which is directly been penalizing American companies that have been working to move their trade exposure, away from China, since Covid. Anyway, Trump was known in Southeast Asia, met with a lot of the Asean leaders and hammered out a series of deals, most notably with Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and Cambodia. And really across all of them, the the core issue is that these really were only deals as declared by, Donald Trump himself. 

And none of the four countries are really talking about them in the same way. Most of these deals never even had a text released or even a press statement from the hosting government. So it’s all very much in progress. Basically, the approach that Trump seems to be taking is that our trade deficit in goods has been imposed on us. 

And his unfair, but our trade surplus in digital goods has been earned. And so therefore it is fair. If you don’t accept that, you can have tariffs. And needless to say, there’s a lot of countries who find that general negotiating position to be unfair. And so there hasn’t really been any meaningful progress made on the talks. A lot of little details have been popped up like, say, rare earths exports from Malaysia as being a big deal. 

But, you know, Malaysia already exported rare earths to the United States. They just put a limit on the exports to the world, not just the United States. So they would have enough of themselves. None of this has really been changed. And the country that is probably, from my point of view, the most important to the United States mid term as a trade partner would be a Vietnam and more technically technologically advanced than the Chinese are. 

They have over a, you know, workforce. It’s almost 100 million people. If you’re looking to plug gaps, it’s a country you want to plug them with. And we really didn’t get a meaningful deal out of these agreements. Moving up to Northeast Asia, there does seem to be more progress with the Japanese and the Koreans. The Koreans are in a desperate position because the demographics are so bad, and they realize that if they can’t maintain a working relationship with the United States of the kind of screwed as a country. 

So they were willing to give a lot more and we actually got our most detailed deal yet. Out of all the trade negotiations between the Trump administration and the rest of the planet just came out of Korea just a few days ago. That doesn’t mean it’s done. Basically promises that the North Koreans are going to dump, over $150 billion of investment to the United States, which I would argue they were going to do anyway. 

But now it’s codified. And then in exchange, they got a lower tariff rate. This is really the first deal we’ve seen out of the white House that actually has numbers to it. Now, it remains to be seen whether it can be done, because some of the numbers involved are pretty big for a country the size of South Korea, which has under 50 million people, but still progress. 

And then the final deal, with the Chinese will come back to that. Now, before you think that I’m just like, Trump’s an idiot and he doesn’t know how to negotiate, he certainly doesn’t understand trade. Let’s look at this from the Chinese side, because Chairman XI Jinping went to Asean almost immediately after Trump was there and talked about multilateralism and unicorns and chocolate and how we’re all one big happy family and signed a trade deal with the Asean countries, a face three day trade deal. 

So while the Southeast Asians and to a lesser degree, the Koreans and the Japanese are looking at Trump like God, when will this end? They’re not looking at gee and think, oh, thank God she was there. No, no. They’re like, you expect us to believe us that you’re the nice guy, the one who’s been bullying us on every issue for the last 30 years, that suddenly we’re going to love you. 

So you look at Trump and they say he doesn’t understand economics or trade and the right and then they look at gee and like he doesn’t understand diplomacy or trade. And the right one of the things to keep in mind about both leaders is both of them have actively circumscribed the type of people that they allow in the early circle to be people who will never even appear to know more about any topic than they do, because they don’t want to be told that they might be wrong. 

So we have these completely ossified Jared autocracies running the two largest countries in the world right now, and it’s showing up and how they’re dealing with every other country. So really all that leaves for today’s topic is how they dealt with one another because she and Trump met directly in Korea. We have a temporary defuzing of the trade tensions. 

There’s no reason on any side to think that this is going to last. But the Americans agreed to reduce the tariff rate. They were charging the Chinese. They removed their threat of an additional 100% tariff. So based on what the product is, the tariff rate from products coming from China, somewhere between 20 and 50%, again, in exchange, the Chinese agreed to limit fentanyl precursor exports to the United States and to start buying some soy. 

So from my point of view, on the outside looking in, the Chinese agreed to do some of the things that they have agreed to do over and over and over these last 15 years in exchange for actual concessions. And if the Chinese actually do what they say they’re going to do this time, it will be the first time that has ever happened. 

Part of the problem that the United States always has in trade relations with the Chinese is there’s rarely any follow up, and there won’t be this time, because that requires a team that is actually staffed out to enforce the trade deals. And even under normal circumstances, where the United States has the Commerce and the Treasury Department of the U.S. Trade Representative’s office dealing with trade issues, that’s a lot to do. 

And this time around, Commerce and Treasury in the USTR aren’t even staffed out. And Trump is handling the negotiations personally. So just as what happened in phase one trade deals between the Chinese and the Trump administration in the first Trump presidency, the Chinese aren’t going to do any of this. And we’ll be right back where we started six months from now. 

And one more thing. One thing that doesn’t change. You know, the more the things change, the more they stay the same. With these adjustments. This last week, we are now in our 540th tariff policy since January 20th. So the ambient chaos that is confusing American traders and manufacturers and consumers. Showing no sign of letting up. There’s no reason to expect that any of these deals are the final version. And until we get, well, maybe, maybe, maybe Korea. So maybe we have one. Until we have a whole raft of those, the back and forth and the ebb and flow continues.