Trump 2.0 – Reindustrialization

Another layer of the challenges facing the Trump administration is the fallout from a Chinese collapse and what it will mean for US reindustrialization.

China is the world’s manufacturer, but just about everything is going wrong for them. Between demographic and economic decline, trade blockades, and a collapsing workforce, China won’t be around for much longer. So, everyone else will have to find another way to get their stuff.

That means reindustrialization and the US is nowhere near being ready to take on that load. We’ll need to rebuild industrial capacity, expand the electrical grid, and address labor shortages. If Trump fails to do that before China goes off the deep end, we’re going to experience product shortages and record inflation, cementing Trump’s legacy as the man who made American something less than…great. Or maybe, just maaaaaybe, the old/new president can address these issues and shepherd the United States into a new golden age.  fingers crossed

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Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from the top of French Ridge in the Motoki Tuki Valley of New Zealand. This is the first place I ever went backpacking in the country. And I haven’t been back in 27 years. So just as hard as I remember it when I was 23. Okay. We are going to continue on with the Trump 2.0 series today, specifically the sort of domestic issues that are going to be waiting for the president. 

Really, this is a China, China, China situation. But from an economic point of view, rather than a geopolitical one. Let’s review, China’s dying, birthrate has dropped by over half in the last six years. They now have more people over age 50 than under. And their workforce is in the early stages of collapse. Their population has been in a state of collapse for over 20 years. 

But, when you run out of people aged 0 to 20, you really don’t feel it in your consumption or your investment or your tax base. You’re just paying for less education. Well, that has now been going on for 45 years, and they’re running out of new people to bring into the system. At the same time, they print currency like mad. 

Like, you know what the gold bugs say that the US Federal Reserve does, China actually does. But like times five, they expand their money supply by about 500% more than the United States has on a monthly basis. And so that drives up asset prices, which makes it for more difficult for the young people to do anything because, think about if everyone in the United States was over 40, was buying a vacation home, how hard it would be to start out if you were in your 20s. 

Now, I’ll apply that to China. So you’ve got all this massive real estate build and absolutely no chance that someone young can get in on it. So we are looking at a national collapse here and a population collapse and probably a civilizational collapse. The only question is time frame. If I was to, put a date on that and yes, yes, yes, putting dates on things like that is hard. 

And that is, the most difficult part of what I do. I would expect a complete economic breakdown within a decade and then probably a national breakdown. What’s the ten years after that, anyway? One way or the other, the Han ethnicity is not going to survive in this century under Donald Trump. Donald Trump absolutely is. Rare. 

And to pick a fight with the Chinese on trade issues, he’s been talking about massive tariffs to stack on top. He and Biden actually are pretty close together on these issues. 

Trump enacted a lot of Selective tariffs on specific items as well as blanket tariffs. Biden didn’t peel any of those back. 

Biden went in and did tech tariffs to prevent technology transfer. And now that Trump is back, I find it very unlikely that he’s going to peel back anything that, Biden did. If anything, he’s going to double down on it. So the way that China has traditionally dealt with its demographic collapse and making sure that the economy can go is again printing lots of currency, building lots of industrial plant and then exporting it. 

Well, under Trump, that worked. But it’s no longer working under Biden because Biden has basically marshaled the entire Western alliance to act against things like tech transfer and most notably, electric vehicles and automotives. And so the Chinese don’t have any place to dump it. It’s gotten so bad that even the Russians and the Brazilians and the Turks are basically blocking Chinese imports. 

So we have all this new productive capacity coming online in China, nowhere to send it. We’re getting an inflationary and a deflationary pulse in China at the same time, which is like the worst kind of bad. Anyway. Bottom line is that Trump is very clearly wanting to pick a trade fight, but it doesn’t appear that his incoming administration has given any thought to what happens should he win. 

China is the workshop of the world, and while there are certainly sectors that Americans would like to keep the Chinese out of, they are the single largest presence in almost every industrial sector and their sudden disappearance. And it probably will be sudden because it will be, involving a degree of government and economic collapse. Then what? 

Because we still need the stuff. And if the Chinese are incapable of building it, suddenly we are in a very, very new sort of economic cycle. So, you would fix this by massively expanding the industrial plant and the manufacturing base in the United States. But you don’t do that quickly. You don’t do it overnight, and you don’t do it cheaply. 

So the smart play, if you’re looking for recommendations here, is to take whatever income comes in from tariffs, regardless of how they’re sourced, and actually use them to underwrite the construction of an industrial plant, starting in industrial processing, things like turning, bauxite into aluminum, things like steel, and then moving into, more and more sophisticated manufacturing. 

That requires a degree of organizational build out that the United States doesn’t have. The United States hasn’t had an industrial policy like that since World War Two. Luckily, Joe Biden and Donald Trump are the only two Americans left alive who remember any of that day. Yes, yes, yes, they’re about the same age. So hopefully, somebody on Team Trump will know what to do with that. 

But we’re starting from almost scratch. Everything that the Biden administration did along those that path was dealing with environmental issues in some way EVs, solar panels, that sort of thing. And I’m not saying that that was bad, but that’s just a one very, very narrow niche for what is necessary to be done. We need a multitrillion dollar build out as quickly as possible. 

Second, powering it. It’s not that the United States needs oil or natural gas. We are awash in that. And energy policy under Trump suggests that he wants to build up that advantage even more. The problem is electricity. It takes a lot of power to stamp and mold and move things that you don’t need when you’re basically doing digital work. 

So we need to expand the grid on a nationwide basis by at least half, and places that are likely to see the biggest industrial build out, places like the Rocky Mountains, the classic South, and Texas, they probably need to double the grid within five years, which is just a massive task. But I haven’t seen anyone from Team Trump even breathe the word electricity when discussing the energy situation. 

It’s all about oil. It’s all about natural gas. It’s even about taking things like windmills out of the equation, which I think would be unwise since, you know, Texas gets 15% of their electricity from now. The easiest way. There’s nothing easy about it, but the easiest way to do that is to make it much, much easier for electrical cooperatives and electric companies to import and export power across jurisdictional boundaries, whether that is across the, the seams that separate the three big grids in the United States, whether it’s among states, whether it’s within states that cross from, say, a co-op to a city’s, power system, we need everyone who has a competitive advantage, whether it’s in capital, in labor, in sourcing because of green tech, in sourcing, because of natural gas, to be able to put up a power plant and send that power to where it is needed. Doing that, of course, requires significant reform of the electrical grid in its current form and a whole lot of build out. And Donald Trump is famous for many things, but managing what is functionally a new department, creating it from scratch is not something he seems to have considered at all. 

Third is labor. If we’re going to expand the industrial plant by half, that’s a whole lot of workers that the United States doesn’t have right now. In fact, the United States, since, Covid is facing a worker bust for two reasons. Number one, we have started this re industrialization. We are seeing expanding, labor in all of us. 

Sorry. We are seeing an expanding labor demand in all of these sectors. But too far more importantly, the baby boomers are leaving us two thirds of them have already retired. The oldest ones are starting to die. They’re leaving the labor force in numbers, like when they entered the labor force back in the 1960s. And we have to basically do almost all of this work with just a fading remnant of labor from the boomers. 

There is no indication from Team Trump that, workforce training for blue collar workers is something that’s particularly high on the list. And if anything, all this talk of mass deportations of, illegal workers from the United States is going to actually tighten the labor supply. So basically, we’ve got two scenarios here, and it’s going to be up to Donald Trump and his team to decide which one to go. 

Number one, you smash China while they’re down. You kick them in the face, you break them, but you fail to build up the industrial capacity. You fail to build up the electrical capacity, and you’ve got the labor force at the same time that will generate a shortage in every possible consumer and industrial good at the same time, while also generating the fastest inflation that the United States has ever experienced. 

And Donald Trump will go down in history as the president who broke it all, or you build up the electrical grid, you find a way to square the circle with illegal migrants, you expand workforce training, and you repurpose the capital that was coming in from tariffs to actually build up the industrial plant faster. And Donald Trump goes down in history as both the president who broke China and set the stage for a new fundamental age of American economics. 

I know which one I’d rather see. 

China Will Soon Lose the Title of “World’s Manufacturer”

Globalization led to the rise of China as a manufacturing powerhouse, since finding the lowest cost producer was the priority. However, deglobalization, coupled with China’s demographic decline and aging workforce, has both eroded that competitive advantage and changed everyone’s priorities about cost. So, what happens next?

With China fading from the spotlight, Western countries will become more protectionist, which means manufacturing will be coming back home to places like the US and Europe. But that’s going to bring a while slew of problems with it.

While this transition will create significant job growth and increase the political power of labor, it will also bring high inflation and inefficiencies. This will force highly skilled workers to take on tasks that were historically outsourced to cheaper labor markets. So, if you thought inflation was bad now, just wait…

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Transcript

Hey everyone. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Yosemite. This is an unnamed lake behind me, so I’m going to claim it. This is Peter Lake and there’s Peter Island right in the middle of it. Great for laps. I built a summer home here. Any who? I wanted to talk a little bit today about the global structure of employment.

Looking forward and back, if you could sum up the concept of globalization into a single phrase, it would be lowest cost producer. The idea is, whoever can produce the product or the step in the supply chain at the lowest cost in a reliable manner pretty much gets the business. And when the Chinese built it up to the bar in the 1980s, they brought a billion industrial workers with them.

And that’s before you consider the fact that it’s a single legal structure, such as it is, or that they subsidize the bejesus out of everything to drive any competition out of business. Basically, they took all the assembly and the low-end stuff from the rest of the developing world, where no region was probably suffering more than Latin America.

Where the geography is much more difficult for infrastructure. And so the Chinese could outcompete them there as well. For the first world countries, and most notably, the United States, we got out of that sort of business because if you pay an American $50,000 a year to assemble a car, it’s going to be a really expensive car.

And so we doubled, tripled, quadrupled down on design work. And there are few industries where this shows up more than technology. The Chinese may make some low-end semiconductors and do a lot of assembly, but it’s the Americans who design most of the chips and make a lot of the high-end chemicals that are necessary for Chinese fabrication facilities to work.

So when someone tells you that the Taiwanese or the Chinese or the Koreans or the Japanese stole our industry in semiconductors, you know, no, we still do the high-value added stuff. The Chinese do the low-value added stuff. Anyway, this has been the state of affairs in increasing intensity for the last 30 to 40 years.

And now we’re entering a new world where the Chinese are aging out. And so they’re losing their economic competitiveness, even at the low end. And their workforce is collapsing because their population is in demographic decline, actually, demographic decline is too kind—demographic collapse. They now have more people aged 60 to 75 than 0 to 25, if I remember my math correctly. Anyway, it’s close.

Sorry, I can’t fact-check out here anyway. Lots of old people, very, very few young people, and even fewer people coming into the workforce in the future.

Okay, so what happens now? Well, the Chinese are no longer competitive. It’s only because of the sunk cost of the industrial plant that we still think of China as an industrial power.

And, you know, 30-odd trillion dollars in sunk cost in industrial plant. That’s not nothing, but it’s not enough without a workforce.

That’s before you consider the trade wars that are intensifying, regardless of who wins the American presidential election, regardless of who wins in various European elections. Both the American and the European blocs have turned very sharply protectionist, specifically versus China, and so we’re probably going to see significant crunches in the trade portfolio of products coming from China very, very soon.

What we’ve seen with the electric vehicles is really only the beginning. What that means is if the Europeans, and especially the Americans, still want stuff, they’re going to have to make it their damn selves. And there is the problem, because the United States has geared its educational system, its infrastructure, and its capital structure over the last 30 years to do more and more higher and higher value-added work, not a lot of assembly.

And so we’re going to have to take highly paid, highly skilled American workers and put them to work doing things that, under normal circumstances, they’d have people in another country do. Now, this will generate a lot of employment. This will generate a lot of political power for labor, organized or otherwise. But it comes at a cost, because if you’re going to pick one word to sum up globalization, it was efficiency.

And there is nothing about having people do jobs that they weren’t trained for, or that they’re overqualified for, that’s efficient. So yes, we will get huge growth, and yes, we will get huge inflation to go along with it. The 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7% that people have been bitching about these last 3 or 4 years, that’s just the start.

The Future of Manufacturing: Where and Why?

China has been the global manufacturing hub for decades, but what happens if that goes away? If and when China experiences a significant collapse, someone will have some big shoes to fill, but who can do it?

There’s a few requirements that help narrow down our list – proximity to a consumer base, a young workforce, and existing infrastructure. Argentina shows promise, but political instability limits the country from realizing its potential. North America – specifically the US and Mexico – have the opportunity to claim a piece of this pie. However, the region that is most likely to benefit most from a shift in global manufacturing is Southeast Asia.

Countries like Vietnam and Indonesia are particularly noteworthy, thanks to their large, youthful populations, expanding infrastructure, and ability to handle manufacturing along the entirety of the value-added scale.

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Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are not only free, they will always be free. We also will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

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Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from the Gulf Shores. Today I’m taking an inquiry from the Ask Peter Forum. And it’s if my estimation for the mass collapse of China comes true, where is the manufacturing going to go? Well, first things first. If you remove a billion people from the global pool, you people are stopped. So yes, we’re still talking about tens of trillions of dollars of capital investment that needs to happen, but maybe not quite as much as we think. 

Now, once you’ve gotten past that, you’re basically looking at three factors that shape where the stuff is going to go. Number one, a place that is either has itself or is proximate to a significant consumer base to justify the infrastructure development in the first place. Number two solution number of people under 50, not just to consume, but actually to do the work that is necessary. 

And then third, you would prefer somewhere where they’re not starting from scratch. there’s $35 trillion of leased and industrial plant in China. And even if we only need to relocate half of that, which would be overly optimistic, I would argue, having to do that in a place that doesn’t have a road and rail system would be a much heavier carrier than a place that does. 

So this rules out any number of locations. Africa doesn’t look too good because it doesn’t have the infrastructure, and it’s too dependent on numerous oil imports to make it system function. Europe doesn’t look that good because it all has the infrastructure. It doesn’t have the consumption base. Japan kind of falls into the same category. So when I think of this, I think of three regions. 

So in ascending order at the bottom is Argentina. good infrastructure, great educational system, positive demographics, probably. They’re arguably the best one in the world for a country at its point of economic development. Of course, the downside is that it’s full of, Argentina foreign policy and. Yes, yes, yes, Malay, the new president is, doing reasonably well, but one president does not make a pattern. 

So we will see. But if if Argentina is successful at reinventing itself, it will easily become the manufacturing hub and player, not just for itself, but for the broader Southern Cone region. Brazil can’t compete in this. The infrastructure isn’t there, the education system is there and the country is aging rapidly. So you can see a world evolving where Argentina gets a lot of these pieces and then just treats Brazil as a captive market. 

Okay, that’s number one. number two is North America. the United States obviously has the consumption base, but so too does Mexico. It’s a pretty young country, demographically speaking, and, well, most of North America has already been absorbed into the NAFTA system. Central and southern Mexico really haven’t. So there’s a lot of low hanging fruit there, not just from a consumption point of view, but more worker point of view. 

And then, of course, the United States is the world’s largest consumer market with top rate infrastructure. so we’ll grab some chunks to, the third section. And the part that I think in relative terms is going to do the best is Southeast Asia. Here you’ve got a cluster of countries that have partially integrate. We partially globalized and partially industrialized, but almost all of them still have significant, reserves. 

They can grow up under labor. And as the place does better and better and better, the consumption situation is going to look better. the two countries that I’m arguably most, interested in, in relative terms are Vietnam and Indonesia. Both have large populations who are at a beach. Both have large populations in excess of 100 million people. 

High almost quarter billion in the case of Indonesia. Their infrastructure is okay, not great, but it’s rapidly expanding. And there’s some very clear population centers where this is all really serving as nodes for greater regional distribution. They’re also proximate to China. So this is a place where Chinese companies are already investing. These are countries who get along with the United States. 

They’re places where the Americans are invested. These are places, the people of Japan. So the Japanese are investing. And most importantly, they’re all at different stages of production. So it’s easy to imagine a supply chain system where the Vietnamese do the really high end stuff, then come down the Thais and Malaysians for the middle manufacturing and then lower end stuff in places like Indonesia. 

Vietnam is the one I’m most interested in because they’re trying to jump stages of production, and already 40% of the college grads are Stem graduates. So it’s easy to see them becoming the next Malaysia. But with a population that’s roughly four times as large. that becomes significant very, very quickly. So. So I get everything. Yeah, I think that’s everything. 

All right. I wanna have a good one. 

The Future of Ohio: Manufacturing Growth and Political Shifts

If you’ve ever spoken to an Ohio State fan, you know that they’ll tell you how amazing they are without you asking. Unfortunately for all of us, I’ll be adding to their boasting list today because there’s plenty of success and growth in store for Ohio.

After years of stunted economic growth caused by the Jones Act destroying its manufacturing base, Ohio is ready to turn the page like Bob Seger’s hometown. As Ohio’s reindustrialization process kicks off, we’ll see plenty more projects like Intel’s semiconductor facility pop up throughout the state.

Ohio’s political stance has long aligned with national sentiment, and we’re now seeing the state shift toward populism. Between a political shift and Ohio’s manufacturing resurgence, it’s a safe bet that this state (and all those Buckeye fans) will continue to play a critical role in the country’s future.

Prefer to read the transcript? Click here

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are not only free, they will always be free. We also will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

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Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from not Idaho and not Iowa, but Ohio. Iowa’s got corn and pigs and soy and insurance and Idaho has potatoes and wheat and the Snake River, Ohio excels at things like manufacture. Or at least they did. Ohio is one of the states has been really hurt by something called the Jones Act, which is something that bars cargo ships from transporting cargo between American ports unless the vessel is 100% American owned.

Captains built in 75% crude. It’s something we did in 1920 as part of the Interstate Commerce Act that absolutely destroyed the ability to move things on the water. And since Ohio is bordered to the south by the Ohio River, which is one of the world’s great waterways, and then the north by the Great Lakes, which are one of the world’s great waterways, Ohio is arguably the State of the Union that has suffered the most.

It also took a big hit because of globalization. Ohio is also the state that has arguably suffered the most from globalization because it had the economic geography that was excellent in terms of lots of flat land that was easy to build infrastructure on and a lot of legacy infrastructure from its industrial period. But with globalization and the United States basically elevated places that didn’t have very good geography as part of our plan to defeat the Soviet Union.

And that meant that places with subpar geography thinking here, Brazil or India or China were able to get a huge leg up. And that gutted a lot of the manufacturing base here. Now, Ohio is still a significant manufacturing player, just not as rich as there used to be. And part of the decline in the use of the waterways and because of globalization is part of the reason why Margo and Donald Trump have done so well in this state and why the state’s politics has taken such a hard turn to the populist right that is in the process of shifting maybe not the political stuff, but all the economic trends.

Globalization means that we need to rebuild a lot of industrial plants in other parts of the world, and all of a sudden geography matters again, and Ohio’s looking pretty good. Ohio is one of the healthier demographers in the advanced world, suggesting that it has a pretty robust potential workforce. And the state and the local governments here in the Columbus area have been very aggressive at going out, including the investment with the single biggest achievement they have been the intel facility that is just down the road here.

Intel is an American semiconductor manufacturer who was the world leader until about six years ago when they made a bad bet. They bet that this new thing called extreme ultraviolet lithography was just not ready for prime time. And they designed their chips using an older type of technology that’s much more expensive to operate and a lot more finicky.

But turns out that EUV actually was ready and the company that bid on or BET on it was TSMC, which is the semiconductor manufacturer out of Taiwan. So today, all the world’s best chips are basically made in Taiwan. And while Intel has designed some of the chips that TSMC makes, they don’t really mean facts for very many of their own.

Certainly not here in the United States. This new facility that’s under construction in Ohio seeks to change that. Specifically, they’ve got these two models called the 20 A and the eight A if works by 2025, they’ll be produced in this facility and they are sub five, even sub three nanometer, which will almost overnight elevate them to producing some of the world’s most advanced chips.

So far, $20 billion have been sunk into this facility, 2 billion of which is local and federal subsidies. And if Intel has its way over the course of the next decade, that number, 20 billion, will increase to a hundred billion. And that’s just for fabrication. That doesn’t include any follow on businesses that are likely to pop up from network effects, whether that is assembly or testing or light manufacturing to take these chips and put them in things that we use every day.

So the potential here for the Ohio region to grow is explosive, and that even assumes that we don’t do anything with the Jones Act. And if we do that, all the old manufacturer, it is likely to come back as well because you just can’t beat the local geography here for internal transport. So will that have political connotations? Probably delay and that’ll get really colorful, but we’re going to cover that in a different video.

I’m just outside Columbus today and we’re going to talk politics a little bit. We’ll use a link in this mail to give you an idea of where I generally think U.S. politics are going. But the general issue here today is we’re at an inflection point. Ohioans are proud that they’ve been voting for the winning side in almost every presidential election for over a century, with all the events in 2020 breaking their pattern.

And the reason both for it happening and the pattern break is Donald Trump. So before 2020, Ohio was the middle of everything middle class, middle income, middle and manufacturing, middle and services. It was very representative of the United States as a whole. So it was very easy to track the political winds based on what the Ohioans were thinking, but they did suffer quite a bit from globalization and something like the Jones Act, as you saw in the previous video.

And so there’s a lot of resentment in the state. And since Donald Trump basically ran on resentment and people who felt they had been left behind, Ohio switched and now is considered a generally populist conservative, socially area. However, if you remember some of my other work, you know that the political factions that make up the country are moving around basically the the American political system is made up of two very large parties because the electoral system forces that into form.

Basically, you have to get one more vote than the other guy in order to win the seat. And so therefore, you don’t want to alienate any potential voters. And in that sort of environment, you two huge parties that are made up of independent factions that shift around based on changes in economics, sociology, politics, demographics and in the last 30 years, we’ve had a lot of things go down.

We’ve had the rise of the baby boomers and now the retirement. We’ve had hyper globalization and now it’s end. We’ve had the rise of social media and the implosion of information transfer. And through all of that, the two parties held together until very recently. And in the Trump era, that relationship is breaking down. Now, Trump did a lot of things for a lot of reasons to a lot of people, but the ones that matter for this discussion is he elevated a faction known as the populist to power, and they are now the single largest voting bloc in the United States.

They’re very powerful here in Ohio. But in doing so, he drove away a number of more traditional factions. He would call them RINOs that include the entirety of the business community. But he was able to court other groups that are more socially conservative, people like the Catholics and the Hispanics over to his side. And as part of that process, there’s now a tug of war between the Democrats and the Republicans over the future of organized labor, where an organized labor is only become more and more powerful over the next decade because we need to build out the industrial plant.

And most of those jobs are blue collar, and we’re an environment of labor shortage. So we’re going to see more and more strikes. What this means is the business community and the labor community, which have traditionally been the two most powerful voting blocs in Ohio, are suddenly Sweden voters. So everyone got used to Ohio being the man in the middle and ultimately representing what we were all thinking.

We’re still there. It’s just that the two factions that matter the most are at the moment not part of the political process. So what we’re going to be seeing over the next few years between this massive re industrialization and buildout and this political shift is Ohio is still going to be the man in the middle. And where they come down is going to determine the shape of our political parties moving forward.

And we’re seeing those arguments across the Ohio political landscape right now with everyone engaged in everybody angry and everyone hopeful, all at the same time. So stay tuned. Watch Columbus. And they’re going to give us our first good taste of what our post-Trump party structure is going to be.