The US Strikes Iran’s Nuclear Facilities

United States Air Force posted rare photos of a GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker buster bomb being transported at Whiteman Air Force Base. Photo by wikimedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_strikes_on_Iranian_nuclear_sites#/media/File:Deleted_GBU-57_MOP_photo_(2).jpg

Over the weekend, the US launched a major airstrike on Iran, targeting critical nuclear sites. We don’t know the extent of the damage as of yet.

While the US strike will cause setbacks in Iran’s nuclear program, it didn’t destroy everything. So, we’ll have to wait and see if Iran rebuilds or escalates through other avenues.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here comes to you from Colorado. This video is a little late getting to you, because I was hoping we were to get some more information on what happened when the United States dropped some bunker buster bombs on Iran over the weekend, but it does not seem like anything has clarified. So I’ll give you an idea of what’s happened and now what we’re waiting for. 

So, number one, United States dropped a couple dozen major bombs on the Iranian nuclear facilities, specifically a place called Fordo, which is basically under a mountain, Natanz, which is where they do a lot of their centrifuge work to enrich uranium. Some of which of the facilities are heavily reinforced and underground and is from, which is a facility where they do most of the machining and the physical construction. 

The first two sites got hit with by bunker busters, most notably Fordo, where as it’s from was primarily hit by Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from submarines in the Persian Gulf. We do not have damage assessments from any of these places, which is part of the reason that I was kind of waiting. And we’re probably not going to get anytime soon. 

Donald Trump has said, of course, at every facility, the United States has been blown up and to smithereens, and there’s no danger whatsoever. The Joint Chiefs are like, no, we really don’t know. And until somebody does an inspection, there’s no way to know. The truth, obviously, is closer to the, the general position than Trump’s. But what’s new there? 

Iran doesn’t have a conventional military. They can’t reach out and touch someone with tanks and planes in the way that you might expect a country of 80 million people to do, their military is designed to occupy their own populations. 

It’s a civil patrol force. They have normally reached out to touch people through sectarian groups that get hopped up on weapons and drugs and basically send out to cause carnage, groups like Hezbollah, for example. But groups like Hezbollah have basically been neutered. The Gazans are in no shape to do anything. And even if they were, you know, Americans are no, we’re close to them. 

And the U.S. military footprint in the region is down to less than a quarter of what it was at its peak and continues to trend down. So the the more normal military option is really off the table and they’re more normal paramilitary operation is off the table. And that just leaves things like terror attacks, for example, dirty bombs, which might work, but they take time to put together and time to ship in into place and they can be intercepted. 

And so it could be a big splash, but then it would be an attack on, say, the United States, which United States would definitely respond with something more than some bunker busters. Okay. What do we know? Or what are we waiting for? The bunker busters, the GBU 57. I think that’s the acronym. Anyway, this is the first time the United States has ever used them against an actual target as opposed to testing. 

And we dropped 20 for the suckers. These are the 30,000 pound bombs. If anything can blow up a place like Fordo, it’s probably these guys. But again, it’s the first time we’ve ever used them. We don’t know. So in many ways, this is a test case for the United States, as well as a question for Iranian actions. 

And what everyone oh my God, what everyone wants to talk about is whether this is going to make it more likely be a deal or less likely. Folks, there is never going to be a deal. Iran has never signed and implemented a security deal with anyone. In fact, the only thing that even comes close is the 1987 ceasefire in the Iran-Iraq War, which was never turned into a peace agreement. 

They haven’t signed a deal with Iraq or with Turkey or with Pakistan or with anyone. We’ve got some cooperation, deals on economics and say nuclear sharing with the Russians and the Chinese, and that’s about it. So if you’re obsessed with a deal on oil or technology or security, you just waste your time obsessing about something else. This is not how Persian society works. 

I would love to be wrong, but I’ve been right since 1979, when I was five. Oh my God. Oh. Anyway, so this is what a holding pattern in the Middle East looks like. People throw weapons at one another, things explode. But we’re waiting for someone to fundamentally change the nature of the relationship. And I just don’t see that happening on the Iranian side anytime soon. 

Oh, one more thing. The Israelis have proven that while they can take out, Iran’s air defense, and while they can’t operate with impunity above Iranian skies, they lack the deep strike capability that is necessary to take out something like the Iranian nuclear program. Now. So now it’s an open question whether the United States lacks that capacity, and not just because of the size of the bombs. 

The Iranians have been preparing in some form, for this sort of attack for decades, and that means that while these are the three most important sites that the Iranians have, they have dozens of others now, collectively, they’re not as important as these three. So while this undoubtedly has set setback, that it because the program quite a bit it’s certainly not over. 

And the question now is whether the Iranians try to spin the paramilitary forces back up, spin their nuclear system back up, or try something new. We’re not going to learn that in the next two days.

Israel’s Uncertain Endgame in Iran

Aftermath of Israeli strike at the IRIB building. Photo by wikimedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Israel_war#/media/File:Attack_on_IRIB's_Live_News_Broadcasting_Studio_07.jpg

Israel and Iran are still in the thick of an air war, which is really their only option given the several countries between them. But are things going to ramp up here soon? Is nuclear war coming? Will the US get involved?

This conflict began because the Israelis wanted to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The reality is that Iran wasn’t even close to having a fully fleshed out nuclear weapon, they’re only just at the early enrichment stage of the process. So, cross that one off the list. What else could Israel be pushing for then?

Israel might be working towards instigating a regime change in Iran. A quick history lesson will teach us that Iran is a theocracy, seated deeply in a mountainous region, with thousands of years of continuity; simply killing the Supreme Leader isn’t going to change anything. But what if the Israelis got some help?

US involvement would most likely come in the form of air support, and it would require lots of bunker-busting bombs, with no guarantee of permanent success. But again, this wouldn’t spark regime change or revolution. Is dragging the US into a deeper conflict without a clear end goal worth it?

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from sunny Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about what’s going on with the Israel Iran war, the possibility of the United States getting involved and what you should look for and why. Core issue is that Iran and Israel not only don’t border one another, there’s a couple of major countries in between them with some major population centers, most notably Iraq. 

So there is no way for these countries to get at each other in terms of land action. There are only two ways they can interact. One is basically an air war, which we have right now. And the second option would be an exchange of nukes. On that front. The Israelis have about 150 nuclear weapons, mostly tactical scale. 

And the Iranians have none. Now, one of the reasons people have been arguing for striking Iran for a long time is to prevent them from getting nukes, but keep in mind, it’s a multi-stage process. And the Iranians haven’t completed the first one. So step one is you get uranium or you spin it until you get enough weapons grade fissile material that you can then make an explosive core. 

That is the stage that the Iranians were close to completing. However, once you have enough fissile material, you then have to build some explosives that make a perfect implosion to force the nuclear reaction to happen. They don’t have those. Then you have to make an explosive device. They haven’t done that. Then you have to ruggedized that system so it can survive an attack. 

They haven’t done that. And then you have to miniaturize it. So you can either put on a bomb that a plane can carry or a missile. And they haven’t done that. So even if they had enough to make a uranium or God forbid, a plutonium core, they don’t have any of the additional steps. And at the pace that they’ve gone so far just to get to this step. 

We’re not talking about this being a reasonable threat this century. That’s piece one. So if you want to talk about regime change, you now have to shift to a different sort of conversation. Yes, Iran is a deeply authoritarian system, but it is not a dictatorship. It is not a one man rule. This is not Putin’s Russia. This is not Xi’s China. 

This is something else. This is a theocracy. So even if the Grand Ayatollah who’s in charge of everything right now, where to kick it tomorrow with either because he’s older than dust or because a bomb drops on his head that doesn’t remove the regime. There are over 15,000 mullahs that are part of the ruling class. And while regime change certainly could lead to a period of instability. 

It doesn’t fundamentally change what Iran is. And what Iran is, is Persia. Iran is a bunch of mountains. It’s not a chunk of plains like Mesopotamia. It’s not a single seaside community like Israel. It’s about 80 million people who live in mountains. 

Some version of Persia has existed almost since the beginning of the human story. It is one of the original civilizations of our species. And yes, the government has fallen from time to time, but really, we’ve only had seven regime change that are worthy of the term in 6000 years. We’re not going to see one this year. And the United States lacks the capacity to force that issue, even if it does get involved. 

Now, in this heartbeat, the United States does not have any carrier stationed in the Persian Gulf somewhere on the way. This heartbeat. We don’t have a large military force in Iraq any longer. So if we want to do a ground invasion, we’re talking about some months of prep. Hopefully none of that happens. But if the United States was to get involved in the air war version of this, keep in mind that the various aspects of the Iranian nuclear program have been preparing for an American air war for the better part of the last 40 years. 

And so it’s dispersed. It’s hardened. It’s underground. And does the United States have enough bunker busters to take them all out? Because you would probably need a couple thousand. Maybe some of these facilities would probably take several dozen all by themselves. And yes, that might remove the theoretical future of a nuclear program which is nowhere close to producing a weapon. 

But then what? Iran is still Iran. Persia is still Persia. The United States can’t send in a military force on the ground to clean up the entire clerical class. No. If there is going to be a meaningful regime change, if Iran is going to enter a fundamentally different governing age, it’s going to have to be a revolution. And you don’t sponsor a revolution with bombs dropped from the air. 

So where does that take us? I’m honestly not sure. Donald Trump’s inner circle on national security issues is small and incompetent, and being nudged by the Russians to get us directly involved in the fight as quickly and as deeply and up to our eyeballs as is possible. It is unclear, from my point of view if Donald Trump is falling for it, yet he keeps his own counsel on issues like this. 

It’s one of the few things he’s quiet on. But forces are moving into the region. So we are all going to find out probably within the next week or two.

What is Israel’s Victory Condition in Iran?

Attacks by Israeli Air Force in Tehran. Photo by Wikimedia: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a0/Pictures_of_the_Israeli_attack_on_Tehran_1_Mehr_%282%29.jpg

Israel and Iran are still going at it, but things have not significantly escalated. Here’s a breakdown of the situation and what could come next.

Israel has been able to take out Iran’s air defenses and strike some key nuclear sites, especially at the Natanz facility that enriches mid-grade uranium. However, all of Iran’s advanced stuff is dispersed and hidden deep underground, which is beyond Israel’s current strike capabilities. Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes have been largely ineffective due to poor targeting capabilities and strong Israeli defense systems.

So, Israel can continue to hit targets that delay and stall Iran’s nuclear program, but outright destroying the nuclear program probably isn’t in the cards. The question then becomes – what is Israel’s victory condition? If fully eliminating Iran’s nuclear capabilities is off the table, will they turn towards crippling Iran’s economy?

It remains unclear where and how far the Israelis will take this campaign, but unless they escalate their effort, they’ll just be buying time.

Transcript

Hey, all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. We are going to talk about the status of the air war between Iran and Israel. Today it is the 16th of June. You’ll be seeing this one in the morning. Short version. It hasn’t gotten all that serious from a physical damage point of view, especially on the Israeli side. 

Iran lacks meaningful long range power production capacity. They’ve got a lot of missiles. But they’re not particularly smart. And the Israelis have a pretty good theater missile defense. And that’s before you consider the Americans are helping as well. So no appreciable damage inflicted within Israel at the moment. Going the other direction. The Israelis have been primarily targeting air defense, which has proven to be woefully inadequate, on the Iranian side and have taken out the easy targets in the Iranian nuclear development program, most notably the centrifuge complexes at Natanz. 

That is where most of the centrifuges are. That’s where they take raw yellowcake, which is processed, uranium ore and turn it into a kind of a mid enriched uranium. From that point, the stuff is then sent to other facilities to go to highly enriched uranium. And the idea would be that if you get highly enriched enough that you could make a actual bomb. 

No indications at the moment that the Iranians have been getting to the level of enrichment that is necessary to then go to the next part of the process. The problem that the Israelis are facing is that those more advanced centrifuges, the one that goes a higher percentage of fissile material, are underground. They’re buried. They’re dispersed. 

Keep in mind that the Iranians have kind of been playing with their nuclear industry for 30 years now, and the Iranians always assumed that when the bombs actually fell on them to break up their nuclear program, it was going to be the United States dropping the bombs. And the United States would have had things like aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf that would be flying out of places like Kuwait and gutter. 

And so there would be lots and lots and lots of sorties dropping very, very advanced bombs that are designed to penetrate very, very deep places. Israelis don’t have any of that. They’re flying from an extra thousand kilometers away. They don’t have the deep penetration capacity. So can Israel hurt Iran? Of course. Can they take it all out? I really doubt it. 

It’s an open question whether the United States could, which means that the Iranian nuclear program is only stalled so long as the bombing continues, and Israel only has so many weapons that can be used in this conflict. So the question we need to start asking ourselves is, what is the victory condition for Israel? Because their ability to actually destroy everything in the nuclear program is probably not going to happen. 

So what they seem to be doing is going after the power infrastructure and the access infrastructure to delay what’s left of the Iranian nuclear program as long as possible, which is a reasonable plan. And then the question becomes whether or not they decide to do more to set back Iran. More generally, going after military sites is kind of pointless because Iran’s military, for the most part, is infantry based. 

And if you’re doing long range pinpoint attacks, you’re just not going to break it up in any meaningful way. But you could torpedo the Iranian economy by going after the oil refining capacity. Iran is an oil exporter, not merely what they used to be back in their heyday, probably only about a million, a million and a half barrels a day. 

Today. That includes the smuggling, but they are highly dependent upon fuel processing at home just to keep the country together. So if you go after the refineries, which are much easier than going after the oil fields, the Israelis could achieve two things. Number one, that could destabilize the internal regime, because if there’s not fuel, it’s really hard to maintain an industrial level economy. 

And second, it would actually probably pour some literal oil on troubled waters, because if the Iranians can’t process the crude into fuel, they would then be forced to export more crude, which would actually weirdly push oil prices down. Something to consider. No sign that the Israelis are doing that right now, but considering their limited options for actually removing the nuclear card from the board, it’s something that seems pretty feasible to me.

Oil Markets Aren’t Worried About Iran

Photo of gas pumps at a station

With everything going on between Israel and Iran right now, I know what you’re thinking – it’s time to run to Costco and fill up the gas tank. Hear me out though, we don’t live in the same world we did a few decades ago.

Oil markets aren’t reacting to this conflict for a few reasons, but it boils down to where the crude is coming from. Between the US shale revolution and a diminishing importance of the Persian Gulf in oil markets, this conflict just doesn’t move the needle like it used to.

Sure, there could be a situation where I might start to worry. But that would require Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz (very unlikely) OR marching troops all the way to Saudi Arabia’s oil fields (also very unlikely). So, unless some dramatic military step is taken by Iran, we can all just fill up whenever it’s convenient.

Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from a somewhat breezy and drizzly Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about the attack that happened over the weekend in Iran. Israel’s basically bombing the crap out of Iran, going after the nuclear facilities. And, contrary to popular concern, oil prices really haven’t done all that much. They’ve moved less than 10%. 

Why do they not care? Why do I not care? Now, if you back up 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 years ago, any sort of spat involving Israel in any way immediately sent oil prices through the roof. And if it involved Iran, oh boy howdy. Because the Persian Gulf remains, even today, the world’s largest producer of crude and by far the world’s largest exporter of the stuff. 

And with in the modern day, the Europeans no longer taking crude from, Russia because of the Ukraine war, it’s become more important to global petroleum than it’s ever been before. However, however, however, there is another factor and that is the US shale revolution. The United States, in the last 20 years has gone from the world’s largest importer crude to, in gross terms, the second largest exporter, second only to Saudi Arabia. Does that mean we’re completely immune to what’s going on? But it does mean that we’re dumping more than 10 million barrels a day of crude into this market than what we did before, closer to 15, actually, now that I think about it. 

And that changes the math for everything, because if we did have a sharp cut off of the very thing in the Persian Gulf, the United States would face some teething pains as we use some of the crude grades that we produce in refineries that weren’t designed for it. But overall, we’d be okay. And having that extra 10 or 15 million barrels a day of global production just means that in percentage terms, the Middle East doesn’t matter nearly as much as it used to. 

Now, where does that take us? More specifically, what would make us worry? I am of the opinion now that even if Iran decided it wanted to shut down the shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf, it probably couldn’t. They’ve got a lot of small boats. A lot of them are really nothing more than, speedboats. It could do some damage. 

But about the only thing that is going to get Iran any assistance, any sympathy in the international system is if it doesn’t shut down the energy line that allows countries like China to function. If it does, that really is all on its own, except for the Russians, who would be happy to see global energy go up in smoke, which means, it’s down to how good their military is. 

And, you know, Iran has never, ever, ever in its history been a naval power. Probably the last battle that Iran was really noteworthy. It was like against Sparta. And if you’ve seen, you know, those movies, you know exactly what I’m talking about. It didn’t end well. What would make me care? Well, if Iran were to take its military and surge it into Iraq and south through Kuwait and go for the Saudi oil fields with the intention of taking them offline. 

That would get my attention. Iraq plus Kuwait. You’re talking 5 to 6 million barrels a day. Once you talk about the Saudi oil fields, you’re talking about another ten. All of these Saudi oil fields are in the far east of the country, really close to gutter. In a Shia majority area, and in theory with the Iranians, who are also Shia religiously, would get along with these people. 

So you could see some sort of rebellion happening at the same time. But for that to happen, that would be a big risk for Iran these days. One of the things we’ve seen with the Israeli attack is Iran no longer has any meaningful air defense whatsoever, and it’s generally easier to have static air defense in it. It has mobile air defense. 

So if they take their army and throw it at Saudi Arabia, they would have no air cover at all. In addition, Iran does not have what we would consider to be a mechanized military. It’s an infantry heavy force. So you’d basically be sending, don’t know, 50,000 hundred thousand, 200,000 men marching through the desert, 500 miles. Leaving aside the logistical terrain, that would be easy pickings. 

They would be completely open to the sky the entire way. And so even a successful operation would be hugely costly for them. And a failed operation would mean the end of the Iranian government, because the Iranian military wasn’t designed to fight other countries. It was designed to occupy all of the non Iranian non Persians in the country of Iran. 

Only about half the population are ethnically Persian. So if if they were to do that, it would be incredibly risky. And unless they pull it off successfully, I still don’t care and neither should you.

Israel Launches Attack on Iranian Nuclear Sites

Photo of attacks on Tehran by Israel in June 2025 targeting top military officials. Photo by Wikimedia Commons: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9e/Destroyed_buildings_as_aftermath_of_2025_Israeli_attack_on_some_areas_in_Tehran_23_Tasnim.jpg

Israel has launched a significant military campaign against Iran, primarily targeting nuclear facilities. Let’s break down the targets, impacts, and what’s coming.

A handful of sites used in uranium enrichment, fabrication, and machining were hit, along with several Iranian scientists and military figures.

Iran’s air defenses have fallen short, and given the amount and style of attacks, it’s likely that Israeli agents have made their way into Iran. The response from Iran has been lackluster and that’s not likely to change; with limited response options (paramilitary proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis are too weak), missile and drone launches are the extent of Tehran’s retaliatory options.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from a slightly stormy Colorado within the last 12 hours. The Israeli government has started a broad scale military campaign against Iran, going after primarily their nuclear facilities. This is the big one already. They’ve done more damage in Iran than any other power has done since the rise of the Ayatollah back in 1979. 

And they’re telegraphing that this is going to continue for at least a couple of weeks. The damage inflicted is notable, but let’s do a quick breakdown of what’s going on and where it’s likely to go before we all jump to conclusions. So first of all, let’s start with the non nuclear targets. The Israelis have targeted nuclear scientists. They have targeted military leaders. 

They haven’t had a success and targeted at least some of them. But honestly this is not all that impressive from my point of view. Israel has been going after nuclear scientists for the better part of the last 20 years. It’s not a great industry to be in if you want to live. So taking out 2 or 3 here and there doesn’t really change much. 

And as for the military leadership, Iran’s military is an occupation force that Iran uses to keep its own population in check. It’s not really capable of projections across territory. So if they were all gutted and it’s only been a few, it really doesn’t change the math at all. Got Iran affects its region through paramilitary groups that are not Iranian citizens. 

So by supplying them with equipment like the Houthis in Yemen. So gutting these two ranks of people doesn’t really change my math for anything of more significance is going after the nuclear facilities. Primarily we’re looking at Natanz, which is the primary enrichment facility that the Iranians used to turn uranium ore into something that can be used, fissile isotopes that can be used in weapons. 

There are secondary facilities in a place called Isfahan, which also handles a lot of fabrication. And higher end machining. In theory, being designed to be put into weapons. Now, let’s be clear. The Iranians have never tested a nuclear device. They have never demonstrated that you have the ability to put a nuclear device onto a missile and miniaturize it and ruggedized it so it can actually be thrown. 

We’re just talking here about a country that at the moment is working on enrichment and maybe the next couple of steps. And then the Israelis have started targeting an area called for, though, which is just sort of calm. For though, is the one place in the country where the centrifuges that are used to enrich uranium are actually in a reinforced location under the mountain. It is unclear whether the Israelis have the military capability of shattering for though this is where they turn. 

Kind of like mid-enriched uranium into highly enriched uranium, the fissile stuff, you can make a bomb out of, and so they’re going after things like air defense, power grids, that sort of thing going after the access points. Early days. We’re really only in the second wave of attacks right now. But the damage is notable. 

What? The Israelis have not gone after to this point are known stockpiles of nuclear fuel or the operational civilian power plant at Bushehr. It appears that they don’t want to be accused of war crimes by basically doing an inadvertent or maybe advertised dirty bomb in civilian areas. So that has not happened to this point. 

All right. What’s next? 

What is perhaps most interesting about this attack so far is there has been no meaningful Iranian air defense at all in the last two rounds of strikes over the last year, which were much smaller by comparison. Israel went after the air defenses first and discovered that they weren’t nearly as robust as they thought they were. These are older systems, or Russian systems, that have been purchased in the last 30 years, and apparently against the Israelis, who have a much more sophisticated, air penetration capacity than, say, Ukraine. 

They’re just not working at all. So if you’re a country out there and you bought a lot of Russian air defenses, you may have wasted a lot of money. Anyway, the Israelis aren’t just attacking with impunity. They’re actually announcing what their future targets would be. And there is plenty of indications across Iran that the Israelis have infiltrated and put agents on the ground and are using things like drones to go after movement of things like trucks and personnel. 

So if you announce you’re going to hit X site, an X site pulls out of their bunkers and starts to run, then they get hit by drones. So this is something that the Israelis very clearly have been working on for months. And it’s been played out so far pretty effectively. Whether it will completely destroy the Iranian nuclear program is, of course, an open question, because there are so many sites, and the Iranians have been preparing for this for so long. 

But if there’s anything that we have learned about Iran over the last few years, is that a lot of their stuff is not nearly as robust as they thought it was. It’s a lot more brittle. And so the Iranians really don’t have any good way to respond. Iranian power is not about the conventional military. They’re stuck in their mountain fastness. 

Half their population is not Persian. It’s in their paramilitary groups that they support around the country. She is in Iraq, Houthis in Yemen, maybe the Palestinians, if they get lucky, Hezbollah in Lebanon. And most of those groups between the American war on terror and recent Israeli operations have basically been gutted at the organization on the leadership level. 

And so none of them can really strike back against Israel in a meaningful way. That just leaves missiles. And yes, we have reports now that several hundred of those have been flying over, I should say several dozen. We’ve got drones and missiles. A lot of things are in the air. It’s not clear yet that they can get through Israeli defense or not. 

We’re. Oh, rain. We’re nearing a position where if Iran still thinks it’s going to have strategic leverage in anything, it’s going to have to use it or lose it. The thing is, it may know well that if it uses it, it will be its last shot and it’s not going to achieve anything anyway. Anyway, no one can decide the political and strategic math on that, except for the Iranian government and they’re under assault.

What’s Up In the Middle East: Israel’s Future

Photo of Israeli flag in from of some buildings

We’re kicking off a short new series on the Middle East. Of course, we must begin with the country on everyone’s mind – Israel.

The Israeli government is a fragile conglomerate of coalitions that have been led (and weakened) by Benjamin Netanyahu over the past decades. Netanyahu has managed to piss off Trump in recent times as well, with his requests for freedom to operate in Gaza, removal of US tariffs, and US strikes on Iran; Trump was quick to reject all three. But Netanyahu did get something from Trump – a nice seat at the top of his s**t list.

The situation in Gaza remains unsolved and is as complicated as ever. The US is disengaging from the Middle East, which means Israel is going to have to find someone else who carries a big stick and can help ensure its strategic future. Given Israeli reliance on imports food, energy, and tech, Turkey is the best option…despite the hoops and hurdles they’ll need to jump through and around to make it happen.

Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here come to you from Zion National Park. We’re launching off a week in the Middle East today. And, as seems appropriate, when I. You’re in Zion, we’ll start by talking about what some people call the Zionist state, Israel. Israel is a multi-party democracy, that hasn’t had a majority government in years. 

This is not an electoral system like the United States, where if you get one more vote than the other guy, you get the seat. And and you knew if you get a certain percentage of the votes, you get a certain percentage of the seats. So we’ve got like 11 parties in the Israeli, parliament right now. And as a result, for the last 30 years, their governments have been, very weak because they have to, make all of their coalition partners happy. 

Because if a coalition partner leaves odds are you’re going to have a fresh election and you get started all over again. So, it’s a lot like how Italy used to be in the 60s, 70s and 80s and 90s and 90s. Now, in Israel, where governments very, very rarely last out their whole term. The guy in charge is Benjamin Netanyahu, who has been near or at the top of the Israeli political heap now for pushing almost 30 years, almost 40, not a long time, anyway. 

He is a populist conservative who has no problem throwing other people under the bus or sacrificing some of his, political, preferences in order to maintain power. And I don’t necessarily mean that in a condescending or condemning way. When you’ve got multiple parties in Parliament and multiple parties in your government, you have to make a lot of horse trades on a tactical basis day by day. 

And that means that a lot of the things you do care about get pushed to the side. And that’s part of his problem right now. Donald Trump, entertained Netanyahu at the white House a few weeks ago, and it went horrible, really. The only world leader who’s been to the white House since Trump has been in that had a worse time was Zelenskyy of Ukraine. 

If you remember, that ambush. Anyway, Netanyahu came asking for three things. Number one, he wanted a completely a free hand in Gaza to do whatever he wanted. Reminder that Gaza is that little strip of territory, that until recently was ruled by a militant political group called Hamas, kidnaped hundreds of Israelis still are holding a couple hundred of them. 

And the Israelis have now been spending about a year and a half trying to beat that and into some sort of shape that they actually think they can deal with in the long run. The second thing that Israel wanted was an end to tariffs. Trump put tariffs on pretty much everybody who wasn’t Russia And the Israeli project in many ways has been American subsidized since the beginning, back in 1948. And so the idea that the United States is now going to charge a pretty hefty, tariff, you can see Israeli’s really caught everyone of all political stripes and Israel off guard because they thought that Trump, being a populist conservative, was one of theirs. 

Apparently not to the degree that they thought. And then third, Netanyahu really wanted to get, Trump to bomb Iran into the Stone age and do Israel’s work for it. It didn’t go well. He basically got a firm, loud Trumpian no. One, all three. And, you know, there’s a lot of speculation on a lot of sides as to how this is going to shake out. 

But what it feels like to me is that, Trump has just done, what, the entire alliance structure. It’s not just the Germans or the Brits or the Australians. It’s everybody. And that includes Israel. And so the Israelis are learning that even when they have the most populist conservative government in decades, and the Americans have the most populist conservative government in literally centuries, they do not see eye to eye. 

And from Trump’s point of view, the problem appears to be Netanyahu. The way Trump sees the world, which is through a very specific lens that I would argue needs to be replaced, Netanyahu represents everything that Trump looks down on, came to the white House and he asked for things. That’s not what winners do. That’s what losers do. 

He hasn’t been able to clean up Gaza. And it’s been a year and a half. Why is this still going on? It’s entirely unfair. You’ve got over 2 million people basically living on a postage stamp. The idea that’s going to be anything other than a breeding ground for insurgency is silly, and there is no good solution for Gaza. 

You want to ship the Gazans somewhere else where apparently people are starting to talk about sending them into the middle of the desert in Libya. Now, whatever. There’s no infrastructure to move them. There’s no place that can take 2 million people in the Middle East anywhere, even including in the rich places. But Israel wants them gone. 

And Trump wonders why this hasn’t been settled on the tariff situation. You know, the Trump view that the world has been ripping off the United States economically. I have no respect for that. That’s just flat out wrong. We basically paid people to be on our sides for the Cold War. So we got something in return. We got security control. 

Israel, Israel’s different, Israel has basically occupied a soft spot in the American strategic formula. Since foundation. And when they say come after our IP, like the Chinese or the French do, we really don’t do a lot about it because we’re trying to make sure that Israel can exist as an island of democracy in a sea of problems.  

Anyway, so there was no change on the tariff situation. Third up is Iran. And while the Trump administration and Trump personally talks a big talk on Iran, Trump has made it very clear over and over and over again in both this administration in his first one, that he has no intention of getting involved in a meaningful war. 

I mean, he picked a fight with the Yemeni recently and then stopped after 30 days. And now the idea that the United States is going to get involved in a knock them out fight with a country that can influence militants across the entire region seems a bit of a stretch to me. Also, the Israelis very clearly have been pushing for the United States to do this long before Trump going back, five presidents. 

And it hasn’t really gone the way that the Israelis would like. And so when Netanyahu made his direct, almost arrogant plea to Trump, he was turned down flat. That doesn’t mean that the Americans and the Iranians are about to, like, kiss and make up. But Trump really does want a nominal deal that would allow him to say that he made a deal. 

And so those talks are continuing to grind forward. The bottom line is that Netanyahu can’t give Trump anything that he wants. Number one, there’s not a lot in the Middle East that the United States does want, especially now that the withdrawal after Iraq has been completed. And then second, anything that might produce movement of, for example, peace in Gaza, which is one of the things that, Trump campaigned on can only happen by rupturing Netanyahu, whose domestic political coalition because by the tenor of the right wing in Israel, Donald Trump is a hippie 

commie. And there’s just no version of any deal, in Gaza that would work. For who? This is nice. Let’s take a look at that. That would work for all of the factions. In fact, there are some members of Netanyahu’s coalition who are wondering why they haven’t kicked up the crematoria and just gotten rid of the Gazans directly. 

Anyway, so that’s where Israel is. That’s where Netanyahu is. He’s kind of stuck in a lurch. There’s no real good move for him. And Trump is tuning out. And that means the Israelis are going to have to figure out how to function in a world where the United States just really doesn’t care about the Middle East. 

So, obviously this has happened under Team Trump, but I would have argued that we’ve been edging this direction for a good 15 years already, and we’re always going to get to some version of this where the Israelis have to figure out that they can’t look after the security themselves. They’re too small, they’re too dependent on energy imports, the two independent food imports, the two dependent on technology imports. 

But there are partners out there that might work. They just have to figure out which one they can stomach. And the one that is most obvious, the one that is closest to one that could be a threat if it wasn’t a partner would be Turkey. And we’ll talk about them tomorrow.

Gaza Goes Back to Square One

Photo of Gaza with destroyed buildings

Israel has resumed military operations in Gaza, so any ceasefire or hostage deal that was on the table can be kissed goodbye.

The humanitarian crisis in Gaza has worsened; much of the housing has been destroyed, food supplies remain critical, and supply chains have been disrupted. Given these conditions and the dense urban area that Hamas operates in, it will continue to have a stream of new recruits that will make elimination a near-impossible task.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hello from Vegas. Just a real quick one today. Earlier this week, the Israelis, went back into Gaza. So we’ve had multiple hundreds of strikes and basically full military operations that began again. And so the, the peace for hostages deal that may have been kind of, sort of in place is clearly gone now. And anyone who’s interested in negotiating a ceasefire or a truce is just going to have to start from scratch. 

Unfortunately. Fortunately, I words are kind of insufficient. Most of the population had tried to return to their homes, only 

discover that, two thirds of the housing stock has been destroyed. And keep in mind that it takes about a thousand trucks a day coming in with food aid in order to keep the population alive. And that at a time when the greenhouses were working, which they no longer are. 

So we’re once again right back into the humanitarian catastrophe. And if you are Israel, we are once again right back into the situation where Hamas is strong. Keep in mind that you’ve got over 2 million people living in an open air prison camp with absolutely no prospects. You can’t get out of the, Gaza Strip. Unless the Israelis specifically allow you almost on a case by case basis. 

And because of that, you’re basically just in this cauldron. It’s a horrible way to live. And it makes it very, very easy for militant groups like Hamas to recruit. So if you think of all the big successes that Israel has had recently, they gutted Hezbollah with a brilliant, long term intelligence operations where they blew up cell phones. 

They’ve gutted the, Lebanese government. The Syrian government has fallen, and with airstrikes, they basically removed all the heavy equipment that Syria has built up over the last 60 years. And Iran is on the back foot throughout the entire region. But Hamas is different because it’s basically in an urban zone and doing door to door clearing of an urban zone, especially when you can tunnel under it is just an order of magnitude more difficult. 

It’s not that Israel’s been unwilling to put the men in the materials to the work to try to root out Hamas. It’s just that as long as there’s 2.3 million people there, Hamas will always, always, always, always be able to recruit more. 

And unfortunately, that just means that a conflict like this doesn’t have an end. It’s just a question of what minimum tolerance the Israelis are willing to put up with in terms of violence. And it appears, at least for this government, that means keeping troops on the ground and active military operations for the foreseeable future.

Israel’s Strategy for Iranian Nukes

Photo of Israeli Troops overlooking an area

With the Iranians eyeing nukes, why haven’t regional powers like the Israelis stepped in and squashed those dreams?

Targeting Iran’s nuclear capabilities isn’t so straightforward. Plutonium is a byproduct of civilian nuclear reactors (and they’re not going to target those), uranium is abundant and can be sourced fairly easily, and uranium enrichment centrifuges can be easily moved…so, targeting their nuclear infrastructure is impractical.

Israel has opted to disrupt Iran’s nuclear hopes in other ways. They eliminate key experts via assassination programs, launch cyberattacks and keep tactical airstrikes in their back pocket. And given Iran’s declining industrial capabilities, this nuclear program serves more as a bargaining chip than a serious attempt at weaponization.

Should Iran fly a little too close to the sun and get a nuke within arm’s reach, you should expect Israel and Saudi Arabia to quickly put them in their place.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from three sisters in Taranaki, New Zealand. And today we’re taking a question from the Patreon family. Specifically why Israel hasn’t struck at Iranian nuclear facilities in an attempt to prevent the Iranians from ever developing a bomb in the first place. And there’s a number of reasons for this. But the core issue is this. 

And there’s too much to go after to do it reliably. So let’s go through the materials of what you need to to make a meaningful bomb. First of all, you need the raw materials, either uranium or plutonium. Now, any civilian nuclear power reactor is going to generate a lot of plutonium as a byproduct. So we’ve got about a one gigawatt, power plant, which for a nuclear power plant is pretty much a run of the mill. 

You’re going to generate enough waste plutonium every year to make about a dozen plutonium bombs. So unless you’re going to take out the nuclear facilities, you’re not going to be able to remove that from their supply chain. And, bombing a civilian nuclear power plant obviously comes with a few consequences. As for uranium, uranium is one of the most common materials on Earth. 

And so it’s very easy to source. In the early Cold War days, when we thought it was rare, we, the United States, cut a deal with the Australians who at the time had most of the global production, basically cornered the market. But since then, it’s been discovered in all kinds of places. And the world’s largest producers are Canada, Australia, Kazakhstan, Russia and China. 

So, you know, removing those countries from the mix. Yeah, I’m not going to happen. Even if you did. Ultimately, you only need a few tonnes of the ore to generate the yellowcake that you need, in order to generate the finished metal that you need for lutetium. So going after the raw materials really isn’t a play. Moving up the value added scale, however, you get some more options because, you know, these raw materials don’t do anything, by themselves. 

You need the system that’s necessary to purify and extract the plutonium from the waste material and then purified in the metal. There are a lot of chemicals you can go after there. But again, most of those are globally available under the civilian supply chain. So it’s a limited on the uranium front. 

If you have your raw uranium ore, you basically have to mix it with chlorine gas to make a material that you can then run through a centrifuge over and over and over and over to extract the specific type of uranium that is fissile, that can go into a bomb. Those centrifuges are definitely a weak point in the process that is restricted technology. 

And in order to have a weapons program of size, you also need a lot of them. Now, the problem here is it doesn’t matter where those things are. You could have a cluster of a few thousand in one place. You could disperse it. And whenever people talk about striking Iran’s weapons systems, the Iranians just move the centrifuges around because they can be easily individually loaded into trucks and move wherever they want. 

So, you know, you do a single round of airstrikes, you might get some of them. You’re certainly not going to get all of them. And you only need so much of this stuff in order to make a bomb. Then you’ve got the the metallurgy. There are different types of weapons systems, that use plutonium and uranium, and there’s different ways that you can combine them to make an explosive product. 

But this is an engineering question. And ultimately, this is where the Israelis have chosen to focus. Can’t go after the raw materials. You can’t go after the equipment. You go after the people with the experience of how to turn these processed materials into something that can go boom. And so Israel focuses on what it does well. Instead of surgical strikes, they have an assassination program. 

And whenever an Iranian nuclear scientist starts to get a little bit too productive, he tends to, fall down some stairs after getting shot in the back of the head with some bullets. So it’s not that the Israelis aren’t doing anything to contain this threat, it’s that they’re striking the weak point in the system, which is the personnel. 

One of the wild things about Iran is that their industrial base today is significantly less sophisticated than it was back in 1980. This is a country that has been in long term industrial decline for any number of reasons, sanctions of which are only one part of it. And that means the Israelis have found it actually pretty easy to pick off individual people who are involved in the weapon system in order to snarl the whole system. 

Now, that doesn’t mean that’s the only thing they do. They also engage in a degree of sabotage and cyber hacks. And if push came to shove, I have no doubt that they’re willing to do tactical airstrikes. But you’re talking about something that can be dispersed. You’re talking about something that once you do start going after it, the, receiving country, Iran in this case, has a vested interest in keeping the system as dispersed as possible and then accelerating the work. 

So until now, the Iranian nuclear program has mostly been a negotiating chip that they are willing to trade away in exchange for a broader deal specifically with the United States. And that’s one of the reasons why this technology, which was developed in the 40s, still hasn’t been replicated in the Persian Gulf. There’s also a strategic side to this. 

Israel is already a nuclear power. And if the Israelis ever really did feel that the Iranians were getting close, they’d probably use their own systems to make sure that Iran could never cross the threshold and they’d do a preemptive nuclear strike. The other side of the strategic question is Iran is not alone in the neighborhood. Closer to home. 

Just across the Persian Gulf are the Saudis and the Saudis and the Iranians don’t care for each other very much. And the big difference between these two is that Saudi Arabia has much deeper pockets. So if Push ever did really come to shove, and it did look like Iran was going to develop a functional weapon, not only would they be risking a preemptive Israeli nuclear strike, but the Saudis would probably just go out, write a check, and buy some nukes from another country, most notably Pakistan. 

So for Iran, the nuclear card is not nearly as valuable as most people seem to think it is, because they know if they even try to draw it from the deck, they’re gonna get hammered real hard. So this is something I worry about. Not really. And whenever there’s something in the Middle East that I don’t worry about, I call that a win. 

The Syrian Consequence: Iran Goes “Defensive”

Flag of Iran

Syria was critical for Iran’s influence in the Arab world. For 40 years the Iranians could project power via Syria and Hezbollah, but the collapse of the Assad regime means Syria’s role as buffer and distraction has ended. So, what’s next for Iran?

With Hezbollah in Lebanon severely weakened and Hamas constrained in Gaza, there’s not a whole lot of reliable proxies distracting regional powers. As eyes turn to Iran, it will need to shift its focus to threats that are closer to home. We’re talking Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

As these regional adversaries begin putting pressure on the Iranians, they will likely respond more aggressively than we’ve seen in recent times. This could lead to heightened tensions and potential conflict with the likes of Saudi Arabia.

This marks a larger shift in the Middle East, as regional instability moves eastward toward Iran’s borders.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hello, everybody. I’m here coming to you from Okura Kuru in New Zealand. Today we’re going to talk about, more consequences of the Syrian civil war coming to an abrupt shift with the fall of the Assad regime. And today we’re going to talk specifically about Iran. Now, Iran’s primary method for intervening in affairs in the Arab world has been through Syria, because here you have a nominally Arab Sunni state in the middle of the region. 

Now, Syria has never been ruled by the Sunni Arabs in the modern age. It’s always been by the Assad family, who are a minority called Alawites, which are generally considered to be a heretical sect. But by influencing, affecting, emboldening and empowering the Assad dynasty, the Iranians were basically able to keep everyone on their toes and off balance. 

One of the things to keep in mind if you’re a country like Iran, which is basically a mountain fortress, is that, if everyone can concentrate on you, you don’t stand a chance. So the trick for successful management is to make sure people are occupied with other problems. And in a world where the dominant superpower is a naval power, the United States. 

You want to keep them locked down with concerns on land somewhere else. And so that’s why the Iranians were always active in Syria. That’s why the Russians were active in Syria. It was just a distraction play more than anything else. Well, now that Syria has fallen, now that the Assads are gone, now that Syria is going to find a different course, Iran is discovering that everything that has worked for in the last 40 years is kind of falling apart all at once. 

Hezbollah, which is the militant faction in Lebanon that intervened in the Syrian civil war and has gone to war with Israel a couple times, has basically been beheaded. And the question is whether it can reform at all. And Hamas is now in a box. That’s the militant group in Gaza, and there’s really nothing left, which means that everyone can focus on Iranian issues that are closer to Iran proper, which is a real problem for the regime. 

Now, I don’t think that overthrowing Iran is even remotely realistic. This isn’t Russia, where it’s a cluster of people at the top. This isn’t China where it’s a one man show. This is not 

Syria where there’s a dynasty. Iran is a theocracy. And so there’s a class of over 10,000 mullahs that rule the country. 

And that would be a hell of an assassination program in order to overthrow the political system. But that doesn’t mean there aren’t threats. And that doesn’t mean that there aren’t ways that Iran can be contained and contained. And mostly that’s going to have to do with local issues that have to do with naval prominence and energy policy. Keep in mind that the Persian Gulf is where half of all internationally traded oil is sourced from Iran, even in low times, is going to be a major oil producer and exporter. 

So as you crunch down the outer perimeter of where the Iranians have influence, and it moves from Lebanon to Syria to Iraq in the Persian Gulf, it is easier for external powers to pressure Iran right at home. In many ways, this is the worst of all worlds. And what we’re probably going to see in the next few years is Iran being forced to respond in kind within its own inner periphery. 

And so that’s less stuff going on in the Levant. That’s less stuff going far away in places like Yemen. And it means having to deal with opposition, both international and local, right around their inner perimeter. Expect to see more going on with Pakistan and the Baluchi rebels that are operate on both sides of the border. With now the Iranians more on the offensive and suffering from Baluchi attacks, rather than empowering them somewhere else. 

Expect to see Azerbaijan, which is majority Shia but secular, taking a more pro-American line to contain Iranian power to the north. Expect to see Iraq empowered, which, you know, Iraq is a majority Shia state, but they’re Arabs and not Persians. And in times when Iran tends to get, how should I say this? Insecure, they tend to be very active in what we think of as Mesopotamia, today’s Iraq. 

And I would expect that to become much more inflamed, especially as Turkey becomes more involved in the broader region. But the real issue, the real fight is going to be between Iran and Saudi Arabia, because they are the two biggest energy powers. They were the two largest economies in the Persian Gulf. And in any scenario where Iran is on the defensive. 

Saudi Arabia has a really big checkbook. And while Sunni militants have hit out at the United States and hit out at Israel and hit out Russia and everyone else, the ethnic group, the religious group that the Sunni Arab militants like okay, are most opposed to are Shia Persians. Most of these groups were originally founded with the intent of taking Iran or its predecessors down a notch or three. 

So expect to see a lot more violence as Saudi Arabia starts to write a lot of checks to hem in Iran on all possible points of the compass. And the only way that Iran can return the favor in any meaningful sense is to do a normal war. So, ironically, the end of Iran’s power in the western parts of the Middle East, in places like Syria, is probably going to lead to a more aggressive Iran. 

And from their point of view, a defensive Iran. And the only way that they can stop the attacks that are likely to increase upon them is to take the fight to a country like Saudi Arabia. That’s, to be perfectly honest, doesn’t have a functional military on its own. So the next chapter of Middle Eastern history isn’t going to be any more or less violent than the one that came before. 

It’s just the violence is going to be further east and closer to Iran’s borders.

The Syrian Consequence: Israel’s Opportunity

Photo of Israeli flag in from of some buildings

The Russians aren’t the only ones trying to figure out what to do following the chaos in Syria; Israel is also reassessing their regional positioning. However, while Israel’s regional strategy will need to be revamped, they have an opportunity to capitalize on this situation.

Syria previously limited Israel’s ability to find security in the region, but a window for change has been opened. With the Shia crescent and its influence on this region being disrupted, the threat that Iran and Hezbollah once posed to Israel has greatly diminished. And while Israel is a bit preoccupied with Gaza and Hamas, there’s not a real threat to Israeli statehood.

It would seem Israel could be ready for a new strategy, but regional relations will be critical in determining how that plays out. Between Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iran, there’s plenty of countries to keep an eye on; although, the most important places to watch will be Syria and Turkey.

As Syria builds back, we could see a Sunni Arab consolidation, which might cause bigger problems for Israel down the road. But Turkey will be the final boss here; depending on how Turkey approaches Israel, that will determine which strategic path Israel will be forced to go down.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Egmont National Park. That’s Mount Taranaki in the background. And I’m walking through the ahu Kawakawa swamp, which is nonstandard. Anyway, we’re gonna continue talking about the consequences of the fall of the Syrian government. And today we’re going to cover Israel. There’s an old adage going back to the late 70s, that says that there is no war without Egypt and no peace without Syria. 

The last major Israeli, Arab conflict was in 1973, and it was a surprise attack. That probably shouldn’t have happened, but it ended with a resounding Israeli victory. And after that, it set the stage for peace talks with the Egyptians, which concluded under Jimmy Carter in 1979. But Syria always stayed on the outside. And the whole concept of that phrase is that Israel is a vulnerable state, and until it has peace with all of its neighbors, it has peace with none of its neighbors, because there just isn’t any strategic depth. 

But now the situation has changed. And there is an opportunity here for Israel to do a few things differently, should it so choose, the border with Egypt is internationally monitored, and Egypt is as close to a friend as the Israelis have in the region. And that provides some strategic opportunities here, especially since now that the, northeastern border is open. 

So this is gonna take a few places. First of all, the Golan Heights, that’s a chunk of territory that the Israelis captured from the Syrians in a series of conflicts throughout, the 20th century. It hasn’t really been settled, because there’s always this idea that there was eventually going to be a land for peace deal. Well, that doesn’t have to happen now. 

So you should expect to see the Israelis make the most of what is actually some significantly fertile territory that, could help a country that imports over half of its foodstuffs. Second, the remaining security concerns are now somewhat limited. There’s this thing called the Shia Crescent that starts in Iran, goes through Iraq, through northern Syria and into Lebanon. 

And the idea is this is the area that the Iranians would use to project power. And one of the big fuck ups that the Americans did with the Iraq war is basically shatter what was an Arab Sunni power that ruled that area and allowed the Iranians to penetrate into the region very, very deeply. They don’t control Iraq, but they’re certainly the first power in the country. 

Well, now, with Syria broken. The Shia crescent has been cut in half, and the Iranians can no longer drive or even reliably fly equipment or arms or men, to the western part of the crescent, which means that Hezbollah, which is the militant group that the Iranians founded and sponsored, but the Syrians manage, that operates mostly in Lebanon. 

Is now, I don’t want to say dead. That’s maybe the wrong word, but certainly gutted. And it will have to do with its own resources and without the Syrians or the Iranians to manage them or reinforce them or provide them with weapons. That’s not a lot. And that’s before you consider that over the last couple of months, the Israelis have done a damn solid job of gutting the entire, Hezbollah leadership. 

So there’s still a lot of anger. There’s still plenty of people to recruit from. But as a functional organization, Hezbollah is functionally gone at this point. And with Syria now gone, there’s really no way to rehabilitate it very quickly. This is not the cold War. This is not a period of heavy globalization where freedom of the seas is sacrosanct. 

This is a world where if you want to get equipment from A to B, you have to basically get it there yourselves and provide the military escort that’s necessary. And Iran’s not a naval power. Okay. That just leaves where this all started. In recent days, Hamas in Gaza. Now, my assessment of what’s going on there really hasn’t changed. 

Hamas, rules Gaza. Gaza is occupied territory. As long as it’s occupied territory, there will be no end of people who are willing to fight the occupiers. And the occupiers are the Israelis. The only question is whether or not the organization that runs the place can get enough equipment and weapons, to fight back in a meaningful way like they did, a year ago, October, when they did that big assault that killed a thousand people. 

The Israelis are in the process of crunching that down. They’re building a cordon in the edge of Gaza, and then cutting it in half, basically splitting into tiny little cantons that they feel they can manage more directly. Now, this will guarantee that the population will always be hostile to them. But you’re talking about a low level simmering insurgency, as opposed to something that could generate the military organization that’s necessary to actually attack a state. 

So it’s ugly. It will continue to be ugly in fact, it will probably from a human rights point of view and a starvation point of you get uglier. But that doesn’t mean it’s a threat to the state of Israel. And that’s everybody, everyone around, Israel has now been clipped or befriended. Jordan is basically an economic satellite who’s indirectly sponsored by Israel and the United States. 

Egypt is relatively friendly. Lebanon, in a good day, is a failed state, and without Hezbollah, they might actually be able to make a go of being a semi ish kind of sort of normal state. And Iran lacks the ability to, dick around in Israeli affairs so long as there is no Syria. Now, there’s two things to keep in mind for a longer term. 

First of all, Syria itself. One of the reasons that the Israelis never got involved in the Syrian civil war is they felt that if the majority in Syria was able to take control, the Sunni Arabs, then they would be dealing with something like Gaza and Hamas, but on a much larger scale. And so they didn’t like Assad or Assad Syria, but they felt it was the least bad option. 

 

So as whatever post-assad Syria consolidates into a new form, the Israelis are going to be acting very, very cautiously. You’re going to be watching very, very closely. And they’re May based on the way politics evolves, maybe a strong, far stronger case for Israeli intervention in post civil war Syria than there was during civil war. 

Syria, of course, will probably have a second civil war. Now all the Sunni Arabs figure out who’s in charge. So as long as it hasn’t consolidated, Israel is fine. Once it starts to consolidate, Israel is going to be watching very closely because it might not like the form that it takes. What’s next? Second. And the bigger question, the longer term question and the question that ultimately is going to occupy, Israeli strategic thinkers for decades is the relationship with Turkey. 

Now, in the past, the Israel Jews got along with the Ottoman Empire. And during the Cold War, the Israelis got along with Cold War era Turkey. But that is not where we are right now. Turkey is in the process of redefining what it is to be Turkish, and based on how that definition goes. There may or may not be room for Israel in that definition. 

The issue is, is that Turkey is a major power and there is nothing that Israel could ever do to change that. And so Israel is stuck dealing with whatever the new Turkish identity happens to be. Now, me taking the arm chair, look, a a turkey that partners with Israel is one that de facto controls the entire eastern Mediterranean. 

Egypt would probably be brought along for the ride and becomes a major regional power in its own right. An Israel that doesn’t get along with Turkey is one that is locked down in a series of local conflicts. That greatly sap its power and its ability to project in any direction. So if the government of Turkey can decide that Jews are okay, then we go one direction. 

And for the powers of Europe, all of a sudden Turkey is a major player that they can’t be ignored. If the Turkish leadership decides that the Jews are the problem, then we have a very different situation with the European side, with the Israelis, to keep the Turks boxed up. Now that is a debate and a question and a time frame that would be decided years from now. 

But now that Syria has been broken, that is the next big thing on the Israeli and the Turkish agenda.