Israel Archives - Zeihan on Geopolitics

America After the Election: Foreign Policy & Does Turkey Have the Power to Control Israel’s Future?

America After the Election: Foreign Policy

Listen, I debated even entertaining an election video for today, but since this question was so good, I just had to record one.

The question is: what aspects of American foreign policy are going to stick with us regardless of who wins the presidential election? The answer is not as eloquent.

I’m sure that not one of you will like what I had to say and that’s fineeeee, because as long as I pissed off everyone, I should be in the clear…and I coincidentally planned an international trip, so enjoy! Muahahahah!

Does Turkey Have the Power to Control Israel’s Future?

Israel has had a lot of eyes on it lately and many are starting to wonder what the future looks like for this small and arid country. Let’s break this down through the lens of deglobalization.

With US involvement and globalization set to decline, Israel could be losing a very valuable partner. Remember that the US has supported Israel with critical resources like food and energy, as well as on the security and military fronts. That leaves some pretty big shoes to fill.

I don’t want to discredit Israel entirely because they have established themselves as a technological power, but that can only take them so far. The main shortcomings being energy, food, and protection. Thankfully there are some viable options out there.

Saudi Arabia and Israel have already begun working together and I would expect that to continue. Turkey, who will take some convincing to enter into a partnership, would be a powerful addition to the team (Turkey is poised to be the regional leader moving forward, thanks to its military and economic power). And then we’ll throw in Egypt to round out the roster.

I don’t want to put too much stress on this, but if Israel can’t figure out its relationship with Turkey…the Israeli future could look bleak.

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For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado, well we are two-thirds of the way through our first ten inches of snow for the season. Ooh. Happy election day to everyone. I had considered just letting this pass and just dealing with the crap that’s going to inevitably happen after. But I got a really good question from one of the Patreon crowd members.

So I figured I would take a shot at it, before I leave the country for a couple days. So, the question is this: what aspects of American foreign policy are going to stick with us regardless of who wins the presidential election? Great question. I do not have a great answer. In the world until roughly…

Oh, let’s call it 2012. We had something in the United States, when it came to foreign policy and strategic policy, called the bipartisan consensus. And the idea was that the Soviet Union was bad. Global communism was not a great idea. And the way for the United States to secure its security, as well as its economic well-being, was to build an alliance network that would span the world and pursue a free-trade world,

a globalized world with everyone so that most countries of consequence would have a vested interest in benefiting from participating in the American security agreements rather than going and doing something else. And that gave us NATO and the Japanese and the Korean, the Taiwanese alliances, and all of that, and built the nonaligned world into an economic powerhouse that wasn’t necessarily aligned with the United States, but really wasn’t aligned with anyone else either.

Broadly worked. But then in 2012, we had eight years of a visceral disinterest in governing, by Barack Obama. And then we got Donald Trump and Joe Biden, who were two of the most economically populist presidents we’ve ever had. And over that 16-year period, the bipartisan consensus has withered away. And the party that was responsible for basically writing most of the real policies, the Republican Party, has now

found itself in a different place with the national security conservatives and the business conservatives not really even part of the party architecture any longer.

And there are some factions of the Republican Party that are finding themselves very strangely aligned on some issues with Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. So, to say that security policy is no longer up for grabs in the United States is not paying attention to what’s really going on. What that means is the United States is in a period of flux, not just politically, internally, but internationally.

Now, this is the topic of a lot of my workings,

Starting with The Absent Superpower and The Accidental Superpower ten years ago. But what we’re seeing in the United States is also churning other things, which means that very few of the things that we consider to be normal national security and economic precepts are likely to survive because the institutions of the parties that formed them are themselves up for grabs.

And we’re seeing the leadership of both the Democratic and the Republican Party taking the institutions into a nonfunctional era. They will reform, and we will get to a situation where we can have a meaningful conversation about foreign policy again, but it’s probably not going to be for a few more years. So we’re stuck with what we have.

So let’s start with the Democrats and Kamala Harris. How can I say this without sounding like a complete prick? She’s an empty suit. Kamala Harris’s only job experience before she became vice president was being a prosecutor, which is, you know, better than the last three presidents, but it’s still not a lot. It’s a relatively minor view of anything.

And so when you look at anything she’s going to say about anything, she’s never actually implemented anything. And so you have to take everything with a big block of salt. In her first year as vice president, she was at Joe Biden’s side in every press conference, every summit, every meeting, and it got to the point that Biden’s staff decided that, no, we don’t want her around.

So they gave her a task that they knew she would fail at and gave her no power to carry it out. And that was going down to solve the border. And so, lo and behold, it was a failure. And then they were able to shovel her off to the side for the next two and a half years until it turns out she’s the presidential nominee.

So if you are voting for Kamala Harris, do not fool yourself. You are voting for an unknown, somebody with very limited experience, and who will come into the White House without a circle of people around her who are competent. They’re going to be people she’s picked up, people who are not loyal to her personally, most likely.

And so it really is a crapshoot. And then, of course, we’ve got the Republican side. And I’m going to put aside for the moment most of my feelings on Donald Trump on strategic issues. I would just ask you to look at really any of his interviews or rallies

in the last three weeks, especially the one that was in Michigan two days ago.

The degradation that I saw during the debate with Biden was in full swing, and this guy is just not all there anymore. So even if he does become president, he probably won’t be for very long. Keep in mind that he is older now than Joe Biden was when Joe Biden became president. And the mental fortitude required for the job is immense.

And Trump just doesn’t have it. So don’t kid yourself. If you’re voting for Trump, you’re actually voting for JD Vance. And JD Vance is even more of an empty suit than Kamala Harris. He’s also a bit of a chameleon, which I don’t know if it’s a plus or minus. He wrote a somewhat famous book,

Hillbilly Elegy, a few years ago, and since then, he’s partially repudiated what he said.

And then he said that Donald Trump was a horrible person, should never be president, and was a danger to democracy. And he’s obviously repudiated that. This is a guy who will say anything to get closer to power. And if Trump wins, he will be the next president. So we’ve got two candidates here who both seem to be fairly economically populist, both of which have no experience in the real world,

and no experience in government—very limited, anyway. And that’s what’s on the docket. So any sort of institutional loyalties are weak to none. Any sort of policy experience that might give us an idea of what they might prioritize is negligible. And so any sort of policies that might have consistency, from the last 20 years to the next four, it’s going to be a short list.

The issue with foreign policy in the United States is that most of it is a presidential prerogative, and it’s very rare that Congress has any say in any of it, at least in the formative stages. And so if we don’t know who, institutionally speaking, politically speaking, ethically speaking, the next president is going to be because there’s no track record,

we don’t know what they’re going to prioritize at all, and we don’t know how they would react to any hypothetical scenario because they’ve never had to do it before. The only policies that are an exception, then, are issues where the president has chosen to cede a degree of authority to Congress and lock something in with an act of Congress that limits the president’s room to maneuver. Those sorts of policies will probably stick because it would require an act of Congress to overthrow them.

In the case of the United States, that’s a very short list of things. And most are related to trade, of which by far the most important policy that falls into that bucket is NAFTA. Now

I’ve made no bones about my general dislike of Donald Trump on any number of issues, but what he did with NAFTA 2 renegotiation, I thought, was brilliant because it was the right thing at the right time with the right partner.

Mexico has become our number one trade partner. And if there is a future for the United States economically, outside of being locked into a very dangerous and unequal relationship with China, Mexico will be the core of whatever that happens to be. And so having the hard work done already, and having it be the isolationist right of the United States that did the negotiations, I thought was great.

So no matter who becomes president next, I think NAFTA is fine. And honestly, that is the single most important foreign policy priority the United States has. So at least when it comes to preparing for whatever is next in the world, as the Chinese become more belligerent and as they start to fall apart, as the Ukraine war crescendos and we face the Russian demographic dissolution as the European

fractures because the population there is making it very difficult for them to do anything else.

The most important single piece of our future was done by Donald Trump, and he deserves credit for that. And I don’t think that whoever his successor is—Harris or JD Vance—is going to have the political authority or interest in overturning that. So, you know, hurray. Now, with that said, I have now probably thoroughly pissed off everybody on both sides.

You should go vote. And you should know that by the time you’re seeing this video, I’m already out of the country, so have a good one.

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the coast of South Carolina. Several of you have written in on our Patreon forum with questions about what the future of Israel will be, especially as the world de-globalizes. Well, a little background, and then we’ll go into it.

So, number one: Israel is not a big place. We’re talking about a country that’s roughly the size of New Jersey, in a large neighborhood that is pretty arid and not exactly full of friends. Yes, Israel has built a surprisingly dynamic society with an amazing level of technological acumen, but it didn’t do it alone. The question is whether it can sustain itself; it’s basically a de facto sponsorship of the United States from the beginning. And while, for example, its missile defenses are impressive, the real ones—the ones that intercept the ballistic missiles, the arrows—have never functioned without American participation in terms of targeting, tracking, and even, you know, firing.

So, by far the most capable state of the region, but the PA isn’t exactly high. Here’s a country that imports the vast majority—over 80%—of its energy. And despite all the talk, a kibbutz is something like three-quarters of its food as well. So it’s in kind of a pickle. It requires foreign sponsorship for security and it requires access to economies outside of the region for its energy and its food. You remove the United States as the security guarantor, or you remove globalization, and this should, in theory, be one of those countries that, without a radical change of affairs, is simply going to dry up and blow away.

Now, I don’t think that is Israel’s future because a few things are going to change, some of which already have. One of the things that so frustrates the United States about Israel is it acts on its own. It has agency. When you are so much more technically capable and have so much more reach than your neighbors, you have some options. And the Israelis often exercise that. They often engage in military and paramilitary operations that are directly opposed to U.S. interests. And because of that, the Israelis have this view that no ally is worth forever. If push comes to shove, you do what you feel you need to do. And if it happens to piss off the person who ensures you get fed and the lights come on and the missiles get shot down, well, that’s so be it.

They know that at some point down the road they’re going to have to do things differently. And while they probably can’t do it on their own, that doesn’t mean that they can’t find a new friend. So, the question is, who are the candidates?

Well, in terms of energy, I would argue that they’ve already found that one. Starting over 15 years ago, the Israelis basically built a de facto alliance with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia would provide them with some intel on Iran and some energy. And in exchange, the Israelis would provide the Saudis with backdoor access to American weapons systems that the Americans were willing to sell to Saudi Arabia, along with the training that was necessary so they could use them. In addition, anything that involves Iran, the two of them will operate pretty closely.

Now, this doesn’t mean they get along on everything. Obviously, when it comes to the Palestinians, there are still some fine details to work out. But the two of them get on pretty well behind the scenes and publicly spout a lot. But behind the scenes, they’re actually getting along great; they’re reasonable friends. Agriculture is easier. There are a lot more countries in the region that provide food surpluses, most notably in Europe. So it’s not like the Israelis need access to the globalized system to keep the food flowing.

But when it comes to security, that basically tells you where they’re going to get their food. Every country in the Middle East is in the process of wondering when the United States will pull back and, if so, who they should go to. And none of the options are particularly good if you’re an Arab. If you consider that the French and the Brits and the Turks have all had colonial empires in the region, no one really wants to go back to that day. But if you’re Israeli, you’ve got some options because the Israelis were never really a traditional colony; it was formed by the Zionist movement in the aftermath of World War II.

Partnering up with France, or Britain, or in my opinion, Turkey, is something that can be done with a minimum of cultural pain. Of the three, the most likely candidate will be Turkey—not because it’s the closest cultural cousin; it’s the opposite. But if Turkey is not a friend, then Turkey will most likely be an enemy. And having an alliance with someone against your local foe puts you really at the mercy of your ally. But if the Israelis can find a way to bury the hatchet with the Turks, then you take the largest economy and military in the area, with the most projection-based economy and military in the region, and you get a very powerful pairing.

That’s going to be pretty easy to justify joining. So I think the future of this region is likely to be Turkish-led, to a degree Israeli-managed, Saudi-fueled. And those three will have no problem bringing in Egypt as a big bulwark partner in North Africa. That quad is likely to be the power center for this region in a post-American system. And they have everything that all of them need—energy, security, naval access, food, and a really good network of intelligence systems.

I know a lot of you are going to say, “Wait a minute, doesn’t the Turkish government hate Israel right now?” Yes. I didn’t suggest any of this was going to be easy. The issue is that the Turkish government can protect Israel from, say, France or Britain, but France or Britain can’t really protect Israel from Turkey. So there’s really not a lot of strategic choice here. You know, if you’re Saudi Arabia, the idea of reaching out to a distant power like Japan or China makes a degree of sense. But for Israel, the potential foe is near and present. So if Israel cannot find a successful way to get along with Turkey, then Israel will vanish.

This is a region that is actually pretty easy for the Turks to get at. They’re not too far away. They only have to punch through Lebanon, and Lebanon is not really going to fight back. Not to mention you’re going to talk about a really meaningful blockade that would starve Israel of food and energy as well. Far better to find a way to get in bed with the Turks than the other way around.

So again, never said this would be easy. Never said there wasn’t a lot of work to do.

Israel Attacks Iran, Again – Part 1 & 2

An Israeli F-35I "Adir", the model of aircraft reported to have taken part in the strikes.

Part 1

Recently, Iran attacked Israel, again. And so last night Israel attacked Iran, again. Believe it or not, this is normal AND good news! At least until the Russians come to the party.

Part 2

Now that we’ve had a bit more time to see what happened in Israel’s latest attack on Iran, let’s dive a bit deeper. Israel struck military facilities like missile storage and production sites, but avoided nuclear and oil infrastructure.

This damage will set Iran’s missile capabilities back for a while, but these defenses were lackluster to begin with. A more significant takeaway from this attack was the absence of any meaningful resistance for the Israeli aircraft, which pokes some serious holes in the Russian-made S-300s and similar Chinese models.

Israel’s attack not only diminishes Iran’s military power, but also gave the world some insight as to shifting regional power dynamics.

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Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Austin, Texas. It is the 27th of October, and we’re going to do a follow-on to yesterday’s video about the Israeli retaliatory strike on Iran. Now that we know a little bit more about what was hit, the Israelis were able to target military facilities. They didn’t go after the nuclear program and they did not go after oil facilities.

Instead, their primary targets were facilities that stored missiles and were a critical component in the construction of the missiles that the Iranians like to use. Basically, there’s two types of fuel that you can put in a ballistic missile. The first is liquid fuel. This is cheaper and technically easier, but it’s very dangerous because you can’t store the rocket fuel in the rocket.

If you’re not going to launch in the next couple of days, you generally leave them empty. So, it’s easy to know when the bad guys are going to launch a bunch of missiles because satellite images can show the trucks pumping in the somewhat toxic, very explosive, very dangerous fuel.

Now, the Iranians have moved on from liquid fuel to solid fuel, which is much more stable. You can store the fuel in the rocket indefinitely, but it’s more technically involved, and the Iranians don’t know how to do it themselves. They bought the facilities to make this fuel from China, and now those are mostly smoking holes in the ground after the Israeli raid.

Until these facilities are rebuilt, and given Iran is now under much stricter sanctions than when it acquired these originally, the Iranians will have a hard time running their missile fleets as they have been, which is clearly what the Israelis were aiming for. They may have one or two operational fuel fabrication facilities left, but certainly not at a scale that poses a real threat to Israel.

So, you know, strike one, Iran. The second point to keep in mind is that wherever Israeli fighter bombers went—whether over Iraq, Lebanon, or Iran itself—they took out all the air defenses along the way. Most of the air defenses the Iranians use are called S-300s, which are the second from top-of-the-line system that the Russians produce and export.

The top model is the S-400. The Iranians knew this strike was coming, had plenty of notice, and still couldn’t shoot down a single Israeli jet. Between this raid and the war in Ukraine, where many of these S-300s are in use, we’ve been getting a bit of an awakening for people who have relied on Russian equipment all these years—it simply couldn’t do the job.

All of these air defenses are now smoking holes in the ground. On a larger stage, this has made the Israelis quite confident that whenever they feel the need to establish air superiority, they don’t even need jets—they just need to take out the air defenses since no one in the region has competitive air power.

Looking at the broader strategic picture, the Russians do have some S-400s, but not enough to provide full coverage, and they’ve already lost several in the Ukraine war. Yes, the S-400 is the most advanced air defense system the Russians have, but it’s not that much more advanced than the S-300. More importantly, the Chinese have their local air defenses, the HQ-9 and HQ-22, which are essentially knockoffs of the S-300 floor model, though upgraded in some ways with Chinese technology. We’ve never seen them in actual combat, but now we know the Israelis, who don’t even have a first-rate air force, were able to take out every S-300 they encountered. This suggests that the U.S., with its superior air force, would likely have no trouble operating in a similar environment if push came to shove with China.

Surely this isn’t what the Iranians planned when they conducted their raid on the 1st of October, but they’ve given strategic thinkers a lot to chew on, indicating that air defenses on the other side might not be nearly as interesting or capable as we’ve long assumed. So, you know, as

**Photo of an Israeli F-35I “Adir”, the model of aircraft reported to have taken part in the strikes by Wikimedia Commons.

The (Next) Gulf War Is Coming

Photo of a destroyed building in the middle east

If you’ve read my book The Absent Superpower, then today’s video shouldn’t come as a surprise to you (yes, I wrote it nearly ten years ago!). If you’ve been stuck under a rock and haven’t gotten the chance to read it -OR- you want a refresher, you can purchase a copy below.

You can even purchase an autographed copy as well here

Given the recent conflict in the Middle East, I’m worried that an oil crisis could be brewing. The main players that might kick off the (next) Gulf War are Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Israel was recently attacked by Iran and their retaliation could be devastating for Iran. Should they choose to target critical Iranian oil infrastructure – most of which is conveniently located near Kharg Island – Iran’s exports would plummet. Should that happen, an Iranian attack on Saudi oil fields wouldn’t be out of the question, and then we could be talking about 20 million barrels per day being under threat.

That means a global oil price of $300 per barrel is in the cards…but not for everyone. The US has the domestic supply to maintain a price closer to $60 per barrel (outside of California, because they still rely heavily on Persian Gulf imports). China would get the snot knocked out of ’em if it does play out like this. The UAE and Saudi Arabia would keep some exports alive thanks to pipelines that bypass the Strait.

Before you go buy a few drums of oil to throw in the basement, let’s wait for Israel to decide what their retaliation plan looks like.

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If you sign up for our Patreon page in the month of October, the proceeds from your subscription for the remainder of 2024 will be donated directly to MedShare. So, you can get our all of the perks of joining the Patreon AND support a good cause while you’re doing it.

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Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the gloomy California coast. Got a nice little inversion layer going on out there. Anyway, today we’re going to talk about something that I haven’t really talked about in my professional career because I never thought it was going to happen until we had a change in circumstance. Well, we’ve had a change in circumstance, and now it’s time to talk about it.

And that is the possibility of a severe oil crisis because of a conflict in the Middle East. Now, back at my old job at Stratfor, they were always beating this drum. The idea that Iran was about to close the Strait of Hormuz and oil prices go to $500 and blah, blah, blah. And I was always the dissident voice because unless and until Iran feels it has no other choice, that doesn’t work because all of Iran’s crude goes out through the Strait of Hormuz.

Now, when I left, I went on my own. My second book, written about ten years—ten years ago, how did that happen?—mentions the three wars of the globalization period, conflicts that will boil up because the U.S. has stepped back, and whether the countries feel they have an opportunity or because they’re desperate, they take matters into their own hands.

Now, one of these I called the Twilight War, which is now in the opening act with the Ukraine conflict as the Russians try to reshape their neighborhood. But the second one, I called the Next Gulf War. And it’s about a conflict in which Iran and Saudi Arabia fight each other at each other’s throats because they can’t reliably get energy out.

So they try to take out each other. In that scenario, you basically have potentially 10 to 12 million barrels of crude that is at risk. Now, I haven’t brought this conflict up very much since I wrote the book because the circumstances haven’t warranted it. Especially in the last three years, it’s all been about Ukraine and Russia in their Twilight War.

But in recent days, I am reassessing. And specifically, the concern is after Iran launched a couple hundred missiles at Israel a couple weeks back, the Israelis have made it very clear that they intend to retaliate in the time and place of their own choosing. And they’ve specifically shortlisted Iran’s oil sector as potential targets. There is a very obvious target point.

It’s called Kharg Island. There is subsea infrastructure that links via pipe the mainland to the island. And then all, all, all of Iran’s offshore loading platforms are just off the island. This is the only meaningful export point for Iranian crude. And as the Israelis have proven, back in April when we had the previous Iranian assault on Israel, they can take out any air defense system in the country.

If you remember back then in Isfahan, which is where the Iranians have the nuclear program headquartered, the Israelis took out the air defense around the nuclear program specifically to prove that they could if they wanted to. So any sort of air defense and Kharg is almost a rounding error in the Israeli calculus. And there’s no bridge here. It was not built by the Iranians.

It was built by Westerners in the days before the Shah fell. So if Israel decides to move, it’ll just take a couple of sorties. They’ll be done in an hour. And Iran’s entire oil export capacity would be devastated. And in that scenario, suddenly Iran doesn’t have much to lose and, out of desperation, would probably make a push to take out Saudi Arabia.

The scenario specifically outlined in the book involves a military invasion that crosses into Iraq and Kuwait, heads south, making a beeline for the oil fields. Keep in mind that the southern half of Iraq is Shia-populated and has generally had a very pro-Iranian slant ever since the war against Saddam Hussein back in the 2000s. Whether or not it would be an easy invasion is open for debate based on how or whether other countries, such as the United States, get involved.

But even if that is not an option, all of those missiles that the Iranians launched recently against Israel, they have more than enough to take out oil export and processing facilities on the western side of the Persian Gulf, notably Saudi Arabia. Most of Saudi Arabia’s crude comes from the Ghawar region, which is hard up against the coast, and all of the loading platforms are also on the Gulf Coast.

Well, most of them. So you’re talking between the two of them, a significant reduction in what is globally available. If it was just Iran, not a big deal. You’re talking about a million barrels a day. They’ve been under sanction for a while. They’ve mismanaged their own system. But if you bring in Gulf states, most notably Saudi Arabia, all of a sudden that 1 million turns to 10 million or more, and that doesn’t count what comes out of, say, Iraq or the UAE or Kuwait, all of which would be in the way of a potential conflict.

So now you’re talking potentially 20 million barrels a day. You want oil prices above $300? That’s how you get there. Now, not everything is equal for all players. Yes, currently we have a single global oil price. But in that scenario, that system would shatter because in the United States we have a populist president, and the people running for president are populist.

And back in 2015, U.S. Congress granted the American presidency the authority to summarily end all American crude oil exports, which have been several million barrels a day for a while now. The shale revolution really is rocking and rolling. And so if we have oil prices shoot up, you would have the president, whoever it happened to be, end exports. That would create a super-saturated market within the United States while denying the rest of the world another few million barrels per day, sending prices up even higher.

So you’d have a functional ceiling in the United States of $60 to $70 a barrel, and you’d have a functional floor in the rest of the world, probably around $200 to $300 a barrel. So you get a global depression. At the same time, the United States just kind of skates right on. Second, the country that would suffer the most by far would be China.

It is the largest consumer of crude from Saudi Arabia, from the UAE, from Kuwait, from Iran. And all of those sources would be in danger in some way, if not going completely. Third, on the producer side, not everyone in the Persian Gulf would suffer equally because the Saudis and the Emiratis have seen some version of this problem coming.

And so both of them have built bypass pipelines that avoid the Strait of Hormuz completely. So roughly 5 million barrels a day, maybe as much as six and a half, could still get out. That’s enough to take a lot of the sting out from a budgetary point of view. And if you’re Saudi Arabia and oil prices triple but your exports halve, you’re actually in a net financial superior position.

Assuming the Iranians don’t conquer you. And then finally, in the United States, there is one state that would be in a different situation, and that would be here in California. California doesn’t have any pipes that connect it to the oil fields of Ohio or North Dakota or Texas. And it is the one oil producer in the country that has not benefited from the shale revolution because of regulation out of Sacramento, which means that in this scenario, they’d be kind of hosed because they actually import most of their crude from the same place the Chinese do—the Persian Gulf.

So in the rest of the country, you’ve got a ceiling on energy prices. But out here on the West Coast, you’re looking at $10 a gallon for gasoline, triggering a significant schism in the economic outcomes, even within one country. So this has gone from something that was just kind of out there in the future, if and when de-globalization really gets going, to all of a sudden it’s a meteor.

And now the chances it’s going to happen? Well, I mean, really that’s up to Israel. And then, of course, the Iranian reaction. But I would say it’s somewhere between 1 in 4 and 1 in 3 to happen over the course of the next few months. And considering the depth of this disruption, I hope everyone sleeps well.

The Downward Spiral of the Chinese Economy

A man holding a Chinese Yuan in the middle of Tinannamen Square

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The Chinese have been struggling with economic growth since the beginning of COVID, missing their growth rate target repeatedly and on the verge of a recession. Attempts to bail themselves out continue to fall short, likely because these stimulus measures do not address the core problems (that the population is aging and private consumption is plummeting).

That’s not even an exhaustive list either. The Chinese banking system is severely strained as well. With the government pushing for more lending at low/negative rates, the banking sector is in dire straits. Until major reform hits China, the spiral down will continue…and a larger financial crisis will continue to creep closer and closer.

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First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are free and we will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the South Carolina coast. And today, we’re going to talk about the normal things I talk about when I’m walking on the beach, and that’s Chinese finance. Okayyy? Let’s get that out with a straight face. Okay. For those of you who have been watching the Chinese markets and the economic recovery—or lack thereof—over the last year, you’ll notice it’s been kind of a rough year for them.

By their own statistics, they’re not going to hit their 5% GDP growth target for the year. And if you talk to private folks who have a more realistic understanding of what’s going on, the China that is what’s left of the Chinese bureaucratic system has basically gutted its own statistics to the point where they’re becoming literally useless. We are talking about a borderline recession.

We’re not in China, and this isn’t new. The Chinese economy stumbled in the fourth quarter of 2019 with the onset of Covid. And aside from a couple of blips here and there, it’s kind of been down in the dumps ever since. It wouldn’t surprise me if we had an actual forensic audit done on Chinese books and found that the Chinese economy writ large over that entire period was actually roughly the same size it was before.

The data isn’t out of malfeasance. It’s just the system is outdated. It’s a flag, so you don’t get accurate data at the local level, much less at the national level.

Anyway, in the last couple of weeks, we’ve seen a huge number of measures—not huge stimulus, two different things. They’ve tweaked the mortgage rate a little bit and reduced something called the reserve requirement, which is the percentage of bank deposits that have to be held back at the bank in order to make loans.

All of these things are mildly stimulatory, but they don’t get to the core issue that China now faces: it has so few people under 50 that there just isn’t much of a consumption base to be boosted. And that’s before you consider that the government of Chairman Xi Jinping really doesn’t see private consumption as a meaningful driver of economic growth.

From an ideological point of view, the idea that people would spend on themselves as opposed to spending on the state is something that seems to be a little alien to him based on his rhetoric and speeches. Anyhow, that also kind of ignores the point. We’ve talked a lot about consumption, investment, and trade.

But something we don’t talk about very often are Chinese banks, which are the method by which capital makes its way into the Chinese economy—like in most economies. And that is also completely broken. The Chinese method of encouraging economic activity is to lean on the banks so they lend to everyone for everything, often at zero to negative rates once you adjust for inflation. And when you put a bottomless supply of capital in front of anyone, they will gorge on it, and you will get economic growth.

But whether that growth is stable or sustainable is, of course, questionable. Basically, for those of you in the United States, I’ve just described subprime, Enron, or the savings and loan crisis. It’s all fine until someone actually has to start valuing the loans that are on the books. And when you flood the market with credit, a lot of these loans just don’t work out.

In the U.S., we call these “non-performing loans” (NPLs). If 1.5% by value of a bank’s loans go into that NPL category, then a government regulator will knock on your door and force you to change your policies to bring that number down. Once you get over 2%, that’s when banks start snapping like matchsticks because there isn’t enough margin on those loans to grow out of them.

Well, in China, the margin is sometimes zero or even negative. And because the concept of fiduciary responsibility doesn’t exactly translate well into Mandarin, many of these loans that should have never been made have gone bad. By most internal estimates, China’s total NPL ratio for the entire banking sector is somewhere between 5.5% and 6%, which would basically mean their entire banking sector is, well, out of luck.

This doesn’t mean every bank is there, but for every bank that is below that number, there’s at least one or two above it. As a rule, the least stable banks are the ones that aren’t on the coast. Investment inflows, export activity, and foreign money mean coastal banks tend to run tighter ships.

But as you move inland, especially to poorer, more agricultural areas, it’s all about Chinese state banks, whether they’re the big four national banks or smaller regional ones. So, if you want to talk about the future of Chinese economic growth, it’s not going to be boosted by changing the reserve requirement.

It’s going to be improved by getting the banks into a position where they can actually function a bit more normally. But that can’t happen until they deal with the NPLs. In the U.S., every time we’ve dealt with NPLs, it’s only been because we had a recession linked to the financial sector, like the subprime crisis of 2007–2009 or the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s. China will need to go through something similar.

But you’re talking about something at least an order of magnitude worse. And in relative terms, because the U.S. economy is much stronger than China’s, you’re talking about something even worse than that. So, it’s nice that the Chinese stock market is having a little bit of a pop, but none of the underlying issues have been addressed. Trying to make credit easier when credit is already overextended will simply make the inevitable crash that much harder.

How Effective Are the Israeli Defense Systems?

Photo of Iron Dome missile defense system firing

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Israeli defense systems are getting put through the ringer as of late, so let’s talk through each of these systems, how they’re doing, and what the US involvement looks like.

The Iron Dome is what we hear about most often; this is what intercepted the rockets from Hezbollah. This system is designed to counter unsophisticated rockets, and thanks to Israel’s small size, it does this quite well.

When the bigger stuff starts to fly, like ballistic missiles, that’s when the Arrow system comes into play. While its been successful against the recent attacks from Iran, the US was helping out on the tracking/targeting side of things, so we don’t have a true measure for how good this system is on its own.

That helping hand from the US is key, not only because its helping the Israelis defend themselves, but the US is also getting some valuable, real-world testing for tech that can be used back at home. So, its a bit of a win-win here.

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are free and we will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the South Carolina coast. And we’re going to talk about technology that’s been in the news a little bit, and that’s missile defense, specifically the Israeli system that has proven to be remarkably successful in recent years, both at shooting down Hezbollah rockets coming in from Lebanon and, more recently, ballistic missiles coming in from Iran.

A couple of things to keep in mind—three things to keep in mind. Number one, there is more than one system here. The first system is called Iron Dome, and that is the anti-rocket system deployed in northern Israel that’s been intercepting the rockets coming in from Lebanon. Now, it’s not that this isn’t an impressive system in its own way, but the rockets being fired by Hezbollah are oftentimes garage projects.

And as such, you’re not talking about something that is particularly sophisticated or moving particularly quickly. Basically, what happens is the Israelis launch a lot of interceptors when a barrage is coming in, and they kind of loiter until they can lock onto a rocket, and then they zip down and hit it. But even if they miss, a lot of times these things have a very high dud rate.

Over a third of them probably don’t even explode when they do hit, and they have next to no guidance. In fact, most have had no guidance at all. So it’s good for what it is, but let’s not overplay it. Also, keep in mind that Israel is the size of New Jersey, and the northern border with Lebanon is very, very short.

So, from a technical point of view, it’s relatively easy to guard that sort of territory. The second system, second thing to know, is the ballistic defense system called the Arrow system. And it is significantly more sophisticated than what’s going on with Iron Dome. This was pulled into play to defend Israel against the ballistic attacks that came in from Iran last week.

Now, the problem here is in assessing how successful it is. We really don’t know, not because it hasn’t shot missiles down, but because it hasn’t done so alone. In the recent attacks from Iran, the United States has been there, present, shooting things down too, and linking the radars together. And we just don’t know how well the Israelis could do if it weren’t for American involvement in the defense.

It probably still is among the best in the world, but everything that has been thrown at it has already had to deal with the United States. Everything has basically been designed before the year 2000. You’re talking about missiles that are at least 20 years old, off of designs that are at least 30 years old. Calling it cutting-edge is probably the wrong phrase.

Again, this is a country the size of New Jersey. You don’t need a lot of arc of coverage in order to shield the whole thing. And even with those factors in play, a lot of the missiles still made it through. They didn’t cause any substantial damage, but that is a fault of the missiles, and maybe, perhaps deliberate targeting, avoiding civilian areas more than anything else.

And then the third and final thing to keep in mind is that, for the United States, this is a perfect layout. U.S. assistance with both of these defense systems, with the intent of then taking them, modifying them for our uses—whether in terms of deployment, theaters, or the homeland—and then scaling them up. And so, believe it or not, all of the ongoing agony and violence of the Middle East, in many ways, is providing the perfect testbed for missile defense for U.S. defense systems.

Okay, I’ve got to hit the beach today, but anyway, until that, bye.

Impacts of an Israeli Strike on Iran’s Oil Sector

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Following my video on Iran’s attacks from the other day, I feel it necessary to explore the possibility of an Israeli strike on Iran’s oil sector and the affect it would have on global markets.

Iran’s oil exports hover around 1 million barrels per day. Thanks to sanctions, mismanagement, and maturing fields, production has taken a hit over the years. Regardless, that’s a million barrels per day that could vanish from the markets, which means a $10-15 increase per barrel on top of the “war premium”. Not a global catastrophe, but it will still hurt.

The US is fairly insulated from shocks to the global oil markets (like this one), so I’m not worried about the US. Should this get really bad, the US president can authorize a suspension of crude exports which would create a glut of oil in North America…similar to what we’ve seen with natural gas prices.

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are free and we will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the beautiful chaos that is Dallas Love Airport, headquarters of Southwest Airlines. In the aftermath of a video I recently did on the Israelis and their potential strike on Iran — specifically targeting the oil sector — I thought it would be worth noting how that could affect a few things, most notably here in the United States.

So, Iran’s oil production has been suffering for years. Part of it is due to sanctions, but mostly it’s because their regulatory regime is really punishing for would-be foreign investors. They basically require that the state take a leading role in everything, and the state company is not very good. Most of the oil fields in Khuzestan are mature and require a lot of technology that the Iranians don’t have and don’t understand in order to make them produce meaningfully.

Everything else worth having is offshore, but the Iranians have absolutely no ability to operate offshore by themselves. So while the numbers that officially hit the market ebb and flow because of the sanctions regime — and whether or not the Iranians are attempting to sneak around sanctions — the actual flow is about a million barrels per day of exports. Sometimes it’s as low as 400,000, sometimes it feels a little bit higher, but about a million. Now, if you remove a million barrels a day from the market, we’re going to feel it. But that’s only 1%, so you would expect, in a purely market-driven environment, for that to kick up prices by ten, maybe fifteen dollars a barrel. Of course, since it would be due to someone dropping a bomb on something, there would be a war premium on top of that.

The impact globally is going to be felt, it’s going to be real, but it’s not going to be huge. As for the United States, I’m really not concerned. The U.S. is no longer an energy importer. We’ve come a long way since 2007, when we were importing something like 14–15 million barrels a day, thanks to the shale revolution.

The United States is now arguably one of the lowest-cost producers in the world, and our production is well over 20 million barrels a day. Moreover, the U.S. has diversified its economic strength and is now absorbing far fewer barrels. Now, if you look at the headline numbers, you’re not going to see that, but that’s because the U.S. Energy Department calculates things differently from everyone else.

We look at the amount of crude we actually consume in total, including what goes into our refineries for products that are then exported. That’s not how most countries do it. The argument here is that nobody consumes raw crude; it has to be turned into something. So, it’s not a stupid way to look at the data, but it does make it seem like we are more dependent on international trade than we actually are.

In fact, if you consider all the types of crude that the U.S. produces — raw crude, natural gas liquids, condensates — we now have such a huge surplus that by the end of this year, the U.S. will be exporting 5 million barrels a day of roughly defined product. In the history of the petroleum era, there are only three countries that have ever produced more than 5 million barrels per day of raw crude, and we’re exporting that much in refined product.

So, the degree to which the United States is insulated from this is robust. Now, do keep in mind that oil is an internationally traded product, and so there is more or less a single global oil price point because it is an easily exchanged commodity. But if we ever get to the point that there is an oil shock — I don’t think that will happen with Iran — but if we do, and prices get to a point that the American president finds untenable, the U.S. president, courtesy of powers granted back in 2015, has the authority to summarily suspend all exports of raw crude. And we do a lot of that too. If that happens, the crude gets trapped within North America.

We get a supersaturated energy market, and then North American energy prices separate from global energy prices in a manner very similar to what has already happened with natural gas prices. U.S. natural gas prices, because of a similar glut in natural gas, are as a rule one-fourth to one-eighth what they are in Europe or Asia. So if we ever do get into a situation where crude prices get sketchy, you can count on the American president — whoever it happens to be — to enact that power.

Then, all of a sudden, we’ve got energy prices here that rarely go above $60, because every shale oil field we have is cost-competitive at that price, while everyone else screams past $100 on their way to $200 and more.

Okay, that’s it for me. Of course, the biggest downside of being here is that, because Southwest is a hub and it’s open seating, you have to check in 24 hours online in order to get a decent seat. And because I was launching this new thing called Patreon 24 hours ago, I forgot. So I am C-51. I will be the sad person up against the bathroom, trying to squeeze this lengthy, 6-foot-5 frame into a middle seat that does not recline. Pray for me.

Defanging Hezbollah

Things are heating up between Israel and Hezbollah, with both sides launching attacks on the other.

Why You Should Ditch Your Pager (Hezbollah Operative Edition)

If your pocket starts to feel warm in the coming days, here’s a few questions you should ask yourself. #1 – Are you trapped in the 80s? #2 – Are you affiliated with any terrorist organizations? If you answered yes to either of these questions, you should probably throw your pager away…but hopefully all of my readers ditched their pagers before Bush Senior left office.

If you haven’t heard by now, a sophisticated Israeli operation targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon was carried out on September 17. While Israel has not officially claimed this attack, it appears to be the next chapter in the rising tensions between Israel and Hezbollah.

Israel’s operation involved intercepting pagers somewhere along Hezbollah’s supply chain, implanting explosives, and then returning those devices to the supply chain to eventually end up in the hands of Hezbollah operatives. Those devices were then detonated earlier this week. Hezbollah has evolved into a political and militant power within Lebanon, so they’ve somewhat limited conflict with Israel to help maintain their political footholds.

This attack resulted in a number of casualties among Hezbollah and also provided the Israeli’s with a strategic understanding of who is involved with the organization. As of now, I don’t expect this to escalate into a broader conflict.

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are not only free, they will always be free. We also will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today, I’m recording this on the 18th. Yesterday, the 17th of September, we had several thousand pagers explode in Lebanon, injuring at least 2,800 people and killing at least 12. This was undoubtedly an Israeli operation. The Israelis aren’t saying anything about it, but no one else would, and no one else has a vested interest in doing this.

The target was Hezbollah, which is a militant/political organization in Lebanon that the Israelis have been dealing with over the last several months, and vice versa.

Okay, so what’s going on?

Number one, Hezbollah is not new. It’s been around for decades. Israel is not new. It’s been around for decades. Basically, since Hezbollah’s formation—it’s been around for 40, 50, 60 years—they’ve always been involved in conflict with Israel. However, things have evolved over the last 15 years in a more peaceful direction. The two haven’t come to direct blows since a brief air war in the early 2000s. The reason is very simple: Hezbollah is not a typical terrorist organization. They also have a political wing that is part of the government in Lebanon.

There’s a whole class of people in Hezbollah who don’t see a vested interest in firing rockets into northern Israel because they are now part of the power structure. If you challenge Israel in a way that makes them feel the tanks need to move, there’s nobody in the neighborhood who can stand up to them. So, you get this hybridized organization where there’s a militant wing and a political wing.

I’m not suggesting any of them are nice people, but not everyone wants to have a war. In fact, even on the militant side, in the aftermath of the Hamas attacks last year, Hezbollah knows they are fortunate that Israel has its hands full with a suppression operation in Gaza. The danger, of course, is that everyone in the Middle East always wants the last word.

Both sides—Israel and Hezbollah—have been doing attacks on each other, just like the Iranians, in order to get the last word. But since no one will let anyone else have the last word, we keep having these layered attacks that escalate, settle down, escalate again, and so on.

I have no reason to believe that this is any different. I don’t think it’s going to lead to a general war, but Hezbollah will feel like it has to respond, and then Israel will feel like it has to respond, which will make Hezbollah feel like it has to respond. Welcome to the Middle East. This is just what the place looks like on a good day.

This does not change my assessment that the Middle East is still the most volatile part of the world and has been for a little over two years now.

Now, what about this attack specifically?

Well, a few things. First of all, this is clearly against international law—using a civilian network, the telephone network, to trigger civilian devices (pagers) in civilian areas of Lebanon is clearly not legal. But because Hezbollah has a militant wing and has been launching missiles and rockets into Israel, I really don’t see anyone who matters bringing a court case against the Israelis for this one. So that’s kind of a minor sideshow issue.

Far more important: this was a pretty sophisticated attack. The Israelis have had a lot of intelligence failures over the last few years. They completely missed the Gaza operation, and they’re botching their counterattacks into Gaza now. This should have been done months ago, and they’re making no appreciable progress. They’ve had to go back over areas they’ve already cleared, over and over again. This has the makings of a quagmire operation for them.

Now, let me explain how this attack likely happened. The pagers were manufactured in Taiwan. They were shipped to Hungary, where a Hungarian company’s distribution system took over. Somewhere between Taiwan and Hungary—and these things being delivered to Hezbollah—the Israelis got a hold of the shipments and implanted explosives in them. Probably what they did was swap out the batteries and replace them with a hybrid battery-explosive system.

There’s no way to remotely hack a pager and turn it into a bomb. Sorry. The most a pager would do is get really hot if tampered with. So, the sophistication to do that without anyone noticing, and getting it into thousands of people’s hands, is kind of impressive.

There’s also the operational aspect. Hezbollah uses pagers because cell phones can be easily tracked if you know what you’re doing. Pagers only send a signal when they’re on, so they’re a much simpler technology but safer if you’re trying to avoid having the Israelis drop a bomb on your head. Well, the Israelis have now hit a couple thousand people who were part of the Hezbollah supply chain and distribution system.

It’s not like everyone who has a pager in Lebanon got hit—just the people who had gotten pagers from Hezbollah. The vast majority, if not all, of them were affiliated with the organization in an operative way. So, the next step here is that the Israelis undoubtedly had observers in hospitals across Lebanon. They’ve either confirmed or identified hundreds, if not thousands, of Hezbollah agents and operatives. That’s a rich intelligence trove. It doesn’t get much better than that. Not to mention, a lot of these guys are going to have holes in their thighs and will be easy to identify after they heal because they’ll be limping for the rest of their lives.

You’ve got to give credit where it’s due—that was a brilliant operation.

Finally, it raises the question of what else the Israeli intelligence services have been up to. After those recent intelligence failures, there was an open question as to whether or not Israel had lost its mojo. Clearly, at least some people in their intelligence services have not. If they can interrupt a supply chain of pagers, what else can they do?

Manufactured goods in Lebanon—everything is imported. So, that’s an opportunity for the Israelis to reach out and tackle anything that Hezbollah might have an independent supply system for.

Today, on the 18th, we found a second wave—walkie-talkies, something else that is hard to hack—that exploded and probably injured another 300 people. Now you’ve got a bunch of Hezbollah folks walking around missing fingers. The Israelis are not done here, and Hezbollah will react, but we have seen a level of sophistication in Israel today and yesterday that we just haven’t seen in the last few years.

Whether they’re doing this because they have some broader plans or whether this is just the most recent tit-for-tat, I don’t have an answer for you. But what I can tell you is that operationally, Hezbollah has now been marked, and a more traditional assassination campaign would be so much easier than it was just three days ago.

The Gaza Conflict and Shifting Politics in Israel

*This video was recorded last week, prior to Peter departing on his backpacking trip.

The conflict in Gaza has been raging on for nearly 300 days, and there is no end in sight. However, Israel is heavily reliant upon American tech and weapons and that relationship could be changing.

The political situation in Israel is complex. As the country grows more conservative and reactionary, tensions between the three largest population groups are rising. These groups are the Palestinians, secular Jews, and the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi).

The Haredi are gaining influence and have some hardline policies against Palestinians. In 25 years, their voting power will rival that of secular Jews and Israeli policies will be drastically impacted.

This shift in local politics is amplified by the shift in international relations with the Americans. The US remains a strong supporter of Israel, but shifting demographics and growing criticisms of Israeli practices in this war indicate that this could change in the coming decades.

Here at Zeihan On Geopolitics we select a single charity to sponsor. We have two criteria:

First, we look across the world and use our skill sets to identify where the needs are most acute. Second, we look for an institution with preexisting networks for both materials gathering and aid distribution. That way we know every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence. Then we give what we can.

Today, our chosen charity is a group called Medshare, which provides emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it. Until future notice, every cent we earn from every book we sell in every format through every retailer is going to Medshare’s Ukraine fund.

And then there’s you.

Our newsletters and videologues are not only free, they will always be free. We also will never share your contact information with anyone. All we ask is that if you find one of our releases in any way useful, that you make a donation to Medshare. Over one third of Ukraine’s pre-war population has either been forced from their homes, kidnapped and shipped to Russia, or is trying to survive in occupied lands. This is our way to help who we can. Please, join us.

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here. Today we’re going to talk about Israel. There is no reason to expect the Gaza war to end anytime soon. And while both Israel and Hezbollah really don’t want to have a military conflict, there are some factors that are pushing them more in each other’s face. So, we can’t rule out a specific war there.

But what this does is keep Israel top of mind for a lot of American security planners, especially for the White House, because at the end of the day, Israel relies on American tech transfer and weapon procurement in order to keep its own security in order. And the question is whether or not that is in a degree of danger.

Let me cut to the chase and say that the short answer is no, for now. There are two issues that kind of define this problem. The first is that the political evolution of Israel is towards a much more stodgy, reactionary approach to not just politics, but security.

If you consider Israel and the Palestinian territories as a single unit, there are three forces in play. The first, of course, is the Palestinians themselves, who are capable of resistance, but not in a traditional manner. What we saw back in October with the terror assaults, that’s about the most they can hope for.

There are no anti-tank rockets, no air forces, no tanks. So, from a security point of view, this is a pain and tragic, but it’s not a traditional state challenge. It is an ongoing, grinding issue of occupation and resistance that will always be there in the background. The second group are the Jews, specifically the secular Jews, who have controlled the governing system of Israel for the last 75 years.

Now, these, of course, break into different groups with different politics, just like any other country. But ultimately, they’re all drawn from a similar political stock, if you will. The third group, the one that is disrupting this balance, if that’s the right word, are the Haredi, the ultra-Orthodox, who are much more conservative and, for the most part, not integrated into Israeli life.

Until very recently, they were not even contributing to the military. We’ve recently had a change in law there, which we will link to that piece and the implications of it here. Anyway, this is a group that basically lives on the government dole and does what their rabbis tell them to do. It’s not that simple—don’t send me hate mail for that statement—but these are people who are not as sophisticated as the secular Jewish population.

And they have some very, very, very strong opinions on what should be done to and about the Palestinians. Much more hawkish, but they haven’t really contributed to the assets that are necessary to carry out that policy because they pay very little taxes. Most of them haven’t served in the military, and yet they want a very hardline response.

Well, for the last couple of decades, this ultra-Orthodox coalition has been a bigger and bigger factor in internal Israeli politics and has been the kingmaker in any number of governments, including the current one. Because they’re basically paid to exist by the state, their numbers are growing very rapidly, and we’re going to need a position within the next 25 years where they are going to be neck and neck in terms of voting power with the traditional secular Jews.

That transition from here to there is going to generate a very different set of policy options in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. So, the question is, how does this relate to the Americans? Well, in the short term, it really doesn’t. Donald Trump, when he was president, was very pro-Israeli, very anti-Palestinian. His policies reflected that, and the folks in charge of the Israeli government were very supportive of that.

Under Biden, there’s been a little bit more oblique criticism. The Palestinians, of course, would disagree with that assessment. But Biden is basically starting to call a spade a spade and has said that some of the things that the Orthodox-tinged government in Israel is doing are perhaps not legal internationally and border on, from time to time, a little bit genocidal. At times, that criticism has boiled up in international affairs and actually affected Israel’s ability to access American weapons.

It hasn’t gotten to a break point, because one of the advantages in the United States of having a president who’s older than dust is he remembers when the Jewish state was formed, which means he remembers personally the Holocaust. He remembers Abraham, and Isaac, and all the rest. So, he knows that in the long sweep of history, what’s going on right now is a bit of a bump.

But Biden will not be there forever. Trump will not be there forever. And we’re having a demographic shift in the United States as well. In Israel, right now in 2024, the majority of America’s baby boomers, who are probably the most pro-Israel generation we have, have already retired. Over that same transition period, while the ultra-Orthodox sects are going to rise to power in Israel, America’s baby boomers are going to die out.

And the younger generation coming up, the Zoomers and, to a lesser degree, the millennials, are not nearly as evenhanded when it comes to Israel versus the Palestinians. So, demographics are absolutely against Israel on this topic. But never forget that demographics are like a glacier; they move slowly. They don’t matter until the day they do. We’re not going to hit that day in the next four years, but we will hit it in the next four decades.

So, for now, the Israeli government, regardless of its makeup, can be assured of long-term American support. But long-term does not mean permanent.

No More Military Exemption for Israeli Ultra-Orthodox

The demographic pyramids below reflect the Israeli government’s best (public) understanding of the changing profile of its population. The two fastest-growing segments are Palestinian-identifying Muslim Arabs in Gaza and the West Bank, and the ultra-Orthodox Jewish Israelis. Not only do these two groups have starkly different ideas about what the future of disputed territories look like, they have increasingly little common ground with what one might call the more secular, moderate core of Israeli society at large.

The Israeli Supreme Court just ruled that the ultra-Orthodox community will no longer get exemption from military service. This addresses a number of long-standing issues, but it could spell trouble for Netanyahu’s political career.

The ultra-Orthodox community makes up 10-20% of the population, pays less taxes relative to their share of the population than secular Israelis, receives subsidies, has low labor participation…so until now, the rest of the population has been picking up the slack. By eliminating military exemption for the ultra-Orthodox community, that extra weight can be lifted from the remaining population.

As you would expect, the ultra-Orthodox aren’t thrilled with this decision and they’ll likely be making that known politically. Since the ultra-Orthodox parties are key supporters of Netanyahu’s coalition, don’t be surprised if we see some changes soon. This will only be amplified by criticisms of Netanyahu’s handling of the Hamas conflict and strategic incompetence.

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Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from square top mountain and back behind me is Argentine Peak. Edwards. And I think Kelso. It’s the 25th of June. And today we’re to talk about what’s going down in Israel. the Supreme Court just ruled that the country’s ultra-Orthodox, who have been granted exemptions from serving in the military for decades, can no longer give exemptions because it’s a discriminatory long term issue, is that, the ultra-Orthodox are somewhere between 10 and 20% of, Israel’s population, based on where you draw the number.

And since they pay very low taxes and qualify for all kinds of subsidies and don’t serve, most of them don’t work. And so they have high, very, very, very, very high birth rates, very, very low labor participation rates. And they don’t serve in the military. so there is an issue that has to become a larger and larger percentage of the population, just the the sheer weight of what, is then dropped on the shoulders of everybody else becomes almost insurmountable.

Keep in mind that there is an Arab minority in Israel that, secular, not like they’re protesting or throwing bombs or anything, but it’s a very real issue from a national identity and a social management point of view. there’s also a short term issue that has to do with the Netanyahu government. most of the parties that subscribe to ultra-Orthodox are part of Netanyahu, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s governing coalition, and have been for quite some time.

Israel’s had a lot of government the last 20 years when since Netanyahu kind of came into the burst on the field, he’s definitely their longest running prime minister overall. Anyway, what’s the best way I can put this into American terms? Think of Matt Gates. You know, the guy from Florida with really good hair, talks a lot of shit about the military, but thinks that the military is a solution to everything.

We should bomb this country and invade that country. But he’s never served. so take blowhards who don’t really contribute to the system, thinking that they know best about how to use military power. strip away the good hair and, the child sex trafficking charges and the drug charges or allegations. Excuse me. And basically, from a political point of view, you just described most of the ultra-Orthodox parties, in Netanyahu’s coalition.

So they talk a big game, but they don’t really contribute to the solution financially or in terms of, people with boots. there’s another issue, of course, and the whirlwind export havoc. And there’s also a very short term issue. After the Hamas assault on Israel back in October, Netanyahu was able to convince most of the parties in parliament, to form a unity government, because the feeling was the attack had been on everyone.

So everyone should have a say in how things unfold. since then, Netanyahu has not shared power with unity government all that much. And so party after party has left, accusing Netanyahu of not having a plan for the war, accusing Netanyahu of prolonging the war for his own political purposes in order to solidify his position as prime minister.

and, accusing him and the ultra-Orthodox overall of just general strategic incompetence because this attack shouldn’t have happened. Hamas is like the one thing that the Israelis are watching every single day. It’s there shouldn’t have been no surprise attack. And here we are eight months later, and there’s no sign that the war is going to conclude.

And in a number of places where Israel has supposedly already cleansed the area of Hamas fighters, they’ve popped up again. So, the international condemnation from the point of view of people who have left the Israeli government is now for nothing, because the Israelis have basically paid the price of launching a major war and, being at least indirectly complicit, a lot of unpleasantness.

But there’s still no sign that the war’s end is in sight. that means that, that Yahoo really, really needs the Orthodox to hold onto power while other parties in Parliament are actively agitating for fresh elections. We only take one significant coalition partner in, in India, whose coalition to force new elections in which, I would probably not do very well.

And you had throw the Supreme Court today into that mix, and you’re undoubtedly going to have at least some or ultra-Orthodox who think they might get a better deal with a different government, as opposed to having to serve in the military or actually be actively involved in changing the law so that their own people have to serve in the military, since they’re sitting in the government right now, when the case has been made.

Anyway, so significant decision changes things on the domestic and the international fronts. And that’s all I’ve got. All right. I got to cross this.

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