China’s Manufacturing Power Will Not Last

Photo of workers in a manufacturing shop

China is the world’s premier manufacturing superpower. There is no argument there. However, that doesn’t mean China’s industrial dominance is sustainable.

Through scale, technology acquisition (more appropriately called theft), government subsidies, and demographics, China emerged as the world’s manufacturer. But it’s those same forces that are going to bring China down.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from a chilly Colorado. We just had our first freeze on the 16th of October. Today I’m going to talk about why the Chinese are the world’s manufacturing superpower. Because that doesn’t happen by accident. 

We have four big factors. The first one, of course, is scale. Contrary to the Communist Party’s teachings. China has not been a unified entity for almost the entirety of its history. It’s more like Europe, where it’s a series of several and sometimes dozens of competing political and economic and military authorities that war with one another. In fact, you could argue quite easily that the North China plane, which is home to two thirds of the Chinese population, is actually the most war torn area throughout history. It’s had 27 major civilizational collapses and literally hundreds of wars. But with the rise of the American order at the end of World War Two, the United States basically told the rest of the world that they can’t invade China for any reason anymore or anyone else, and it left the Chinese in a bit of a bubble to deal with their own domestic issues themselves. And they had a horrific civil war in which Mao Zedong emerged victorious and then proceeded to gut the country twice with the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward, killing tens of millions of people. But one outcome of that was political unity. So it paid a very, very heavy price, kind of like Americans did the very hardest possible way, but eventually did end up with a single political authority. And you put several hundred million people into the same political authority, and all of a sudden infrastructure can start to link them together. And basically, the story of the Chinese in the late 70s through the late aughts was kind of like what went down in Germany when the Germans unified in 1871, and you got economies of scale for the first time. At the same time, industrial technologies were available and boom, single industrial economy of large scale. 

Number two is tech theft. This is one of the Chinese don’t like to talk about as much, but it’s just as important. Two big avenues there. Number one, the Chinese actually do have a bureau whose job is to hack the world and steal technological secrets and then distribute them to their state-owned companies. And that’s obviously something that most other governments don’t really care for. The second one is just foreign investors being stupid. Basically, we’ve seen lots and lots and lots of American, Western, other Asian investors set up production facilities in China to take advantage of the economies of scale, to take advantage of the low labor costs. And then what happens is the Chinese hire a lot of those same workers and build another production facility across the road. And so all these people were double shifts. So they work for the foreign investor, learn what they can, then go across the street and build a copycat. And within a decade, typically the original investor has lost everything. And I’ve always found this hilarious because it’s like everyone knows that it’s happening and everyone knows it’s happening to the people who were there before them, but thinking, you know what? It’s going to be different for me and it never is. So Americans fell for it, Japanese fell for Koreans fell for Germans are the most recent ones to fall for it. And we’ve kind of gotten to the point now that everyone who has something to add has fallen for it. And the Chinese have moved up the value added scale high enough that there’s not a lot of new investment going into that space, because Chinese labor isn’t as cheap as it used to be. In fact, in outward productivity per unit cost per hour that you pay your worker, Chinese worker productivity has actually gone down over the last 25 years. We’ll come back to that. Okay, so that’s tech theft. 

Third is subsidization. Sometimes this is direct. Sometimes it’s by shielding the domestic market from any sort of international competition because the Chinese really aren’t all that efficient. But the big one is something called hyper financialization, where the savings of the population is basically not given a lot of places to invest in. And then the state forcibly directs that financial strength directly into the companies, typically via loans that are below the rate of return that you would get on the international market, below the rate of inflation and many times subzero. So basically, you’ve got the entire state apparatus and not just the national level, but the local level, force feeding capital into these industries with loans that arguably will never be paid back. And if you can have access to a bottomless supply of zero or subzero percent loans, you know, of course you’re going to build whatever you want because it doesn’t matter if it’s cost effective. And so the industry just gets bigger and bigger and bigger. 

Fourth, and surprisingly, is demographics has been a big part of the success. The Chinese stopped having kids back in the 80s. It looks like from the most recent data that the United States birth rate has been higher than China since roughly 1991. And what that means is today, through the 20 tens and the 2020s, China has lots of people in their 40s and 50s, but no one younger. And so instead of spending your money and your time on kids, you spend it on your career. It also generates a different kind of consumption because you’re buying a car, as opposed to paying for diapers. That generates more economic activity in the short run. Of course, by the time you get your 50s, everything that you need in your life, you already have and you’re just working, working, working. And that generates a massive productivity pulse…once. And we’re in the final years of that working for China, because once you hit 65, that just goes away. Now China being China, I’m sure they will work these people until they die. But for the most part, these are not white collar jobs. And so passed roughly age 62, the human body simply can’t handle the work, and the workforce falls off very, very quickly. And we’re now about at that point. But until now, it means you’ve got this huge workforce that has nothing to do but work. You combine that with the other factors… global manufacturing superpower. Of course, it’s a one shot and we’re now near the end of that. 

There’s another angle to all of this. When you produce this much because it’s done artificially. Everything but scale is something that has been introduced to the system to artificially boost manufacturing as a percentage of the economy. You can’t possibly consume what you produce, especially once you start considering the demographic situation. Most consumption is done by people under age 45, and the Chinese just don’t have those people anymore. And that means you have to dump it into the international system. So as long as some version of globalization exists, and as long as political leaders around the world allow market access, the Chinese can hyper produce at home in inefficient industries that are massively subsidized, and they just dump the product everywhere else. And because it’s hyper financialized and they don’t care about sub 0% loans, they can do it at a loss and regularly do. What this also means is that the Chinese economy is atypical compared to everyone before it, not just in terms of its dependance upon the international system, but the Chinese never walk away from a sector that they have dominated. They keep it and they just subsidize it more. So, for example, in the early 2000, the Chinese moved into textiles in a very big way. But Chinese labor costs have gone up by more than a factor of ten there. And the Chinese are wildly, wildly noncompetitive in that sector, now. Normally, it would have been offloaded to a less advanced economy ten years ago. That might have been Vietnam. Today it might be Laos, Cambodia or someplace in Africa. And the Chinese don’t do that. Bangladesh comes to mind. The Chinese don’t do that at all. They keep it all under lockdown. You get local governments to basically fund 20 or 30% of their budget into sectors that are noncompetitive, because from their point of view, it’s the only way to generate revenues and taxes and keep their people employed. If you saw a outflow that was based on labor costs and labor productivity, easily half of the industries in China would pick up and leave. But they are basically not allowed to. Money just keeps getting pumped in. So you get this debt bubble that is conservatively now 400% of GDP just in the corporate space. Before you start considering that the local governments have been borrowing money in order to keep those subsidies going, and the federal government is now starting to get into that activity as well. 

So we talk about our debt bubble here in the United States or in Japan, but it’s nothing compared to what is in China.  But in China, it is wrapped up in the industrial story. In the United States, it’s largely a government issue. In Japan, it’s largely a pension issue, which means that when this breaks in the United States, it’s a question of how you handle it when you’re the world’s global currency and everyone holds your currency and you have a monetization issue, which is printing currency, which is not great, but it’s an option. In Japan, it’s all domestically held. So you might just be able to wave it away, which they’ve done multiple times in their history. There’s an adjustment there. It’s really certainly not good for the financial sector, but it’s been done. In China, it’s a corporate story. It’s wrapped up with households and the property market and local governments instead of the federal government. There’s no easy way to disentangle it from everything else. And so when that reckoning happens. Wow. And that’s on top of the demographic story. So China. Yes. Industrial superpower. Sustainable. Totally different question.

China’s Power Vacuum Worsens

Photo of Xi Jiping

Xi Jinping has made it clear he plans to ride this ship all the way down.

At the latest CCP Congress, more leaders were removed, but one official was elevated: Zhang Shengmin. Zhang oversees military purges, and his promotion signals that more purges are coming soon.

As Xi intensifies the power vacuum in China, it will inevitably lead to major policy failures and make it increasingly difficult for the outside world to peek behind the curtain.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Over this past week and into the weekend, the Chinese Communist Party had their party congress, which is, you know, really very little more than a rubber stamp of the leaders policy prerogatives, leader being Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping has basically evolved into a dictator in the mold of some of his predecessors. And to understand where we are right now and what’s about to happen, I think it’s best to take a big step back. 

In the aftermath of World War Two, hell during World War Two, there was a civil war in China that was finally resolved in favor of the communists in the 1950s, and a guy by the name of Mao Zedong became the winner and the first leader of China. He was a genocidal dictator of his own people. And over the course of the Thousand Flowers Blooming and the Great leap Forward in the Cultural Revolution, tens of millions of his own people were killed, some for seditious information, like knowing how to work a lawnmower. Basically, if you know how to do something, you were a real problem. Echoes of Trumpism in there, by the way. Anyway, put that to the side anyway. Eventually he died, thankfully, and a guy by the name of Deng Xiaoping took over. And Deng was of the opinion that Mao was a disaster and started to unwind a lot of the horrible things that he had done and set China on the track that it has been on ever since to become a unified, industrialized country, and he’s broadly successful in that.  But he also knew that he couldn’t predict what was going to happen ten, 20, 30 years after he was gone. So he forced all of the party committee members to come together, and he picked the next two successors, Jiang Zemin of southern China and Hu Jintao of northern China, because he knew that the country would need the economic and financial acumen of the South…Shanghai, combined with the national zeal of the North around Beijing, in order to form a country that would stick. But he smart enough, know he didn’t know what the country would need next. And so the idea was 20 years later. The North and the South would come together and pick a compromise candidate. Well, they did that about 15 years ago. And that candidate is the guy who’s in charge now. Xi Jinping. 

And Xi Jinping didn’t have a big following, and he wasn’t a big institutional powerbroker. So the North and the South thought that they could control them. They were wrong. And ever since then, Xi Jinping has been purging every aspect of Chinese society of anyone who is capable of independent thought whatsoever. And I would argue that he’s pretty much completed that. And now he’s a one man government ruling from a black box, and he’s not giving up power at all. So during the Communist Congress that we just had more people were purged. The purges that were high level from the last year were codified into law. And the body itself is now about one quarter empty because he’s really literally running out of people who can do the job, or who are so brain dead, they’ll just do whatever they were told. This is a real problem in the Republican Party, too, because Trump has destroyed the recruitment arm anyway. One name that was elevated was a guy by the name of Zhang Shengmin, I think is how it’s pronounced. Anyway, this is a guy who has been rolling around the top of the power structure for the last few years as an Inquisitor, and it’s been his job to basically purge the Chinese military, which he has done to the point that I would argue it’s made the Chinese military largely nonfunctional. Regardless of what you think about corruption in the Chinese military, which is very real, there is now only two people on the equivalent of the Chinese joint chiefs, Xi Jinping, the leader, and Zhang, who’s the inquisitor. That’s it. Well, now, Zhang has been elevated to the Politburo. And the only reason you would put an Inquisitor on the Politburo is if you’re planning on doing more purges. 

The Politburo is roughly analogous to the US cabinet, and next year Xi will be up for his fourth five year term. You’re only supposed to have two. And so he’s basically already declared that he’s going to be a dictator for life. And now he’s declared that Zhang is going to purge the top of Chinese society for him. And really, all that is going to be left in a few months here is Xi and nothing else. Now that will allow technically decisions to be made very, very quickly. But we’ve already seen the Chinese bureaucracy hollow out because if any information makes it to Xi that he doesn’t want to hear, that he has so punished the bureaucracy that it’s not that they stop transmitting the information, they stop collecting the information at all. So China has become a bit of a black box that is basically driven by a nationalist fuhrer and nothing else. And the Communist Party Congress that we’ve just had now makes sure that that cannot be undone. So Xi will ride this country into the ground with Zhang at his right hand, whipping everybody along the way. The problem that the rest of us have is it’s really hard to get an accurate view of what’s going on inside the country now, because everyone who used to collect that information has now been purged, and anyone who might say something intelligent is now being punished. 

So, buckle up.

Does China Have a Succession Plan

Flag of China woven and waving

Concerns over Xi Jinping’s health have begun to spread following his appearance in Washington. Beyond the obvious question of how Xi is doing, let’s discuss the Chinese succession plan if Xi kicks it.

Unfortunately for China, there’s not much to discuss here. When you have a leader who has hollowed out every meaningful institution in the country, it’s kind of tough to come up with a solid successor. Expect regional fragmentation, widespread instability, and economic turmoil.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re taking a question from the Patreon page, specifically at the recent summit between US President Donald Trump and Chinese Chairman Xi Jinping. Xi didn’t look that good. How bad is he? And what’s the succession plan in China? It’s like, well, let’s start with the first part there.  

Yeah, he looked bad. He was in the white House, you know, for quite some time. But over two thirds of the time he was there, he was in a separate room with just his wife basically recovering. Of course, none of that made it into Chinese media. Everyone just talked about how she outsmarted and outlasted Trump in every possible way, because that’s what propaganda looks like. Anyway, of the hours that he was at the white House, they had very little contact. I mean, there was the dinner, there was the tour, and then there were a couple of short meetings. And honestly, that was it. Not a lot was discussed because there wasn’t a lot of time to discuss it. And the deals that came out on the other side were pretty milquetoast. And then he was hustled back onto his plane and flown home. I think he might have gone via Canada anyway. He didn’t have a particularly robust social schedule. And whether you want to view that as a repudiation of Trump, which is fair, or you can review it as the fact that he’s physically just not up to it, which is also fair. Remember, this guy’s 80. So do you think that he’s in there for the long haul is probably a stretch. 

Anyway. The problem we’re going to have in China is that there’s there’s nobody to take over. China’s a big place, bigger than the United States. Lots of people, lots of different geographic subregions and lots of barriers between them. So historically speaking, China is kind of fallen into two categories. Either it hypercentralizes like it is now to the point that the bureaucracy is damaged beyond repair, the military stops functioning, and eventually this over centralization leads to a broad political, economic and social breakdown which we’re headed for. Or the regions grab as much autonomy as they can swallow, and basically start functioning like independent states. And eventually you get a widespread civil war where the center tries to reassert control, or the regions go to war with one another. It’s another viable option for where we’re headed. The difference this time is because China is so dependent on the rest of the world for the inputs for, say, its food supply, but also its manufacturing system also to keep the lights on. We’d be facing a deindustrialization breakdown at the same time. The only way you might, might, might, might be able to hold that off is to have a strong ruler. Somebody kind of like Xi, who can hold the system together. Here’s the problem. Ever since he came in 14 years ago now, Xi has gone after those people, put them in prison, executed them, exiled them, intimidated them into silence. And so whether you’re looking at the educational system or the media or the business community or the military or the state apparatus, all of it has had its teeth ripped out to the point that all it can do is offer milquetoast praise of their great leader. So if Xi were to keel over tomorrow, there simply isn’t an institution, much less a personality, who could potentially step forward and take over his role. And even if there was, so much competence has been deliberately bled out of the system that whoever this person is probably wouldn’t be able to rule competently anyway. Think of China as a ball that’s been tossed up, and it’s at that moment at the high. Where it’s just kind of rotating and everyone’s kind of looking around like, oh shit. 

Historically speaking, when China loses a ruler who’s of the centralized type, it’s a generation of freefall and a civil war and a famine before the system starts to stitch itself back together. You’re doing that today in a backdrop where Chinese industrial dependency and agricultural dependency is so huge that the population adjustment conservatively will be half the population, that assumes it can recover on the other side of this. So the leadership issue is just one more problem the Chinese have that they have to deal with over the next 20 to 30 years. The best case scenario is that Xi becomes the new Yeltsin or Brezhnev, and remains just alive enough that he can be propped up in a chair and wave to the crowd every once in a while. While everything slowly disintegrates around him. The problem, of course, is that information control in China is very, very tight. And if we can’t get reliable population numbers or GDP numbers, we sure as shit can’t get an accurate read on Xi’s health. So, all of this is reading between the lines and looking at historical examples, and not one of them looks positive.

China Gets a New Base in Southeast Asia

Chinese troops in formation and in camouflage fatigues

The Chinese are laying the groundwork for a new overseas military base in Laos. What makes this so special? Well, it would be the first foreign base that China can reliably supply without heavy dependence on other countries. And it would enable greater power projection across mainland Southeast Asia.

But there are some caveats. This base would be hard up against the Thai border, and for anyone who lacks regional knowledge, Thailand isn’t just some pushover country. It has a longstanding history of independence and a military to uphold that. Regardless, China’s base could significantly alter the region’s strategic balance.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. It’s a nice fall day. Figured I’d get out and stretch the legs. Today we’re going to talk about a new development in Southeast Asia. It appears, I don’t want to overplay it, but it appears that the Chinese are laying the foundations for their first overseas base that they can actually supply without outside help. Keep in mind that they only have one until now. And that one is in Djibouti. It’s part of the whole anti-piracy operation, but that is completely dependent upon countries like Vietnam and India allowing their navy to operate unfettered, and the United States even facilitating actively Chinese supply lines. They just they can’t project power that far.  

The new one is in Laos, a country in Southeast Asia. It’s landlocked. It is. Let’s be kind. It’s a failed state, and the only reason that it even gets talked about at all is because Chinese investment basically controls it. Chinese security forces basically run the intelligence services. It is not an independent power in any stretch of the imagination. It’s much more under the Chinese thumb than, say, Belarus is under Russia’s thumb, for example. Anyway, it’s landlocked. It’s got Vietnam on one side, Thailand to the south and Myanmar to the west. And so what it really has is strategic position among countries that really matter now and will really matter in the future, because if you look forward 10, 20, 30 years, these three countries, Vietnam, Thailand and Laos have a combination of industrial capacity and geographic potential and for the most part, a good demographic structure. So they’re going to be major industrial powers moving forward. Anyway. The new base is just south of Vientiane, which is the capital of Laos, and it’s basically hard up spitting distance of the Thai border. And with the air base, it seems to be under construction. Satellite photos have shown a number of Chinese aircraft that have been there, and not just overnight. So it’s not an exercise. The Chinese would be able to project power really throughout land based Southeast Asia, which is something that could be a problem for anyone in the area. Pros and cons from the Chinese point of view, pros of course, is the new reach that they have and turning a client state into a military satrapy. Not a bad idea. Cons. The country that this is on the border of is Thailand, and Thailand is arguably the most capable country in the region from an economic and from a security point of view. So if you put an air base hard on the border of a country that actually has a functional army, if you ever use that air base, you’re going to be hating life and the not too distant future. Also, keep in mind that Thailand is not a normal country in many respects. It’s not that it’s pro-American, although as a rule it is. It’s that Thailand has a deep cultural muscle tone that isn’t just part of the post-World War II era. Even at the height of the Age of Empires in the colonial age, Thailand was never fully colonized. The core of it, including right up to the border that this base is now on, always remained under domestic Thai control. 

So if the Chinese were looking to pick a fight with someone who can fight back, they picked well. And if they’re looking to undermine a country, this is the one they have to undermine. So one way or another, this is really colorful, and I don’t think we’re going to have to wait more than a couple of years to see how Thailand and other countries respond. 

That’s it.

The AI Race: U.S. vs. China

The letters "AI" on a blue cyber background

The AI race is in full swing. China is chasing digital sovereignty, but there’s a glaring hole in that plan…it doesn’t have the advanced manufacturing capabilities to achieve it. Here’s the real kicker: nobody does.

China might be a bit more flexible with its ethics and data manipulation, but that means nothing without the advanced chipmaking equipment. China can produce less efficient chips, but has incredibly low yields on leading-edge chips. To produce the highest-level chips, there are roughly 65 countries involved in a complex supply chain.

Which means that not even the U.S. could go out and do this on its own (unless it underwent a 20+ year tech ecosystem rebuild). America’s real advantage in the AI race comes from the broad coalition of allied countries all working together to produce high-end semiconductors.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from the top of little Castella, taking advantage of a break in the wind to answer a question from the Patreon crowd. Oh, by the way, that’s an ash mountain over there. And all of that is the Turner Ranch. Ted Turner, I guess, is a state, is a single largest landowner in the country. 

And that’s where he used to party. Anyway, the question is, is how is China’s artificial intelligence program coming along? They clearly don’t have any of the ethical restrictions that the United States has. And is that given them an edge? Is this something we need to worry about? Number one, I would argue that if you’re comparing the tech bro culture of Silicon Valley to China and the idea that one of them is morally superior, you need to do a little research. 

Silicon Valley, and especially the folks that are involved in AI, really don’t give a rat’s ass about your personal privacy and are perfectly willing to pillage your data in any possible form. In fact. Hey, I got a little visitor here. Hey, buddy. Yep. Never mind. He’s gone. Anyway, point being that if you are on Facebook or what is it now? Meta, whatever, any sort of social media whatsoever, all of your data is being mined actively in a way that the Chinese honestly sometimes have trouble keeping up with. And while the Chinese certainly do it with a little bit more flair, the AI Kings in the United States, the data kings in the United States have no problem getting all of the information that they need from you already. 

So the info influx really is not much of an issue. There used to be a moment when things had to be manually entered in, and the Chinese had an advantage of that for the numbers, but now AI has reached the point that it can self process. So again, that’s gone away too. So the structural issues really are not relevant. 

It really comes down to hardware. Now the Chinese are under export restrictions, so they cannot import the hardware that is necessary to make high end semiconductors, specifically the extreme ultraviolet machines that come from the Dutch company ASML. And without those, there’s no way they can make anything that’s really under seven nanometers reliably. That means that the reliant on importing chips and their export restrictions on anything coming out of the United States or Taiwan or Japan or Ireland, or any of the countries that make high end semiconductors, that limits them to approximately a 4 to 5 nanometer ceiling. Now, it’s not that those are bad chips at six nanometers. 

I mean, they’re fine, but if you want to do AI, it’s all about the number of computations you can crunch per chip and the power that takes per computation. And right now, in the rest of the world, the high end chips are in the 2 to 4 nanometer range, and we are now starting to get ships that were designed with coolant topography in mind. let me spell that out. What that means for an operational if you have a one gigawatt hyperscale data center, you probably have about a half a million GPUs on top of that. Lots of CPUs, lots of Dram, lots of Nand, different sorts of processing capacity, lots and lots of hardware. 

But the 500 GPUs or the core of it because large models. And when we’re talking about AI today, that’s what most people are discussing. Use those chips almost exclusively. And the better they are, the more computations, the more energy efficient per computation. The Chinese don’t have access to those 2 to 4 nanometer chips. Sometimes they can import some five and especially six nanometer chips. 

But they have made the decision that for sovereign control reasons, they don’t want to depend upon anyone’s imported chips. If they can make anything that’s even partially functional themselves really cool in. But there’s a middle ground. There’s a gray area because while the Chinese can’t import those high end chips in that high end equipment, they can still import a lot of equipment and a lot of gear. And they do that. They imported deep ultraviolet, DUV machines that are still pretty good and that are the basis for a lot more mature nodes. 

And they have used these to successfully make nodes as small as seven nanometers. Now I have to emphasize this. These chips kind of suck. They you generate about one third the computations per chip compared to what comes out of Asme and Taiwan. They generate about twice as much power, probably closer to three times as much power. Once you consider that the rest of the engineering of Chinese data centers, is that just that much worse? 

So you’re looking at overall one ninth efficiency compared to the leading edge stuff. On top of that, the yields for these seven nanometer chips is awful. It’s typically less than 30%. And as a rule, anywhere else in the world, any yield rate below 95% is something that wouldn’t be considered because it’s just such a massive waste of resources. 

China does the math differently, and they’re concerned with digital sovereignty and keeping them with the United States. But what it means is they need to build nine data centers for everyone in the United States in order to get an equal number of compute, and that is assuming the hardware can run the software that is required to do things like large language models. 

Bottom line, the Chinese are doing everything they can. They are sparing no horses, and they’re not even remotely close. They have tried over and over and over and over again for the last four years, to try to push past that seven nanometer limit, and they have succeeded in making a few emphasis on the word few chips, the meter level using technology. But it’s highly inefficient. And you’re talking about yields that are below 5%, nowhere near enough to supply a single data center, much less a raft of them. But before I laugh in their face, I have to say that the technology of AI is changing day by day, week by week, one by month, and the hardware is always two years behind. 

So I don’t want to rule it out there. Certainly motivated, if that’s the right phrase. But when it comes to the domestic manufacturing of the hardware that is required to do this, no, they’re just not even in the same game. Now, before anyone goes and toots America’s horn, the United States can’t make these chips either. Neither can Japan or Korea or Taiwan takes a team effort with 65 countries and 100,000 manufacturing supply chain steps and almost 10,000 companies. 

It really does take everyone. And if anyone is actually trying for real digital sovereignty, they’re going to fail unless they rebuild the entire tech ecosystem. And that is not something you do in less than 20 years. So are the Chinese going to fail at this by the rules of the game, as I understand them? Yeah. Are the Americans going to fail at this by my understanding of the rules of the game? 

Yeah, but the United States is part of a coalition of like minded countries that implement these technologies together. That’s how we do AI. And if the US decides to go it alone, it’ll be at best in China’s position.

China’s Hold on Congolese Cobalt

%) cobalt chips, electrolytically refined, as well as a high purity (99.8 % = 2N8) 1 cm3 cobalt cube for comparison | Photo by Wikimedia COmmons: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cobalt#/media/File:Kobalt_electrolytic_and_1cm3_cube.jpg

Cobalt is critical for modern batteries, but with over half of global production coming from the Democratic Republic of Congo, it represents one of the great geopolitical vulnerabilities.

China controls most of the Cobalt mining in the Congo through coercive labor systems, so if China’s system continues on its current path…Cobalt production will crash. Filling China’s shoes in Congo is no easy feat. Foreign stabilization and oversight are difficult and aren’t likely to come from Western governments. So, Cobalt supplies will collapse.

Either the world will find a way forward with less Cobalt, or we’ll get really good at recycling it. The scariest piece is that Cobalt isn’t the only critical material that’s vulnerable, so the era of easy tech advancement powered by cheap, abundant inputs is coming to an end.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here comes from the Caribbean. Sorry about the sound quality. It’s a little breezy here. Today we’re taking a question from the Patreon page. Specifically, what do I think the future is going to be for cobalt? Out of Congo? Cobalt is a critical material that is used in batteries, primarily cell phones, things like that. 

And it’s really the only battery chemistry we have that has a decent, weight and size, ratio that allows it to be mass used. If you use lithium by itself, it’s not nearly as effective. It degrades a lot faster. You really do need the cobalt in order to stabilize the system. The problem is it really only comes from one place. 

Over half of the world’s production comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo. And the Chinese basically run it like a slave state. That actually makes the Belgian Imperials of old, blush. How it works is the Congolese basically go and dig out all the ore by hand, and the Chinese control the camps, they control the feed thrus, and they basically buy everything up at pennies on the dollar and then ship it abroad for processing back home. 

And so the Chinese control that entire network. You have about 5 to 10% from other places like Canada and the Philippines. little bit from the United States. But the real bulk, if we want to do anything with batteries, especially if your goal is to electrify anything, you have to have this one thing, and it really only comes from one place. 

So, what happens to China? Because we are nearing the point in a few years where the Chinese system is going to collapse for demographic reasons. That assumes there’s not a war, that’s assumes there’s not a trade war, all of which could bring the end date faster. What happens to the structure? Because it’s something that most countries in the world just find morally repugnant. It’s modern day slavery, enforced with a gun. Well, it’s not going to be a pretty picture. Part of the problem is the nature of the Democratic Republic of Congo itself. Part of the issue here is that Congo doesn’t really have a functional port. 

Congo River is only navigable a few miles from the coast. Can Sasha, the capital, is near that head of navigation. But it has the capacity to handle large ships. So for a foreign force to come here and stabilize it, you basically have to come in skiff in and take over a city of a few million people. Can Sasha, and then somehow project power over a zone where there’s no navigable river, no real roads, largely by air, into a zone several hundred miles inland? 

That is hot jungle. And to be perfectly blunt, white people don’t do well in that sort of environment. The reason the Chinese do well is because they’ve cut a series of deal with all the warlords, whether they’re the former warlords who run the government or the ones who happen to be local. And they are really how shall I say this? 

Morally uncaring about the details in a post Chinese collapse scenario, it’s difficult to see a government in Europe or North America jumping into that role. So we would probably be talking about some sort of, arm’s length management system where you partner with consortia and you basically let them do the atrocities. That allows a degree of structure to be imposed. 

It’d be very, very, very, very, very ugly. More likely, we’re just not going to get nearly as much cobalt as we need. And that’s going to change the technological curve of where where you’re going. So if you’re into computers or cell phones or green tech, you have to re fabricate your products with significantly less cobalt and or redesign your products so that the cobalt at the end of the day is recyclable and you can break the system down and reuse it. 

One of those two options is pretty much how we have to go, because we’re not going to have the flows that we’re going to need. About the only good news here I have is that there aren’t a lot of materials in the world that hit that category, specifically micro materials that are critical. Unfortunately, one of the other ones is something called tantalum, which is used for similar purposes, which also is in Congo and is produced in almost exactly the same matter. 

So we’re going to lose a couple of things that are very important here. The third one is tungsten. And that primarily comes out of the Chinese border region of what, in the state of Myanmar. That’ll probably be a little bit better. Myanmar is been in and out of civil war now for these 50 years, almost. 

And the Chinese run war, well, they run the mines in WA more or less the same way that they do in Congo. But in a post Chinese environment, you’re probably going to have a stronger central government in Myanmar, whether or not you like what that looks like, it does suggest that there is a path for the tungsten to still come to the market, and there’s not nearly the market concentration for tungsten in Myanmar that there is for tantalum and cobalt in Congo, where it’s over half of the global total, tungsten is a little bit more varied. 

So so bottom line is that for a number of materials, including these three, we’re going to have to learn how to get by with less. Maybe that’s recycling. Maybe that’s if we get lucky new sources. But more likely the business as usual of tech advancement that we’ve become used to is simply not going to fly, and we’re going to have to get by with less.

Why a Russian-Chinese Pipeline Won’t Happen

An oil pipeline closeup

If China and Russia are so buddy-buddy now, why don’t they build pipelines across Siberia to bypass the Persian Gulf?

There are more issues than I can cover in this video, but here are a couple. Their recent cooperation is less of a friendship and more of a “the-enemy-of-my-enemy-is-my-friend” situation. Geography is the bigger problem, though, with thousands of miles separating Russian energy sources and Chinese population centers.

Even if a pipeline plan was put in place, neither side would want to pay for it, and Russia wouldn’t have the technical expertise to develop it. So, unless maritime shipping goes completely offline, this pipeline isn’t happening.

Transcript

Hey everybody, Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Middle Chain Lake in southeastern Yosemite. This is one of my favorite places in the national park system. We’re just going to pan around from time to time as I’m doing this video. Have it all to myself. Anyway. 

Today we’re taking a question from the Patreon crowd. Specifically, if China and Russia love each other so much, why don’t they just build a pipeline or cluster of pipelines connecting them to one another and not have to worry about the Persian Gulf at all? 

Great question. Let’s start by saying that the Chinese and the Russians do not love each other very much. They are arguably two of the most racist cultures in the world, and the culture that they’re most racist against is one another. The Chinese see the Russians as backwards barbarians, and the Russians see the Chinese as peasants. So any sort of collaboration they have is in reaction to other things, not because they actually like one another. That’s part one. 

Part two. It’s simple geography. It’s a distance issue. The population of Russia, for the most part, is hard up on the European boundary, and the bulk of the Chinese population is within spitting distance of the Pacific coast, which leaves something like 7 to 8000 miles of great wide open empty in between. Now, if you want to have a pipe, you’re going to have pumping stations, and that’s already a very long way to go. So if you go in from European Russia to Asiatic China, you’re already talking about pumping costs that are well over $80 a gallon. Most likely, that’s on top of the tens of billions of dollars that it would take to actually build the pipeline. That’s number two. 

Number three, the oil and natural gas that the Russians have is, for the most part, in the wrong place. It’s almost all in northwestern Siberia, which is actually further from China than European Russia. So it’s easier to do, say, a rail line going to China than it is a pipeline. And so the eastern and Western networks for the Russian energy distribution system just don’t connect. There’s like one spot and it’s pretty small. So whenever the Russians go, oh, we’re just going to send our oil and gas somewhere else and not to Europe, it’s mostly bullshit because they just don’t have the capacity to do so in large volumes. 

That brings us to the final point, is that there are a few fields going out into Asiatic Siberia, places like Kovykta which is just to the northeast of Kazakhstan, and places like Sakhalin Island, which is just to the north of Japan. These are places where the conversation isn’t silly. The distance is only, you know, a thousand miles or so, as opposed to going all the way across the continent.   

The problem here is that the Russians don’t have the technical skill that’s necessary to tap these fields. And so in the case of Kovykta, that was a BP project. And when BP was basically shown the door a few years ago, it stalled. And in the case of Sakhalin, not only did the Japanese kind of call dibs on that output, but it takes super majors like Exxon or BP or Japanese firms, most of which are now gone because of the war, in order to keep the output going. So it just doesn’t justify anything. 

Whenever Putin and Xi get together, the conversation always is, hey, let’s do a pipeline. And they both always say, yeah, hey, that sounds great. And then they both point at the other one, say, and you pay for it. The Chinese see no reason to pay for infrastructure that is going to cost so much to operate. And the Russians see no point in paying for infrastructure that will benefit the Chinese. So we just get these stalled statements and no real motion. And this is how it’s been going for the better part of the last 30 years now.  

Now, if you change the circumstances, if you remove maritime transport altogether, then all of a sudden we’re having a different conversation. But that doesn’t make the project any cheaper. So you’re still talking about tens of billions of dollars to get the infrastructure in the ground, and then a transit costs that is about the same as prices are right now. So you’re talking about a very nasty change in circumstances if that’s how you want to go. All right. That’s it for me for today. Take care.

China’s Real Estate System Is Failing

Image of Chinese home and real estate

You know what happens when you do exactly what the Chinese government tells you to do? You get sentenced to life in prison. That just happened to Evergrande’s former chairman, and it tells you everything you need to know about China’s failing real estate system.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Colorado. The news today is that the Chinese government just sentenced the former chairman of the real estate company Evergrande to life imprisonment. Because that’s what happens when you do exactly what the government tells you to do, when it doesn’t work out. Very, very short version of the history. There aren’t a lot of investment options for Chinese citizens. Foreign investment is sharply restricted because the Chinese know that their own system provides very, very, very poor returns. And if they opened their accounts to the world that the money would just flow out in the tens of trillions. And at home, everything is driven by throughput and employment rather than profitability. So if you invest in a specific company, your chances of actually getting a return are minimal because those companies are able to access subsidized loans from the government at negative real interest rates. And if you’re an investor, you get a negative real return. So local governments had for the last 20 years, basically encouraged property companies to come in and buy land from them, which is where they got over half of their income; the state governments, local governments got over half their income. And then take money from individual citizens to build condos. And the result, because we had widespread urbanization going in China at the same time, remember, this is the same time the Chinese are going through their industrialization pulse. The thought was that this would just go on forever. So prices would rise, you’d build more homes, there would be more demand, blah, blah, blah. And on and on and on and on. There are two problems with that theory.  

Number one, eventually you created more housing than China needed by a factor of 4 or 5 by some measures. And then second, nobody was being born. The Chinese demographic bust probably started, data’s a little sketchy, but probably started back in the early 90s. That’s when we now know, according to official Chinese statistics, that the Chinese birth rate dropped below the American birth rate 35 years ago. Anyway, nobody gets born for 35 years. All of a sudden, the demand for the housing goes down. And eventually this bubble popped in the early 20s, which is when Evergrande went bust with something like $300 billion of losses, which even by Chinese standards, that’s a pretty big number. Anyway, people who invested in Evergrande directly or indirectly by having Evergrande build them an apartment basically lost their shirts. And now we’ve had this complete collapse in the system. New construction in China is down by 75% in just the last five years since this went down. And that’s data as of the end of 2025, which is the most recent we have best estimates, is that there’s going to be another 20% collapse this year. And to put it from the point of view of the individuals, the people who are buying these homes, to give you an idea of how screwed they are. In inflation index terms, and keep in mind the Chinese doctor their data so their inflation does not look as bad as it is according to the official statistics. Homes today are worth less than they were at the start of the boom in 2005. So in the United States, when we had the adjustment with the great financial crisis in 2007 to 2009, and home prices dropped back to like 2005 levels, and we all kind of lost our mind. Can you imagine a 20 to 25 year loss in appreciation and the impact that has on the mindset of the average Chinese? Now, this hasn’t translated into a stock route because the Chinese regulate that on one hand. But more importantly, the Chinese citizens know that investing in the stock market in China is a fool’s errand. Again, Chinese companies have access to below market prices, below inflation prices, real negative prices for loans. So any investment there honestly is a fool’s errand. And if you happen to invest in Chinese equities, I also have a bridge that I would like to sell you that I think you’ll really, really like. 

Anyway, bottom line is that the Chinese government is now trying to get this money somewhere else. We have something like 22 trillion US equivalent in deposit accounts. It’s just Chinese citizens who don’t know what to do with their money, because they don’t want to put in the stock market. They now know that housing is a trap. So it’s just sitting in a deposit account in their local bank. And so the Chinese state has reduced deposit rates to below 1%. So this money isn’t really earning anything. And they’re trying to force the Chinese citizens to invest in the stock markets. But the Chinese citizens at the moment are smart enough to realize that that is a fool’s errand. The only other possible way for it to go would be out of the country and go somewhere else where it could be more productive and be, you know, safer. But the Chinese keep that locked down. So I always find it very amusing of the people who want to get their money into China to make money, when the people who are in China are desperate for any way to get the money out. Anyway, that’s it for now. See you next time.

The Limits of China’s Military Reach

Chinese soldiers in camouflage fatigues

Despite China’s growing military, it remains constrained by geography and dependent upon U.S. secured trade routes.

Even if China manages to expand its Navy to the point where it can break through the First Island Chain, it still needs to find a way to replace the U.S.-maintained international system. And that’s no easy feat. The Chinese proved they could adapt and buy themselves some time during the Iran War, but it could not avoid the pitfalls associated with being the world’s largest oil importer.

Transcript

Hey, everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from Yosemite National Park. This is Royal Arch Lake. This is the very first place I ever went camping when I came to Yosemite years ago. So it’s kind of cool to be back almost by accident. Anyway, taking a question from the Patreon page today specifically, why don’t I see the Chinese going all bonsai in their neighborhood? 

Why are they not being more militaristic? I would argue that until eight years ago, when chairman G. Jinping got rid of his last real advisors, he had a very accurate understanding of the world about how China was arguably the country in world history, most dependent upon international trade, and how China utterly lacked the military means in order to protect that trade, even within sight of its own shore. 

Trying to basically faces three layers of problems. Number one, their chief sources of demand, primarily the United States, but to a slightly lesser degree, the European Union are on the other side of continents from them, and they’re broadly hostile. That means unless they can find a consumption source to absorb their goods, their current economic model won’t work at all. 

And since their own demographics are so totally horrid, they know that that consumption boost can’t happen at home and the developing world, writ large, has less than half the consumption power of the United States, and much less the US and the EU put together. So there is no option for China except to maintain some version of the current system. 

And the United States is the one that has a global Navy. That’s problem one. Problem two even if the Chinese could float a navy that was equal to the United States, and right now we outgunned them roughly 15 to 1, they still need to get through the first island chain that is Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. 

It’s not so much that those countries are de facto US allies. In most cases, it’s that if the Chinese are going to project power to the wider world, they have to get past these islands regardless of who controls them. And it’s much, much, much, much, much easier to sink ships, especially commercial ships in a straight than it is to dominate an archipelago. 

You’re talking about a combined population in the zone. That is, Indonesia has 250 million people by itself, so well over half a billion. I don’t think I’ve ever done that math before. Taiwan has about 30. Philippines I think is 70 these days. Lots of people. Well, well, well beyond the capacity of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. That’s what they actually call their navy, as well as the People’s Liberation Army. 

The Chinese Army is not designed to project power and hold territory. It’s mostly for domestic control, which is something that does pretty well. Anyway, so that’s problem two. Problem three. Let’s assume that they can outrun the US Navy and dominate the first island chain. And those are some wishful thinking there that doesn’t solve their problem. 

They still have to get to North America to dominate that commercial base. So have to get to Europe to dominate the commercial base. They still have to get to the Middle East to have energy. The Chinese system, from a strategic point of view, has always been in a bind. And so I’ve always found it hilarious that the official stance of CCP is that the United States. 

Should patrol the world and secure the ceilings on behalf of China. Their official plan is that we can’t do it, so you should do it for us. So no no no no, not a lot has changed. We have had a little bit of color that has come in because of the Iran war, in that the United States bungled everything. 

And the Chinese, I don’t want to say that they bungled or that they had a a home run. It was somewhere in between. It exposed just how vulnerable they were to energy disruptions. And they did showcase through switching for petrochemical inputs and for using EVs, that they could reduce their demands by about 2 million barrels per day, maybe not even quite that much. 

But, you know, that’s a significant volume to reduce your crude by. That’s like, geez. United Kingdom uses about that much, but that’s it. So even after all the fuel switching, even after going over to electric vehicles, even after shutting down some of their refineries, they were still far and away the world’s largest oil importer from all the same places as before. 

Nothing really changed. If I was going to highlight one thing that may be pointed the other way, it’s not so much that the Chinese have more flexibility, it’s that we found out just how dependent other countries were on them. Now, we understand in the United States how much were dependent on the Chinese for manufactured goods. But over the course of this conflict, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Australia, the Philippines all discovered how much they were dependent upon Chinese refined product. 

So, yes, the math really hasn’t changed for China in terms of any sort of major conflict. But we now know that if they do go down, they’re going to be taking the fuel systems of a half a dozen countries that the United States cares a fair amount as a side effect. And the only way to fix that is for these countries to secure their own energy and specifically to develop their own refining base, which for some of these countries is something they gave up on decades ago. 

So it’s not so much that we know that China is in a stronger place. They’re not. So they may have just tethered themselves to a few countries in the meantime.

Chinese Marriage Data Confirms Demographic Crisis

A chinese woman in a bridal dress walking down the aisle with her father and onlookers taking photos

Most of the data coming out of China isn’t worth the paper it’s printed on, but there are a handful of metrics that aren’t based on estimates. Today, we’ll be looking at marriage registrations and what the 6% decline from last year means.

This echoes a decades-long decline in marriage registrations and reflects the broader demographic decline facing China. Since an overwhelming number of Chinese births occur within marriage, the population decline may be even worse than previously forecasted.

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here coming to you from…where am I? Termoli In Italy? And today we’re going to talk about some Chinese statistics that just popped out in the last couple of weeks that look really bad even by Chinese standards. So backdrop that you need to know this way is that Chinese data is awful. Part of that is just the nature of the beast. 

China really only started its industrialization process in 1978, and so the techniques that a lot of Western countries have been using for the better part of a century are new. And computerization really is only the last 20 years. And it’s a huge place. So getting the locals and the center to agree on what is normal statistics is a little hit and miss at times, and part of it is unfortunately by a degree of design, the central government sense quotas for everything and so lo and behold, the locals meet the quotas or maybe expand upon them. 

And then on top of that, you’ve got punishment issues. And where if a data point comes out, the Chairman Jinping doesn’t like the person who presents it to them, may have their job and or life forfeit. And so the people who do the data collection just stop collecting that data point, whatever it happens to be. So we have really poor data on Chinese demographics and financial issues and bonds and all these other things these days, especially health anyway. 

But there are some that are seen as not politicized. And so data for those is good. And the one we’re going to talk about today is marriage registrations. According to the new data that’s come out in the first half of the year. Those are down by roughly 6% in just the last 12 months. And that is on top of year and year declines that go back the better part of 30 years. 

This is data that has been collected since 1978. And it’s not an estimate like a lot of data. It’s actual registrations. People have actually gone to the equivalent of city hall and registered the marriages. So it’s something we relate to or it’s something that we can relatively rely upon. Now, the reason why this matters is if family formation is down, the birth rate is down, and if the birth rate is down, China’s hollowing out. 

Now, this is something we’ve been looking at at any number of angles for quite some time. What is interesting here, from my point of view, is that the marriage rate drop has been dropping much, much, much faster, two and three times faster than the. Suppose it had declined in the number of 20 and 30 somethings, where usually the people get married. 

So it gives us a little bit more accurate view of just how bad the demographic crisis is. And it was already really, really bad. Basically, we no longer have enough people under age 50 in China to even theoretically repopulate a country of 400 million people, much less supposedly the 1.2 billion that China says it has. And in internal conversations, the Shanghai Academy of Sciences is now debating how many hundred million people under age 40 they’ve over counted. 

They know it’s at least 100 million. And this year, the number 500 million popped up for the first time as a possibility. They just don’t know. And they don’t believe they have the capacity to go out and do get the information, because too many people are concerned with getting the wrong ancer anyway. It’s a tiny little window into the crisis that the Chinese are facing these days, and to be perfectly blunt, there’s no coming back from this without marriages. 

There are no children or very few. But more importantly, there are now no longer enough people to even theoretically get married in order to attempt repopulation. So it’s just a question of timing, whether it’s in single or double digits of years, of course, matters to all of us because we’re all living in the now. 

But it looks pretty rough and this isn’t going to last much longer. All right. That’s it for me for today. Till next time.