The Revolution in Military Affairs: Naval Advances

Photo of a US Naval Carrier

Trying to predict the long-term future of naval warfare may be futile, but we can examine some of the weapon systems emerging in current conflicts.

The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that naval vessels are becoming expensive floating targets. From jet skis packed with explosives to other low-cost drones, the closer a ship gets to shore, the easier and cheaper it becomes to destroy. However, when naval assets remain offshore, they lose much of their tactical effectiveness.

Two technologies will be at the forefront of this shift: detection and jamming. Identifying threats through drones, satellites, and radar systems will be essential. And the ability to operate at extended ranges with greater flexibility will define the future of naval power. There’s still much to figure out, but one thing is becoming clear—the era of close-shore naval operations is coming to an end.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Arches National Park in Utah. And today we’re doing another episode of our Future of Military Technology series. Basically, we’ve had a series of breakthroughs in energy transmission and data processing, digitization, materials science that are basically opening up a whole new wave of military technologies that we’re inventing as we go. 

So anyone who says that they know what’s going to be the weapon system in five years, ten years, 20 years, whatever. We’re kind of making this up as we go. Don’t be too harsh. But what we know now from the Ukraine war is that. Wow. If you have a conventional military warship that requires to be within 160 miles of the coast, you’re going to lose that ship. 

Basically, if it can be seen, it can be targeted, and it can be targeted with weapons that you might not be able to detect until they’ve blown up the size of your vessel. The Ukrainians in particular, have taken motorboats and jet skis and things like them, loaded up with, equipment and with bombs and either gone out and used them to shoot down things like planes and drones, or simply ram the ships on the other side. 

And naval vessels are among the most expensive things that a military can field. So to be taken out by a jet ski is kind of embarrassing. From both, strategic and political and of course, a financial point of view. But that’s just where we are now. The question is, how far out does the range have to go before a naval vessel is safe? 

And if you’re talking about a military asset being safe because it has to be so far back that it can’t function, it’s no longer really serving the purpose anymore. At the moment in Ukraine, 100 miles is absolutely the death zone for any Russian vehicles. In addition, the Ukrainians have shown on multiple occasions that they can strike much further away sometimes, as much as 350 miles, if they know where the target is. 

And that at the moment means that we can’t be a mobile target. So they can say attack ports at places like Novorossiysk, with limited effectiveness, certainly anywhere in the Crimean peninsula. But they can’t necessarily go after a ship just because it’s out there. So the whole World War Two story of sending destroyer squadrons out to find the other guy’s aircraft carriers, that is not what we’re talking about. 

Or at least not with today’s technology. Ten years from now, who knows? Which means that in this interim period, while these technologies are still being developed, detection is going to be the big thing, and that is going to be a combination of service radar, satellite recon, in a sense, and a network of drones that can go out at distance and network their information together. 

Just keep in mind that at the moment, getting a clear signal from your operator to your drone is the limiting factor in drone warfare. One of the reasons why those fiber optic spools that can go out several miles are so important because they can’t be jammed. Put any jamming out. However, in a drone that’s a hundred miles from shore, it’s just going to fall into the sea because it can’t report anything. 

It can’t be directed, you can’t see through its eyes. So we’re going to see this kind of arms race with two technologies when it comes to naval issues. Number one detection. And that can combine the old with the new. And number two jamming. And the question is how powerful the jammer can you fit onto a naval asset? 

I don’t have an answer for that. Like I said, these are being invented as we go, but the old days of being able to do easy amphibious landings. When I say there’s nothing easy about an amphibious landing or patrolling relatively close to the coast, that those are pretty much in the past now. And any country that has naval access that is somewhat constrained. 

So basically, if your ports are within, say, 500 miles of anybody else, those ports are no longer functional for military assets in the world. We’re in. That includes every port in Russia, that includes every port in Saudi Arabia, that includes every port in China. And we need to start thinking of naval power in a completely new way. 

That is a lot more flexible and has a lot more range.

The Revolution in Military Affairs: Europe’s Future

Last time we chatted about the misalignment between American weapons systems and European needs. So, what does the future of Europe’s military strategy look like?

A growing threat from Russia means European countries are rearming, and quickly. Between Polish conscription, Swedish and German defense budgets climbing, and everyone else preparing infrastructure at home, there’s a lot happening. The big question on everyone’s mind is who/what can replace the Americans and their weapons systems?

European jets are too limited in supply, so a different direction is being pursued. Think drones and jamming systems. After seeing success in Ukraine, the rest of the Europeans are treating these options as viable way of fighting wars and defending themselves. And they’ll get some tech and help from Ukraine.

While there are still capacity and infrastructure issues that will have to be dealt with, this is solid alternative to relying on the Americans. Obviously, there’s still a need for infantry, navy, and manned aircraft, but this is the first step in shifting Europe’s military future.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re going to continue our open ended series on the future of military technology. And we’re gonna look specifically at Europe. The Americans under the Trump administration have gone from being Europe’s security guarantor to perhaps even a security threat. And everyone in Europe is trying to figure out if there’s any pieces of the relationship that can be salvaged. 

And in the meantime, laying the groundwork for whatever is next. The problem, of course, is the Europeans know in their bones that the Russians are coming for them. And if Ukraine falls within 2 to 3 years, they’re going to be fighting on European territory. So we already have the poles, which have basically reestablished something equivalent to the draft for all men of potential fighting age. 

The European Union is encouraging its people to build basically prepper kits that allow them to deal for three days on their own minimum, without any sort of government services. The Swedes are announcing a tripling of their defense budget. The Germans are doing something similar. And on and on and on. But the common refrain and all of these things are two things. 

Number one, the Russians are coming. We have to get ready now. And number two, the Americans can’t be relied upon. And that includes American equipment. Historically speaking, since World War two, about half of all European military procurement has come from American firms, and most Europeans are basically looking to drive that number down to zero as quickly as possible. This isn’t necessarily a political issue from the European issue. It’s a practicality issue. 

Legacy systems like fighter aircraft can take decades to design, years to build out the industrial plant, and then you get only a certain flow through of production per year. So if you look at the options that are in front of the Europeans right now, there’s really only four. First is the American F-35, which is by far the best in terms of overall capabilities, but it has a couple giant, flaws in it. 

Number one, it’s over $100 million in airframe and then triple that addition over the lifespan of the vehicle. So, you know, the Europeans just don’t have that kind of money. But the other options Europe has designed for themselves don’t look great. 

The best one is probably Sweden’s Gripen. They can make about 25 of those a year. That’s great for Sweden, but it’s not enough for anyone else. The French have the rifle, which they can also do about 25 a year. Again, because the French have been maintaining an independent defense. Identity for decades. That might might be enough for just France, but there’s no more for anyone else. 

And then you’ve got the Eurofighter Typhoon, which is kind of the European equivalent of the F-35, but older technology, which is of questionable use in a lot of situations. It’s designed the industrial plant is designed for 60 year, but it’s really never run more than 20. So the idea that you can spin this up is a question mark. 

But the bottom line is, you know, if you’ve only got 2 to 3 years and you’re talking about needing about a thousand airframes, there’s just no version of traditional fighter jets that works for you at all. And so the Europeans have to turn the page on military technology and try something fundamentally new. 

Consider the system in Germany, which is kind of emblematic of what’s going on and what will be going on. They’ve invested nowhere near enough for the defense industry to be self-sufficient on any stretch of the imagination. And me personally, the idea of a relatively unarmed Germany. I consider this a plus from a security point of view personally. 

Anyway, now that the Americans are proving to be a little whacko, the Germans have to do their own thing. And so they’re looking at the legacy systems that they’ve invested in. After the Ukraine war began in 2022. The Germans decided to belatedly sign up to the F-35 program that the Americans run, on the condition that the manufacturing for the German airframes actually happen in Germany. 

So the Americans basically worked with the Germans in 2023 and 2024 to build a facility that can handle the construction, but it’s not happening fast enough. I mean, the first plane began manufacture in 2024. It won’t be finished until 2026. First deliveries to the German Air Force won’t happen until 2027, and the 35 airframes that the Germans have ordered won’t be completely built into around 2040. 

And it’s only 35 frames for a country the size of Germany, that is almost pointless. But the cost of these planes is, you know, 100 to $110 million in airframe. It’s a waste of money, especially for an airframe that is not appropriate for the German strategic needs. So why did the Germans do it at all? 

Well, two reasons. First, that implicit security guarantee you get from the Americans because you know, you’re using their hardware. Trump administration has shown that that is absolutely worthless. So that logic has gone away. And second, they want to learn the technology. And so what’s going to happen in Germany is because what’s going to happen a lot of places, assuming they continue with the F-35 program at all, it’s just so that they can do it long enough to master the technologies involved. 

Then they’ll, under the contract, walk away and use those technologies to build something that they actually have a use for. And at the moment, the only thing that looks sufficiently promising to replace ground strike air power, is a combination of air defense and drones. And in that the Europeans do have a couple things going for them. First is resources. Drones cost a lot less. The most advanced rocket drone that the Ukrainians have fielded so far only costs about $1 million, compared to a $110 million for an F-35. Smaller drones that are used on the battlefield to go after tanks are an order of magnitude less. 

And the anti-personnel drones that the Ukrainians have been kicking out in the millions because two orders of magnitude less. There’s also a range advantage of the shaheen’s that come out of Iran, much less the Ukrainian and the Russian. Duplicates of those technologies have the same range as the J35, and you can send them out in the thousands if you want to, which means that any sort of forward positioned air facility is going to have to have great jamming, because if a few of those suckers get through, you’ve lost airframes that you simply can’t replace. 

So the Europeans are terrified, and rightly so, because they have to turn the page on the technological book that they’re used to, but they have to do it because there’s no way they can build out the industrial plant that is necessary to generate what they need in time. There are only a very few countries in Europe that have been able to even try this, and it’s ones that started years ago, specifically mentioning the Swedes and the French, who have always had an independent defense identity and maybe mentioned poles, who have been working with the South Koreans to build out their capacity. 

They brought in a couple hundred tanks. They’re building out construction facilities right now with the intent of starting mass production next year. But even that might not be soon enough. So it’s drones, drones, drones, drones, drums. And if you look at what the Europeans were planning on spending on the F-35 program, it was supposed to be about $80 billion for procurement and then about another 220 to 250 billion for, life cycle. 

You know, that’s a lot of money that you can put in other things. And so the Europeans are going to be doing just that. So resources probably not going to be an issue because the technologies are much more appropriate to the needs the Europeans have than what the Americans would have sold them otherwise. 

The second issue provides even some more, hope and that’s Ukraine. Ukraine, out of necessity, has become the world leader in drone based technologies. And it’s got everything from those small first person drones that have a range of a few kilometers to fiber optic drums that are immune to jamming, that have a range of upwards of 60km long range ones like their rocket drones and their version of Shaheed, which can go 600 to 1000km. 

And increasingly, we’re seeing the manufacturing being more and more components that come from Ukraine itself right now. Probably, when they started, it was like 10 to 20% of the components were made in Ukraine. Now it’s closer to 70 to 80%. The biggest challenge of the Europeans are going to have is building out the industrial plant that’s necessary to build these parts. 

Right now, a lot of this stuff just comes from the United States of China, off the shelf. They’re gonna have to build that themselves. But the Ukrainians have shown, with a relatively strict budget on a tight timetable while under air assault, you could actually make a lot happen. So if you start doing this in, say, Belgium, while you’re in a very different security situation with a lot more money, that you can throw these problems. 

But perhaps the best advantage that you have of working with Ukraine? Well, there’s two of them. Number one. This is where the things are going to be used. And every drone that is used in Ukraine against the Russians is one that doesn’t have to be used in Germany, against the Russians. That provides you a lot more flexibility. Not to mention an amazing testbed. 

But second. The Ukrainians have promised to fully share all of their drone technology with any country that is willing to put boots on the ground in Ukraine, either as part of a peace agreement, as for on training, or to fight the Russians directly, and for the Europeans who are watching the Americans exit stage right. That’s a really attractive offer. 

Now, will this work? Revolutions and military affairs caused by changes in technology. These are tricky things. You don’t know what’s going to work until it comes up against its equivalent on the other side and up against legacy systems on the other side. 

the determining technology that I have identified at the moment. And keep in mind that, you know, anyone who makes these guesses is just that. 

It’s just a guess. It’s jamming. Because if you can prevent the drones from functioning, then they really can’t target anything. Now again, the Ukrainians have become the world leaders in electronic jamming technologies and the most expensive jammer they build right now is only $5 million. That’s like 1/20. The cost of what comes out of the United States. And the Ukrainian system is far, far, far superior. 

The American systems really can’t jam drones at scale. So you basically get the Europeans looking to bankroll Ukraine’s military industry with the hope of copying and advancing as much of it as possible as part of Europe’s own defense matters. Now, this doesn’t solve everything. They’re still gonna have to figure out infantry. They’re still gonna have to decide if they’re even going to have a navy. 

And at the end of the day, there are certain missions that you need manned aircraft for that drones can’t do. But that is today. If you had told me three years ago there’d be something called a rocket drone with a range of almost a thousand miles that was basically immune to jamming. I would have laughed at you. But necessity, invention, all that good stuff. The Europeans are operating under necessities lash.

Israel’s Uncertain Endgame in Iran

Aftermath of Israeli strike at the IRIB building. Photo by wikimedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Israel_war#/media/File:Attack_on_IRIB's_Live_News_Broadcasting_Studio_07.jpg

Israel and Iran are still in the thick of an air war, which is really their only option given the several countries between them. But are things going to ramp up here soon? Is nuclear war coming? Will the US get involved?

This conflict began because the Israelis wanted to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The reality is that Iran wasn’t even close to having a fully fleshed out nuclear weapon, they’re only just at the early enrichment stage of the process. So, cross that one off the list. What else could Israel be pushing for then?

Israel might be working towards instigating a regime change in Iran. A quick history lesson will teach us that Iran is a theocracy, seated deeply in a mountainous region, with thousands of years of continuity; simply killing the Supreme Leader isn’t going to change anything. But what if the Israelis got some help?

US involvement would most likely come in the form of air support, and it would require lots of bunker-busting bombs, with no guarantee of permanent success. But again, this wouldn’t spark regime change or revolution. Is dragging the US into a deeper conflict without a clear end goal worth it?

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from sunny Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about what’s going on with the Israel Iran war, the possibility of the United States getting involved and what you should look for and why. Core issue is that Iran and Israel not only don’t border one another, there’s a couple of major countries in between them with some major population centers, most notably Iraq. 

So there is no way for these countries to get at each other in terms of land action. There are only two ways they can interact. One is basically an air war, which we have right now. And the second option would be an exchange of nukes. On that front. The Israelis have about 150 nuclear weapons, mostly tactical scale. 

And the Iranians have none. Now, one of the reasons people have been arguing for striking Iran for a long time is to prevent them from getting nukes, but keep in mind, it’s a multi-stage process. And the Iranians haven’t completed the first one. So step one is you get uranium or you spin it until you get enough weapons grade fissile material that you can then make an explosive core. 

That is the stage that the Iranians were close to completing. However, once you have enough fissile material, you then have to build some explosives that make a perfect implosion to force the nuclear reaction to happen. They don’t have those. Then you have to make an explosive device. They haven’t done that. Then you have to ruggedized that system so it can survive an attack. 

They haven’t done that. And then you have to miniaturize it. So you can either put on a bomb that a plane can carry or a missile. And they haven’t done that. So even if they had enough to make a uranium or God forbid, a plutonium core, they don’t have any of the additional steps. And at the pace that they’ve gone so far just to get to this step. 

We’re not talking about this being a reasonable threat this century. That’s piece one. So if you want to talk about regime change, you now have to shift to a different sort of conversation. Yes, Iran is a deeply authoritarian system, but it is not a dictatorship. It is not a one man rule. This is not Putin’s Russia. This is not Xi’s China. 

This is something else. This is a theocracy. So even if the Grand Ayatollah who’s in charge of everything right now, where to kick it tomorrow with either because he’s older than dust or because a bomb drops on his head that doesn’t remove the regime. There are over 15,000 mullahs that are part of the ruling class. And while regime change certainly could lead to a period of instability. 

It doesn’t fundamentally change what Iran is. And what Iran is, is Persia. Iran is a bunch of mountains. It’s not a chunk of plains like Mesopotamia. It’s not a single seaside community like Israel. It’s about 80 million people who live in mountains. 

Some version of Persia has existed almost since the beginning of the human story. It is one of the original civilizations of our species. And yes, the government has fallen from time to time, but really, we’ve only had seven regime change that are worthy of the term in 6000 years. We’re not going to see one this year. And the United States lacks the capacity to force that issue, even if it does get involved. 

Now, in this heartbeat, the United States does not have any carrier stationed in the Persian Gulf somewhere on the way. This heartbeat. We don’t have a large military force in Iraq any longer. So if we want to do a ground invasion, we’re talking about some months of prep. Hopefully none of that happens. But if the United States was to get involved in the air war version of this, keep in mind that the various aspects of the Iranian nuclear program have been preparing for an American air war for the better part of the last 40 years. 

And so it’s dispersed. It’s hardened. It’s underground. And does the United States have enough bunker busters to take them all out? Because you would probably need a couple thousand. Maybe some of these facilities would probably take several dozen all by themselves. And yes, that might remove the theoretical future of a nuclear program which is nowhere close to producing a weapon. 

But then what? Iran is still Iran. Persia is still Persia. The United States can’t send in a military force on the ground to clean up the entire clerical class. No. If there is going to be a meaningful regime change, if Iran is going to enter a fundamentally different governing age, it’s going to have to be a revolution. And you don’t sponsor a revolution with bombs dropped from the air. 

So where does that take us? I’m honestly not sure. Donald Trump’s inner circle on national security issues is small and incompetent, and being nudged by the Russians to get us directly involved in the fight as quickly and as deeply and up to our eyeballs as is possible. It is unclear, from my point of view if Donald Trump is falling for it, yet he keeps his own counsel on issues like this. 

It’s one of the few things he’s quiet on. But forces are moving into the region. So we are all going to find out probably within the next week or two.

The Revolution in Military Affairs: Weapons Sales

An F16 Fighter jet

Our series on the revolution in military affairs continues with the geopolitics of weapons sales. Why does Europe buy US weapons? And will they continue to do so?

Let’s start with the US weapons. They are designed for fighting like an American, aka fighting wars far from home against greater numbers and tough conditions. But that’s not quite what the Europeans need. The Europeans are facing off with a much closer adversary in Russia, who churns out cheap, mass-produced, short-range weapons like nobody’s business. And those Europeans should probably be taking a page out of the Russians playbook here.

So why is it that Europe continues to buy US weapons systems? Well, there’s that sweet little thing called an implicit security guarantee. You know, if you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours. And sure, having weapons that are consistent across NATO doesn’t hurt either. Oh, and those billions of dollars that have already been committed aren’t helping. But, that oh-so-important “implicit security guarantee” might be crumbling.

If Trump continues down his current path, the Europeans can’t be sure that Uncle Sam will step in if (and when) they need him. So, it’s looking like it might be time for a sourcing trip somewhere else…

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about the geopolitics of weapon sales, particularly American weapon sales or what the US builds, the sort of weapon systems that fields. And so therefore what it sells are largely driven by America’s own geographic options and constraints. The whole goal going back to the time of reconstruction 150 years ago, has been to make sure that if the United States is going to be involved in a war, that it happens over there and not over here. 

So we have a forward deployed military, wherever possible, that tries to keep potential violence as far away from American shores as we can, preferably away from the entirety of the Western Hemisphere. And over the decades, weapons systems that we use, have evolved to mirror that prerogative. So we started with the Monroe Doctrine and blocked sea access to the United States. 

Then we projected out on our sea lanes, and then eventually with World War One and World War Two, were actually fighting in the Eastern hemisphere in major conflicts. And the weapon systems that have evolved since then reflect the fact that the bulk of the fight happens over there. So if you look at every weapon systems that the United States has, it’s built on two basic cons or three basic concepts. 

Number one, we will always, always be outnumbered no matter where we are. And so the weapon systems have to punch much harder than everybody else is to make up for it. Second, we’re going to be fighting at the very end of a very long logistical chain, which means that the US has to excel at logistics and have allies that can help with logistics. 

And then the weapons systems themselves have to be much longer range than anything they’re fighting against, both because basing can be limited. And we have to make sure that the fight is happening as far away from our bases as they possibly can. And then the third system is these systems have to be durable. So whether it’s the F-16 or the Abrams or the now the F-35, it has to be able to fight in a contested environment that will always be contested by a greater number of things. 

And it has to be able to take as many hits as possible before it goes down. So yes, the US Abrams is the most badass tank on the planet, can take several direct hits and probably just shrug them off. Things like the F-16 can actually take anything shy of a missile hit and keep flying. And of course, the F-35. 

It’s a stealth issue. These aren’t by accident. This isn’t something that the United States just stumbled across. It’s something that we discovered with blood and with money over the decades for what was necessary for us to project power. And it affects everything from the hardware to the alliance structure. The Russians have a very different system. The Russians knew that all fights are always going to happen on their immediate periphery. 

And so they don’t need a long range system. 

They don’t need an excellent logistical tale. They don’t even need durable stuff. They want numbers. They want to be able to mass the other side with more jets than anyone else can field. They can be short range. That’s fine. They’re fighting from their own territory. They don’t need to worry about the logistical tail. They don’t have to be particular lethal. Sure. 

Maybe the opponent vessel can take eight hits. Hit him with 100. And so you go for cheap, short range and disposable. You fight with numbers, which makes the American Alliance with Europe somewhat odd. Why the U.S. wants to fight in Europe is obvious. 

Keep the fight over there and why the U.S. wants American basing rights in Europe is obvious. You want that logistical tale in place with competent people. But why? The Europeans would purchase American weapons? That’s a bit of a mystery, because ultimately the Europeans know that their fights are going to be in their near abroad. The Russians are right there. 

And if Ukraine falls over there, right, right. Right there. So you would expect the Europeans to develop systems that are much shorter range, that are much less durable, that are much cheaper, that can be fielded larger and larger numbers. And when you look at the weapons systems that the Europeans have fielded themselves, most of them crowd into that category. 

And yet they still buy weapons from the Americans. In fact, half of their military procurement is from the United States. But their weapons systems that are broadly inappropriate for their needs. They do this for two reasons. Number one is the NATO alliance. If there ever is a fight, the United States assumes immediate control of all European militaries, and interoperability of military forces is critical, especially to the United States, considering its robust logistical needs. 

The second reason is a little bit more tutti frutti. The Europeans would like the Americans to offer the Europeans as many security guarantees as possible. And while NATO is there from a legal structure, using American systems implies a degree of involvement in European militaries, because the manufacturing is in the United States, the services comes from the United States, the technicians from the United States. 

All the equipment comes through the United States, and the weaponry comes from the United States. And so maintaining that commercial relationship maintains an implicit security guarantee that is every bit as important as the article five guarantee of NATO. Or at least that’s where we were a few weeks ago. The last few weeks, the United States has proven the Trump administration has proven to the Europeans that none of this means anything. 

United States is clearly moving away from supporting article five on any issue that matters to the Europeans, most notably Ukraine and Russia. The United States is publicly debating whether it should withdraw from military command of NATO, which is the basically the same thing is withdrawing from NATO itself, since it’s illegal in the United States for any other country to command U.S. forces. 

That would mean an end to the NATO alliance. and that is the explicit security guarantee. And the Americans have already withdrawn weapons support and intelligence support for Ukraine, which is, you know, the fight of the age from the NATO point of view, especially from the European point of view. And the Europeans seen that the Trump administration is directly militarily threatening NATO allies now in places like Denmark and Greenland. 

Everyone’s wondering, why did we buy any of this stuff in the first place? If ultimately the Americans simply are going to stop supporting it. And so the Europeans, every country is basically in the midst of having a debate with itself over whether and how to stop buying American weapons systems and moving to something that is more appropriate for their needs, their geography, and especially the war that is on their horizon right now. 

A great example is the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, a fighter bomber with stealth capabilities. It’s perfect for the United States. It’s got stealth capabilities, got okay range, really good hitting power, very tough plane, largely pointless for everyone in Europe. It’s got too much range for what they need. Cost too much. Over $100 million per platform. And so far, the Europeans have committed to purchasing enough to spend about 75 to $80 billion. 

And then over the lifecycle of the jet, that’s another 250 to 300 billion. That’s a lot of money to spend on a relatively small number of planes that are not designed for your theater or your needs. And so the Europeans are looking to back away from all of those purchases and spend it on something that’s more appropriate. 

Now, at break of European purchase of American weaponry means a lot of things to a lot of people in a lot of places, and will require a lot of words for me to explain all the connotations. And that’s going to have to be tomorrow’s video.

What is Israel’s Victory Condition in Iran?

Attacks by Israeli Air Force in Tehran. Photo by Wikimedia: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a0/Pictures_of_the_Israeli_attack_on_Tehran_1_Mehr_%282%29.jpg

Israel and Iran are still going at it, but things have not significantly escalated. Here’s a breakdown of the situation and what could come next.

Israel has been able to take out Iran’s air defenses and strike some key nuclear sites, especially at the Natanz facility that enriches mid-grade uranium. However, all of Iran’s advanced stuff is dispersed and hidden deep underground, which is beyond Israel’s current strike capabilities. Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes have been largely ineffective due to poor targeting capabilities and strong Israeli defense systems.

So, Israel can continue to hit targets that delay and stall Iran’s nuclear program, but outright destroying the nuclear program probably isn’t in the cards. The question then becomes – what is Israel’s victory condition? If fully eliminating Iran’s nuclear capabilities is off the table, will they turn towards crippling Iran’s economy?

It remains unclear where and how far the Israelis will take this campaign, but unless they escalate their effort, they’ll just be buying time.

Transcript

Hey, all, Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Colorado. We are going to talk about the status of the air war between Iran and Israel. Today it is the 16th of June. You’ll be seeing this one in the morning. Short version. It hasn’t gotten all that serious from a physical damage point of view, especially on the Israeli side. 

Iran lacks meaningful long range power production capacity. They’ve got a lot of missiles. But they’re not particularly smart. And the Israelis have a pretty good theater missile defense. And that’s before you consider the Americans are helping as well. So no appreciable damage inflicted within Israel at the moment. Going the other direction. The Israelis have been primarily targeting air defense, which has proven to be woefully inadequate, on the Iranian side and have taken out the easy targets in the Iranian nuclear development program, most notably the centrifuge complexes at Natanz. 

That is where most of the centrifuges are. That’s where they take raw yellowcake, which is processed, uranium ore and turn it into a kind of a mid enriched uranium. From that point, the stuff is then sent to other facilities to go to highly enriched uranium. And the idea would be that if you get highly enriched enough that you could make a actual bomb. 

No indications at the moment that the Iranians have been getting to the level of enrichment that is necessary to then go to the next part of the process. The problem that the Israelis are facing is that those more advanced centrifuges, the one that goes a higher percentage of fissile material, are underground. They’re buried. They’re dispersed. 

Keep in mind that the Iranians have kind of been playing with their nuclear industry for 30 years now, and the Iranians always assumed that when the bombs actually fell on them to break up their nuclear program, it was going to be the United States dropping the bombs. And the United States would have had things like aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf that would be flying out of places like Kuwait and gutter. 

And so there would be lots and lots and lots of sorties dropping very, very advanced bombs that are designed to penetrate very, very deep places. Israelis don’t have any of that. They’re flying from an extra thousand kilometers away. They don’t have the deep penetration capacity. So can Israel hurt Iran? Of course. Can they take it all out? I really doubt it. 

It’s an open question whether the United States could, which means that the Iranian nuclear program is only stalled so long as the bombing continues, and Israel only has so many weapons that can be used in this conflict. So the question we need to start asking ourselves is, what is the victory condition for Israel? Because their ability to actually destroy everything in the nuclear program is probably not going to happen. 

So what they seem to be doing is going after the power infrastructure and the access infrastructure to delay what’s left of the Iranian nuclear program as long as possible, which is a reasonable plan. And then the question becomes whether or not they decide to do more to set back Iran. More generally, going after military sites is kind of pointless because Iran’s military, for the most part, is infantry based. 

And if you’re doing long range pinpoint attacks, you’re just not going to break it up in any meaningful way. But you could torpedo the Iranian economy by going after the oil refining capacity. Iran is an oil exporter, not merely what they used to be back in their heyday, probably only about a million, a million and a half barrels a day. 

Today. That includes the smuggling, but they are highly dependent upon fuel processing at home just to keep the country together. So if you go after the refineries, which are much easier than going after the oil fields, the Israelis could achieve two things. Number one, that could destabilize the internal regime, because if there’s not fuel, it’s really hard to maintain an industrial level economy. 

And second, it would actually probably pour some literal oil on troubled waters, because if the Iranians can’t process the crude into fuel, they would then be forced to export more crude, which would actually weirdly push oil prices down. Something to consider. No sign that the Israelis are doing that right now, but considering their limited options for actually removing the nuclear card from the board, it’s something that seems pretty feasible to me.

Oil Markets Aren’t Worried About Iran

Photo of gas pumps at a station

With everything going on between Israel and Iran right now, I know what you’re thinking – it’s time to run to Costco and fill up the gas tank. Hear me out though, we don’t live in the same world we did a few decades ago.

Oil markets aren’t reacting to this conflict for a few reasons, but it boils down to where the crude is coming from. Between the US shale revolution and a diminishing importance of the Persian Gulf in oil markets, this conflict just doesn’t move the needle like it used to.

Sure, there could be a situation where I might start to worry. But that would require Iran closing the Strait of Hormuz (very unlikely) OR marching troops all the way to Saudi Arabia’s oil fields (also very unlikely). So, unless some dramatic military step is taken by Iran, we can all just fill up whenever it’s convenient.

Transcript

Hey, all Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from a somewhat breezy and drizzly Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about the attack that happened over the weekend in Iran. Israel’s basically bombing the crap out of Iran, going after the nuclear facilities. And, contrary to popular concern, oil prices really haven’t done all that much. They’ve moved less than 10%. 

Why do they not care? Why do I not care? Now, if you back up 20, 30, 40, 50, 60 years ago, any sort of spat involving Israel in any way immediately sent oil prices through the roof. And if it involved Iran, oh boy howdy. Because the Persian Gulf remains, even today, the world’s largest producer of crude and by far the world’s largest exporter of the stuff. 

And with in the modern day, the Europeans no longer taking crude from, Russia because of the Ukraine war, it’s become more important to global petroleum than it’s ever been before. However, however, however, there is another factor and that is the US shale revolution. The United States, in the last 20 years has gone from the world’s largest importer crude to, in gross terms, the second largest exporter, second only to Saudi Arabia. Does that mean we’re completely immune to what’s going on? But it does mean that we’re dumping more than 10 million barrels a day of crude into this market than what we did before, closer to 15, actually, now that I think about it. 

And that changes the math for everything, because if we did have a sharp cut off of the very thing in the Persian Gulf, the United States would face some teething pains as we use some of the crude grades that we produce in refineries that weren’t designed for it. But overall, we’d be okay. And having that extra 10 or 15 million barrels a day of global production just means that in percentage terms, the Middle East doesn’t matter nearly as much as it used to. 

Now, where does that take us? More specifically, what would make us worry? I am of the opinion now that even if Iran decided it wanted to shut down the shipping lanes in the Persian Gulf, it probably couldn’t. They’ve got a lot of small boats. A lot of them are really nothing more than, speedboats. It could do some damage. 

But about the only thing that is going to get Iran any assistance, any sympathy in the international system is if it doesn’t shut down the energy line that allows countries like China to function. If it does, that really is all on its own, except for the Russians, who would be happy to see global energy go up in smoke, which means, it’s down to how good their military is. 

And, you know, Iran has never, ever, ever in its history been a naval power. Probably the last battle that Iran was really noteworthy. It was like against Sparta. And if you’ve seen, you know, those movies, you know exactly what I’m talking about. It didn’t end well. What would make me care? Well, if Iran were to take its military and surge it into Iraq and south through Kuwait and go for the Saudi oil fields with the intention of taking them offline. 

That would get my attention. Iraq plus Kuwait. You’re talking 5 to 6 million barrels a day. Once you talk about the Saudi oil fields, you’re talking about another ten. All of these Saudi oil fields are in the far east of the country, really close to gutter. In a Shia majority area, and in theory with the Iranians, who are also Shia religiously, would get along with these people. 

So you could see some sort of rebellion happening at the same time. But for that to happen, that would be a big risk for Iran these days. One of the things we’ve seen with the Israeli attack is Iran no longer has any meaningful air defense whatsoever, and it’s generally easier to have static air defense in it. It has mobile air defense. 

So if they take their army and throw it at Saudi Arabia, they would have no air cover at all. In addition, Iran does not have what we would consider to be a mechanized military. It’s an infantry heavy force. So you’d basically be sending, don’t know, 50,000 hundred thousand, 200,000 men marching through the desert, 500 miles. Leaving aside the logistical terrain, that would be easy pickings. 

They would be completely open to the sky the entire way. And so even a successful operation would be hugely costly for them. And a failed operation would mean the end of the Iranian government, because the Iranian military wasn’t designed to fight other countries. It was designed to occupy all of the non Iranian non Persians in the country of Iran. 

Only about half the population are ethnically Persian. So if if they were to do that, it would be incredibly risky. And unless they pull it off successfully, I still don’t care and neither should you.

Israel Launches Attack on Iranian Nuclear Sites

Photo of attacks on Tehran by Israel in June 2025 targeting top military officials. Photo by Wikimedia Commons: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9e/Destroyed_buildings_as_aftermath_of_2025_Israeli_attack_on_some_areas_in_Tehran_23_Tasnim.jpg

Israel has launched a significant military campaign against Iran, primarily targeting nuclear facilities. Let’s break down the targets, impacts, and what’s coming.

A handful of sites used in uranium enrichment, fabrication, and machining were hit, along with several Iranian scientists and military figures.

Iran’s air defenses have fallen short, and given the amount and style of attacks, it’s likely that Israeli agents have made their way into Iran. The response from Iran has been lackluster and that’s not likely to change; with limited response options (paramilitary proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis are too weak), missile and drone launches are the extent of Tehran’s retaliatory options.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here coming to you from a slightly stormy Colorado within the last 12 hours. The Israeli government has started a broad scale military campaign against Iran, going after primarily their nuclear facilities. This is the big one already. They’ve done more damage in Iran than any other power has done since the rise of the Ayatollah back in 1979. 

And they’re telegraphing that this is going to continue for at least a couple of weeks. The damage inflicted is notable, but let’s do a quick breakdown of what’s going on and where it’s likely to go before we all jump to conclusions. So first of all, let’s start with the non nuclear targets. The Israelis have targeted nuclear scientists. They have targeted military leaders. 

They haven’t had a success and targeted at least some of them. But honestly this is not all that impressive from my point of view. Israel has been going after nuclear scientists for the better part of the last 20 years. It’s not a great industry to be in if you want to live. So taking out 2 or 3 here and there doesn’t really change much. 

And as for the military leadership, Iran’s military is an occupation force that Iran uses to keep its own population in check. It’s not really capable of projections across territory. So if they were all gutted and it’s only been a few, it really doesn’t change the math at all. Got Iran affects its region through paramilitary groups that are not Iranian citizens. 

So by supplying them with equipment like the Houthis in Yemen. So gutting these two ranks of people doesn’t really change my math for anything of more significance is going after the nuclear facilities. Primarily we’re looking at Natanz, which is the primary enrichment facility that the Iranians used to turn uranium ore into something that can be used, fissile isotopes that can be used in weapons. 

There are secondary facilities in a place called Isfahan, which also handles a lot of fabrication. And higher end machining. In theory, being designed to be put into weapons. Now, let’s be clear. The Iranians have never tested a nuclear device. They have never demonstrated that you have the ability to put a nuclear device onto a missile and miniaturize it and ruggedized it so it can actually be thrown. 

We’re just talking here about a country that at the moment is working on enrichment and maybe the next couple of steps. And then the Israelis have started targeting an area called for, though, which is just sort of calm. For though, is the one place in the country where the centrifuges that are used to enrich uranium are actually in a reinforced location under the mountain. It is unclear whether the Israelis have the military capability of shattering for though this is where they turn. 

Kind of like mid-enriched uranium into highly enriched uranium, the fissile stuff, you can make a bomb out of, and so they’re going after things like air defense, power grids, that sort of thing going after the access points. Early days. We’re really only in the second wave of attacks right now. But the damage is notable. 

What? The Israelis have not gone after to this point are known stockpiles of nuclear fuel or the operational civilian power plant at Bushehr. It appears that they don’t want to be accused of war crimes by basically doing an inadvertent or maybe advertised dirty bomb in civilian areas. So that has not happened to this point. 

All right. What’s next? 

What is perhaps most interesting about this attack so far is there has been no meaningful Iranian air defense at all in the last two rounds of strikes over the last year, which were much smaller by comparison. Israel went after the air defenses first and discovered that they weren’t nearly as robust as they thought they were. These are older systems, or Russian systems, that have been purchased in the last 30 years, and apparently against the Israelis, who have a much more sophisticated, air penetration capacity than, say, Ukraine. 

They’re just not working at all. So if you’re a country out there and you bought a lot of Russian air defenses, you may have wasted a lot of money. Anyway, the Israelis aren’t just attacking with impunity. They’re actually announcing what their future targets would be. And there is plenty of indications across Iran that the Israelis have infiltrated and put agents on the ground and are using things like drones to go after movement of things like trucks and personnel. 

So if you announce you’re going to hit X site, an X site pulls out of their bunkers and starts to run, then they get hit by drones. So this is something that the Israelis very clearly have been working on for months. And it’s been played out so far pretty effectively. Whether it will completely destroy the Iranian nuclear program is, of course, an open question, because there are so many sites, and the Iranians have been preparing for this for so long. 

But if there’s anything that we have learned about Iran over the last few years, is that a lot of their stuff is not nearly as robust as they thought it was. It’s a lot more brittle. And so the Iranians really don’t have any good way to respond. Iranian power is not about the conventional military. They’re stuck in their mountain fastness. 

Half their population is not Persian. It’s in their paramilitary groups that they support around the country. She is in Iraq, Houthis in Yemen, maybe the Palestinians, if they get lucky, Hezbollah in Lebanon. And most of those groups between the American war on terror and recent Israeli operations have basically been gutted at the organization on the leadership level. 

And so none of them can really strike back against Israel in a meaningful way. That just leaves missiles. And yes, we have reports now that several hundred of those have been flying over, I should say several dozen. We’ve got drones and missiles. A lot of things are in the air. It’s not clear yet that they can get through Israeli defense or not. 

We’re. Oh, rain. We’re nearing a position where if Iran still thinks it’s going to have strategic leverage in anything, it’s going to have to use it or lose it. The thing is, it may know well that if it uses it, it will be its last shot and it’s not going to achieve anything anyway. Anyway, no one can decide the political and strategic math on that, except for the Iranian government and they’re under assault.

Watch This Number for Recession Indicators

Photo of the word recession with storm clouds overhead

Everyone, get your calendars out and draw a big red circle around July. Why? Because a recession could be coming.

The tariff war caused a huge drop in imports from China, with transpacific shipments falling to historic lows. Trump has since backed off the gas, but the supply gap could strain US inventories. If those stockpiles run out, a recession will follow in short order. And we can say thanks to the erratic policy for this recession, as consumer demand and investments have remained steady.

But the real point of this video is to give you a tool to monitor early signs of economic trouble: first-time unemployment claims. What we’re seeing right now is a rise in claims, when all other economic signs say that unemployment should be falling. There are some specifics and nuance to this, but it’s a good starting point.

Link to the tracker: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/ICNSA

Transcript

Hey all, Peter Zeihan here come to you from Colorado today. We’re going to give you a benchmark that you can evaluate for the status of the United States economic expansion slash recession. Quick reminder, I’m of the belief that July is going to be the critical month. And the reason is an 

interruption in shipments, of product from the rest of the world, most notably China, when Trump started the tariff war back in early April, we quickly got into a shouting match with the Chinese that saw bilateral tariffs go over 150% and cargoes just stopped moving. 

Functionally, it wasn’t a tariff was an embargo. And we have had more transpacific shipments canceled, since then than what happened during the entirety of Covid times five. So the last of the pre tariff ships arrived in New York at the end of May. And we’re now in this complete drought and probably in July, we’re looking at the consumption rate of the American economy overwhelming what was stored in terms of inventories from companies that kind of pre surged imports into the country. 

The question is the problem is the reason I can’t be any more specific than that is that Trump then gave in on the tariffs in order to restart talks with the Chinese. He did that about a month ago now. So we’ve had roughly a two month period with almost no sailings and then they’ve restarted. No, those new sailings haven’t reached the United States yet. 

They’ve only now started to leave Chinese ports. So we’ve got this gap where product is going to be insufficient. And the question is whether the inventories that have been built up are enough, and there’s no way to know. We don’t have a good enough data on the inventories to know. But July is when the rubber is going to hit the road. 

And we’re going to find out this is a really weird recession because everything else, whether it’s capital formation, retail sales and investment levels, has actually been pretty robust, has been for a couple of years. We’re dealing with a policy recession caused by really, really crazy easy decision making. And Washington has a very Venezuelan, Zimbabwe and Greek feel to it. 

And one of the weird things about that is it means you can schedule when the, recession is going to happen because everything else is kind of holding steady. So July is when we’ll find out. Now, the reason I’m bringing this up today is because we’ve got a measure that I want to make sure that everybody understand. 

It’s called first time unemployment claims. There’s a lot of pieces of data that economists look at for various reasons. But the problem with most of this data is it’s only as good as the data collection. And usually there’s a huge lag. So for example, retail sales, great measure, but they can’t finish collating all the data right away. 

It takes 6 to 7 weeks before the data comes out. So if we have low retail sales in July because of, insufficient inventory, we’re not going to know that until September. And by then it’s too late. Same thing goes for the Department of Labor’s estimate on job creation. It’s an estimate that is based on a series of estimates that are based on a series of more estimates and surveys. 

And so I don’t want to call it a made up number. It’s one of the best things we’ve got. But it’s not a real data point. But first time unemployment claims are because when people go to file for unemployment assistance, they do it right when they lose their job. And it’s a real number. Now, the data increase from today indicated that first time unemployment claims in the United States has risen to hit 248,000 people. Under normal circumstances, I would not even blink at this number. It’s actually a pretty good number because normally when you hit 300,000 or below, it means that not a lot of people are losing their jobs. The job market is strong. It’s when you hit 400,000 jobs or higher that you’re getting the danger territory, and 3 to 400 requires a little bit of loosey goosey analysis. 

So under 300 should be fine, but it shouldn’t be rising at all. Two things going on here. The first is industrial construction spending, another number that I figure has basically been flat ever since Trump came in. We’ve now had 140 tariff changes since the 20th of January. Trump has made it very clear that, especially for a major trading partners, in the next two weeks, there’s at least another 20 tariff policies coming in. 

They are still working on secondary sanctions for Venezuela. Congress is talking secondary sanctions for Russia. And we still have semiconductor and agricultural tariffs that are supposed to be just around the corner, although the US now has been just around the corner for two months. There’s more coming and as long as that is the case, no one knows what the rules of the game are and no one wants to break ground. 

So industrial construction spending hasn’t dropped. Everyone’s still finishing the projects they were on, but this should be a job creation story and it’s not so. First time unemployment claims should be going down and they’re going up. And even though they’re still well below the threshold, I normally worry about, I’m a little bit more worried. Second problem is the baby boomers are always the baby boomers. 

Over two thirds of them are retired, which means that the balance in the economy between number of workers and number of non workers is in the process of shifting by the greatest proportion since the baby boomers entered the markets back in the 60s, which means a lot of our benchmarks might need to be readjusted because that balance is shifted. 

And when you remove that many workers from the economy, workers who are retiring, not workers who are being fired, then maybe that 300 to 400,000 arc in first time unemployment claims should actually be revised down to maybe 250 to 350, because there’s fewer people to theoretically lose their jobs. We’ll have to find a new equilibrium on that as years go ahead, all of the baby boomers will be out of the market the next few years. 

But we live in the now. Anyway, so here’s a QR code for first time unemployment claims as garnered by the fed every single week. It is one of the measures I am watching most closely and now so can you.

Trump Calls in the Marines for California’s Protests

Photo of soldiers at the California 2025 ICE protests. Image by Wikimedia commons: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f4/Los_Angeles_riots_-_June_2025_-_20250613.jpg

Anyone remember that 2011 movie called Battle Los Angeles? It’s beginning to look a lot like that again, just with a different kind of aliens this time.

Earlier this week, immigration enforcement began arresting suspected undocumented immigrants, which triggered protests. Trump deployed National Guard troops and Marines to LA, despite strong objections from the CA governor and LA’s mayor. Trump can legally enforce immigration laws and declare a state of emergency, so he stands on pretty firm legal ground.

The use of military forces like the Marines should be setting off alarm bells because this is not in their job description. Putting Marines that are trained for combat, into a situation where they will interact with civilians and act as law enforcement, is risky to say the least.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of these protests is the scale. With CA’s size and political leaning, larger turnouts would be expected. Despite this, Trump clearly has no issues pushing California’s buttons, especially if it means political gain for him.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan coming to you from a hotel room where I’m about to give a presentation. I figured that with everything going on in California, I’d better say hello and let you know my $0.02 on what’s going on. Short version is that we have protests and a little bit of rioting in the Los Angeles area specifically. 

What happened is, a few days ago, immigration enforcement went into communities and started rounding up people that they thought may or may not be illegal. There have been several hundred arrests, and that has triggered protests and action. That has prompted Donald Trump to send in about 4000 National Guard troops from local units, over the objection of the la mayor and the California governor. 

And as of a few hours ago, 700 Marines have, joined them as well. So few things here to unpack. Step one. Does Donald Trump have the legal right to do this? Of course he does. Enforcing immigration laws is why Ice exists. So of course, Donald Trump can send in, their forces in order to root out what they see is an illegal community. Were these folks doing anything particularly bad? Not really.  

One of the things that, the Trump administration has discovered is that if you want to treat immigration as a law enforcement issue, the step one is to investigate and figure out if someone’s actually breaking a law aside from being in the country illegally. That’s what Trump campaigned on. But that takes time. And, per agent, if you can get an arrest every few days, that’s actually pretty good. 

And Trump wants to uproot people and hundreds of thousands moving into the millions. And so that just doesn’t get the numbers that Trump is after. So he’s going into places where illegal immigrants are known to congregate. In the case of this California case, they started at the Home Depot and went after the day laborers and then eventually went into the communities and places that were known to employ illegals. 

And that’s how this all got started. Can Donald Trump declare a state of emergency and mobilize the national Guard over the objections of local authorities? That’s a bit more mixed, but probably yes. The federal government political leaders have the right to declare states of emergency and bypass some of the laws that we consider to be normal, especially if you’re dealing with someone who isn’t an American citizen. 

So Governor Newsom and the LA mayor have both sued, and the initial court case will be heard, today when you’re seeing this on Thursday. But I really doubt it’s going to go their way. The courts generally give a very wide latitude to any administration when it comes to issues. Federal law enforcement, if there’s going to be a check on the president’s power in this specific instance, that’s probably going to have to come from Congress, because they’re the ones who determine when states of emergency can and cannot be declared. 

And at the moment, there doesn’t seem to be any appetite in Congress to challenge the president on this or any other issue. So this is probably going to work out just fine for Trump from a legal point of view. That, of course, leaves the practicalities. Honestly, if I were the one writing this headline, I’d be like only 17,000 people in California protest. 

I mean, the protest movement in California has this high on self-righteousness and huge. And to consider that we are now in, I reemerge April, May in the fifth month of the Trump administration, and we haven’t seen widespread protests. That’s kind of surprising to me, especially in California. So the numbers of people involved here, the level of skullduggery or violence, if that’s what you’re after, is really very, very low by normal California standards, much less by the standards of what the Trump administration say triggered the first time around. So, this is very clearly, from my point of view, Trump trying to instigate an issue, California is on the opposite side of the political aisle from this administration. It is the most powerful economy in the country, and arguably the sixth or seventh most powerful one in the world. And Trump would love to take it down a notch. Now, will that work? Well, that’s really up to the rest of the country and Congress. 

But I think it is worth pointing out that this has the potential to get really, really ugly. The military is designed to kill people. We discovered in the war on terror that we do not like it when our military is responsible for civilian control and law enforcement. They are not trained for it, and it’s only in the last 24 hours that the Marines have started to get trained on non-lethal munitions and things like riot shields. 

So they’re being deployed with minimal training, but a lot of testosterone into an environment that is becoming deliberately volatile. That is not the sort of mix I feel great about now. Legally, unless it’s things get really out of hand, the military can’t be used for law enforcement, so they’re technically there to protect, say, federal sites. The Marines are not a protection force. 

The Marines are go in there and kick some ass force. And so putting the military in this sort of position is really awkward for everybody. Now, the last time the California authorities requested government assistance for things like law enforcement was the Rodney King riots that dated back to, you know, the early 1990s. Anyone who participated in that has been long since left the federal bureaucracy. 

And another thing to consider is that Donald Trump’s gutting of the federal bureaucracy goes up, and to include the military itself. So most of the people who would tell him that this is a horrendously bad idea have already been fired, and we’re all going to have to learn the hard way.

The Revolution in Military Affairs: Series Intro

Photo of a solider throwing a drone into the air

Today, we’re launching into our new series on the future of military affairs. Before we get into what is coming, let’s first discuss what past revolutions in warfare have looked like.

The industrial era brought about the first major shift, with the rise of mass-produced weapons, railroads, and field hospitals. The second shift was seen in the late 20th century as digitization led to the introduction of precision-guided weapons and satellite systems. Now, we’re entering a third revolution.

With breakthroughs in digitization, energy transfer, and materials science, we’re seeing things like drones change the way wars are fought. Without adaptation and changes to traditional infantry and armor, these forces will soon be obsolete.

Some are better positioned for this coming revolution; take the US for example, they have money, industrial infrastructure, and they’re not in a major conflict. Other countries, like Ukraine, will be the guinea pigs for this coming technological shift. However, this new era of warfare will sneak up on everyone eventually…

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here. Coming to you from Nashville, Tennessee, right outside the Country Music Hall of Fame. Today we’re launching a fresh series on the future of military technology and specifically how it’s going to change strategic efforts by various countries, and the policy that goes along with it. And before we can go forward, we need to take a big step back and understand the last couple of major revolutions in military affairs. 

The first one really begins with the dawn of the industrial era, and how the advancement of things like gunpowder and steel and electricity started to interface with the way we ran the military and the conflicts in question, or the Crimean War of the 1850s and the American Civil War of the 1860s. 

Both of these conflicts, we saw technologies that had been percolating for decades suddenly come into their own very real way, where they could be mass produced as opposed to individually crafted. 

And it changed the nature of war ever since. These include things like rifling muskets to give them better range and faster reloads and lower breech chance. This includes the, early efforts with the telegraph for mass communication and sending information to and for very quickly, the railroads for the rapid distribution of troops, field hospitals to prevent casualties from turning into fatalities. 

And of course, things like the ironclad, which gave rise to modern navies and all of these cases, if you were using a pre-industrial military force, if you came up against these forces, you were pretty much wiped out. The ratios were absolutely horrific and the more militarized of the countries did better. So this is not just having a little technological edge. 

This is operating in a fundamentally different technological era, Stone age versus Bronze Age versus Iron Age versus sedentary agriculture versus industrialization. It was one of those kind of seminal jumps that redefined what was possible. The Crimean War, I think, is particularly instructive because you saw the early industrial powers, most notably the Brits and the French, going against a completely, industrialized power, primarily Russia. 

And they laid a few miles of rail track and set up a couple of field hospitals. And that alone was enough to absolutely gut the Russians. The Russians simply could not maneuver fast enough to keep up with what the Brits could do. Via rail on the Crimean peninsula. That’s phase one. The phase two of the revolution. And military affairs happened much more recently, in the 1980s and then into the early 1990s, which digitization, basically taking the computer and applying it to military technology, started out in the Gulf War in a very big way with things that we call Jams now, joint direct attack munitions, where you take a relatively dumb bomb, put a fin kit on it, and a GPS locator can hit within about ten meters of its target. We’ve obviously gotten better since then. That against the Iraqi army. The Iraqis had no chance. And then you throw in things like not just satellite reconnaissance, but satellite communications, and you get cruise missiles and all the fun things that come from that direction. 

And that is now kind of the leading edge of what is possible with the US military today. And again, when we hit this point at the end of the Cold War, there was no competitor. And so every country that the United States came across was two, maybe even three generations of weapons behind. And there really hasn’t been a fair fight since. 

Unless the United States is in a situation where its advantages are denied it, like, say, in a long term occupation in a place like Iraq or Afghanistan, we are now at the verge of something new. In the last five years, we’ve had ever mounting breakthroughs in a number of sectors that are not related to military technology, most notably digitization, energy transfer and materials science. 

And those three building revolutions are combining to generate an entirely new form of warfare, of which drones are only the very leading edge. We don’t know where this is going to go. We don’t know what the military technologies are going to look like in ten, 20, 40 years. But we do know from previous periods that when the old technology comes up against the new technology, things get really exciting really quickly because either the new stuff crashes and burns because it’s inappropriate, not ready, or the old stuff is destroyed and everyone has to rip up the playbook. 

It appears at this moment that it’s going to be some version of the latter in the Ukraine war. To this point, about two thirds of the fatalities that the Russians have suffered have been because of first person drones, which is not even a particularly sophisticated technology that combines digitization, material science and energy transfer. It hasn’t gone into the second generation of technology yet. 

We’re still and basically mass producing cheap things with a small explosives on. Once the kinks get worked out, it is difficult to see any military, most notably infantry and armor, surviving in the new environment unless they can develop their own countermeasures, which will mean an additional technological revolution. So we’re nearing the point now where we need to start having the conversation as a country, as a culture, as a military, as to what it is that we want, what we’re willing to pay to get it, and how big of a technological jump we’re willing to take to try. 

Now, in this, the United States has a couple of advantages. Number one, cache. Number two, a existing military industrial complex that can always be retooled. But third, and most importantly, at the moment, we are not in a hot conflict. And the countries that we are most likely to be facing down Russia, China, Iran are already in this technological shift. 

So we get to watch what they do and learn a few things in this. The Ukraine war is going to be most instructive, because the Ukrainians have been at the vanguard of this entire transition process and are coming up against a much larger conventional military being supplied by the Chinese who are providing the bulk. And yet they’re still there. 

And that should tell us a lot of what we need to know about the technological changes that are going to be sticking with us for the years to come. 

Bottom line. The human race is about to experience a higher form of war. That means, of course, new weapons. But from that comes new everything else.