The Future of NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander + Live Q&A Reminder

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The Supreme Allied Commander position in NATO allows the US to lead allied forces in wartime. However, the Trump administration is considering withdrawing the US from that position (mainly for cost-cutting reasons).

Stepping away from the Supreme Allied Commander position would signal America’s withdrawal from NATO, since US forces cannot legally be placed under foreign command. There must be some strategic misunderstanding of the power this title holds, a lack of expertise in Trump’s circle, a penetration into Trump’s thinking by Russian propaganda, or a combination of all of those.

Should the US move forward with leaving NATO leadership, US power projection in Europe would be crippled and another box on the Russian wish list would be crossed off.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey, all. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from a sunny Colorado. Today we’re going to talk about something that is making the rounds within the Trump administration as it relates to the NATO alliance. The idea is that the United States is going to withdraw from something called the Supreme Allied Commander position. Now, the Supreme Allied commander, as it sounds in times of war,  takes command of all local military forces that are affiliated with the Alliance. So in a hot shooting war, the US would take control of the world’s third, fourth, sixth and seventh largest navies and the world’s fourth, fifth, sixth, ninth and 10th largest armies, as well as that of all the smaller members of the European structures. And the question is, why would you give that up? 

Well, keep in mind that NATO is the most powerful alliance in human history, and it was founded by the United States, and it was run by the United States. And, yes, the lion’s share of the equipment and the troops come from the United States. But since all of the Europeans have regional militaries, while their militaries may be stronger, they’re all focused on one area as opposed to ours, which is spread out around the world. 

So collectively in the European theater, the rest of the European forces actually are on par with what the US can do. So a massive force multiplier there. The Trump administration says that the NATO countries, the European countries, have been taking advantage of the United States and trade. They need to defend themselves. But how? Giving this up would be a big deal. It would be the end of American ability to project power throughout all of Europe. 

You see, unlike the other NATO countries who can sublimate their military commands to American authority, the reverse is actually illegal here in the United States. So if we give up the ability to command Europe and say, a European has to take that position, we’re also saying that no American forces are now available for NATO use, and that’s functionally leaving the alliance. 

Now, I personally think that would be a horrible idea, but I think it’s going to happen anyway. The Trump administration seems fairly hellbent on leaving NATO. Three things going on here. Number one, the Trump administration seems has a very inaccurate idea of how militaries work. Because in a time of war, when you need the help to be able to automatically, reflexively just be able to take  control of everyone else’s militaries in the alliance and just go through. 

How much is that worth to you? How much is it worth to have that on standby the whole time? It’s worth the cost of a trade deficit, in my opinion. The second issue is that Trump doesn’t really have anyone in his circle telling him otherwise or correcting him on these things. One of the weird things about the Trump administration is, you know, normally when you lose an election, they’re out of power  for a few years. You try to learn from your past mistakes. You try to build a team that is competent, that fills in the gaps with the things that you don’t know. And you get people who are experts in legislation so that when you come back, you can get everything pushed through Congress as quickly as possible. 

Codify what you want and have it outlive you. Trump’s taken the opposite lesson, and he’s removed everyone from his circle who knows anything about anything, because people who know things tend to say that they know things. And that means that Trump is not always the person who appears as the smartest one in the room. It’s the difference between a good leader and a bad leader. 

That means that Trump is making the decisions based on the advice that comes to him from a handful of people he trusts, and the people trusts aren’t honest with him, which is bring us to the third problem. Russian  propaganda has penetrated up to and including the white House. Last week we had Donald Trump repeating some particularly interesting propaganda. 

Notice he was saying, in true social posts and in interviews that the Russians had surrounded several thousand Ukrainian troops, and he was pleading with the Russians to not kill them in what would be a bloodbath. Here’s the thing that never happened. 

In fact, that didn’t even occur in Russian propaganda in American political circles. That was Russian propaganda for Russian citizens to try to convince the Russian citizenry that the war in Ukraine was going very well. 

Somehow that little bit got lodged in Trump’s mind. And it didn’t come from the CIA or the FBI or the Defense Department. It either came directly from Vladimir Putin or through one of the other vectors that the Russians have been using to influence this administration. So we have a white House that is making public statements and policies, basing on an internal Russian propaganda. 

Now. And if I could think of one thing that the Russians want in the short term from this administration, it’s to destroy the NATO alliance, which was always formed to contain Russian aggression. And here we are.

The American Reindustrialization – A (Stalled) Progress Report

American reindustrialization image

I recorded this video before Trump took office for his second term. At the time, this video outlined the trajectory the US was on. We held off on releasing the video because…well, everything was going to be changing. So, here is a look at where we could have been. In the coming days, we’ll unpack where things are heading now.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, taking a question from the Ask Peter Forum on the Patreon page. And that is where is the United States or where do we stand in the re industrialization process that started a few years ago? Just a quick backgrounder. The Chinese population is plummeting. And we now have about the same number of people in China above age 50 as below. 

And so we’re looking at an economic collapse over the course of sometime in the next decade. And so if the United States still wants manufacturing goods, we’re gonna have to get it from somewhere else. And the quickest, easiest, cheapest way to do that is to build out the industrial plant within North America. And to that end, we have seen industrial construction spending. 

Think of that as the construction of factories, expand by a factor of ten over the last five years. So we are definitely hitting the ground running in a number of sectors. The two sectors that have seen the most activity are things that are energy adjacent. Taking advantage of the fact that the United States has the largest supply of high quality crude in the world and the largest supply of natural gas in the world, retooling our entire chemical sector to run off of, especially the natural gas. 

And now using all of these intermediate products that we get from the processing of this for other things going into heavy manufacturing. So that’s a big part of the story that is moving very, very fast and is being moved almost exclusively by, domestic economic concerns without any push from any politicians anywhere in the system, because it’s just we have the most and the cheapest. 

And so the next logical step is then to move up the value added scale. That’s proceeding just fine. Most of the stuff where the government has put its finger on the scale involves electron IX, and especially computing. Think of the Chips act and the IRA, which are designed to bring back the manufacture of things like semiconductors. Now, it’s not that I think that any of this is a bad idea. 

I just think it’s kind of missing the primary need we’re going to have. There are 9000 manufacturing supply chain steps that go into the manufacture of a high end semiconductor. And the Fab facility, while important, is only one of the 9000. And there are any number of ways that the United States can build out the supply chains, in addition to the fabs that are a lot cheaper than the fab. 

So I’m not saying no. I’m saying it’s really, really myopic, focusing on one very, very specific piece when you need all of them. If you’re looking for a recommendation, I would say the single biggest restriction on manufacturing in general is going to be processed materials. I know that doesn’t sound very sexy, but it really is a problem. 

In the United States, we have steadily outsourced pretty much anything that is energy intensive and might have an environmental footprint that we don’t like. The Europeans have done the same to a lesser degree, the Japanese the same thing. And most of the stuff has gone to China. It’s not that China is better at it, a more efficient at it. 

It’s just that the Chinese massively subsidize everything and their environmental regulations are significantly lower. So taking raw materials like bauxite and then turning them into an aluminum and then aluminum, the Chinese control roughly 60 to 70% of that market for something like gallium, which is a byproduct of aluminum processing, it’s closer to 90% for things like rare earths, it’s over 80%, for lithium. 

It’s not that they have the lithium that comes from Australia and Chile, but they take the lithium concentrate in the lithium ore and they turn it into metal in China. And you can just go down product after product after product for the Chinese. Basically, if cornered, this market. Well, if the Chinese go the way that I’m anticipating all of that’s going away and we’re going to make our own, it’s luckily there’s nothing about these, material processing technologies that is difficult in most cases. 

You’re talking about things that were developed over a century ago, and it would probably only take a couple of years and a few billion dollars to set up for each specific material that we need. So not hard, but something that is cheap and quick is not the same as saying that it is, free and overnight. Right. 

And until we do the work, we haven’t done the work. And if China cracks before we do the work, then we have to figure out how to re industrialize without lithium or aluminum or cobalt or on and on and on and on and on. So this is something where I would expect state governments to take the lead, because it’s ultimately about an environmental regulation issue paired with the energy intensity that’s required. 

And so most of this is probably going to end up going on in the Texas or Louisiana coastal regions, where those two things kind of come together right now nicely for the federal government to be part of the solution. But considering politics in the US, I think that’s a kind of a high bar. One other broad concern, no matter what the industry is, no matter what is reshoring, no matter what, we’re expanding automotive, aerospace, insulation. 

You know, take your pick. All of it requires electricity. For the last 35 years, the United States has become a services only economy to a certain degree. We do manufacturing still, in terms of net value, we produce more in the manufacturing sector than we did 35 years ago. But everything else has gotten so much bigger. And while the AI push with data centers does require more electricity than what we’ve done before, as a rule, moving things, melting things, stamping things, building things requires more energy than sitting at a computer and typing. 

And so we have, for the first time in 35 years, a need for a massive expansion in the electrical grid. We probably overall need to expand the grid by about half. And half and expand, generating by about half. And there are certain parts of the country like the Front Range, Arizona, Texas in the south, going up to roughly Richmond, that probably need to double their grid as soon as possible, because if you don’t have enough electricity, it’s really hard to have meaningful manufacturing. 

The problem in the United States is we don’t have a grid. We’ve got one that’s basically from the middle of the Great Plains West, from the middle of the Great Plains East, and another one in Texas. But even that makes it sound like it’s more unified than it is, because almost all utilities are state mandated local monopolies. So they all have their turf, and all of them have to individually make a case for expanding their electricity production, because that cost ultimately has to be passed along to someone else. 

One of the reasons why I’m so interested in things like small modular nuclear reactors is if you get the tech folks to pay for that, then all of a sudden you get the power and you don’t have to go through all the normal regulatory rigmarole because you have to, as electrical utility, prove to your regulator that, what you’re doing is in the best interests of your end consumers and until you have the manufacturing capacity, it’s hard to make the argument that you need electricity to make manufacturing capacity. 

So it’s a very chicken and the egg thing. The easiest way to get around this would be for state and regional electrical authorities to loosen up the ability of one electrical mini grid to provide electricity to another. That would do two things for us. Number one, it would increase the amount of transmission we have within the system, allowing power to go from where it’s generated to where it’s needed. 

And second, If you’re in a rural area that’s not likely to get, say, a major chip’s factory, you could still build a power plant and export it to an urban center that is likely to need a lot more electricity, and all of a sudden you can get someone else to pay for your electricity development in your own region. 

So that is where I’d say the shortfall is. It’s a solvable one. It’s just one that we need to do as soon as possible. Because if we say, wait ten years and the Chinese are gone, then we have to do this all from scratch with less money, less labor, and everyone trying to do everything at the same time. 

And if you think inflation was uncomfortable for the last three years, nothing compared to what that environment would be like. All right, that’s it for me. Take care.

Introducing the Next Generation Air Dominance Platform, F-47

President Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have announced the approval of the Air Force’s newest toy, the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) platform, aka the F-47 fighter jet.

In recent times we’ve seen the very impressive F-22 built for air superiority and the lackluster F-35 designed as a multi-purpose aircraft. Shifting priorities have sidelined the F-22 in favor of the F-35, but how will the F-47 fit into the picture? Here are some of the big concerns I have.

This thing will be expensive, posing problems for foreign buyers. The details are still unclear on this aircraft, so we’re not sure if the limitations that faced the F-35 will persist. Since this will be an air superiority fighter, a ground attack jet will still be needed. And given the evolving tech, manned fighters could be rendered obsolete before reaching full deployment.

Here at Zeihan on Geopolitics, our chosen charity partner is MedShare. They provide emergency medical services to communities in need, with a very heavy emphasis on locations facing acute crises. Medshare operates right in the thick of it, so we can be sure that every cent of our donation is not simply going directly to where help is needed most, but our donations serve as a force multiplier for a system already in existence.

For those who would like to donate directly to MedShare or to learn more about their efforts, you can click this link.

Transcript

Hey everybody. Peter Zeihan here, coming to you from a sunny Colorado. Today is the 21st of March. And there was just a press conference between American President Donald Trump and American Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, where they announced the launch of a new fighter program called the NGAD, the next generation air dominance fighter. It’s been, dubbed the F 47 because it’s Trump’s the 47th president. 

 But anyway, you can’t make this stuff up anyway. It in theory will be made by Boeing and should come into manufacture in a few years. That’s the goal. Before we go forward and talk about what it can do and implications, let’s talk about how we got here. So if you dial back to the 1990s and the early 2000, the Defense Department realized that they had a window. 

The Soviet Union had collapsed, and the Russian Federation, which emerged from it, was a pale shadow of its predecessors. And so there was going to be an extended period of time where the Soviet slash Russians weren’t going to be able to develop new air products. No new bombers, no new fighters. They did get a couple off the drawing board, but they were never able to produce more than one of them at a time. 

And even now, 35 years later, they only have 12 of some of their more advanced fighters. And that meant you had an opportunity to skip a generation. So Donald Rumsfeld, who was working with the Defense Department at the time, had this idea that we will look at the best technologies we have available right now and build the absolute minimum that we possibly can, and then research the next generation. 

Back at the time, we were dealing with F-15s and F-16s and the two programs that were greenlighted to proceed on that limited production basis were the F-22 air superiority fighter, which I think is one of the most badass pieces of military technology I’ve even heard of. It can hit supersonic speeds without using its afterburners, and all of its weapons are internal bay, so it has the radar cross-section of a small bird. 

I mean, it is bad ass. And then the other one is the F-35 joint strike factor, which is a flying pig. From my point of view, yes, it’s better than what we had, but its range isn’t very good. And the technology that’s gone into it has had all kinds of teething pains, and this has driven up the cost of the fighters to over $100 million per fighter. 

And it’s not very good at doing what it needs to do because its range is so limited. And that’s even before you put external weapons on it. The problem is it’s a Joint Strike fighter. It’s designed for both air to air combat and ground assault. And by being a multi-role platform, yes, you can do more, but you don’t do any of it particularly well. 

So we only made a few less than 200 of the f-22s, even though they are the perfect tool for the job, because we also need ground strike. And so the decision was made to do more and more and more of the F-35s, despite its many, many shortcomings. And that meant looping in lots of allies in order to help defray the overall production cost. 

And that brought it down to $100 million per airframe. Anyway, Rumsfeld and people like him thought, you know, we’ll just build the minimum we possibly can and then launch forward. And then the war on terror happened. And in the war on terror, what we discovered is we don’t need an air superiority con or a fighter against the Taliban because they don’t even have blimps, much less jets. 

But we do need ground strike. And so the F-22 was pushed to the side, kind of stuck with that initial plan of just a limited run. And the F-35 went into mass production. And we’re getting lots and lots and lots of those. Fast forward to today, because of the war on terror, we spent 20 years fighting ground wars, and we weren’t able to put the resources that would have been ideal under the Rumsfeld plan into the next generation. 

We’re only now getting there, took this long, and the end gap is supposed to be an air superiority fighter. The next generation after the F-22. Well, that leaves us with four complications. Problems. The first is cost. We saw the cost of the F-35 go up and up and up and up and up, and the end guard got a really nasty review from an internal Pentagon audit. 

I think it was just last year or the year before where they said it looked like the cost could be upward of $300 million per airframe. And the days of us being able to spread that out across the alliance are gone. The Trump administration is careening very rapidly to breaking most of our alliances, including the NATO alliance, which is where almost all of the F-35 sales we’re making are going. 

And every country that is committed to buying them is now rethinking it. Because if the United States is not going to be there in a real fight, not only are you not getting the implicit security guarantee that you thought you were getting, but if the Americans are responsible for all the tech and all the technicians and all the repair work and all the servicing, all the software and a lot of the weapons, do you really want to be dependent on the Americans at all in this brave new world we seem to be falling into so the F-35 is likely to get even more expensive, and no one is likely to sign up for the end guard at all. Problem two range. This is a black issue. It’s just an issue of, classification. We don’t know what the range of the guard is yet. It is in limited production, very limited, basically handmade. Nothing manufactured. The manufacturing wouldn’t be in for a few years yet. 

Three at the absolute low end. So this is a weapon system for the future, not for tomorrow. And until we know that range, it’s really hard to know if this is going to give us some of the advantages of the F-16 and the F-22, or weigh us down with some of the restrictions of the F-35. We’re just going to have to wait for more details on that. 

The third problem is that the end guard is going to need a complement. It is an air superiority fighter in the vein of the F-22, and we will still need something for ground attack. And if it’s going to be the Joint Strike Fighter, if that’s what we’re going to use for the next 30 years, then that puts some really huge limitations on what the United States can do militarily. 

Its range is just about 600 miles. Not great in terms of deep strike. And if we are moving into a world where the United States is walking away from most of its alliances, then we’re losing all the forward bases that allow us to launch these things in any meaningful way in the first place, which means we will also need a new ground strike jet. And that is an entirely new program that is going to have its own cost structure. And overlaying all of this is the question of technology during the course of the last 60 years. We haven’t seen actually almost 80 years. We haven’t seen a lot of changes. I mean, yes, yes, yes, we’ve gotten better at stealth. 

Yes, yes, yes, our missiles have gotten more accurate. All that’s true. But we haven’t really seen a change in what, a fighter or what a fighter bomber does. Until really recently, in the last few years, we’ve had building breakthroughs in things like materials science and digitization and energy transfer. And we don’t know where this is going to take us in terms of military technology. 

Yet the end guard looks interesting to me. It’s basically like a narrower version of the B-2 bomber, which is a badass piece of equipment, but it’s not a fundamental break. The stealth is cool. Don’t get me wrong, stealth is awesome, but it doesn’t do anything that you wouldn’t expect an air superiority fighter to do. These three breakthroughs in technology are in the very, very beginning stages, giving us drone technology, and we have discovered that the Ukrainians, for less than 20,000 a pop, can build a thousand drones that can saturate a battlefield, or for something closer to $200,000 a pop, develop rocket drones that can strike targets that are about as far away as the F-35 can reach. So we’re seeing these newer technologies come in and we don’t know how they’re going to mature. And so investing billions, tens of billions, hundreds of billions into a new manned fighter program, you got to wonder if this is the right call. I’m not saying it’s not. I’m saying we don’t know. And in a world where the United States is walking from its alliance structure, the new systems are probably not appropriate to what bases we’re going to have in a few years. 

I don’t mean this so much as a condemnation of Trump, although there’s plenty of that going around right now, but just a recognition that as our technological envelope evolves, one of two things has happen. Either we develop technologies to match the geography of our deployments, or we change our deployments to match the evolution of the technology. 

And there’s plenty of examples throughout history of both happening. We don’t know where we’re at yet. What we do know is if we try to do both.